In this paper I take issue with Allison's ‘two aspect’ view of Kant's transcendental distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. Unlike those of Allison's critics, who criticize him, and by implication Kant, based on some form of the ‘two world’ view, I argue that, even Allison's methodological, more moderate interpretation, nevertheless includes an excessive commitment to the role of things-in-themselves in Kant's theoretical philosophy, a commitment which is both unnecessary and incompatible with Kant's text. I offer an alternative (...) interpretation which, in my view, is at once more accurate, and more defensible against the familiar claim that Kant's philosophy is either incompatible with itself or it inevitably leads to idealism. (shrink)

In this paper I take issue with Allison's ‘two aspect’ view of Kant's transcendental distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. Unlike those of Allison's critics, who criticize him, and by implication Kant, based on some form of the ‘two world’ view, I argue that, even Allison's methodological, more moderate interpretation, nevertheless includes an excessive commitment to the role of things-in-themselves in Kant's theoretical philosophy, a commitment which is both unnecessary and incompatible with Kant's text. I offer an alternative (...) interpretation which, in my view, is at once more accurate, and more defensible against the familiar claim that Kant's philosophy is either incompatible with itself or it inevitably leads to idealism. (shrink)

We believe that intellectual humility is an essential intellectual virtue for university students to foster. It enables them to excel as students of philosophy and other disciplines, to navigate the fast-changing world inside and outside academia, and to flourish in interaction with others. In this paper, we analyze this virtue by singling out two distinct but related aspects: the openness-aspect and the care-aspect. The former makes one value a dialogue with those who have different views from one’s own. (...) The latter aspect involves searching for implicit assumptions one brings to encounters with one’s object of inquiry and trying to study this object as unique and irreducible. We discuss four learning activities we developed for the philosophy bachelor course “Who are we? Philosophical views on humans and the gods” at University College Utrecht (the Netherlands). Throughout this paper, we show extracts from the students’ assignments, reflections, and evaluations. These extracts indicate that students developed both aspects of intellectual humility —openness to different views and care for the uniqueness of each object of inquiry— and acknowledged their importance. (shrink)

The so-called paradoxes of quantum physics are easily disposed of as soon as one accepts that there are no such things as intrinsically existing particles and their intrinsic properties, but that both particles and properties are relational “observables.” Accordingly, quantum physics does not offer a “description of the outer world,” but rather a prescription about how to make probabilistic predictions within a participatory environment. The latter view looks quite radical with respect to standard Western Aristotelian ontology; but it looks (...) natural in the context of the Indian-Buddhist concept of Pratītyasamutpāda which underpins Śūnyatā. Special attention will then be devoted to the quantum feature of non-separability, which displays remarkable similarities with Pratītyasamutpāda. Finally, the meaning of such twofold parallel between quantum physics and Śūnyatā will be discussed. This parallel will be related to the similarity of epistemological situation between knowing a world from which we are not entirely separated and knowing oneself. (shrink)

The topic of self-interest raises large and intractable philosophical questions–most obviously, the question “In what does self-interest consist?” The concept, as opposed to the content of self-interest, however, seems clear enough. Self-interest is interest in one's own good. To act self-interestedly is to act on the motive of advancing one's own good. Whether what one does actually is in one's self-interest depends on whether it actually does advance, or at least, minimize the decline of, one's own good. Though it may (...) be difficult to tell whether a person is motivated by self-interest in a particular instance, and difficult also to determine whether a given act or decision really is in one's self-interest, the meaning of the claims in question seems unproblematic. My main concern in this essay is to make a point about the content of self-interest. Specifically I shall put forward the view that meaningfulness, in a sense I shall elaborate, is an important element of a good life. It follows, then, that it is part of an enlightened self-interest that one wants to secure meaning in one's life, or, at any rate, to allow and promote meaningful activity within it. Accepting this substantial conception of self-interest, however, carries with it a curious consequence: the concept of self-interest which formerly seemed so clear begins to grow fuzzy. Fortunately, it comes to seem less important as well. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit distinguishes three sorts of theories about self-interest–hedonistic theories, preference theories, and what he calls “objective-list theories." Hedonistic theories hold that one's good is a matter of the felt quality of one's experiences. (shrink)

The topic of self-interest raises large and intractable philosophical questions–most obviously, the question “In what does self-interest consist?” The concept, as opposed to the content of self-interest, however, seems clear enough. Self-interest is interest in one's own good. To act self-interestedly is to act on the motive of advancing one's own good. Whether what one does actually is in one's self-interest depends on whether it actually does advance, or at least, minimize the decline of, one's own good. Though it may (...) be difficult to tell whether a person is motivated by self-interest in a particular instance, and difficult also to determine whether a given act or decision really is in one's self-interest, the meaning of the claims in question seems unproblematic. My main concern in this essay is to make a point about the content of self-interest. Specifically I shall put forward the view that meaningfulness, in a sense I shall elaborate, is an important element of a good life. It follows, then, that it is part of an enlightened self-interest that one wants to secure meaning in one's life, or, at any rate, to allow and promote meaningful activity within it. Accepting this substantial conception of self-interest, however, carries with it a curious consequence: the concept of self-interest which formerly seemed so clear begins to grow fuzzy. Fortunately, it comes to seem less important as well. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit distinguishes three sorts of theories about self-interest–hedonistic theories, preference theories, and what he calls “objective-list theories." Hedonistic theories hold that one's good is a matter of the felt quality of one's experiences. (shrink)

With the appearance of mankind, the history of mankind's understanding of the human body itself also began. This long process of development rang with the struggle of two world views. The history of the development of man's understanding of the structure and functions of the human body is the history of the unbroken triumph of materialism over idealism, of the dialectical over the metaphysical. This essay simply takes a preliminary look back at this struggle from several aspects in the hope (...) that it might be of use in promoting a deeper and more systematic study of the question. (shrink)

in a late note, dated 1797, Kant refers to the schematism of the pure understanding as one of the most difficult as well as one of the most important issues treated in the Critique of Pure Reason.1 His treatment of this theme is indeed notorious for its obscurity.2 As I see it, part of the problem is caused by the fact that Kant frames his discussion in terms that he could expect his readers to be familiar with, while he gradually (...) develops ideas that breach any traditional account of cognition. This holds for his references to the power of judgment and the related view that cognition is a matter of subsuming intuitions under concepts3 as well as for the suggestion that there is an initial gap between categories... (shrink)

The contemporary view of the fundamental role of time in physics generally ignores its most obvious characteric, namely its flow. Studies in the foundations of relativistic mechanics during the past decade have shown that the dynamical evolution of a system can be treated in a manifestly covariant way, in terms of the solution of a system of canonical Hamilton type equations, by considering the space-time coordinates and momenta ofevents as its fundamental description. The evolution of the events, as functions (...) of a universal invariant world, or historical, time, traces out the world lines that represent the phenomena (e.g., particles) which are observed in the laboratory. The positions in time of each of the events, i.e., the time of their potential detection, are, in this framework, controlled by this universal parameter τ, the time at which they are generated (and may proceed in the positive or negative sense). We find that the notion of thestate of a system requires generalization; at any given τ, it involves information about the system at timest(τ) ≠ τ. The correlation of what may be measured att(τ) with what is generated at τ is necessarily quite rigid, and is related covariantly to the spacelike correlations found in interference experiments. We find, furthermore, that interaction with Maxwell electromagnetism leads back to a static picture of the world, with no real evolution. As a consequence of this result, and the requirement of gauge invariance for the quantum mechanical evolution equation, we conclude that electromagnetism is described by a pre-Maxwell field, whose τ-integral (or asymptotic behavior as τ → ∞) may be identified with the Maxwell field. We therefore consider the world of events in space time, interacting through τ-dependent pre-Maxwell fields, as far as electrodynamics is concerned, as the objective dynamical reality. Our perception of the world, through laboratory detectors and our eyes, are based onintegration over τ over intervals sufficiently large to obtain an aposteriori description of the phenomena which coincides with the Maxwell theory. Fundamental notions, such as the conservation of charge, rest on this construction. The decomposition of the common notion of time into two essentially different aspects, one associated with an unvarying flow, and the second with direct observation subject to dynamical modification, has profound philosophical consequences, of which we are able to explore here only a few. (shrink)

Meaning-making processes, understood hierarchically, in line with the Semiotic Hierarchy framework, change on various timescales. To account for and predict these changes, one can take a cognitive view on semiosis. I adopt an interdis-ciplinary approach combining semiotic studies and cognitive studies in an attempt to account for meaning-making activity and to predict the course of semiosis. In this context, I consider meaning-making activity as shaped by both “external” (to a semiotic system) as well as “internal” factors. I also show (...) how both the “external” and “internal” sources of the dynamicity of meaning-making should be framed in terms of studies on cognition.I start with a non-standard, 4e approach to meaning-making. According to this framework, meaning-making processes are constituted by (and not just depen-dent on) environmental and bodily factors. The dynamicity of semiosis can be accounted for in terms of an experiencing, embodied subject (agent) enacting her/his/its own domain of meaningful phenomena. As I argue, this perspective on meaning-making is the cognitive foundation of the first two levels of the Semiotic Hierarchy. In the following sections I present the Peircean view on signs and semiosis, according to which semiosis is a result of the very nature of a sign and a sign system. In this view, the dynamicity of semiosis has primarily “internal” sources: it stems from the unavoidable fallibility of interpretation and synechism of signs. As I show, this aspect of semiosis can be addressed by means of standard (cognitivist) cognitive science and by means of cognitive modelling. Ultimately, I sketch a proposal of an attempt to develop a uniform cognitive framework allowing for integration of the above-mentioned aspects of semiosis – a framework based on Rowlands’ idea of the Amalgamated Mind. (shrink)

This paper examines one aspect of the relation between philosophy and myth, namely the function myth has, for some philosophers, in narrowing the distance between appearance and reality. I distinguish this function of myth from other common functions, and also show how the approach to reality through myth differs from a more empirical philosophical approach. I argue that myth plays a fundamental role in Plato's approach to the appearance/reality distinction, and that understanding this is important to the interpretation of (...) Plato's frequent use of language suggesting the existence of a world of unchanging ideal objects and a world of transient, variable particulars. All things are an exchange for fire, and fire for all things, as goods for gold, and gold for goods.1 ?Heraclitus DK 22 B 90. (shrink)

In the debate concerning the education of nurses that is currently taking place in Denmark, two widely differing views are apparent regarding the best way of training nurses such that the ethical aspect of their work is adequately considered. The first of these is based on the premise that practical care is fundamental to and justified by theories on nursing, care and ethics, which is why the theoretical part of nurse education deserves a higher priority. The second view (...) is based on the premise that social care cannot be taught by means of theories, but can be learnt only through practice. The master-apprentice principle of ancient Greece is stressed in connection with this as being a viable alternative to the theoretical model of education. These two very different views can be traced back to Plato’s and Aristotle’s ideas on ethics and teaching respectively; indeed, those engaged in the debate make specific reference to these philosophers. In Denmark, a third fundamental viewpoint exists, known as ‘ontological ethics’. Phenomenologist KE Løgstrup is one of the best-known representatives of this view. Basing the line of argument on Løgstrup’s ethics and the view of education associated with this, this article questions the relevance of ancient Greek thought to today’s world by illustrating a number of problems that are connected with the theoretical model of nurse education and with the master-apprentice principle. Løgstrup associates ethics with the aesthetic principle that ‘the useless is the most useful’ in human life and with the view we also see in Kierkegaard’s and NFS Grundtvig’s writings that ethics can be imparted only by indirect means. Løgstrup bases his understanding of ethics on the Judaeo-Christian concept of Genesis and the view that human beings were created with an ethical potential that is best nourished by aesthetic impressions. (shrink)

The trouble of proving the effects of participation lies in the mismatch between three aspects of ownership: physical, legal and psychological. In our interdisciplinary systemic model of ownership, we propose 10 relationships related to ownership/participation from: „A is a part of B” - greatest involvement to „A does not know about B” - the least involvement. „A” and „B” may take different values of: a person, an institution, a community, a group, an object. Once formalized we can view the (...) studies in participation from one, system theory point of view, and formulate hypotheses related to many aspects of ownership. A multilevel analysis with multiple measures of both participation and effectiveness from two data sets has supported the proposed model. (shrink)

The thesis that I have been trying to establish in this dissertation is that ethical systems are constructed on the basis of certain presuppositions about the temporal horizon in which human beings live, and most importantly, of the horizon within which they ought to live. In order to take a step towards establishing this claim, I examine what I take to be the two most powerful ethical theories in the western tradition, Aristotelianism and Kantianism, reconstructing their implications for the relationship (...) between ethics and temporality. I argue that Aristotle's ethics are intended to moderate the future orientation of his psychology by stressing the importance of the past. I suggest that it is possible to provide a temporal reading of Kantian ethics by emphasizing the notion of objective ends. But since this is one of the most tenuous elements in his system, the results will always be unstable. Finally, I argue that Habermas's discourse ethics can be read as an attempt to mediate the differences between Aristotle and Kant, and that it rests on a temporal horizon that deserves serious consideration. This is a temporal horizon that results from understanding the importance of tradition for questions of self-identity, on the one hand, and on the other of universality for questions of justice. (shrink)

Few philosophers today know much about Charles Peirce’s metaphysics, although a great many know something about his epistemology, philosophy of science, and logic. Indeed, few Peirce experts have written much on his metaphysics or made it the focus of their research. To an extent, this is understandable. Peirce’s writings were left in a disastrously disorganized state (mostly unpublished), and the crucial papers on metaphysics from his later years have not yet been republished in the first-rate chronological edition, the incomplete Writings (...) of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition , edited at Indianapolis by my friends. And then there is Peirce’s writing: an awkward, abrasive, arrogant, eclectic style that demands technical knowledge in diverse fields, especially logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences. His worst personality traits manifested themselves in his highly technical metaphysics—with its idiosyncratic, anti-Cantorian conception of continua, a pecularly mathematical phenomenology, and elaborate views on Darwinian and non-Darwinian evolution, for example. Finally, there is what might appear to be the bizarreness of the theory itself, as we shall see. Peirce was a kind of philosophical swashbuckler, a bold, courageous speculator on philosophical questions beyond most of our temperaments even to ponder. Ours is not the philosophical age of Errol Flynn but the minimalist age of Harrison Ford, with no grand gestures or speeches, just a series of small, no-nonsense gestures: we typically like our philosophy short, neat, "science-like," and isolated from other philosophical issues. (shrink)

The article by Alexander Soldatov contains a new view to solving the problem of autocephaly in the context of the desire of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine to the attainment of the autocephalous status. Analyzing the canon law, the statements of the Holy Fathers of the Orthodox Church and the historical experience of Orthodoxy, the author comes to the conclusion that there are two types of autocephaly in the Orthodox tradition - old and new one. These types are different (...) in the scope of authority of the church authorities and in the mode of origin. Author's concept is related to the ancient principle Pentarchy, i.e. the primacy in the Universal Orthodoxy five ancient patriarchates that are exclusive carriers autocephaly completeness. Only they, with certain reservations and limitations, have the right to grant autocephalous status of the other local Churches. The Moscow Patriarchate is not a member of Pentarchy, this right it does not have, which removes from the agenda the question of the very possibility of obtaining autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Moscow. In this regard, the article addresses some lesser known aspects of "resubordination" of the Kyiv Metropolis to Moscow Patriarchate from Constantinople in the end of the XVIIth century. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to Franz Brentano’s conception of intentionality, and aims to reveal some of its lesser known aspects, like the implications of his studies for our understanding of Aristotle’s psychology. I try to show two “currents” in Brentano’s thought: beside what is widely known as Franz Brentano’s philosophy of mind, I also present the Aristotelian side of his thinking. Each of these currents, which I call A and B, makes different assumptions about the ontological status of the soul (...) and God, and from these different conceptions of mental life and its relation to God follow different accounts of immortality. By discussing them in detail I also hope to show Brentano as a philosopher of religion. (shrink)

This response proceeds in three sections, each focusing on the role of cases in understanding the principle of double effect. The first section asks about the relationship between the principle and its cases: Does the principle authorize the cases or do the cases authorize the principle? To illustrate the latter claim's plausibility, certain aspects of the articles by Aulisio, Berkman, and Odozor are highlighted. Section two uses the cases of bombing in warfare and self-defense to explain reservations Mennonites are likely (...) to harbor about the principle. The third section focuses on a medical case to show why a concern for virtue must attend to the principle's distinction between what is intended and what is merely foreseen. (shrink)

Philosophical traditions often bear the seeds of their own destruction.Their seminal insights are achieved in part by ignoring or distorting certain aspects of human experience. Insights and mistakes grow from the same roots. In transitional periods, this dialectic leads to strange reversals in allegiance and to unexpected and even unnoticed shifts in philosophical doctrine. Classical empiricism presents an example of this when one shifts attention from its treatment of epistemological questions to problems of humanaction, or to the relation of knowledge (...) and action. The empiricist analysisof knowledge in terms of the succession and conjoining of ideas and impressions in the mind leaves the mind itself a passive spectator that undergoes its contents. On this view, the human subject lacks any distinctive spontaneity or power of initiative. The mind's internal processes are conceived ofon analogy with Newtonian mechanics and are distinguished by their law-likeregularity. The subject is not, and cannot conceive itself as being, a kindof agency. Historically, the consequences of this are evident in Berkeley's difficulties regarding ‘active spirit’, of which we have ‘notions’ but not perceptions, and in the often remarked upon disparities between Parts I and III of Hume's Treatise. (shrink)

This book explores the concept of consciousness when defined in the terms mind, spirit, soul and awareness. It consists of the edited proceedings of a colloquium held in Cordoba, at which experts in physics, neuro- and psycho-physiology, analytical psychology, philosophy and religious knowledge discussed aspects of their work related to this main theme. The following areas are covered: quantum mechanics and the role of consciousness, neurophysiology and states of consciousness, the manifestation of the psyche in consciousness, the odyssey of consciousness, (...) and science and consciousness. The discussions which follow give a multi-disciplinary perspective on the questions involved. (shrink)

This paper reports from an ongoing multidisciplinary, ethnographic study that is exploring the views, values and practices (the ethical frameworks) drawn on by professional staff in assisted conception units and stem cell laboratories in relation to embryo donation for research purposes, particularly human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, in the UK. We focus here on the connection between possible incidental findings and the circumstances in which embryos are donated for hESC research, and report some of the uncertainties and dilemmas of (...) our staff participants. We explore the views of our study participants in relation to two themes: (1) rights to information and anticipating how donors might be informed about future research findings and (2) occupational work goals and trust. (shrink)

Among contemporary ethicists, Hume is perhaps best known for his views about morality’s practical import and his spectator-centered account of moral evaluation. Yet according to the so-called “spectator complaint”, these two aspects of Hume’s moral theory cannot be reconciled with one another. I argue that the answer to the spectator complaint lies in Hume’s account of “goodness” and “greatness of mind”. Through a discussion of these two virtues, Hume makes clear the connection between his views about moral motivation and his (...) understanding of moral evaluation by providing us with two portraits of the Humean moral agent. (shrink)

Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage point that is, in Nagel's words, "nowhere in particular". At the same time, each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world, a view that we can recognize as just one (...) aspect of the whole. How do we reconcile these two standpoints--intellectually, morally, and practically? To what extent are they irreconcilable and to what extent can they be integrated? Thomas Nagel's ambitious and lively book tackles this fundamental issue, arguing that our divided nature is the root of a whole range of philosophical problems, touching, as it does, every aspect of human life. He deals with its manifestations in such fields of philosophy as: the mind-body problem, personal identity, knowledge and skepticism, thought and reality, free will, ethics, the relation between moral and other values, the meaning of life, and death. Excessive objectification has been a malady of recent analytic philosophy, claims Nagel, it has led to implausible forms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind and elsewhere. The solution is not to inhibit the objectifying impulse, but to insist that it learn to live alongside the internal perspectives that cannot be either discarded or objectified. Reconciliation between the two standpoints, in the end, is not always possible. (shrink)

In Cognitive science and philosophy of consciousness, the explanatory gap, following Joseph Levine, refers to the unintelligible link between our conscious mental life and its corresponding objective physical explanation; the gap in our understanding of how consciousness is related to a physical or a physiological substrate :354–361, 1983). David Chalmers holds the explanatory gap as the evidence for a form of metaphysical dualism between consciousness and physical reality. On the other hand, McGinn takes it as an epistemic rather than an (...) ontological gap. Considering the recent advances in neuroscience, however, the reductionist approaches have become replete, which attempt to reduce consciousness and subjectivity to neurobiological accounts. On this view, consciousness mirrors the brain mechanisms, and the self is formulated as an illusory product or construct of neuronal processes. Thomas Fuchs, who is committed to embodied and enactive approaches toward cognition, in Ecology of the Brain, espouses an enactive-ecological perspective concerning the problem of the explanatory gap. He develops an account of human’s life in its dual aspects of the living body and lived body which, on the one hand, defies the ontological dualism and, on the other hand, avoids drifting towards any form of reductionism. Often, the ontologically monistic approaches to the explanatory gap have inclined to a form of reductionism because they conceive consciousness as either identical with its physiological substrate or caused by it, where in both cases, consciousness is claimed to be explainable within the framework of physicalism. Fuchs, however, defends an ontological monism which remains irreconcilable with reductionism. In his account of dual aspects, there is no interaction or impact between the sphere of subjectivity and nature; however, these two aspects imply one another. In this essay, I will develop the philosophical justification of the above reformulation of the mind–body problem and employing the analogy of light will canvass the paradoxical relationship between dual aspects in a phenomenological framework. (shrink)

The first known statements of the deduction theorems for the first-order predicate calculus and the classical sentential logic are due to Herbrand [8] and Tarski [14], respectively. The present paper contains an analysis of closure spaces associated with those sentential logics which admit various deduction theorems. For purely algebraic reasons it is convenient to view deduction theorems in a more general form: given a sentential logic C (identified with a structural consequence operation) in a sentential language I, a quite (...) arbitrary set P of formulas of I built up with at most two distinct sentential variables p and q is called a uniform deduction theorem scheme for C if it satisfies the following condition: for every set X of formulas of I and for any formulas and , C(X{{a}}) iff P(, ) AC(X). [P(, ) denotes the set of formulas which result by the simultaneous substitution of for p and for q in all formulas in P]. The above definition encompasses many particular formulations of theorems considered in the literature to be deduction theorems. Theorem 1.3 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a logic to have a uniform deduction theorem scheme. Then, given a sentential logic C with a uniform deduction theorem scheme, the lattices of deductive filters on the algebras A similar to the language of C are investigated. It is shown that the join-semilattice of finitely generated (= compact) deductive filters on each algebra A is dually Brouwerian. (shrink)

The concept of meaningful work is used to evaluate the quality of work. Typical cases of meaningless work that have been used to clarify this concept are assembly line work, and work involving other types of mindless tasks, but also David Graeber's ‘bullshit jobs’. I argue that there are at least two fundamental reasons to care about meaningful work: reasons from the wellbeing of the worker and reasons pertaining to meaningfulness of the worker's life. I first argue that a concept (...) of meaningful work needs to reflect these two values, but that these two values may come apart. Because of this, accounts that provide a single answer to the question to what extent a particular work context is meaningful work for a particular worker are unable to reflect these two values. I then survey three promising accounts of meaningful work: perfectionism, which captures the self-interested aspect of meaningful work well but fails to capture the meaningfulness aspect appropriately; consequentialism, which captures the meaningfulness aspect well but fails to capture the self-interested aspect; and Wolf's Fitting Fulfilment View of meaningful projects, which can be read as addressing both concerns but leads to implausible judgments about meaningful work. I then argue that we should conceive of the concerns that fall under the notion of meaningful work as two separate concepts and values. The best work incorporates both these dimensions but falling short on either dimension is problematic for different reasons. (shrink)

In this article, we explore whether cross-linguistic differences in grammatical aspect encoding may give rise to differences in memory and cognition. We compared native speakers of two languages that encode aspect differently (English and Swedish) in four tasks that examined verbal descriptions of stimuli, online triads matching, and memory-based triads matching with and without verbal interference. Results showed between-group differences in verbal descriptions and in memory-based triads matching. However, no differences were found in online triads matching and in (...) memory-based triads matching with verbal interference. These findings need to be interpreted in the context of the overall pattern of performance, which indicated that both groups based their similarity judgments on common perceptual characteristics of motion events. These results show for the first time a cross-linguistic difference in memory as a function of differences in grammatical aspect encoding, but they also contribute to the emerging view that language fine tunes rather than shapes perceptual processes that are likely to be universal and unchanging. (shrink)

In this book, Jiri Benovsky takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view (...) is that the nature of reality is 'phental' (physical-mental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combination problem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the question even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular – namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micro-mental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with a reductionist/eliminativist view of the self, allows us to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Self-ambiguity’, we suggest, is best understood as an uncertainty about how strongly a given feature reflects who one truly is. When this understanding of self-ambiguity is applied to a view of the self as having both essential and shapable components, self-ambiguity can be seen to have two aspects: (1) uncertainty about one's essential or relatively unchangeable characteristics, e.g. one's sexuality, and (2) uncertainty about how to shape oneself, e.g. which values to commit to, actions to pursue, or essential features (...) to identify with. We explain how a narrative account of agency can accommodate these forms of self-ambiguity and argue that such an account also reveals another kind of self-ambiguity, namely, (3) uncertainty about whether one's established self-narrative represents who one really is. We illustrate this third form of self-ambiguity in the context of addiction where people's established addiction self-narratives make it difficult to identify with recovery. We argue that recovery will require embracing, especially, our third form of self-ambiguity as a chance for positive self-transformation. Treatment for addiction should, therefore, support people in going through and ultimately narratively resolving the inevitable self-ambiguities of the recovery process. (shrink)

There are roughly two main understanding in philosophy of science: Epistemology of Science and Metaphysics of Science. It is examined that some concept such as Laws of Nature, Causation, Time and Space into the metaphysics of Science. In this paper, it has been studied laws of nature which is one the most important subjects in metaphysics of science. Let’s think outside the box, there are three significant views about laws of nature; Regularity Theory, Necessitation Theory and Dispositional Essential views. It (...) has been worked the views of David Lewis in regularity theory. In the section of nomic necessitation we have been scrutinised the arguments put forward by David Armstrong and finally the last section; it has been discussed Alexander Bird’s views of dispositional essentialism comparing with the other two aspects. (shrink)

Purpose. The purpose of this paper is the study of gender aspects of management and relationship between management characteristic and style of leadership from gender typing in order to improve management efficiency. Theoretical basis. To understand the influence of gender mechanisms on the organization’s governance system, it turns out that there is a difference in the approach of women and men to management and leadership. The main characteristics of male and female leadership style, features in making management decisions regarding work (...) and career are given. Originality of a paper is the further development in the theory of gender processes with application of interdisciplinary approaches in studying the phenomenon of gender, not from the point of view of the interactions between two large social groups, but as a social resource of an organization where men and women represent labor potential, rational use of which is the key to successful management in the organization. The social potential of Ukrainian women can become a valuable resource in a country, a region, and any social organization. Conclusions. In modern society, the unique experience of women’s rule is ignored, indicating that they have significant and little used management potential. An analysis of gender interactions in management processes revealed the active desire of women for career growth and success in individual image. However, the transformation of the gender sphere in an organization reflects the preference of patriarchal relations, which is an obstacle to the advancement of women in the managerial structure and, accordingly, requires them to make significant efforts to achieve equal management opportunities with men. To ensure the effectiveness of the organization, it is necessary to take into account the gender factor and comply with gender balance in management positions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Two Cheers for Blueprints, or, Negative Reasons for Positive UtopianismAntonis Balasopoulos (bio)It is well known that the decline of programmatic or so-called blueprint utopias and utopianism came on the heels of a widespread and concerted attack against them during the first two decades of the Cold War. In the writings of thinkers like Hayek, Popper, Talmon, Kolakowski, and many others, program became synonymous with hubris.1 It was construed as (...) a dangerous effort to regulate the diversity of human subjectivity and the complexity of the social organism, a repressive will-to-order and predictability that tainted utopias by associating them with Totalitarianism. In Popper’s exemplary exposition:The Utopian attempt to realize an ideal state, using a blueprint for society as a whole, is one which demands a strong centralized rule of a few, and which therefore is likely to lead to a dictatorship. [...] [Utopia] claims to plan rationally for the whole of society, although we do not possess anything like the factual knowledge which would be necessary to make good such an ambitious claim.2 [End Page 489]Yet, though this view of how Utopia, to recall Robert C. Elliott, became “a bad word,” is accurate in itself, it also reflects only the negative or destructive side of Cold War anti-utopianism, a trend whose logical inconsistencies and ideological biases have already been ably dissected in the work of Russell Jacoby, Marc Olssen, and Darren Webb, to name but a few.3What one could term the “positive” or “productive” side of anti-utopian denunciations of the dogmatically programmatic character allegedly inherent in utopias went well beyond the exigencies of generating a geopolitical and ideological enemy image. It involved an effort to reconcile western subjects to seismic and highly consequential shifts within postwar, late-capitalist societies themselves. If, as I have argued elsewhere, utopian fictions (and, indeed, nonfictions) before the Cold War period can be read as fictions of organization—of everything from architecture and urban planning, to production, sexuality and biological reproduction, clothing, or diet—it is also the case that in them, “organization” is a response, a reaction to traumatic historical experiences of disorganization, from the decline of the ancient city-state in the case of Platonic utopianism; to the impoverishment and dislocation of rural communities in the era of Thomas More; to the experience of the fracturing of religious community during the religious, civil, and international wars that marked the seventeenth century; to the dramatic impact of early nineteenth-century industrialization on artisanal and agrarian communities, on family cohesion and on the rhythms of the premodern working day.4My argument is, then, that the anti-utopian denunciation of blueprint and program was not simply motivated by the liberal capitalist attack against the planned and highly regulated character of economy and society in the countries of so-called actually existing socialism. It was also motivated by the ideological need to normalize and legitimize the transition, within western capitalist societies themselves, to what Scott Lash and John Urry called “disorganized capitalism.” Lash and Urry’s book, originally published during the decade of the triumphant rise of neoliberalism, in 1987, launches its investigation by tellingly quoting the passage of Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto that focuses on the creatively destructive aspects of capitalist social transformation: the bourgeoisie, Lash and Urry observe, is a class “with vested interest in change, crisis and chaos”; the social world over which it presides is one “which swings wildly out of control, menacing and destructive.”5 In their introduction, the authors outline the basic features of the postwar shift from the organized capitalism of the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to its disarticulated successor formation during the rise of [End Page 490] neoliberal governance. Under the rubric of “disorganization” (which is to say, of a mutation within the western capitalist economic and social order), they include de-industrialization and the decline in the absolute and relative size of the working class in the core capitalist economies; the rise of flexible forms of labor organization in the place of defunct Taylorist principles; the weakening of trade unionist organization; the increasing decoupling of large monopolies from the control and regulation... (shrink)

The concept of a trope (understood as an individual property and not as a figure of speech) plays an important role in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It is, however, often far from clear what the logic of this concept really is. Indeed, there are two equally important intuitions underlying the concept of trope, two intuitions that generate two quite different conceptual frameworks. According to the first intuition, a trope is a particularised property – a property taken as an individual aspect (...) of a particular object. A trope is thus the colour of this table or the shape of this sculpture. In the light of this conception tropes are, as it were, direct abstractions from concrete individuals. According to the second intuition a trope is still such an individual (and abstract) colour or such an individual (and abstract) shape, but now it is not only abstracted from the concrete individual of which it is a trope but also taken in abstraction from the very fact that it has been abstracted this way. We can imagine that the cognitive access to these tropes is obtained by a kind of a double abstraction. All this can sound puzzling at first blush, but in what follows I hope to make the matter a little clearer. Let us anticipate briefly. On the second view, tropes are construed not so much as abstractions from concrete individuals, but rather as primitive items of which the concrete individuals are composed. Tropes so construed are, as it were, metaphysically prior to concrete individuals. We will call tropes of this kind unstructured tropes, whereas tropes conceived as aspects of individual things will be called propositional tropes. This terminology is justified because tropes understood as aspects of things seem to involve something like propositional structure, a structure that tropes conceived as primitive “building blocks” of reality definitely lack. It is sometimes believed that these two concepts of trope are nearly equivalent, that the difference between them is for the most part verbal. Yet it will turn out that there is an important ontological difference here. Propositional tropes are non-trivially propositional and unstructured tropes are non-trivially deprived of such a structure (althought not necessarily deprived of any dependence-links with respect to other tropes). It will be argued that tropes are metaphysically interesting only on the second conception (i.e., as primitive, unstructured items), whereas only on the first conception (tropes as propositionally structured entities) can they function as semantically efficient truthmakers. The moral of the paper will be that our trust in tropes must be mitigated. A trope ontology could plausibly be viewed as a serious metaphysical alternative, but its semantical possibilities should not be exaggerated. (shrink)

Two recent events have caused renewed anxiety concerning the ethics of donor transplantation. The first is the report of the British Transplantation Society and the second is the Bill introduced by Mr Tam Dalyell MP (see page 61 of this issue) in which he seeks to establish by law that unless an individual in his life time has expressly contracted out his organs may after death be used for transplantation. Dr Mahoney in this paper therefore examines from the point of (...) view of ethics some of the personal and social aspects of both proposals. (shrink)

It is not uncommon that nurses are unable to meet the normative expectations of chronically ill patients. The purpose of this article is to describe and illustrate Walker’s expressive-collaborative view of morality to interpret the normative expectations of two women with multiple sclerosis. Both women present themselves as autonomous persons who make their own choices, but who also have to rely on others for many aspects of their lives, for example, to find a new balance between work and social (...) contacts or to find work. We show that their narratives of identity, relationship and value differ from the narratives that others use to understand and identify them. Since identities, relationships and values give rise to normative expectations, in both cases there is a conflict between what the women expect of their caregivers and vice-versa. The narratives also show that two similar persons with multiple sclerosis may need very different care. This implies that nurses caring for such persons should listen carefully to their stories and reflect on their own perceptions of self. (shrink)

The paper attempts to reconstruct the intellectual frame- work of British liberal tradition focusing on two major problems of it, namely the problem of justice and that of political liberty. The liberal interpretation of justice is meant to tolerate all possible individual views of good life, consequently it cannot be established on one of them. This means that the interpretation of justice shouldn’t be derived from some philosophy, as any interpretation has its basis in the political tradition of modernity. Conse- (...) quently democracy always must have priority to philoso- phy (R. Rorty). On the matter of political liberty, Isaiah Berlin defends a “negative” concept of freedom, the freedom of choice without any pressure, while Ch. Taylor sustains the Positive one. The debate between defenders of negative and positive freedom seeks the answer for a question formulated for the first time by John Stuart Mill: why individuals - even if they are free - act usually rational? (shrink)

Theologians of the 14th C. agreed that theology is scientific knowledge based upon the truths of revelation. But the very introduction of Aristotle's and aristotelian philosophy into theology turned out to be problematic. Above all, it was questionable to integrate theology—as a science based on revelation—within the aristotelian framework of sciences. This problem is difficult for Scotus in two ways. On the one hand, he uses the concepts elaborated in greek philosophy, but, on the other hand, his franciscan spirituality compels (...) him towards the opposite solution. Scotus only has the Aristotle's division of theoretical and practical sciences at his disposal to determine the character of theology, and he chooses to classify theology as practical science. Scotus is pouring “new wine” of Christian revelation into “old wineskins” of greek philosophy, the fact causing noticeable problems when interpreting many Scotus' ideas and views. (shrink)

Theologians of the 14th C. agreed that theology is scientific knowledge based upon the truths of revelation. But the very introduction of Aristotle's and aristotelian philosophy into theology turned out to be problematic. Above all, it was questionable to integrate theology—as a science based on revelation—within the aristotelian framework of sciences. This problem is difficult for Scotus in two ways. On the one hand, he uses the concepts elaborated in greek philosophy, but, on the other hand, his franciscan spirituality compels (...) him towards the opposite solution. Scotus only has the Aristotle's division of theoretical and practical sciences at his disposal to determine the character of theology, and he chooses to classify theology as practical science. Scotus is pouring “new wine” of Christian revelation into “old wineskins” of greek philosophy, the fact causing noticeable problems when interpreting many Scotus' ideas and views. (shrink)

Background: Recent studies on public attitudes toward life extension technologies show a mix of ambivalence toward and support for extending the human lifespan. Attitudes toward genetic modification of organisms and technological enhancements may be used to categorize individuals according to political or ideological orientation such as technoprogressive or conservative and it could be easy to assume that these categories are related to more general categorizations related to culture, e.g. between Traditional and Secular-rational values in the World Values Survey. This paper (...) discusses how attitudes toward aspects of radical life extension may be related to cultural values as revealed in an online deliberative survey among university students conducted between January 2012 to January 2013. Survey results suggest that attitudes toward radical life extension tend to be mixed among groups categorized as Traditional, Secular-rational, Survivalist, and Self-expressionist. The study explored the relation between responses of 326 university students to 5 key questions on radical life extension and the cultural values they tend to favor as indicated by their response to 20 statements from the World Values Survey.Design and Method: The survey consisted of 3 stages: an online pre-discussion survey, face-to-face discussion, and post-discussion survey. After completing the 5 main survey questions in stage 1, participants were presented two additional questionnaires: one on cultural attitudes using 20 statements from the 2004-2008 World Values Survey and another on health attitudes with 12 statements from Dutta-Bergman’s 2004 study. In stage 2, participants were engaged in a face-to-face discussion in class focusing on their responses to the five key questions. After the discussion, they were invited to reconsider the choices and reasons they posted in stage 1 in the light of the face-to-face class discussion in stage 2.Results: Responses to the five survey questions showed that there tended to be more individuals across groups who disagreed with adopting technologies that radically extend the human lifespan beyond the current limit of 120 years. Attitudes toward radical life extension did not correspond to cultural attitudes indicated by responses to the WVS questions. The proportion of agreement/disagreement to statements presented in each of the five questions varied across cultural groups and there tended to be more individuals who disagreed with radical life extension in all groups. Changes in responses after the discussion stage were not significant and most respondents maintained their prior views.Discussion: Cultural attitudes associated with familiar technologies may not correspond with attitudes toward newer technologies since beliefs and values may need to be adapted to new imagined situations that the new technologies elicit. Moral understandings associated with familiar technological habits and beliefs are not necessarily carried over to new technologies. (shrink)

One of the most significant, incontestable, and relatively ignored aspects of modernity is the new role states play as generators and facilitators of disasters, on the one hand, and as authors — or at least facilitators, sponsors, and coordinators — of survival and relief operations, on the other hand. The relation of the modern state to disaster has played an important role in the emergence of the state as a "totalizing totality" and in the constitution of its image as a (...) historical subject. This Article argues that state’s relation to disaster and its unfolding consequences has developed in two opposite directions that should be distinguished carefully. In line with these two opposite relations to disaster, I suggest a theoretical distinction between two state formations: a providential state and a catastrophic state. This distinction is based on Agamben’s concept of "bare life," which a sovereign may forsake by declaring an exception but which it may also save by taking extraordinary measures of protection or relief. The Article examines two aspects of the difference between the two state formations. From a formal point of view, it distinguishes and discusses two different notions of sovereignty, its authority, foundation, and legitimacy, along with two different understandings of the subjectivity of the state. These two conceptions involve and are intimately related to two distinct sets of theological presuppositions and two different conceptions of the political. From a chronological point of view, the Article sketches two diverging genealogies that go back to distinct, even if related, moments in the history of the modern West. Recognizing the fact that in certain historical moments these two genealogies were intertwined and that in our time this intertwinement has yielded a rapid process of hybridization, the Article claims that this process is not dialectical, and that the difference between the two genealogies should be maintained for theoretical and political reasons alike. (shrink)

The core aim of the dissertation is the identification of criteria for the individuation of singular, finite modes within Spinoza’s monist system. The analysis encompasses two main routes. First, the characterisation of the notion of ‘mode’, contrasted with ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’. This route leads me to examine several interpretations, which have attempted a description of the core concepts of Spinoza’s metaphysics, and to propose a novel reading that makes a robust use of the historical notion of distinction of reasoned reason (...) (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae) as a philosophical device capable of rejecting the dichotomy between subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of Spinoza. The second route is the analysis of the internal structure of a mode, which I characterise as a trans-attributal entity whose essence can be described as relationally oriented power. Following this characterisation, I provide an argument for considering Spinoza’s metaphysics of modes as a genuine relational ontology. I conclude that the individuation of singular modes in Spinoza can either be perspectival, depending on a causal point of view; or holistic, in which case the process of individuation must account for the totality of the ‘order and connection’ of modal causes. (shrink)

A Nobel prize winner, a great man and a great scientist, Erwin Schrödinger has made his mark in physics, but his eye scans a far wider horizon: here are two stimulating and discursive essays which summarize his philosophical views on the nature of the world. Schrödinger's world view, derived from the Indian writings of the Vedanta, is that there is only a single consciousness of which we are all different aspects. He admits that this view is mystical and (...) metaphysical and incapable of logical deduction. But he also insists that this is true of the belief in an external world capable of influencing the mind and of being influenced by it. Schrödinger's world view leads naturally to a philosophy of reverence for life. (shrink)

When should nudging be deemed as permissible and when should it be deemed as intrusive to individuals’ freedom of choice? Should all types of nudges be judged the same? To date the debate concerning these issues has largely proceeded without much input from the general public. The main objective of this study is to elicit public views on the use of nudges in policy. In particular we investigate attitudes toward two broad categories of nudges that we label pro-self and pro-social (...) nudges. In addition we explore how individual differences in thinking and feeling influence attitudes toward nudges. General population samples in Sweden and the United States were presented with vignettes describing nudge-policies and rated acceptability and intrusiveness on freedom of choice. To test for individual differences, measures on cultural cognition and analytical thinking were included. Results show that the level of acceptance toward nudge-policies was generally high in both countries, but were slightly higher among Swedes than Americans. Somewhat paradoxically a majority of the respondents also perceived the presented nudge-policies as intrusive to freedom of choice. Nudge-polices classified as pro-social had a significantly lower acceptance rate compared to pro-self nudges. Individuals with a more individualistic worldview were less likely to perceive nudges as acceptable, while individuals more prone to analytical thinking were less likely to perceive nudges as intrusive to freedom of choice. To conclude, our findings suggest that the notion of “one-nudge- fits-all” is not tenable. Recognizing this is an important aspect both for successfully implementing nudges as well as nuancing nudge theory. (shrink)

I defend Putnam’s modal structuralist view of mathematics but reject his claims that Wittgenstein’s remarks on Dedekind, Cantor, and set theory are verificationist. Putnam’s “realistic realism” showcases the plasticity of our “fitting” words to the world. The applications of this—in philosophy of language, mind, logic, and philosophy of computation—are robust. I defend Wittgenstein’s nonextensionalist understanding of the real numbers, showing how it fits Putnam’s view. Nonextensionalism and extensionalism about the real numbers are mathematically, philosophically, and logically robust, but (...) the two perspectives are often confused with one another. I separate them, using Turing’s work as an example. (shrink)

My interest is in two of the four conditions which must be satisfied if the doctrine of double effect is to be successfully employed. One of these involves the distinction between direct and oblique intention, And I deny that this distinction is the index of character or goodness adherents to the doctrine take it to be. Rather, I emphasize the notion of "control responsibility", In considering several cases around which discussion of the doctrine has focused. I develop this notion, In (...) the course of rejecting several attempts to render it superfluous, And then sustain it, In the face of a possible rival. Finally, I consider a second condition of the doctrine, One which turns upon the view that the order of causation between an evil and a good effect of an act is morally significant, And I suggest that this view is mistaken. (shrink)

This article attempts to reconstruct Kant's view on the self-opacity of the empirical subject by exploring three aspects of his work: the unconscious, moral incentives and moral genealogy, and rule-following practice. `Self-opacity' means that one is unable to give an account of one's everyday activity, of why in one's everyday life one thinks and acts in the way one does. Kant's view thus recast gives us a sobering insight into our ordinary way of life. The insight is that (...) we are confronted with such self-opacity concerning that area of our activity to which the aforesaid three things apply. That is, a large part of our everyday activity is at bottom opaque to ourselves. This reading of Kant has two implications. First, it enriches our interpretation of Kant. Second, the aforesaid sobering insight is potentially an encouraging message because it may help us cultivate our self-understanding for our everyday life. (shrink)

In order to develop efficient tools for automated reasoning with inconsistency (theorem provers), eventually making Logics of Formal inconsistency (_LFI_) a more appealing formalism for reasoning under uncertainty, it is important to develop the proof theory of the first-order versions of such _LFI_s. Here, we intend to make a first step in this direction. On the other hand, the logic _Ciore_ was developed to provide new logical systems in the study of inconsistent databases from the point of view of (...) _LFI_s. An interesting fact about _Ciore_ is that it has a _strong_ consistency operator, that is, a consistency operator which (forward/backward) propagates inconsistency. Also, it turns out to be an algebraizable logic (in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi) that can be characterized by means of a 3-valued logical matrix. Recently, a first-order version of _Ciore_, namely _QCiore_, was defined preserving the spirit of _Ciore_, that is, without introducing unexpected relationships between the quantifiers. Besides, some important model-theoretic results were obtained for this logic. In this paper we study some proof–theoretic aspects of both _Ciore_ and _QCiore_ respectively. In first place, we introduce a two-sided sequent system for _Ciore_. Later, we prove that this system enjoys the cut-elimination property and apply it to derive some interesting properties. Later, we extend the above-mentioned system to first-order languages and prove completeness and cut-elimination property using the well-known Shütte’s technique. (shrink)