The article sets forth Ronald Dworkin’s efforts to avert the slavery of the talented within his theory of equality, so that they are not forced to work full-time at one type of job, but then criticises Dworkin for failing to apply similar concerns to not so talented workers. It argues that he overlooks the problem of the slavery of the not so talented that results from the tough rules he proposes for dealing with insurance payouts. (...) Finally, it tries to show how this unfairness can be avoided with a better interpretation of the likely outcome of his hypothetical insurance experiment given a better understanding of the motivations of parties operating within that experiment. (shrink)

In this article I argue against Ronald Dworkin's rejection of the labour auction in his ‘Equality of Resources’. I criticize Dworkin's claims that the talented would envy the untalented in such an auction, and that the talented in particular would be enslaved by it. I identify some ways in which the talent auction is underdescribed and I compare the results for the condition of the talented of different further descriptions of it. I conclude that Dworkin's deviation from (...) the ‘envy test’ criterion results in an inequality between the talented and the untalented which cannot be justified in egalitarian terms. Correspondence:c1 [email protected]. (shrink)

Egalitarians must address two questions: i. What should there be an equality of, which concerns the currency of the ‘equalisandum’; and ii. How should this thing be allocated to achieve the so-called equal distribution? A plausible initial composite answer to these two questions is that resources should be allocated in accordance with choice, because this way the resulting distribution of the said equalisandum will ‘track responsibility’ — responsibility will be tracked in the sense that only we will be responsible for (...) the resources that are available to us, since our allocation of resources will be a consequence of our own choices. But the effects of actual choices should not be preserved until the prior effects of luck in constitution and circumstance are first eliminated. For instance, people can choose badly because their choice-making capacity was compromised due to a lack of intelligence (i.e. due to constitutional bad luck), or because only bad options were open to them (i.e. due to circumstantial bad luck), and under such conditions we are not responsible for our choices. So perhaps a better composite answer to our two questions (from the perspective of tracking responsibility) might be that resources should be allocated so as to reflect people’s choices, but only once those choices have been corrected for the distorting effects of constitutional and circumstantial luck, and on this account choice preservation and luck elimination are two complementary aims of the egalitarian ideal. Nevertheless, it is one thing to say that luck’s effects should be eliminated, but quite another to figure out just how much resource redistribution would be required to achieve this outcome, and so it was precisely for this purpose that in 1981 Ronald Dworkin developed the ingenuous hypothetical insurance market argumentative device (HIMAD), which he then used in conjunction with the talent slavery (TS) argument, to arrive at an estimate of the amount of redistribution that would be required to reduce the extent of luck’s effects. However recently Daniel Markovits has cast doubt over Dworkin’s estimates of the amount of redistribution that would be required, by pointing out flaws with his understanding of how the hypothetical insurance market would function. Nevertheless, Markovits patched it up and he used this patched-up version of Dworkin’s HIMAD together with his own version of the TS argument to reach his own conservative estimate of how much redistribution there ought to be in an egalitarian society. Notably though, on Markovits’ account once the HIMAD is patched-up and properly understood, the TS argument will also allegedly show that the two aims of egalitarianism are not necessarily complementary, but rather that they can actually compete with one another. According to his own ‘equal-agent’ egalitarian theory, the aim of choice preservation is more important than the aim of luck elimination, and so he alleges that when the latter aim comes into conflict with the former aim then the latter will need to be sacrificed to ensure that people are not subordinated to one another as agents. I believe that Markovits’ critique of Dworkin is spot on, but I also think that his own positive thesis — and hence his conclusion about how much redistribution there ought to be in an egalitarian society — is flawed. Hence, this paper will begin in Section I by explaining how Dworkin uses the HIMAD and his TS argument to estimate the amount of redistribution that there ought to be in an egalitarian society — this section will be largely expository in content. Markovits’ critique of Dworkin will then be outlined in Section II, as will be his own positive thesis. My critique of Markovits, and my own positive thesis, will then make a fleeting appearance in Section III. Finally, I will conclude by rejecting both Dworkin’s and Markovits’ estimates of the amount of redistribution that there ought to be in an egalitarian society, and by reaffirming the responsibility-tracking egalitarian claim that choice preservation and luck elimination are complementary and not competing egalitarian aims. (shrink)

It is a remarkable thing to find oneself suddenly surprised by an author after having spent years analysing, interpreting, and teaching their works. And yet, that is precisely the experience of many Kant specialists in recent times, as greater attention than ever has been placed on Kant’s discussions of gender and race. Part of the disorientation for Kantians surely comes from the way in which these investigations—oriented as they are by questions of empire as opposed to say, metaphysics—are able to (...) make a body of work that has been long-familiar seem strange and new. It is in this vein that I want to use my discussion here as an opportunity to reconsider one of Kant’s most familiar texts, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in order to focus on the case of moral failure presented by the person who has chosen an easy path in life: one who has ‘seine Talente verrosten ließ’ (4:423; let their talents rust, 75), to use Kant’s phrase.1 With this in focus, I will identify four subsequent counter examples offered up by Kant, each meant to offer specific cases of non-Europeans in a manner that can provide further moral instruction on this point. What this approach should reveal is not only Kant’s unsurprising consistency regarding the need for self-improvement, but also the compatibility he evidently saw between engaging his readers in moral guidance, on the one hand, and identifying non-European others as counterexamples of a morally worthless existence, on the other. (shrink)

In his speech to an assembly of « corporate citizens » at the conference « Fibers and Textiles for the Future » at the University of Tampere in Finland, Hank Hardy Unruh of the WTO explains all the advantages of freedom and remote labor: After all, the American South, a great producer of textiles in its time, gained nothing from its localization of slavery. But remote labor demands close-up forms of surveillance and therefore creates a new market, for which (...) the WTO proposes a « textile solution » ... By passing themselves off as the representatives of an unbearable new world order to which businessmen and technocrats have not ceased to assent, the Yes Men create au extremely effective form of invisible theater, intervening’ in real situations and using various media to deliver their parodic and precise critique of neoliberal ideology. (shrink)

To effectively improve the efficiency of international service design talent training and make it more in line with society's needs, we analyze the current status of international service design talent training and its professional training focus. Based on the above problems, from the perspective of cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence and human–computer interaction technology are used to construct the international service design talent training mode of the HCI intelligent service robot. This mode can be used to solve the existing teaching problems (...) by using novel means to ensure the quality of teaching. Finally, through the actual analysis of teaching cases, the effectiveness of the proposed talent training mode is verified. The HCI system is based on knowledge of cognitive psychology. According to the characteristics and functions of an educational robot, the robot is combined with traditional teaching activities, and the robot-assisted talent training mode is designed. Robot-assisted talent training is a feasible training method that can improve the efficiency of talent training. Students have confidence in their learning skills before the course, and the confidence is further strengthened after the end of the course. After the course, the students have a stronger sense of cooperation. This study can provide theoretical ideas for the research of international service talent training mode. (shrink)

Torture has become the subject of intense debate in recent years. One facet of that debate is whether there are any circumstances during which it might be an appropriate response by a respectable government. One might wonder precisely why torture receives so much more attention than, say, the "collateral damage" that is an inevitable aspect of contemporary warfare. But the debate also involves what counts as "torture," as distinguished from "cruel, inhuman, and degrading" methods of interrogation or even "coercive but (...) acceptable" methods. This article argues that we sometimes overemphasize the significance of particular acts — i.e., x either is or is not torture — as against the importance of the phenomenology of torture, which involves creating a structure of complete domination and, therefore, complete vulnerability. This is similar to the phoenomenology of slavery. Indeed, in this 150th year since the Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case, it is important to contemplate the full meaning of Chief Justice Taney's declaration that blacks had "no rights" that whites were "bound to respect." Can a liberal political order ever carve out a set of persons — such as suspected terrorists — who indeed have "no rights" that the state is obligated to respect? If the answer is no, then what are the implications for the process by which the United States, presumably a liberal political order, conducts interrogations even of those suspected of being "the worst of the worst"? (shrink)

There is something more catastrophic than the end of the world, especially when ‘world’ is understood as the horizon of meaning and expectation that has composed the West. If the Anthropocene is th...

Torture has become the subject of intense debate in recent years. One facet of that debate is whether there are any circumstances during which it might be an appropriate response by a respectable government. One might wonder precisely why torture receives so much more attention than, say, the "collateral damage" that is an inevitable aspect of contemporary warfare. But the debate also involves what counts as "torture," as distinguished from "cruel, inhuman, and degrading" methods of interrogation or even "coercive but (...) acceptable" methods. This article argues that we sometimes overemphasize the significance of particular acts — i.e., x either is or is not torture — as against the importance of the phenomenology of torture, which involves creating a structure of complete domination and, therefore, complete vulnerability. This is similar to the phoenomenology of slavery. Indeed, in this 150th year since the Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case, it is important to contemplate the full meaning of Chief Justice Taney's declaration that blacks had "no rights" that whites were "bound to respect." Can a liberal political order ever carve out a set of persons — such as suspected terrorists — who indeed have "no rights" that the state is obligated to respect? If the answer is no, then what are the implications for the process by which the United States, presumably a liberal political order, conducts interrogations even of those suspected of being "the worst of the worst"? (shrink)

RESUMEN La tesis central de este artículo es que la esclavitud es fenomenológicamente descriptible como reducción del esfuerzo a fuerza física, a través de la imposición de la imposibilidad, como fuente de reconocimiento del sí mismo en la derrota. El esclavo se reconoce desde la negación de lo posible para sí en el mundo. Expongo esta tesis en tres momentos principales, en la primera parte desarrollo el concepto de esfuerzo, con base en los análisis husserlianos de la constitución, expuestos en (...) Ideas II. En el segundo apartado expongo el modo en que el esfuerzo, como concreción de una voluntad egoica-encarnada, es reducido a fuerza fisica -productiva- mediante la alienación de las posibilidades del 'yo-puedo'. El correlato de este modo de constitución del cuerpo propio, en la enajenación de su poder, de lo posible para si, es un horizonte que se presenta para el yo en el modo de la clausura o la imposibilidad, desde la que yo se reconoce como derrotado, tema que trato en el último y tercer apartado. La descripción de la derrota pone de manifiesto la condición de la voluntad corporal como limite resistente ante la esclavitud. ABSTRACT The central thesis of this paper is that slavery is phenomenologically describable as a reduction of the effort to a physical force through the imposition of impossibility as a fountain of self-recognition of the ego in the defeat. The slave is constituted from the defeat of its egoic, personal, and concrete possibilities. I develop this thesis in three moments. First, I explore the effort concept on the phenomenological basis of Husserlian analyses of the constitution into Ideas II. In the second part, I describe how effort-as a concretion of an egoic-embodied will-is reduced to physical force-productive-in the slavery, though the alienation of the possibilities for de 'I-can'. The correlate of this way of constitution of the own body, in the alienation, is a horizon of possibilities are present for the ego in the canceled, or impossibility way in which the ego recognizes itself as defeated, issue of the third and last part. The description of the defeat manifests the condition of the embodied will as a resistant limit against slavery. (shrink)

The institution of slavery is an unjust institution. The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation of why it is unjust. I argue that slavery is unjust because it makes it impossible for slaves to realise both their interest in self-respect and their interest in being at home in the world. Furthermore, I argue that this explanation of the injustice of slavery also provides us with an argument for political equality.

Although Howe et al.'s survey shows little evidence for the talent account, it is premature to conclude that individual differences in achievement can be attributed largely to training and early experience. Moreover, such an empiricist account has problematic social implications, especially in cultures in which effort is emphasized. The aptitude account is thus proposed as a third alternative.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Leibniz puts forward an intriguing argument against the moral permissibility of chattel slavery in a text from 1703. This argument has three independent layers or sub-arguments. The first is that slavery violates natural rights. The second is that moral laws such as the principles of equity and piety oppose slavery, or at least severely limit the permissible actions toward slaves. The third and final layer is that slavery can at most be justified if the slave is (...) permanently incapable of conducting herself well. Yet, it is very doubtful that any actual human beings satisfy that description. This paper analyzes and evaluates Leibniz’s argument, which scholars have so far largely neglected. Even though some elements of the argument are not original to Leibniz, it is of considerable importance for the scholarship of early modern philosophy: it sheds light on Leibniz’s views not only on the moral status of slavery itself, but also on moral rights and obligations more generally. (shrink)

In Thinking of Others, Ted Cohen argues that the ability to imagine oneself as another person is an indispensable human capacity--as essential to moral awareness as it is to literary appreciation--and that this talent for identification is the same as the talent for metaphor. To be able to see oneself as someone else, whether the someone else is a real person or a fictional character, is to exercise the ability to deal with metaphor and other figurative language. The underlying faculty, (...) Cohen argues, is the same--simply the ability to think of one thing as another when it plainly is not. In an engaging style, Cohen explores this idea by examining various occasions for identifying with others, including reading fiction, enjoying sports, making moral arguments, estimating one's future self, and imagining how one appears to others. Using many literary examples, Cohen argues that we can engage with fictional characters just as intensely as we do with real people, and he looks at some of the ways literature itself takes up the question of interpersonal identification and understanding. An original meditation on the necessity of imagination to moral and aesthetic life, Thinking of Others is an important contribution to philosophy and literary theory. (shrink)

Translated into English for the first time, Dark Side of the Light scrutinizes Condorcet’s Reflections on Negro Slavery and the works of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Diderot side by side with the Code Noir (the royal document that codified ...

In Thinking of Others, Ted Cohen argues that the ability to imagine oneself as another person is an indispensable human capacity--as essential to moral awareness as it is to literary appreciation--and that this talent for identification is the same as the talent for metaphor. To be able to see oneself as someone else, whether the someone else is a real person or a fictional character, is to exercise the ability to deal with metaphor and other figurative language. The underlying faculty, (...) Cohen argues, is the same--simply the ability to think of one thing as another when it plainly is not. In an engaging style, Cohen explores this idea by examining various occasions for identifying with others, including reading fiction, enjoying sports, making moral arguments, estimating one's future self, and imagining how one appears to others. Using many literary examples, Cohen argues that we can engage with fictional characters just as intensely as we do with real people, and he looks at some of the ways literature itself takes up the question of interpersonal identification and understanding. An original meditation on the necessity of imagination to moral and aesthetic life, Thinking of Others is an important contribution to philosophy and literary theory. (shrink)

This paper examines the ethics of the Australian business community’s responses to the phenomenon of modern slavery. Engaging a critical discourse approach, we draw upon a data set of submissions by businesses and business representatives to the Australian government’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade ‘Parliamentary Inquiry into Establishing a Modern Slavery Act in Australia’—which preceded the signing into law of Australia’s Modern Slavery Act 2018—to examine the business community’s discursive construction in their submissions (...) of the ethical–political concept of freedom. The paper shows how the concept of freedom was employed by Australian business in a manner that privileged their own subject status and advocated for legislation with minimal burden. Relating this contemporary case to a longer historical context, we show how Australian business responses towards modern slavery map onto liberal and neoliberal ethics in which the freedom of the propertied takes precedent over that of the property-less. Further, we show discursive similarities in the arguments presented by modern Australian businesses and certain historical efforts by members of the business community to privilege commercial freedoms in responses to 18th and 19th Century abolitionist movements. Overall, our research makes two important contributions: first, it highlights the value of a critical discourse lens in business ethics research to show how business and other stakeholders in the field construct and shape their own and other’s ethically-laden understanding of reality; and second, it presents a case for considerable scepticism about the motivation of business to employ the freedoms made available to it under neo/liberal discourse to confront a key human rights challenge. (shrink)

According to Hebrews, the Son of God appeared to "break the power of him who holds the power of death--that is, the devil--and free those who all their lives were held in slavery by their fear of death." What does it mean to be enslaved, all our lives, to the fear of death? And why is this fear described as "the power of the devil"? And most importantly, how are we--as individuals and as faith communities--to be set free from (...) this slavery to death?In another creative interdisciplinary fusion, Richard Beck blends Eastern Orthodox perspectives, biblical text, existential psychology, and contemporary theology to describe our slavery to the fear of death, a slavery rooted in the basic anxieties of self-preservation and the neurotic anxieties at the root of our self-esteem. Driven by anxiety--enslaved to the fear of death--we are revealed to be morally and spiritually vulnerable as "the sting of death is sin." Beck argues that in the face of this predicament, resurrection is experienced as liberation from the slavery of death in the martyrological, eccentric, cruciform, and communal capacity to overcome fear in living fully and sacrificially for others. (shrink)

Experiential factors such as long-term deliberate practice are powerful and necessary conditions for outstanding achievement. Nevertheless, to be able to reject the role of biology based individual differences (including genetic ones) in the manifestation of talent requires designs that expose heterogeneous samples to so-called testing-the-limits conditions, allowing asymptotic levels of performance to be analyzed comparatively. When such research has been conducted, as in the field of lifespan cognition, individual differences, including biology based ones, come to the fore and demonstrate that (...) the orchestration of excellence requires joint attention to genetic–biological and experiential factors. (shrink)

Nietzsche is absent from today’s growing debate on slavery past and present. In this article I argue that his views on the subject add a pertinent, if challenging, dimension to this wide-ranging discussion. Nietzsche’s analysis is capable of contributing to our understanding of this multifaceted phenomenon in a number of respects. I look at Nietzsche’s use of the controversial notions of slavery, understood both historically and in the context of modern society, to explore such central concerns of political (...) anthropology as the nature and role of leadership, and the questions of development and inequality. The key focus of Nietzsche’s examination concerns slavery as an enduring facet of human existence. He sees it becoming an important hallmark of the industrial culture as a barometer of modern society’s physiological well-being, as well as acting as the repository for its externalities. Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry leads him to explore the psychological content of slavery and to conceptualise it in terms of human vulnerability, which increases susceptibility to exploitation. In these respects, Nietzsche’s views resonate with pertinence today and deserve closer critical attention and scrutiny – something Nietzsche would undoubtedly welcome. (shrink)

This article explores the British anti-slavery writings of the mid- to late 18th century, and the meanings which they gave to the idea of owning a property in the person. It addresses the construction of a particular moral and political landscape where freedom was understood as both a kind of property and as non-domination, and slavery was constructed as a form of theft, and as the exercise of arbitrary power. This created a complex moral space, where possession, commerce, (...) savagery, tyranny and the emergence of race were all caught up with each other and entangled with the concept of consent. The article concludes with the suggestion that our current understandings of slavery continue to be informed by our notions of contract and consent, and so by conceptions of freedom and ownership that take us back to the tensions and debates of the 18th century. (shrink)

This essay draws political theory into dialogue with recent work in economic history and the history of capitalism to develop an account of the unique injustice produced by capitalist slavery in the antebellum United States. Prevailing approaches to thinking about slavery in political theory tend to disembed it from its broader socioeconomic context, which has led theorists to overlook some of the distinctive horrors associated with capitalist slavery in particular. In response, I develop a theory of capitalist (...) slavery as expropriation, conceived as violent domination harnessed to the imperatives of capital accumulation. Capitalist slavery-as-expropriation encompasses two analytically distinct moments: the moment of confiscation, in which human lives and capacities are enclosed via commodification, and the moment of conscription, in which enslaved labor is mobilized via routine violence. Though enslaved people were not market subjects, this framework reveals the extent to which they were nevertheless subject to the market. (shrink)

Ernest Gellner's final book, first published in 1998, is a synoptic interpretation of the thought of Wittgenstein and Malinowski.

To rethink history from the perspective of an economy of affects as they are engendered by beings ousted from the definition of the human, I will draw on two Caribbean texts, Anim-Addo's Imoinda: Or She Mho will Lose Her Name and Philip's Zong!. This essay discusses how these two Caribbean texts counterwrite the history of the slave plantation by staging and embodying the work of what I call an affective memory drawn from the history of the black subject as a (...) history of absence and reconstellated in the present as a history of being and community. This affective memory represents the being of the ‘living corpse’ and her making of a community as the subject of a new polity, the polity of decolonised beings. By drawing on these texts to demonstrate how they write the history of spectres, ruins and other communities, I discuss affective memory not as the absolute possession of a body, but rather as the alienated property of the body that can be reclaimed only by a community that, precarious and tentative as it is for it is a community of slaves and subjected bodies, remains the only promise for the future. (shrink)

Indeed, this is the first serious book-length study of the subject by a philosopher of science.

There are three major items involved in Frederick Douglass's critique of enslavement—moral suasion, political abolitionism, and violent resistance. They are interrelated and comprise his critique. But ever since Angela Davis's use of existential philosophy to interpret Douglass's critique, the focus of existential readings on Douglass has been exclusively and constantly on the item of violent resistance, specifically Douglass's fight with Covey. The three items wholly derive their importance solely from this fight, according to the existential reading. Contrary to that reading, (...) this paper shall argue that a reading of Douglass's critique should endorse a normative coordination, through practical reason, of the three items rather than an existential priority of the fight with Covey over the other two. (shrink)

Three professors at Glasgow University in the eighteenth century argued that the economic aspects of slavery were the most likely to see the demise of the institution of slavery. Adam Smith was the most forceful of the three, and on empirical grounds he asserted that although slavery might appear cheap, in reality it was the dearest form of labour, due to there being no incentive for slaves to work, unlike free waged labour's prospect of reward. In addition, (...) slaves were neither innovative nor inventive and did not contribute to growth and prosperity. Linking the question of slavery to the size of population, Hume, Robert Wallace, Sir James Steuart and Montesquieu made significant contributions to the debate, comparing the populations of the Ancient World with those of the eighteenth century. The end of the institution was brought about in no small measure by the arguments of the philosophers, when slavery was legally abolished in the countries of Europe and in America. (shrink)

This paper considers the normative assessment of bonded labor from the perspectives of libertarianism and Paretian welfare economics. I argue that neither theory can account for our objections to bonded labor arrangements; moreover, they fail in interesting ways. Reflecting on their normative failures focuses us on other considerations besides individual choice and efficiency. Such considerations include: the effects of labor markets on workers' preferences and capacities; the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of the poor; and the permanent binding of one person (...) to another. (shrink)

In a paper presented at a symposium on structuralism at the Johns Hopkins University in 1968, the historian Charles Morazé analyzed the issue of invention largely with reference to mathematics and the theory of Henri Poincare.1 Poincare, along with the physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz, was the first to put forward a theory of scientific discovery as occurring in discrete phases. In 1926, Joseph Wallas generalized this theory to apply to all creativity, positing phrases which closely resemble those of Morazé. While (...) both Poincare and Wallas use a four-phrase model of invention, Morazé reduces his to three phrases: information, cogitation, and intellection. In information, the inventor becomes familiar with the sign systems and knowledge, the "collective contributions of society," relevant to his field of problems. Cogitation assembles these materials and concentrates them until "a certain moment" when "a light breaks through." This "sudden illumination...forces us to insist upon the neurological character" of the inventive moment. Finally, in intellection, the inventor rationally evaluates the utility of his invention and thus, in a sense, steps outside of himself and rejoins society. The distinction which organizes Morazé 's entire account, as well as most of the discussion that followed his presentation, is between the "collective" support and control of the inventor and his own individual, or "neurological," act of synthesis or creation. · 1. See Charles Morazé 's "Literary Invention," in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, pp. 22-55. Loy D. Martin is an assistant professor of English at the University of Chicago. He has written The Language of Invention, a study of Robert Browning and the genesis of the dramatic monologue. "A Reply to Carl Pletsch and Richard Schiff" appeared in the Spring 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

W. W. Buckland's highly regarded magisterial work of 1908 is a scholarly and thorough description of the principles of the Roman law with regard to slavery. Chapters systematically address, in Buckland's words, 'the most characteristic part of the most characteristic intellectual product of Rome'. In minute detail, Buckland surveys slaves and the complexity of the position of the slave in Roman law, describing how slaves are treated both as animals and as free men. He begins by outlining the definition (...) of 'slave', their characteristics and conditions, giving examples of particular cases and describing for the reader the sorts of work a Roman slave might do. Carefully and comprehensively referenced throughout, this is a general survey of an important aspect of Roman law by a renowned Cambridge academic, which retains its status as an enduring classic. (shrink)

The prospect of using genome technologies to modify the human germline has raised profound moral disagreement but also emphasizes the need for wide-ranging discussion and a well-informed policy response. The Hinxton Group brought together scientists, ethicists, policymakers, and journal editors for an international, interdisciplinary meeting on this subject. This consensus statement formulated by the group calls for support of genome editing research and the development of a scientific roadmap for safety and efficacy; recognizes the ethical challenges involved in clinical reproductive (...) applications of genome editing but, importantly, rejects the idea that human reproductive germline modification is necessarily morally unacceptable; and highlights the importance of meaningful engagement in discussions of genome editing and the development of regulation and oversight mechanisms to govern future uses of such technologies. (shrink)