This article considers aspects of Philippa Foot’s theory of naturalist realist metaethics. It addresses the question of whether human nature can function as a direct source of normativity or whether it is more of a metanormative framework that is open to norm-creation based on the agent’s rational volitional activity. This gives rise to the question of whether the source of moral normativity is not in fact the agent’s practical rationality since natural facts may conflict and therefore cannot constitute a direct (...) guide for the articulation of moral norms. Our interpretation is based primarily on Foot’s Natural Goodness, and identifies the tensions between the broader and narrower meanings of the conception of human nature. In the first step we discuss the broader meaning of human nature. In the second we consider the narrower meaning of human nature, practical rationality. In conclusion we show that in its broader sense human nature cannot function as a proper source of moral normativity; rather, it is a metanormative framework for making moral judgements. Within this framework practical rationality operates as human nature in the narrower sense and only it can be considered the source of moral normativity. (shrink)

Hlavným cieľom práce je identifikovať antinaturalistické črty etiky Dunsa Scota. Predpokladom je objasnenie pojmu naturalizmu. V teoretickej filozofii je možné rozlíšiť metafyzický, vedecko-metodologický a sémanticko-analytický naturalizmus. V praktickej filozofii je naturalizmus prítomný v etike cnosti, v ktorej sa pri dosahovaní dobrého života pracuje s pojmom ľudskej prirodzenosti a emočno-afektívna stránka človeka je relevantným prvkom etického uvažovania. Voči nej stojí etika pravidiel, podľa ktorej je zdrojom morálne dobrého ľudská racionalita, prax má byť formovaná podľa poznania rozumu a emocionalita je v tomto (...) etickom uvažovaní irelevantná. Na základe rozboru niektorých diel Dunsa Scota je jeho etika antinaturalistická v týchto bodoch: vôľa ako protiklad prirodzenosti; oddelenie morálky a blaženosti; sekundárny význam emócií v etickom uvažovaní; univerzálne záväzný imperatív lásky k Bohu; vôľa ako sídlo morálnych cností. Spojenie blaženosti, cnosti a prirodzenosti u Scota stráca vnútornú súdržnosť, prirodzené a morálne dobro nekonvergujú, čo sa odráža v „denaturalizácii“ morálky. Na základe identifikácie antinaturalistických čŕt Scotovej etiky prichádzame k záveru, že jeho etika má bližšie k etike pravidiel. (shrink)

According to Scotus, abstractive cognition is independent of the actual existence of its object, and must therefore rely on the intentional species. Scotus presents several arguments in favour of the necessity of the species intelligibilis for abstractive universal cognition. After discussing opinions that ascribed exclusive causality in the process of cognition either to the intellect or to the object, Scotus arrives at the conclusion that both the object and the intellect act as essentially ordered partial causes of cognition: the intelligible (...) species is caused both by the phantasm and the active intellect. Thus results a new order of representation, in which the common nature is represented as universal. The process of cognition is described by Scotus as a dynamic succession of active and passive phases. On the basis of these and other characteristic features, Scotus’s epistemology can be described as departing from the Aristotelian tradition, and as the locus of the first appearance of the motives of modern epistemology. (shrink)

Boethius’s short treatise On the Highest Good represents one of the remarkable and important variants of ethical aristotelianism, enriched in Boethius by neo-platonic and augustinian themes. The idea of the “philosophical way”, which exclusively can lead to blissfulness, encompassing theory as well as practice, was dismissed by theologians – counselors of Bishop Tempier. The result was an edict published in 1277, which among others condemned the ideas articulated in the treatise On the Highest Good. On closer view it appears, however, (...) that the “philosophical way” does not contradict the Christian way. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventura Boethius as a “professional philosopher” did not manage to include philosophy into theology. However, this is not to conceive the two as two contradicting disciplines, but rather as two different perspectives on one and the same thing. Therefore they can not be in conflict. (shrink)

The question of the principle of individuation in current analytical philosophy was the subject of medieval discussions, too, in which not only similar proposals of solutions emerged, but also dilemmas invoked by the set of then-discussed proposals appeared. Duns Scotus criticizes the previous theories of individuation and suggests that the difficulties could be avoided by changing the viewpoint from the categorical-quiditative to the transcendental-modal understanding of the principle of individuation. Scotus’ solution is close to the theory of naked substrates, because (...) the substrate and “thisness” act as individuators with modal character. From the relecture of Scotus’ modal understanding of the principle of individuation may arise inspirations that need to be considered in comparison with modern analytical theories of individuation and thus they can be enriched. (shrink)

This paper is a report of the conference 'John Duns Scotus 1308–2008. Investigations into his Philosophy' 5-9 November 2008.

Theologians of the 14th C. agreed that theology is scientific knowledge based upon the truths of revelation. But the very introduction of Aristotle's and aristotelian philosophy into theology turned out to be problematic. Above all, it was questionable to integrate theology—as a science based on revelation—within the aristotelian framework of sciences. This problem is difficult for Scotus in two ways. On the one hand, he uses the concepts elaborated in greek philosophy, but, on the other hand, his franciscan spirituality compels (...) him towards the opposite solution. Scotus only has the Aristotle's division of theoretical and practical sciences at his disposal to determine the character of theology, and he chooses to classify theology as practical science. Scotus is pouring “new wine” of Christian revelation into “old wineskins” of greek philosophy, the fact causing noticeable problems when interpreting many Scotus' ideas and views. (shrink)

Theologians of the 14th C. agreed that theology is scientific knowledge based upon the truths of revelation. But the very introduction of Aristotle's and aristotelian philosophy into theology turned out to be problematic. Above all, it was questionable to integrate theology—as a science based on revelation—within the aristotelian framework of sciences. This problem is difficult for Scotus in two ways. On the one hand, he uses the concepts elaborated in greek philosophy, but, on the other hand, his franciscan spirituality compels (...) him towards the opposite solution. Scotus only has the Aristotle's division of theoretical and practical sciences at his disposal to determine the character of theology, and he chooses to classify theology as practical science. Scotus is pouring “new wine” of Christian revelation into “old wineskins” of greek philosophy, the fact causing noticeable problems when interpreting many Scotus' ideas and views. (shrink)

This paper is a report of the 700th anniversary of the death of Bl. Jan Duns Scotus. International Jubilee Symposium in Lublin.

Hlavným cieľom práce je identifikovať antinaturalistické črty etiky Dunsa Scota. Predpokladom je objasnenie pojmu naturalizmu. V teoretickej filozofii je možné rozlíšiť metafyzický, vedecko-metodologický a sémanticko-analytický naturalizmus. V praktickej filozofii je naturalizmus prítomný v etike cnosti, v ktorej sa pri dosahovaní dobrého života pracuje s pojmom ľudskej prirodzenosti a emočno-afektívna stránka človeka je relevantným prvkom etického uvažovania. Voči nej stojí etika pravidiel, podľa ktorej je zdrojom morálne dobrého ľudská racionalita, prax má byť formovaná podľa poznania rozumu a emocionalita je v tomto (...) etickom uvažovaní irelevantná. Na základe rozboru niektorých diel Dunsa Scota je jeho etika antinaturalistická v týchto bodoch: vôľa ako protiklad prirodzenosti; oddelenie morálky a blaženosti; sekundárny význam emócií v etickom uvažovaní; univerzálne záväzný imperatív lásky k Bohu; vôľa ako sídlo morálnych cností. Spojenie blaženosti, cnosti a prirodzenosti u Scota stráca vnútornú súdržnosť, prirodzené a morálne dobro nekonvergujú, čo sa odráža v „denaturalizácii“ morálky. Na základe identifikácie antinaturalistických čŕt Scotovej etiky prichádzame k záveru, že jeho etika má bližšie k etike pravidiel. (shrink)

The paper deals with the reception and modifications of aristotelism in the epistemology, metaphysics and theology of John Duns Scotus. As a consequence of these modifications Scotus became the founder of a new philosophical-theological vocabulary. In the first part of the contribution the history of aristotelism in the Hellenic period is outlined; the second part examines two lines of aristotelism: that developed in the Latin European West on one hand and that of the Greek-Arabic East on the other hand. The (...) reception and modification of aristotelism in the considerations of J. D. Scotus is examined in more detail on the historical-philosophical background in the third part: rational intuition, ontological conception of metaphysics as scientia transcendens, theology as a practical science. In conclusion the author shows how Scotus’s modification of aristotelism influenced the rise of modern science. (shrink)

The problem of the intuition of the individual as such, i. e. of its individuality (the „principle of individuation“) gave rise to many controversies. The problem becomes especially urgent in the light of the Christian revelation, since Christianity in the first place relates to the singular and individual (and therefore contingent), whereas the universal assumes only a secondary rôle. John Duns Scotus deals with this theologico-philosophical problem and sets out to defend intellective intuition of the individual as a whole. He (...) distinguishes three kinds within this type of cognition: perfect intuitive intellective cognition which is possible only in patria, direct but imperfect (i. e. not penetrating the principle of individuation) intuitive intellective cognition which relates to contingent truths and spiritual acts, and, finally, imperfect and indirect intuitive intellective cognition, i. e. acts of recalling the past intuitive cognitions. In these three examples the fundamental Scotus’s arguments are exhibited and the extent to which Scotus transgresses the limits of Aristotelian epistemology is made clear. (shrink)

This paper is a review of 'Ako sa vyjadrova' rozumne a zmysluplne Uvedenie do filozofickej metodológie' by Lubos Rojka.

This paper is a review of the book 'Náčrt Whiteheadovej procesuálnej filozofie' by Rastislav Nemec.