Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Inter-Definability of Horn Contraction and Horn Revision.Zhiqiang Zhuang, Maurice Pagnucco & Yan Zhang - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (3):299-332.
    There have been a number of publications in recent years on generalising the AGM paradigm to the Horn fragment of propositional logic. Most of them focused on adapting AGM contraction and revision to the Horn setting. It remains an open question whether the adapted Horn contraction and Horn revision are inter-definable as in the AGM case through the Levi and Harper identities. In this paper, we give a positive answer by providing methods for generating contraction and revision from their dual (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Revocable Belief Revision.Hans van Ditmarsch - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (6):1185-1214.
    Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief revision. By this we not merely (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Hans P. Van Ditmarsch - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):229-275.
    In ‘belief revision’ a theory is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory . Typically, is in , one has to give up belief in by a process of retraction, and φ is in . We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein is true. The revision with (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Systematic Withdrawal.Thomas Meyer, Johannes Heidema, Willem Labuschagne & Louise Leenen - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (5):415-443.
    Although AGM theory contraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985; Alchourrón and Makinson, 1985) occupies a central position in the literature on belief change, there is one aspect about it that has created a fair amount of controversy. It involves the inclusion of the postulate known as Recovery. As a result, a number of alternatives to AGM theory contraction have been proposed that do not always satisfy the Recovery postulate (Levi, 1991, 1998; Hansson and Olsson, 1995; Fermé, 1998; Fermé and Rodriguez, 1998; (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Belief Base Contraction by Belief Accrual.Cristhian A. D. Deagustini, M. Vanina Martinez, Marcelo A. Falappa & Guillermo R. Simari - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence 275 (C):78-103.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Bisimulation and Expressivity for Conditional Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Safe Belief.Mikkel Birkegaard Andersen, Thomas Bolander, Hans van Ditmarsch & Martin Holm Jensen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2447-2487.
    Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may contain too much information. A proper notion (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    This volume concerns Rational Agents - humans, players in a game, software or institutions - which must decide the proper next action in an atmosphere of partial information and uncertainty. The book collects formal accounts of Uncertainty, Rationality and Agency, and also of their interaction. It will benefit researchers in artificial systems which must gather information, reason about it and then make a rational decision on which action to take.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Krister Segerberg on Logic of Actions.Robert Trypuz (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
    Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 3(4), 535–553. Segerberg, K. (1995). Conditional action. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas, & A. Herzig (Eds.), Conditionals: From philosophy to computer science, Studies ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations