Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis" verfügbar.

Friedrich Nietzsche has emerged as one of the most important and influential modern philosophers. For several decades, the book series Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung (MTNF) has set the agenda in a rapidly growing and changing field of Nietzsche scholarship. The scope of the series is interdisciplinary and international in orientation reflects the entire spectrum of research on Nietzsche, from philosophy to literary studies and political theory. The series publishes monographs and edited volumes that undergo a strict peer-review process. The (...) book series is led by an international team of editors, whose work represents the full range of current Nietzsche scholarship. (shrink)

Wittgenstein will seinen "Standpunkt weit draußen einnehmen" und philosophische Probleme mit ethnologischem Blick sehen. Ist seine scharfe Auseinandersetzung mit James Frazers Hauptwerk, The Golden Bough. A Study in Magic and Religion, eine Einübung in diese "ethnologische Betrachtungsweise"? Brusotti zeigt in seinem Werk,dass Wittgensteins Denken sprach- und kulturphilosophisch neue Horizonte eröffnet.

The second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals introduces the ‘sovereign individual’ as ‘responsible’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘free’. Does this affirmative use of moral terminology reveal an unexpected affinity between Nietzsche’s thought and philosophical modernity? In the last decades, this issue has been at the heart of a vast and controversial debate. My analysis shows that, rather than throwing light on Nietzsche’s general position, the specific use of Kantian terms in this passage of GM is due to a polemical intention. Implicitly, (...) Nietzsche rejects Eduard von Hartmann’s criticism of the ‘absolute sovereignty of the individual’. The author of the Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins (1879) sees the most radical herald of this ‘sovereignty’ in Max Stirner. From Nietzsche’s point of view, Hartmann’s rejection and Stirner’s affirmation share a reductive conception of ‘sovereignty’. Reinterpreting and ‘revaluing’ Kant’s moral terminology, Nietzsche aims to give an interpretation of individual sovereignty that is at the same time antithetical to Stirner’s and wholly at odds with Hartmann’s ethical views. In showing this, the paper gives a new answer to an old question; for already in the 1890s, Hartmann himself, accusing Nietzsche of plagiarizing Stirner, raised the issue of the historical relationship between the two philosophers. More generally, the paper shows that Nietzsche employs a specific textual strategy, which consists in taking Kantian terms in an ‘anti-Kantian’ sense and systematically cultivating the art of using ‘a moral formula in a supramoral sense’. (shrink)

Der Beitrag untersucht Wittensteins Stellungnahmen zu Nietzshe, die Thesen und Positionen, die er zu Recht oder zu Untrecht ihm zuschreibt, seine Auseinandersetzung mit ihnen und seine Einschätzung von Nietzsche historischer Bedeutung. An Zeugnissen einer direkten Lektüre fehlt es nicht, aber Wittgensteins Bild des Philosophen ist mindestens ebenso stark durch Autoren wie Spengler geprägt. Man hat "a troubling lack of reference to Nietzsche in Wittgenstein's texts and lectures" festellen wollen. Die eingehendere Prüfung des Materials führt zu einem ganz anderen Ergebris. Es (...) werden eine Reihe von Szenarien skizziert, deren Synopse über Nietzsches Bedeutung für Wittgenstein Aufschluss gibt. Die erste belegt Begegnung datiert von 1914: And der Front denkt er über Nietzsches "Feindschaft gegen das Christentum" nach: Dass er sich dabei auf den Antichrist bezieht, wie in der Wittgenstein-Forschung gegnerell angenommen, erweist sich als keineswegs sicher. In den dreißsiger Jahren wird ihm die 'Umwertung aller Werte" zu einer Formel zuerst für die geschichtlich Epoch und dann für seine eigene neue 'Gedankenbewegung'. Nietzsches Präsenz im Wiener Kreis, Wittgensteins zwiespältige Beziehung zu diesem und eine damalige Sicht auf den Zusammenhang zwischen den zwei Philosophien werden ausgehend von Waismanns Buch Logik, Sprach und Philosophie dargestellt. Zu Zarathustras Diktum "Seele ist nur ein Wort für ein Etwas am Leibe" hat Wittgenstein seit Eine philosophische Betrachtung wiederholt Stellung genommen. Der Begriff der Familienähnlichkeit und die Auseinandesetzung mit dem Wiederkunftsgedanken sind Gegenstand der letzen Abschnitte. (shrink)

In an unpublished text from the early postwar period, Georges Canguilhem deals with Nietzsche’s maxim “Become who you are!” Is this “apparently contradictory formula of a philosopher full of contradictions” really only seemingly inconsistent? Canguilhem regards it as a norm whose supposed metaphysical or objective content dissolves upon further analysis. So he here discerns a new instance of the same potential confusion he had already addressed in his classical essay on The Normal and the Pathological (1943). According to him, the (...) formula “become who you are!” must not be misunderstood in a naturalistic sense, a tendency from which not even Nietzsche himself, Canguilhem thinks, was entirely free. Besides the French philosophy of his time, his philosophical inquiry into “Become who you are!” critically engages two classic German Nietzsche scholars, Ernst Bertram and Karl Jaspers, as well as the French interpreters of the latter’s philosophy of Existenz, Mikel Dufrenne and Paul Ricœur. Finally, the paper highlights Nietzsche’s specific importance for Canguilhem and the ambivalence in his privileged relationship to the German thinker. (shrink)

The late Wittgenstein is reported as saying that he owes his ‘anthropological approach’ to Piero Sraffa. In February 1932, however, Wittgenstein reproaches the Italian economist with misunderstandings similar to those he had criticized in the work of the Scottish anthropologist James Frazer six months before. According to a well-known anecdote, a gesture of Sraffa’s had a momentous influence onWittgenstein’s philosophical development.The ‘grammar of gestures’ elaborated by him in the early 1930s is an attempt to answer questions such as those raised (...) by his friend’s Neapolitan gesture. There is a substantial difference between what the late Wittgenstein calls his ‘ethnological way of looking’ and the stance he had adopted in his early criticism of Frazer’s Golden Bough in June/July 1931. In February 1932,Wittgenstein replied to Sraffa’s objections with arguments similar to those he had already raised against Frazer’s very different method. Sraffa pushed Wittgenstein to adopt natural history and to transform his philosophy into an empirical approach. However, in the early 1930s Wittgenstein refused to do either. In order to learn how to look at philosophical problems with an ‘anthropological’ eye from Sraffa, he will need to learn, against Sraffa, not to reduce philosophy to anthropology (natural history). Years later,Wittgenstein still insists on the contrast he had marked between himself and Sraffa: Using imaginary scenarios he intends to show how a superficial analogy can mislead us to mistaking institutions, having an entirelydifferent nature, for economic systems - resulting in them seeming ‘irrational’, ‘unlogical’. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 254-283.

Nietzsche says "good Europeans" must not only cultivate a "supra-national" view, but also "supra-European" perspective to transcend their European biases and see beyond the horizon of Western culture. The volume takes up such conceptual frontier crossings and syntheses. Emphasizing Nietzsche's genealogy of European culture and his reflections upon the constitution of Europe in the broadest sense, its essays examine peoples and nations, values and arts, knowledge and religion. Nietzsche's apprehensions about the crises of nihilism and decadence and their implications for (...) Europe's future are investigated in this context. Concerning the crossing of notional frontiers, contributors examine Nietzsche's hoped-for dismantling of Europe's state borders, the overcoming of national prejudices and rivalries, and the propagation of a revitalizing "supra-European" perspective on the continent, its culture and future. They also illuminate lines of syntheses, notably the syncretism of the ancient Greeks and its possible example for the European culture to-be. Finally certain of Europe's current problems are considered via the critical apparatus furnished by Nietzsche's philosophy and the diagnostic tools it provides. (shrink)

In den ersten Jahrzehnten des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts sehen Philosophen Geometrie und Anschauung auseinanderdriften und ziehen daraus divergierende (auch) kulturphilosophische Schlussfolgerungen. Liegt hier eine Krise der Geometrie vor, weil sie sich der Anschauung entfremdet? Oder nicht vielmehr eine Krise der Anschauung? Oder ist auch diese Krise nur eine in Anführungszeichen? Ist der Prozess einer der Entfremdung oder der Emanzipation? Mein Beitrag, der auf so unterschiedliche Autoren wie u.a. Frege, Husserl, Spengler, Cassirer, Hahn und Waismann eingeht, zeigt auch am Beispiel der visuellen (...) Linie die Bandbreite der damaligen Positionen. In the first decades of the 20th century, philosophers observed a widening gap between geometry and intuition. Divergent conclusions were drawn, also with different implications for the philosophy of culture(s). Was this to be understood as a crisis of geometry, alienating itself from intuition? Or was it rather a crisis of intuition? Or was it just some sort of ›mock-crisis‹? Was it a process of alienation or rather of emancipation? My contribution, which deals with authors as diverse as Frege, Husserl, Spengler, Cassirer, Hahn and Waismann, demonstrates the broad spectrum of stances held at the time based on the example of the visual line. (shrink)

How do we know the position and movements of our limbs? Wittgenstein repeatedly deals with one received answer to this epistemological question: our ‘kinaesthetic sensations’ teach us about our posture and movements. However, he does not reject only this specific solution. He puts into question the very idea of an epistemology of bodily awareness. His critical arguments are not simply reductionist, but neither are they “mainly introspective”, and nor does he lean towards a “perceptual view”. The paper also touches upon (...) the issue of how Wittgenstein's views relate to Anscombe’s much discussed claim that one ordinarily knows the position of one’s limbs “without observation”. (shrink)