Hume: Moral Judgment

I argue for a thorough reinterpretation of Hume’s “common point of view” thesis, at least within his moral Enquiry. Hume is typically understood to argue that we correct for sympathetically produced variations in our moral sentiments, by undertaking an imaginative exercise. I argue that Hume cannot consistently claim this, because he argues that we automatically experience the same degree of the same moral sentiment towards all tokens of any one type of character trait. I then argue that, in his Enquiry (...) at least, Hume claims only that we correct for variations in our non-moral sentiments. To adopt the common point of view just is to express only our calm, moral sentiments, to the exclusion of all other passions, when we publicly evaluate people’s characters. (shrink)

Pamphilus’ introductory letter opens contradictory ways of reading Hume’s Dialogues. The first, suggested by Pamphilus' claim to be “mere auditor” to the dialogues, which were “deeply imprinted in [his] memory,” is the empiricist reading. This traditional reading could, and has, gone several ways, including to such conclusions as Philo forces upon Cleanthes, shocking Demea; e.g., that the design of the mosquito and other “curious artifices of nature,” which inflict pain and suffering on all, bespeaks an utterly careless and insensate, if (...) not malign creator. Pamphilus' preface also opens a more philosophical reading implied in his consideration of the ancient literary form of dialogue. This second interpretive path suspects more design in writing, and more revealed in it, than the simple empiricist reading(s) allow. Dialogically elucidating the Dialogues confronts us with the limits of empiricism in moral and religious philosophy. Hume's last work, if read philosophically, exhibits the vacancy of empiricism. (shrink)

In the Book of his Treatise devoted to morality, Hume gives more consideration to what he calls "artificial virtues" than to natural virtues.1 Artificial virtues rely on conventions which have arisen for non-moral reasons, but which come to be understood as beneficial to society so that, as a consequence, we come to see adherence to these conventions as being morally obligatory. The main such virtue which Hume discusses is "justice," by which he means primarily a respect for the conventions concerning (...) property rights and property transfer, such as the convention to pay back loans of money. Despite Hume's attention on justice, there is much that is puzzling about his... (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to recover an 18th Century approach to moral theory that can be called Moral Taste Theory. Through an exploration of 18th Century sources I define the characteristics of moral taste theory and to distinguish it from its closest rival, moral sense theory. In general a moral taste theorist holds that moral judgments are analogous to aesthetic judgments while a moral sense theorist holds that moral judgments are analogous to physical sense perception. Francis Hutcheson was a (...) paradigmatic moral sense theorist, but I argue that David Hume is best understood as a moral taste theorist. If we do not understand the concept of moral taste, we cannot understand 18th Century moral philosophy, and, more importantly, we will miss out on an important source of inspiration for 21st Century moral philosophy. (shrink)

Hume’s ethics is concerned not only with the metaphysical status of moral qualities but equally, if not more, with the problem of determining to what extent and under what conditions issues of moral disagreement and inquiry can be decided by rational argumentation. This paper argues that Hume’s solution to the second problem is a form of perspectivism: the rational decidability of moral issues depends on the existence of shared perspectives, or sets of assumptions and correlated dispositions to feelings, and is (...) largely independent of the metaphysical status of moral qualities. An issue of disagree- ment may thus be rationally decidable among people with certain dispositions to feeling but not among others. A similar perspectivist reading is suggested for Hume’s analysis of knowledge about causes and effects. (shrink)

In the Treatise, Hume writes several seemingly incompatible things about the moral sentiments, thus there is no general agreement about where they fit within his taxonomy of the perceptions. Some passages speak in favor of the view that moral sentiments are indirect passions, a few in favor of the view that they are direct passions, and yet a couple of explicit statements strongly suggest otherwise. Due to these tensions in Hume’s text, we find at least five competing characterizations in the (...) literature: • Moral sentiments are calm emotions. • Moral sentiments are calm direct passions. • Moral sentiments are calm versions of the indirect passions of love or hatred. • Moral sentiments are unique species of calm indirect passions. • Moral sentiments are indirect secondary impressions. This paper assesses each of these interpretations. When their virtues are brought together, a new interpretation of the origin of moral sentiments starts to emerge. (shrink)

Hume did not criticize Hutcheson’s moral-empirical argument in his published philosophical works, even though he forcefully denied, especially in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, that we could empirically prove the moral attributes of the Deity. Yet he seemingly rejected this particular reasoning in a famous letter to Hutcheson, dated March 16, 1740. Hutcheson’s claim that our moral sense is a likely to be expected effect of divine benevolence and Hume’s critique of this claim are analyzed (...) in this essay. It is argued that the particular criticism presented by Hume in that letter is not sufficient to refute Hutcheson’s argument. It is also suggested that Hume may be right after all in rejecting Hutcheson’s inference about God’s benevolent design on other grounds, that is, our deep-rooted knowledge of the annoying conspicuousness of evil in the world. (shrink)

David Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception (...) of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments. (shrink)

The concern of this paper is to relate the moral philosophy of Hutcheson with a traditional point of view, according to which moral philosophy depends on natural theology. The analysis of this relationship is important because it is a crucial feature of the Hutchesonian moral philosophy. However, this theological outlook does not entirely match his empirical moral epistemology, and this inconsistency allowed David Hume and Adam Smith to throw aside the theological foundation, taking from Hutcheson only the empirical aspects of (...) his epistemology. The intention of this paper is to explain why this theological outlook cannot match a moral epistemology which lacks a metaphysical foundation. (shrink)

The book has two aims. First, to examine the extent and significance of the connection between Hume's aesthetics and his moral philosophy; and, second, to consider how, in light of the connection, his moral philosophy answers central questions in ethics. The first aim is realized in chapters 1-4. Chapter 1 examines Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste" to understand his search for a "standard" and how this affects the scope of his aesthetics. Chapter 2 establishes that he treats beauty (...) in nature and art and moral beauty as similar in kind, and applies the conclusions about his aesthetics to his moral thought. Chapter 3 solves a puzzle to which this gives rise, namely, how individuals both accept general standards that they also contravene in the course of aesthetic and moral activity. Chapter 4 takes up the normative aspect of Hume's approach by understanding moral character through his view of moral beauty. The second aim of the book is realized in chapters 5-7 by entertaining three objections against Hume's moral philosophy. First, if morality is an immediate reaction to the beauty of vice and the deformity of virtue, why is perfect virtue not the general condition of every human individual? Second, if morality consists of sentiments that arise in the subject, how can moral judgments be objective and claim universal validity? And third, if one can talk of "general standards" governing conduct, how does one account for the diversity of moral systems and their change over time? The first is answered by showing that like good taste in aesthetics, 'right taste' in morals requires that the sentiments are educated; the second, by arguing against the view that Hume is a subjectivist and a relativist, and the third, by showing that his approach contains a view of progress left untouched by any personal prejudices Hume himself might harbor. The book concludes in chapter 7 by showing how Hume's view of philosophy affects the scope of any normative ethics. (shrink)

The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the (...) construction of a moral point of view, acknowledged by both writers, as my primary platform. My contention is that Humean sympathy is too mechanistic to actually deliver an impartial adjudicatory perspective, and that Smithian sympathy, with its evaluative, imaginative components, succeeds where Hume's account falls short. The paper is comprised of six sections: (i) introductory remarks, (ii) a discussion of Humean sympathy, (iii) a discussion of Smithian sympathy and its distinctness, (iv) a critical analysis of Hume's attempt to correct for sympathetic partiality in the construction of the judicial spectator's general point of view, (v) a critical discussion of sympathetic partiality in Smithian sympathy & (vi) a critical analysis of Smith's construction of the impartial spectator perspective as a moral point of view. (shrink)

Among contemporary ethicists, Hume is perhaps best known for his views about morality’s practical import and his spectator-centered account of moral evaluation. Yet according to the so-called “spectator complaint”, these two aspects of Hume’s moral theory cannot be reconciled with one another. I argue that the answer to the spectator complaint lies in Hume’s account of “goodness” and “greatness of mind”. Through a discussion of these two virtues, Hume makes clear the connection between his views about moral motivation and his (...) understanding of moral evaluation by providing us with two portraits of the Humean moral agent. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates the role of beauty in the moral philosophies of Hume and Kant. It interprets Hume's thought by showing how he applies "beauty" to conduct and character as well as nature and art; how his "critique" of philosophical reason informs his view of morality; and how his approach compares and contrasts to that of Kant. ;Chapter one examines Hume's concept of "general rules," concluding that philosophy involves reflecting upon ordinary life and formulating "principles" to explain it. This clarifies (...) the aim of Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste." Chapter two employs this argument to show that in his moral philosophy Hume conceives "moral beauty" by analogy with natural and artistic beauty. As in his aesthetics, he approaches moral life by discovering principles which explain conduct. This makes his thought "descriptive" rather than "normative." ;Chapter three responds to the charge that Hume "recommends" one sort of conduct over another. By investigating reflection and character, it argues that these "normative" elements are not recommendations of an "ethical" sort, but part of Hume's philosophical explanandum. This conclusion is central to chapter four which compares "Of the Standard of Taste" with Kant's "Antinomy of Taste," and his notion of "sentiment" with Kant's concept of "feeling." Although points of agreement emerge, the two thinkers are seen to have different views of philosophy and the role it plays in human life. This is reflected in the regulative role Kant assigns to reason, the task he delegates to moral philosophy, and his contention that beauty is a "symbol" of the good. ;Chapter five examines Hume's specific contribution to moral philosophy by articulating three objections to his approach, viz., that he fails to explain, first, the existence of moral imperfection; second, why moral judgments are universally valid; and, third, how "general standards" can be reconciled with cultural diversity and moral improvement. Concentrating on taste and education, subjectivism and relativism, and a "progress of sentiments," respectively, a Humean response to each objection is articulated. The study concludes with a consideration of Hume's "critique" of philosophy and emphasizes his suggestion that philosophical inquiry is itself a matter of "taste.". (shrink)

O que pretendo defender neste texto é que uma posição empirista na moral é compatível com uma pretensão de validade intersubjetiva de juízos morais. Essa pretensão deve, nesse caso, estar calcada na naturalização dos fundamentos da moralidade, mas tem de conviver com limites acerca da justificação de enunciados de valor. Para defender esse ponto, sirvo-me da filosofia moral de Hume, como ele a expôs no seu texto Uma investigação sobre os princípios da moral. No que diz respeito à filosofia de (...) Hume, o objetivo deste texto é explicitar o caráter empírico seja de seu método de investigação da moral, seja do princípio que para ela ele encontra. (shrink)

Hume’s moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons “only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view... ” Rather, “we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may (...) be our present situation”, in order to “correct” our situated sentiments. This seems to create two serious difficulties for Hume’s theory. First, moral evaluations become inductive, empirical beliefs about what we would feel if we really occupied the imagined common point of view, and hence are the deliverances of causal reason; this contradicts Hume’s claim that the making of a moral evaluation is not an activity of reason but of sentiment. Secondly, given Hume’s thesis that the passions do not represent anything else, he cannot say that our moral evaluations will better represent the object being judged if they are made from the common point of view. This leaves no clear reason to adopt it, rather than making judgments from our real position. Hume says that left to our particular points of view, we will encounter contradictions and be unable to communicate, but it is hard to see why.My interpretation resolves these two difficulties. I argue that every time we reflect upon someone’s character from the common point of view, we feel an actual sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, which may alter and merge with the situated sentiment or may fail to do so, leaving two different feelings about the same character. Furthermore, whenever we make moral evaluations we also simultaneously make objective, causal judgments about the love and hatred, pride and humility that the trait will produce. We routinely take up the common point of view in order to achieve truth and consistency in our causal judgments, to avoid grave practical problems. (shrink)

This book is a penetrating study of the theory of mind and morality that Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. Hume's theory presents a powerful challenge to recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement, Bricke argues, and suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content.

La investigación humeana acerca de los principios de la moral parte de la pasión como motivo de la acción y al mismo tiempo pretende que su valoración ha de guiarse por la utilidad. Si bien son dos afirmaciones difíciles de combinar, la tesis del presente estudio es que la posibilidad de tender un puente entre la aspiración a la felicidad privada y el interés por el bienestar público está anclada, en su origen, en el sentimiento de benevolencia que el autor (...) descubre como principio original de la mente, pero logra sus efectos solamente en virtud de la fuerza de la simpatía y del espectáculo de la vida social y la conversación. Así, la moralidad -como posibilidad de realización de distinciones morales, de aprobar o censurar desde el punto devista del espectador- se articula y afina en el flujo incesante decontaminación y contagio de afecciones. (shrink)

The central, general claim that Brand defends is that an understanding of Hume's view of general rules in book 1 of the Treatise is crucial to a full appreciation of Hume's account of moral judgment in book 3. Although Brand also discusses other respects in which the Treatise is a unified work, both the book's title and subtitle suggest a study more wide-ranging than we actually find. Moreover, discussion of some of the issues important for Brand's interpretation, such as the (...) sense in which Humean sympathy itself is cognitive or subject to reason and how Hume's view of moral judgment squares with his view of moral motivation, is absent or difficult to follow. Thus, the book is likely to find a narrower audience than one might have expected. (shrink)

While Hume insists that "sympathy," or fellow feeling, is the primary source of moral evaluation, he recognizes that sympathetically acquired feelings vary in emotional intensity according to a number of factors he regards as morally irrelevant. The question arises as to how the changeableness of sympathy can be reconciled with the "stable" moral judgment. It emerges that the sympathetic judgment becomes corrected by adopting, what Hume calls, a "general point of view." Specifically, the theory of belief and "general rules" in (...) Bk.I of the Treatise accounts for both the prejudice which besets the moralist and the method which corrects such prejudice. In Bk.III, Hume only makes implicit references to the place of general rules in moral judgment. It is urged that without a full appreciation of the theory of belief and general rules in Bk.I, Hume's ideas about moral judgment are far too brief to be understood and are therefore subject to a number of misconceptions. Part One examines Hume's ideas about human reason and Part Two aims to clarify Hume's notion of sympathy. Both parts seek to explain how the "trivial properties" of the imagination are responsible for the "unreasonable" judgment of fact and the "partial" judgment of merit. These properties, or over-generalizing propensities, generate the general rules of the imagination. It is by means of the general rules of the understanding, the rules which regulate initial judgments by an act of reflection, that factual judgments become reasonable and moral judgments impartial. What is of interest is the ongoing dialectic of the two sorts of general rules, the "combat" of reason and imagination, which, it is maintained, Hume never resolves. Although it is concluded that Hume's theory of moral judgment ends with the same skepticism as does his theory of belief and general rules at the close of Bk.I, the positive role that both reason and imagination play in the development of science and morality is also stressed. (shrink)

It is commonly held that moral judgements are implicitly general — or universalizable — in that if anyone is morally obligated to perform or refrain from some action, everyone in relevantly similar circumstances is similarly obligated. I undertake here to show that David Hume fully subscribed to this thesis and that because of the way it is related to his conceptions of obligation and what he terms the practicality of morals he is pushed to insist that the moral sentiments of (...) human beings across space and time are much more uniform than he knew them to be. My discussion places Hume in the historical context of the controversy about 'the general foundation of morals' referred to near the beginning of the second Enquiry, and it is part of my thesis that Hume's moral philosophy can be understood only in terms of arguments and counter-arguments developed by other contributors to the controversy. (shrink)

This paper identifies passmore's interpretation of hume as having skeptical principles so powerful that they should issue in a complete irrationalist which he did not embrace. The idea of such an inconsistency within hume's philosophy is then applied to his theory of morals. The way of ideas, Pessimistic rationalism, And the theory of association should issue in moral skepticism. Instead, Hume equivocates between subjectivist and realist views of the relation between morality and our pleasure or pain in contemplation of actions.

In Book III of A Treatise on Human Nature,' Hume puts two questions which he says are distinct. The first concerns "the manner in which the rules of justice are established by the artifice of men." The second concerns "the reasons which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity." Whatever his sympathies, the reader is bound to be struck by the sustained ingenuity of Hume's answer to the first question. He (...) is likely to be less impressed by the way in which Hume copes with the second. I shall be concerned with certain difficulties in Hume's treatment in the Treatise of this second question-difficulties which are of far more than exegetical interest. However, because the two questions are by no means as distinct as Hume declares-something which is rapidly made evident even by Hume's own discussion-I cannot exclude all reference to the first. What I shall avoid is any attempt to assess what is commonly received as Hume's answer to that question. Furthermore, I say next to nothing about what Hume takes just and unjust behaviour to consist in: about that remarkably confined area of human affairs which for Hume defines the limits within which people may be said to behave justly (and unjustly)-and, of course, to display other parasitic artificial virtues (and vices). My concern is rather with Hume's efforts to explain how there can be as well as natural, artificial virtues; how certain practices, whatever their detailed anatomies and inter-connexions, can be found morally estimable. And my conclusion is that his efforts are bound to fail. (shrink)

One of the most persistent issues of contemporary moral theory is the possibility of inferring moral judgments from factual nonmoral judgments. Another way of stating this issue is to inquire into the possibility of inferring "ought-judgments" from "is-judgments." It is generally accepted that the first person to deny the possibility of this inference was David Hume. The denial is supposed to be articulated in the last paragraph of the section of A Treatise of Human Nature entitled "Moral Distinctions not derived (...) from Reason," pages 469-470 in the Selby-Bigge edition. Hereafter I shall refer to this paragraph, the "is-oughtparagraph," as (I-0). The purpose of this article is to show that in (I-0) Hume makes no such denial, and to outline the implications of this revelation. (shrink)

There are eight major misconceptions about Hume's moral theory. First,many believe that there is no essential difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry. Second, some commentators believe that Hume has an extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Third, many assume that Hume has an explicit theory of moral judgment. Fourth, several commentators have attributed to Hume a multiple theory about the relationship between moral judgment and moral sentiment. Fifth, some assert that Hume has a qualified- or ideal-spectator theory (...) of moral judgment based upon the extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Sixth, some assert that Hume has an emotivist theory of moral judgment. Seventh, several commentatorshave either accused Hume of violating his own argument against inferring "ought" from "is" or they have sought to show how Hume is justified in making an inference from "is" to "ought" by having the "is" refer to a special class of statements about feelings. Finally, some assert that Hume is a utilitarian in his theory of moral judgment. I shall comment briefly on each of these misconceptions. (shrink)