Refined epistemic entrenchment

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (2):237-259 (2000)
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Abstract

Epistemic entrenchment, as presented by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) and Gärdenfors (1988), is a formalisation of the intuition that, when forced to choose between two beliefs, an agent will giveup the less entrenched one. While their formalisation satisfactorilycaptures the intuitive notion of the entrenchment of beliefs in a number ofaspects, the requirement that all wffs be comparable has drawn criticismfrom various quarters. We define a set of refined versions of theirentrenchment orderings that are not subject to the same criticism, andinvestigate the relationship between the refined entrenched orderings,the entrenchment orderings of Gärdenfors and Makinson, and AGM theorycontraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985). To conclude, we compare refinedentrenchment with two related approaches to epistemic entrenchment.

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References found in this work

Two Modellings for Theory Change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Knowledge in Flux.Henry E. Kyburg & Peter Gardenfors - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):519-521.
On the Status of the Postulate of Recovery in the Logic of Theory Change.David Makinson - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4):383 - 394.

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