Los textos publicados sobre el poshumanismo han ido creciendo en los últimos años, asimismo, la recepción del fenómeno se ha hecho cada vez más matizada y los análisis diversos. Tampoco han faltado las metáforas usadas para acercar el fenómeno, un tanto nuevo y desconocido, a otros más familiares. Entre estas metáforas, una de las primeras y, a nuestro juicio, más interesantes es la de Frankenstein. No obstante, su amplio uso, consideramos que falta un análisis más detallado de los motivos antropológicos (...) y las estrategias narrativas que encierra el uso de esta metáfora como critica al poshumanismo. El artículo busca desarrollar dicho análisis. (shrink)

RESUMEN El objetivo de este artículo es proponer una reinterpretación del concepto de comunidad a la luz de las transformaciones tecnológicas y de las formas de comunicación recientes, las cuales ponen la idea de lo social no como precepto teórico, sino como elemento a descubrir en los diferentes estudios planteados. Se busca una transversalización teórica de los tres autores, tomando elementos esenciales de sus obras para proponer una nueva clave interpretativa que permita tomar el concepto de comunidad no como un (...) presupuesto teórico, sino como un producto inmanente, resultado de las conexiones cotidianas que se realizan entre los sujetos de manera espontánea en el campo de lo social. ABSTRACT Taking as a starting point the objective of this article is the reinterpretation of the concept, forced by the technological and communication transformations that place the ideas of social and community, not as theoretical precepts, but as elements to discover on the studies proposed. A theoretical transversalization of the three authors will be sought, taking essential elements from their works to propose a new interpretative key that allows us to take the concept of community, not as a theoretical presupposition, but as an immanent product resulting from the daily connections made between the subjects, spontaneously, on the social field. (shrink)

Sebastian Schmidt (Zürich) fragt in seinem Beitrag »Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker?«, wie es um die Vernunft derjenigen steht, die einer Verschwörungstheorie über die Corona-Pandemie anhängen. Im Umgang mit Corona scheint sich zu bestätigen, was die Psychologie seit Jahrzehnten lehrt: Menschen unterliegen in ihrem Denken kognitiven Fehlern und Verzerrungen. Doch ist verschwörungstheoretisches Denken, das solche Fehler ebenfalls begeht, deshalb irrational? Schmidt warnt davor, einander zu leichtfertig als irrational zu betrachten, und verweist auf die wichtige Rolle, die intellektuelles Vertrauen in Wissensgemeinschaften spielt. (...) Am Beispiel des sogenannten Bestätigungsfehlers führt er aus, dass Menschen, die ihre Überzeugungen nicht fortwährend kritisch prüfen, in diesem Verhalten durchaus rational sein können. (shrink)

Can we take the purpose of nurse education for granted, and, more importantly, should we? That is the issue at stake in this paper. The question of purpose is conspicuously absent in the nursing literature; our aim here is to urge that it not be overlooked by demonstrating its importance to the future of nursing. We approach the question of nurse education's purpose in concrete and speculative terms through two distinct yet interrelated questions: what is the purpose of nurse education? (...) and what should it be? Amidst the complexity and uncertainty of our time, we cast doubt on the adequacy of manualised and regulated approaches—ubiquitous in nurse education—to prepare nurses who can meet the challenges of contemporary practice. We also assert that transgressive approaches to education, as the antithesis of manualisation, reach the same impasse by (over)predetermining what the educational ‘output’ will be. To move beyond this impasse, we draw on the theory of Gert Biesta and Ron Barnett to contrast cultivation and existential‐type education. In so doing, we do not seek to provide ‘answers’ to nurse education's purpose but, rather, raise the profile of what we believe is a right and proper question for the discipline to grapple with. (shrink)

It is often said in physics that if two models of a theory are related by a symmetry, then the two models provide (or could provide) two different representations of the very same situation, alike the case of two maps of different color for the very same city. It is also said that the situations represented by two models of a theory are indiscernible in some ways when the models in question are related by a symmetry of the theory, just (...) like the situation in the interior of the cabin of a train when the train is at rest in the station is empirically indiscernible from the situation in the interior when the train is moving uniformly (in classical mechanics, these two situations are represented by two models related by a boost). In recent years, philosophers of physics have focused a lot of attention in developing various principles that aim to elucidate these and similar remarks on symmetries, models, physical equivalence, and representation that are widespread in physics practice. The goal of the current article is to provide a critical review of these principles, and suggest a new framework for thinking about these kinds of questions. One important upshot of the paper is that questions of indiscernibility, and questions of the representational capacity of models, must be distinguished from one another. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a dialogue between (post-)phenomenological and decolonial approaches to propose a sentipensante ethics. Emancipating from hegemonic approaches to ethics that privilege rationality over feeling bodies, we conceptualise an analogical ethics of virtues that emerge in the framework of an analectic-responsive experience. In this experience, we specify the affective, interoceptive, and inter-bodily aspects as elements of a sentipensante ethics from an enactivist perspective. This exercise allows us to highlight the foundation of the ethical experience as a participatory (...) virtue-making oriented towards solidary well-being. Finally, it invites us to search for pedagogical practices that cultivate this virtue-making. En este artículo introducimos un diálogo entre enfoques (post-)fenomenológicos y decoloniales para proponer una ética sentipensante. Nos emancipamos de perspectivas hegemónicas que privilegian la racionalidad sobre los cuerpos que sienten, y conceptualizamos una ética analógica de virtudes que emergen en el marco de una experiencia responsiva analéctica. De esta experiencia, precisamos los aspectos afectivos, interoceptivos, e inter-corporales, como elementos de una ética sentipensante desde una perspectiva enactivista. Este ejercicio nos permite resaltar el fundamento de la experiencia ética como un hacer-virtud participativo orientado hacia el bienestar solidario. Finalmente, nos invita a buscar prácticas pedagógicas que cultiven este hacer-virtud. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt at the investigation of the nature of polarity contrast in natural languages. Truth conditions for natural language sentences are incomplete unless they include a proper definition of the conditions under which they are false. It is argued that the tertium non datur principle of classical bivalent logical systems is empirically invalid for natural languages: falsity cannot be equated with non-truth. Lacking a direct intuition about the conditions under which a sentence is false, we need (...) an independent foundation of the concept of falsity. The solution I offer is a definition of falsity in terms of the truth of a syntactic negation of the sentence. A definition of syntactic negation is proposed for English. (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es abordar la problemática de las inteligencias artificiales y su incidencia en la sociedad contemporánea. Para ello, se realizan lecturas paralelas de las sociedades distópicas creadas por Isaac Asimov y Philip K. Dick. A partir de estas, se identifican algunos rasgos existentes en nuestro contexto inmediato, enfocándonos en tres ejes principales: la sociedad de vigilancia y control tecnológico, el problema de lo natural en los ciber-seres, y la visión del siglo XXI en la ciencia ficción (...) para analizar si esta es ilusoria o, por el contrario, forma parte de nuestra realidad inmediata. Todo esto con el fin de definir al género como un espejo de nuestro futuro, basándonos en la lectura de nuestro presente para interpretar los mundos posibles y el futuro como fuente de reflexión filosófica y tecnológica. En este artículo, analizaremos a grandes rasgos los elementos de la ciencia ficción de Isaac Asimov y Philip K. Dick, enfocándonos en aspectos como la naturalidad de los individuos, las sociedades de control y las líneas que separan lo humano de lo artificial como bases para la reflexión filosófica. A través de este ejercicio, examinaremos diversas obras de ambos autores, tales como El hombre bicentenario (Asimov 2019b), Satisfacción Garantizada (Asimov 2019a), La última pregunta (Asimov 2019a), ¿Sueñan los androides con ovejas eléctricas? (Dick 2017) y El hombre en el castillo (Dick 2021). El objetivo es identificar elementos que nos permitan interpretar el siglo XXI como una obra de ciencia ficción en constante desarrollo. (shrink)

A pesar de haber trascurrido diecisiete años desde su publicación, por su interés en el campo de su investigación y por ser aun relativamente desconocido en el medio de la exégesis latinoamericana se puede juzgar pertinente analizar esta obra. El libro de Pamela E. Kinlaw presenta una visión de las expectativas que la audiencia del antiguo mundo mediterráneo (AMM) pudo tener respecto a la epifanía de Jesús. Asimismo, ofrece categorías literarias sobre el concepto joánico de encarnación, y abre un debate (...) polémico respecto a las tendencias teológicas adoptadas por el autor(res) del cuarto evangelio y sus oponentes. Estas razones son más que suficientes para leer con detenimiento las tesis que en su libro ofrece. (shrink)

I show that extant attempts to capture and generalize empirical adequacy in terms of partial structures fail. Indeed, the motivations for the generalizations in the partial structures approach are better met by the generalizations via approximation sets developed in “Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I”. Approximation sets also generalize partial structures.

Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.

Essences play a central role in Spinoza’s philosophy, not only in his metaphysics, but also in his philosophy of mind, his theory of affects, and his political philosophy. Despite their importance, however, it is surprisingly difficult to determine what exactly essences are for Spinoza. On a widespread reading, the essence of X is nothing but the concept of X. This paper argues against this identification of essences and concepts. Spinozistic concepts are maximally inclusive: the concept of X contains everything that (...) is needed to make X conceivable. The essence of X, in contrast, is more limited in scope and does not include everything that is needed to make X conceivable. Thus, Spinoza avoids the ‘overloading’ of essences and the problems that would ensue. The account developed in this paper has a surprising implication, namely that the essences of non-divine, singular things do not suffice to render these things fully conceivable on Spinoza’s view. Thus, Spinoza breaks with a tradition according to which the essence of a thing states ‘what the thing is.’ As a result, his conception of essence is much further removed from traditional Aristotelian accounts, and from other seventeenth-century accounts, than usually acknowledged. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v57-luft.

This paper offers a further look at Husserl’s late thought on the transcendental subject and the Husserl–Heidegger relationship. It attempts a reconstruction of how Husserl hoped to assert his own thoughts on subjectivity vis-à-vis Heidegger, while also pointing out where Husserl did not reach the new level that Heidegger attained. In his late manuscripts, Husserl employs the term ‘transcendental person’ to describe the transcendental ego in its fullest ‘concretion’. I maintain that although this concept is a consistent development of Husserl’s (...) earlier analyses of constitution, Husserl was also defending himself against Heidegger, who criticized him for framing the subject in terms of transcendental ego rather than as Dasein. Husserl was convinced that he could successfully respond to Heidegger’s critique, but he did not grasp that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was an immanent development, rather than a scathing criticism, of his own phenomenology. (shrink)

It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a trope ontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already (...) anticipated by Bradley. (shrink)

This article examines a series of events that are generally known in historiography as the “Tatarbunar Uprising” – an armed rebellion that took place over ten days in September 1924 in south-eastern Bessarabia. I am also interested in the aftermath of those events as well as in their legal and memorial afterlife. My attempt is to reason through and to clarify the legal and historio­graphical construction of narratives of sovereign power as they emerge from the archives of the trial as (...) well as that of the preceding and subsequent military and police operations. The reflection I will conduct here is indeed grounded in the historical context of 1923-1925, but the jurisprudential and comparative legal and political analysis I will deploy here has more general reach insofar as it aims to grasp some more general points about the status of legality under the conditions of emergency. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to explore the limits of a conception of metaphysical explanation based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). For this purpose, I will focus on one of the alleged counter-intuitive consequences of an unrestricted application of the PSR, namely: Radical Monism. First, I will articulate such a conception of metaphysical explanation. Then, I will explain how is it that from a famous argument that rests on the PSR (i.e., Bradley’s regress) Radical Monism indeed seems (...) to follow. Right away, I will argue against the natural reaction that such argument triggers, namely: that we shall accept pluralism and relations as brute facts. Finally, I will sketch a qualified version of the PSR that allows us to avoid Radical Monism without compromising the essential content of the PSR. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Husserl received important cues from Natorp and his project of a transcendental psychology. I also trace the entire relationship both thinkers had over the course of their lifetime and show how there were important cross-fertilizations on both sides. In particular, Natorp’s project of a reconstructive psychology proved crucial, I argue, for Husserl’s development of genetic phenomenology. Allowing for a reconstruction of subjective-intentional processes makes Husserl see the possibility of breaking with the paradigm of direct (...) intuition as the sole method of phenomenology. However, Natorp’s psychology was also seriously flawed, to Husserl. While exploiting the fruitful elements of Natorp’s reconstructive psychology, Husserl maintained that they could only come to actual fruition in a transcendental phenomenology. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene por objetivo estipular algunas de las implicacionesque, dentro de la obra de Michel Foucault, supone la aparición de laperspectiva gubernamental. Para ello se especificarán algunos predicadosasociados a los conceptos de “gobierno” y “gubernamentalidad” ensu relación con ciertas nociones significativas como las de “poder” y“conducta”. Se señalarán los supuestos metodológicos que Foucault asumeal tomar al Estado como objeto de indagación. Se procurará explicitar porqué, en la reconstrucción propuesta por el autor, la gubernamentalidadestatal constituye un problema específicamente moderno. (...) Por último, seseñalará la vinculación entre el surgimiento de la gubernamentalidad y laaparición de aquella forma de reflexión crítica que implica un compromisocon el tiempo actual y que Foucault identifica con la impronta de laIlustración. (shrink)

In this article, we present two accounts of intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl, respectively. We argue that both can be brought together for a more satisfying account of empathy and communication in the context of psychiatric praxis. But while we restrict ourselves for the most part to this praxis, we also indicate the larger agenda that drives Jaspers and Husserl, despite all disagreement. Here we spell out, in particular, how a phenomenologically inspired account of empathy and intersubjectivity can have larger (...) ramifications for a theory of social life and interaction. Finally, we argue for a ‘relaxed' view concerning the relation between pure and applied phenomenology, such that both can mutually benefit from one another. (shrink)

Phenomenology was one of the twentieth century’s major philosophical movements and continues to be a vibrant and widely studied subject today. _The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology_ is an outstanding guide and reference source to the key philosophers, topics and themes in this exciting subject, and essential reading for any student or scholar of phenomenology. Comprising over fifty chapters by a team of international contributors, the _Companion_ is divided into five clear parts: main figures in the phenomenological movement, from Brentano to (...) Derrida main topics in phenomenology phenomenological contributions to philosophy phenomenological intersections historical postscript. Close attention is paid to the core topics in phenomenology such as intentionality, perception, subjectivity, the self, the body, being and phenomenological method. An important feature of the _Companion_ is its examination of how phenomenology has contributed to central disciplines in philosophy such as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, aesthetics and philosophy of religion as well as disciplines beyond philosophy such as race, cognitive science, psychiatry, literary criticism and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

This paper takes a renewed look at Husserl's method of the phenomenological reduction. It interprets "the reduction" as shorthand for the meaning of Husserl's entire phenomenology in its mature stage. In the same way, the method of reduction might have different manners of execution but they are nevertheless guided by a common intent. The text takes its starting point by considering the different metaphors Husserl uses - the "flatland creatures" and the reduction as akin to a religious conversion - and (...) spells out their implications, which lead me to consider their metaphilosophical significance. In this way, this article attempts a metaphilosophical reading of the meaning of the reduction in Husserl, which is equal to considering the meaning philosophy has for Husserl in the most general terms. In this way, some unorthodox reflections are carried out that shed new light on central phenomenological concepts, such as evidence and eidetic variation, phenomenology as a form of transcendental idealism, and the notorious problem of the lifeworld. In this way, Husserl's phenomenology is interpreted as a peculiar representative of Enlightenment philosophy that restitutes a special notion of responsibility. (shrink)

This paper pursues the double task of presenting Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as a systematic critique of culture and assessing this systematic approach with regards to the question of reason vs. relativism. First, it reconstructs the development of his theory to its mature presentation in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Cassirer here presents a critique of culture as fulfilling Kant’s critical work by insisting on the plurality of reason as spirit, manifesting itself in symbolic forms. In the second part, (...) the consequences of this approach will be drawn by considering the systematics Cassirer intended with this theory. As can be reconstructed from his metaphilosophical reflections, the strength of Cassirer’s philosophy is that it accounts for the plurality of rational-spiritual activity while at the same time not succumbing to a relativism. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms steers a middle course between a rational fundamentalism and a postmodern relativism. (shrink)

Turri describes a case in which a group of experts apparently correctly advise you not to withhold on a proposition P, but where your evidence neither supports believing nor disbelieving P. He claims that this presents a puzzle about withholding: on the one hand, it seems that you should not withhold on P, since the experts say so. On the other hand, we have the intuition that you should neither believe nor disbelieve P, since your evidence doesn't support it. Thus, (...) there is apparently no doxastic attitude you are permitted to adopt to P. Turri considers various solutions to the puzzle, but in the end rejects all of them and concludes that it seems to be unsolvable. I suggest resolving the puzzle by distinguishing between what I call the subjective and the collective ‘should’. In light of your, the subject's, evidence, i.e., in the subjective sense of ‘should’, you should neither believe nor disbelieve P. However, in light of your and the experts' combined evidence, i.e., in the collective sense of ‘should’, you should not withhold on P. It is true that you are not permitted to adopt a doxastic attitude if you should not, in the subjective sense of ‘should’, adopt it; but this is not so if you should not adopt it in the collective sense. Thus, you are actually permitted to withhold on P. The puzzle is nonetheless philosophically interesting since it points something out that deserves more discussion in epistemology: epistemic advice and the collective sense of the doxastic ‘should’, which we use when giving epistemic advice. (shrink)

Is Hume a liberal or a conservative? Hume scholars are divided over this question. This paper rejects the widespread reading of Hume as a conservative and argues that Hume is a liberal, even though his version of liberalism is fundamentally different from Lockean liberalism. Hume differs from Locke in that he attempts to justify a liberal political order without appealing to natural rights or a social contract. Instead, his liberalism is deeply rooted in his empiricist epistemology and in his sentimentalist (...) ethics. Because the starting point of Hume’s political theory is his analysis of the nature of human beings as they actually are, he ends up with a liberal theory that is less idealizing than Lockean liberalism. He thus defends what I call a non-ideal liberalism. The paper also argues that Hume’s non-ideal liberalism does not rule out political ideals altogether. Such ideals, however, must be derived in such a way that they do not violate his empiricist principles. (shrink)

Este artículo examina de qué forma se refleja el conservatismo de Cayetano Betancur en su filosofía política. El primer capítulo recoge dos acepciones del término conser- vador que abarcan, a grandes rasgos, las dos principales tendencias del conservatismo político. El segundo capítulo está dedicado a examinar cómo cada una de estas dos acepciones (que llamamos negativa y positiva) se reflejan en la obra de Betancur. Como conclusión, se hace referencia a los posibles rumbos hacia los que una investi- gación más (...) exhaustiva del conservatismo político en Betancur podría encaminarse. (shrink)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason —the principle that everything has a reason—plays a central role in Leibniz’s philosophical system. It is rather difficult, however, to determine what Leibniz’s attitude towards the modal status of the PSR is. The prevailing view is that Leibniz takes the PSR to be true necessarily. This paper develops a novel interpretation and argues that Leibniz’s PSR is a contingent principle. It also discusses whether a merely contingent PSR can do the metaphysical heavy lifting that Leibniz (...) aims for. The paper shows that, despite appearance to the contrary, this is possible. In a nutshell, the argument is that the only possible PSR violation Leibniz allows for is God’s creation of a suboptimal world; there is no Leibnizian possible world, though, which intrinsically violates the PSR. Despite its contingency, then, Leibniz’s PSR is modally robust enough to serve as a foundational principle of his metaphysics. (shrink)

The Aristotelian account of change—according to which no individual can survive a change of species because an individual's essence is, at least in part, determined by its species membership—remains popular in the seventeenth century. One important, but often overlooked dissenting voice comes from Anne Conway. Unlike many of her contemporaries, Conway firmly rejects the Aristotelian account of change. She instead endorses the doctrine of Radical Mutability, the view that a creature can belong to different species at different times. A horse, (...) for example, can gradually become a human being and yet remain the same individual. Why, though, is Conway so opposed to the prima facie appealing Aristotelian account of change? This paper claims that she levels two arguments against this account which have been largely neglected so far. First, she argues that there could be no causal interaction between creatures belonging to different species with distinct essences, because cause and effect would be too dissimilar in that case. Second, Conway argues that the Aristotelian model is inconsistent with divine goodness because it allows for the annihilation of creatures and because it imposes arbitrary restrictions on the capacity of creatures to improve. (shrink)

Descartes famously espouses modal voluntarism, the doctrine that God freely creates the eternal truths. God has chosen to make it true that two plus two equals four, for instance, but he could have chosen otherwise. Why, though, does Descartes endorse modal voluntarism? Many commentators have noted that he regularly appeals to divine omnipotence to justify his doctrine. This strategy is usually thought to be unsuccessful, however, because it seems to presuppose—question-beggingly—that the eternal truths are in the scope of God’s power. (...) This paper argues that Descartes’s appeal to divine omnipotence has more going for it than meets the eye. Like many other medieval and early modern philosophers, Descartes assumes that God has the power to control everything that remains unfixed by his own essence. At the same time, though, he denies that the eternal truths are fixed by, or grounded in, the divine essence. The combination of these two commitments leads to modal voluntarism. The paper also argues that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) may play an important role in the reasoning that leads Descartes to endorse modal voluntarism. This is surprising, given that the PSR appears to be deeply at odds with modal voluntarism. (shrink)

Hume is an avowed critic of contractarianism. He opposes the idea that a legitimate government is based on an ‘original contract’ or on the consent of those who are governed. Most scholars assume, though, that his criticisms apply only to a limited range of contractarian theories, namely to theories according to which actual contractors reach an actual agreement. Theories on which the agreement in question is understood in hypothetical or counterfactual terms, however, are oftentimes seen as being compatible with Hume’s (...) views. Against such interpretations, this paper shows that Hume rejects all contractarian theories, including hypothetical ones. It argues, first, that Hume employs a so far unacknowledged empiricist debunking strategy against contractarianism; if successful, this strategy undermines all variants of contractarianism. Second, it shows that the Humean conception of the state of nature (a topic that has received virtually no scholarly attention) is incompatible with hypothetical contractarianism. Finally, it argues that Hume rejects contractarianism in part because he anticipates a line of criticism which nowadays is often leveled against so-called ideal theory. On Hume’s view, the agreements reached by highly idealized contractors are of little relevance to the non-ideal individuals in the actual world. (shrink)

The article aims at giving an account of and comparing Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s critique of contemporary culture by focussing on the category of seriousness. Both thinkers diagnose a general tendency of downplaying, in fact, suppressing or even abolishing consciousness of sin and a concomitant disappearance of seriousness in what they consider „the modern age of reflection.“ First, the concept of seriousness is spelled out within their respective philosophies of religion, and this in relation to the reality of sin as a (...) misguided and distorted relationship to God. Second, the idea of seriousness is analysed with special reference to the different forms and stages of spirit (in Hegel), on the one hand, and „dialectical seriousness“ (in Kierkegaard) on the other hand. Third, major similarities and differences in both accounts are pointed out, in order, finally, to draw some, partly critical, consequences regarding current and future Kierkegaard research. (shrink)

In this paper I compare and contrast Natorp’s and Husserl’s philosophies as to their programmatic and systematic profiles. I will begin by giving an assessment of their relationship and mutual influence, something that many scholars believe had been done exhaustively in Kern’s initial study of 1964 on the relation between Husserl and Kant and the neo-Kantians. Indeed, this topic – in general, the relation between phenomenology and „critical“ philosophy – deserves a new look now that more material has appeared in (...) the Husserliana, forcefully demonstrating the „transcendental Husserl“ and the Kantian influence on his phenomenology, and given the overall growing interest in neo-Kantianism. I will show that, despite fundamental differences in their philosophical outlooks, Natorp and Husserl share the same principal premise as to the relation between life, science and philosophy, and thus the role of philosophy itself in the midst of „culture“ and „lifeworld“ respectively. Hence, the similarities between Natorp’s Marburg School neo-Kantianism and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology outweigh the differences, opening up new avenues to pursue transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to give an account of the thesis according to which composition is identity and of the criticisms that might be formulated against it. According to a weak version of the thesis, composition, in virtue of being analogous in important respects to identity, is as ontologically innocent as identity. According to the strong version of the thesis, composition is literally a species of the generic relation of identity, and is as ontologically innocent as any species of (...) identity. As we will see, the weak version begs the question or incurs in a non sequitur ; and the strong version is incoherent and faces a dilemma. Thus, composition is not identity: one thing cannot be identical to many things. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to give an account of the thesis according to which composition is identity and of the criticisms that might be formulated against it. According to a weak version of the thesis, composition, in virtue of being analogous in important respects to identity, is as ontologically innocent as identity. According to the strong version of the thesis, composition is literally a species of the generic relation of identity, and is as ontologically innocent as any species of (...) identity. As we will see, the weak version begs the question or incurs in a non sequitur; and the strong version is incoherent and faces a dilemma. Thus, composition is not identity: one thing cannot be identical to many things. (shrink)