In this paper we present a brief overview of logic-based belief change, a research area concerned with the question of how a rational agent ought to change its mind in the face of new, possibly conflicting, information. Our intention is to provide the reader with a basic introduction to the work done in this area over the past 30 years. In doing so we hope to sketch the main historical results, provide appropriate pointers to further references, and discuss some current (...) developments. We trust that this will spur on the interested reader to learn more about the topic, and perhaps to join us in the further development of this exciting field of research. (shrink)

This paper addresses a theory of intergenerational justice that we refer to as “needs-based sufficientarianism”. According to needs-based sufficientarianism, the present generation ought to enable future generations to meet their basic needs — for example, their needs for drinkable water, food and health care. Our aim is to explain and defend this theory in a programmatic way. First, we introduce what we regard as the most plausible variant of needs-based sufficientarianism. Then we argue that this variant is superior to several (...) alternative ways of thinking about intergenerational justice. In particular, we defend basic needs as the currency of intergenerational justice and sufficiency as its principle. Our arguments for these claims are neither fully comprehensive nor fully conclusive. Yet, we hope that they suffice to show that needs-based sufficientarianism is a major contender, with significant pro tanto advantages over other views. (shrink)

Epistemic entrenchment, as presented by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) and Gärdenfors (1988), is a formalisation of the intuition that, when forced to choose between two beliefs, an agent will giveup the less entrenched one. While their formalisation satisfactorilycaptures the intuitive notion of the entrenchment of beliefs in a number ofaspects, the requirement that all wffs be comparable has drawn criticismfrom various quarters. We define a set of refined versions of theirentrenchment orderings that are not subject to the same criticism, andinvestigate (...) the relationship between the refined entrenched orderings,the entrenchment orderings of Gärdenfors and Makinson, and AGM theorycontraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985). To conclude, we compare refinedentrenchment with two related approaches to epistemic entrenchment. (shrink)

The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism. James Griffin and Yael Tamir raise questions concerning Raz's notion of group rights and its application to claims of cultural and political autonomy, while Will Kymlicka and Bernhard Peters examine Raz's theory of multicultural society. Lukas Meyer investigates (...) the applicability of the notion of harm in the intergenerational context. Other papers are devoted to fundamental theoretical tenets of Raz's work. Hillel Steiner and Andrei Marmor examine Raz's account of value pluralism and incommensurability in light of what these authors consider to be goods whose equal distribution must be valued for its own sake. Robert Alexy and Timothy Endicott discuss traditional issues of jurisprudence and legal philosphy with special attention to Raz's contribution. Rüdiger Bittner, Bruno Celano, and J. E. Penner discuss and criticize aspects of Raz's theory of practical reason. Jeremy Waldron presents a critique of Raz's interpretation of authority.This volume concludes with a chapter by Joseph Raz in which he responds to arguments in the foregoing essays. (shrink)

Climate change increases the frequency and intensity of certain kinds of natural hazard events in alpine areas. This interdisciplinary study addresses the hypothetical possibility of relocating the residents of three alpine areas in Austria: the Sölk valleys, the Johnsbach valley, and the St. Lorenzen/Schwarzenbach valleys. Our particular focus is on these residents’ expectations about such relocations. We find that (1) many residents expect that in the next decades the state will provide them with a level of natural hazards protection, aid, (...) and relief that allows them to continue to live in these valleys; (2) this expectation receives some legal protection but only when it is associated with fundamental rights; and (3) the expectation is morally significant, i.e., it ought to be considered in assessing the moral rightness or justness of relocation policies. These results suggest legal changes and likely extend to many other (Austrian) alpine areas as well. (shrink)

The pathogenic, Gram‐negative bacteria, Neisseria gon‐orrhoeae, Neisseria meningitidis and Haemophilus influenzae, secrete immunoglobulin A1 proteases into their extracellular surroundings. An extraordinary feature in the secretory pathway of these putative virulence factors is a self‐directed outer membrane transport step allowing the proteins to be secreted autonomously, even from foreign Gram‐negative host cells like Escherichia coli. Here we summarize recent achievements in the understanding of IgA protease outer membrane translocation.

Due to natural selection pressure, certain aspects of memory may have been selected to give humans a survival advantage. Research has demonstrated that processing information for survival relevance leads to better item memory (i.e., the content of information) compared to control conditions. The current study investigates the effects of survival processing on context memory (i.e., memory for peripheral episodic details) and item memory to better understand when the survival processing memory advantage emerges. In this study, participants viewed objects in either (...) a plausible color, for example a red apple, or in an implausible color, such as a green pie. We chose this color plausibility manipulation because color is a detail that conveys information about the fitness of an item. After studying items in either a survival or moving (control) condition, participants made item memory judgments (did you see this item before?), and two context memory judgments: color context (in which color did you see this item?), and source context (in which condition did you see this item?). Results indicated better item memory for materials processed in the survival relative to moving condition. Critically, for color context there was a condition by plausibility interaction, where memory was best for plausibly colored items in the survival processing condition. There was no difference, however, in source context memory between the survival and moving conditions. These results suggest the survival processing memory advantage extends to some contextual details, but only those details that tap into the survival utility of items, such as color. (shrink)

The recent publication of The New Wittgenstein signals the arrival of a distinctive "therapeutic" reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein"s philosophical enterprise. As announced in its Preface, this collection presents the "nonsense" of philosophy as the subject of Wittgenstein"s therapeutic work. The simple, plain nonsense of many philosophical remarks is revealed under the scrutiny of Wittgenstein"s investigations, according to this interpretation, leading us to see that such remarks "fail to make any claim at all" (Crary 6). This view of Wittgenstein"s use of (...) "nonsense" as a term of criticism begins with the work of Stanley Cavell, on this account, and has extended more recently to work on a wide area of Wittgenstein"s concerns, elevating "nonsense" to a central position in his philosophy. This paper argues that, in at least one case of Wittgenstein"s talk of nonsense, this "therapeutic reading" (Crary 7) oversimplifies the subtlety of Wittgenstein"s writing. Indeed, one of the most prominent cases of "nonsense" in the later Wittgenstein concerns the remark "I know I am in pain". Though Wittgenstein repeatedly treats this remark as nonsense, this treatment is not final in his philosophy of psychology. Rather, though his rich discussion in the later manuscripts of the indeterminacy of psychological judgments, the relation of these judgments to knowledge, and the role of first-person psychological descriptions, Wittgenstein is able to find what sense a remark such as "I know I am in pain" might perhaps have. "I know I am in pain" may be called nonsense, but this is not the last word on the matter in Wittgenstein"s text: as Cavell says, ""it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does)" (Cavell 70). Wittgenstein is able to find what sense our remarks of first person psychological knowledge might have, contrary to what the therapeutic reading in The New Wittgenstein would have us suppose. Therefore, at least in one case, the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein goes wrong. (shrink)

In May 2021, Alan Bechaz, Racher Du, Will Cailes and Thomas Spiteri interviewed Sandra Leonie Field for UPJA’s Conversations from the Region. A series of discussions that invites philosophers from or based in Australasia to share their student and academic experiences. The segment looks into what inspires people to study philosophy, how they pursue their philosophical interests, and gives our audiences a better idea of philosophy as an undergraduate.

Theodor Geiger (1891-1952) zählt zu den vernachlässigten Klassikern der deutschen Soziologie. Realismus und Ideologiekritik bilden die Klammer für ein Opus, das von der Schichtungs-, Rechts- und Erziehungssoziologie über Fragen zur Eugenik bis hin zur Erkenntnis-, Modernitäts- und Demokratietheorie reicht. Die vorliegende Studie ist der Versuch, trotz der zahlreichen Wechselfälle in Geigers Leben eine Gesamtwürdigung seines umfangreichen und heterogenen Werkes vorzulegen. Berücksichtigt werden die zum Teil schwer zugänglichen Schriften aus dem skandinavischen Exil sowie einige bislang unveröffentlichte Arbeiten aus dem Nachlass. Dies (...) erlaubt es, wissenschaftsbiographisch aufschlussreiche Aspekte aus der Zeit der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung zu erhellen. Der Vergleich mit alten und neuen Klassikern macht deutlich, dass dem "Querdenker" Geiger innerhalb der frühen deutschen Soziologie eine Ausnahmerolle zukommt. So ist er zum einen Pionier einer kritischen Problem- und Wirklichkeitswissenschaft, der danach strebt, die Soziologie mit den Mitteln der empirischen Sozialforschung und der Sozialstatistik auf eine methodisch kontrollierte Grundlage zu stellen. Zugleich ist Geiger aber auch Machtkritiker, Wertnihilist und Modernist. Als Ausdruck dieser Grundposition lässt sich nicht nur die entschiedene Gegnerschaft zu Kulturkritik, Gemeinschaftsschwärmerei und der NS-Ideologie verstehen, sondern auch sein Beitrag zur Entwicklung einer "realistischen" Demokratiekonzeption. (shrink)

The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism.

Zusammenfassung. Gegenwärtige Fortschritte in den pharmakologischen Wissenschaften erlauben einen ersten Ausblick auf eine individuelle, genotyp-basierende Arzneimitteltherapie, durch die sich die Effektivität der Medikamentenbenutzung weiter verbessern ließe. Die genotypische Erfassung von genetischen Polymorphismen, die bei Medikamentenreaktionen beteiligt sind, verspricht die Arzneimitteltherapie grundlegend zu optimieren, wenn damit Patienten identifiziert werden, für die ein Medikament entweder nutzbringend und sicher angewandt oder aber aufgrund zu erwartender Nebenwirkungen nicht eingesetzt werden sollte. Die neuen pharmakogenomischen Behandlungsstrategien werfen komplexe ethische Fragestellungen auf, da durch ein genetisches Screening (...) für Arzneimittelzwecke asymptomatische Patienten mit erhöhtem Risiko für eine insgesamt schlechtere Prognose identifiziert werden könnten. Die Pharmakogenomik beeinflusst damit das Beziehungsverhältnis zwischen behandelnden Arzt und Patienten, das traditionell auf Diskretion, Vertraulichkeit und dem unbedingten Vorsatz, heilen und keinesfalls schaden zu wollen, beruht. Der vorliegende Aufsatz diskutiert einige ethische Aspekte im Bedeutungswandel der Arzt-Patienten-Beziehung, der durch diesen neuartigen pharmakogenomischen Behandlungsansatz ausgelöst wird. (shrink)

Although AGM theory contraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985; Alchourrón and Makinson, 1985) occupies a central position in the literature on belief change, there is one aspect about it that has created a fair amount of controversy. It involves the inclusion of the postulate known as Recovery. As a result, a number of alternatives to AGM theory contraction have been proposed that do not always satisfy the Recovery postulate (Levi, 1991, 1998; Hansson and Olsson, 1995; Fermé, 1998; Fermé and Rodriguez, 1998; (...) Rott and Pagnucco, 1999). In this paper we present a new addition, systematic withdrawal, to the family of withdrawal operations, as they have become known. We define systematic withdrawal semantically, in terms of a set of preorders, and show that it can be characterised by a set of postulates. In a comparison of withdrawal operations we show that AGM contraction, systematic withdrawal and the severe withdrawal of Rott and Pagnucco (1999) are intimately connected by virtue of their definition in terms of sets of preorders. In a future paper it will be shown that this connection can be extended to include the epistemic entrenchment orderings of Gärdenfors (1988) and Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) and the refined entrenchment orderings of Meyer et al. (2000). (shrink)

Since the term »Jewish Philosophy« was established by Leopold Zunz in 1818, the meaning of »Jewish Philosophy« is, to say the least, controversial. This article examines past and contemporary definitions and debates about »Jewish Philosophy « from a historical and systematical point of view to clarify the setting of these controversies from the 19th Century up to the present. The article argues for a functional understanding of »Jewish Philosophy« and the texts it deals with.

In dem Artikel werden verschiedene Bedeutungen der Worte ‚to recognize‘ und ‚recognition‘ analysiert und systematisiert. Dabei ist insbesondere der Unterschied zwischen einem epistemischen und einem normativen Bedeutungscluster relevant. Dem ersten Cluster werden vier, dem zweiten fünf verschiedene Bedeutungen zugeordnet.

Menschen handeln, und meistens, wenn nicht immer, verändern sie handelnd die Welt. Die Folgen unserer Taten schreiben wir uns gegenseitig zu, und damit auch die Verantwortung für sie: Verursachung und Verantwortung sind eng aneinander gebunden. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Beleuchtung von "Verantwortung und Verursachung" aus philosophischer Perspektive, und zwar in Auseinandersetzung mit der Rechtsphilosophie Hegels. Die "Grundlinien der Philosophiedes Rechts" liefern eine Theorie des Verhältnisses von Verantwortung und Verursachung, in der zentrale Differenzierungen enthalten sind, anhand derer sich diese komplexen (...) Phänomene entschlüsseln lassen und die Vernünftigkeit unserer Zuschreibungspraxis in ihren Grundzügen einsichtig machen lässt. (shrink)

The present work studies for the first time the important discussions of the period from the debate between Leo Strauss and Julius Guttmann, Alexander Altmann s contribution to Jewish theology, to the reception of the work of Franz ...

Most approaches to iterated belief revision are accompanied by some motivation for the use of the proposed revision operator (or family of operators), and typically encode enough information in the epistemic state of an agent for uniquely determining one-step revision. But in those approaches describing a family of operators there is usually little indication of how to proceed uniquely after the first revision step. In this paper we contribute towards addressing that deficiency by providing a formal framework which goes beyond (...) the first revision step in two ways. First, the framework is obtained by enriching the epistemic state of an agent starting from the following intuitive idea: we associate to each world x two abstract objects x⁺ and x⁻, and we assume that, in addition to preferences over the set of worlds, we are given preferences over this set of objects as well. The latter can be considered as meta-information encoded in the epistemic state which enables us to go beyond the first revision step of the revision operator being applied, and to obtain a unique set of preferences over worlds. We then extend this framework to consider, not only the revision of preferences over worlds, but also the revision of this extended structure itself. We look at some desirable properties for revising the structure and prove the consistency of these properties by giving a concrete operator satisfying all of them. Perhaps more importantly, we show that this framework has strong connections with two other types of constructions in related areas. Firstly, it can be seen as a special case of preference aggregation which opens up the possibility of extending the frame-work presented here into a full-fledged framework for preference aggregation and social choice theory. Secondly, it is related to existing work on the use of interval orderings in a number of different contexts. (shrink)

Generalisations of theory change involving arbitrary sets of wffs instead of belief sets have become known as base change. In one view, a base should be thought of as providing more structure to its generated belief set, and can be used to determine the theory change operation associated with a base change operation. In this paper we extend a proposal along these lines by Meyer et al. We take an infobase as a finite sequence of wffs, with each element (...) in the sequence being seen as an independently obtained bit of information, and define appropriate infobase change operations. The associated theory change operations satisfy the AGM postulates for theory change. Since an infobase change operation produces a new infobase, it allows for iterated infobase change. We measure iterated infobase change against the postulates proposed by Darwiche et al. and Lehmann. (shrink)

In studies of multi-agent interaction, especially in game theory, the notion of equilibrium often plays a prominent role. A typical scenario for the belief merging problem is one in which several agents pool their beliefs together to form a consistent "group" picture of the world. The aim of this paper is to define and study new notions of equilibria in belief merging. To do so, we assume the agents arrive at consistency via the use of a social belief removal function, (...) in which each agent, using his own individual removal function, removes some belief from his stock of beliefs. We examine several notions of equilibria in this setting, assuming a general framework for individual belief removal due to Booth et al. We look at their inter-relations as well as prove their existence or otherwise. We also show how our equilibria can be seen as a generalisation of the idea of taking maximal consistent subsets of agents. (shrink)

Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in the process of belief revision. This (...) approach is, however, restrictive in assuming a linear ordering of reliability on the received inputs. In this paper, we replace the linear ordering with a preference ranking on inputs from which a total preorder on inputs can be induced. This extension brings along with it the problem of dealing with inputs of equal rank. We provide a semantic solution to this problem which contains, as a special case, AGM belief change on closed theories. (shrink)

Intelligent agents are often faced with the problem of trying to combine possibly conflicting pieces of information obtained from different sources into a coherent view of the world. We propose a framework for the modelling of such combination operations with roots in the work of Spohn [Spo88, Spo91]. We construct a number of combination operations and we measure them against various properties that such operations ought to satisfy. We conclude by discussing the connection between combination operations and the use of (...) infobases [Mey99, MLH00]. (shrink)

herent and rational way. Several proposals have been made for information merging in which it is possible to encode the preferences of sources (Benferhat, Dubois, Prade, & Williams, 1999; Benferhat, Dubois, Kaci, & Prade, 2000; Lafage & Lang, 2000; Meyer, 2000, 2001; Andreka, Ryan, & Schobbens, 2001). Information merging has much in common with social choice theory, which aims to define operations reflecting the preferences of a society from the individual preferences of the members of the society. Given this (...) connection, frameworks for information merging should provide satisfactory resolutions of problems raised in social choice theory. We investigate the link between the merging of epistemic states and two important results in social choice theory. We show that Arrow’s well-known impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963) does not hold in merging frameworks when the preferences of sources are represented in terms of epistemic states. This is achieved by providing a consistent set of properties for merging from which Arrow-like properties can be derived. Similarly, by extending these to a consistent framework which includes properties corresponding to the notion of being strategy-proof, we show that results due to Gibbard and Satterthwaite (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1973, 1975) and other (Benoit, 2000; Barber´a, Dutta, & Sen, 2000) do not hold in merging frameworks. (shrink)

The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy. We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom—while agreeing that some of their insight deserves to be preserved—and present additional recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the object of revisions. This makes iterated revision possible and renders explicit the connection between iterated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We provide a representation theorem (...) that connects the semantic conditions we impose on iterated revision and our additional syntactical properties. We show interesting similarities between our framework and that of Darwiche–Pearl (Artificial Intelligence 89:1–29 1997). In particular, we show that intuitions underlying the controversial (C2) postulate are captured by the recovery axiom and our recovery-like postulates (the latter can be seen as weakenings of (C2)). We present postulates for contraction, in the same spirit as the Darwiche–Pearl postulates for revision, and provide a theorem that connects our syntactic postulates with a set of semantic conditions. Lastly, we show a connection between the contraction postulates and a generalisation of the recovery axiom. (shrink)