This paper looks to Bernard Suits’s analysis of games and game playing for at least a partial answer to the question in its title. It applies Suits’s analysis to Sudoku, a popular logic puzzle, and to Ana-lytical Reasoning, a question type in standardized assessments. The purpose is both to test Suits’s analysis in a novel domain and to give educators and test developers useful insight into the relationship between logic exercises and games.

This paper deals with what a government funded development agency should do when a developing country imposes restrictions on the development process which discriminate on the basis of gender against some members of the development agency’s staff. The conclusion is that there are circumstances in which development agencies should continue their work in the face of gender discrimination but they should not instigate development projects if doing so would involve them in gender discrimination. A set of procedures for a development (...) agency to follow in these difficult circumstances is outlined. It is argued that an agency is entitled to violate a moral principle when so doing will reduce violations of that same principle. (shrink)

While much of James O. Young’s Art and Knowledge is devoted to showing how works of art might be of cognitive value, we will focus on a prior claim, defended in the first chapter of Art and Knowledge, that “art” ought to be defined such that only works with cognitive value count as artworks. We begin by noting that it is not very clear—despite the considerable attention Young devotes to the matter—just what it is for an artwork to have cognitive (...) value. If by this claim he means only that we can learn something from a work, then the claim is trivial. We might learn from Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, for example, that a urinal can become an artwork. But Young assumes that if Fountain is a work of art, then some works of art do not have cognitive value. So he must have a richer, narrower conception of cognitive value in mind. For the moment let us not worry what this richer, narrower conception of cognitive value is. Rather, let us just assume, along with Young, that Fountain does not have cognitive value. Why, then, is this not a counterexample to Young’s claim that “art” ought to be defined such that only works with cognitive value counts as artworks? Shouldn’t we define “art,” if we are going to define it, such that all and only works of art count as art? Why ought we adopt a definition of something which excludes from the category being defined things that, on the definer’s own grounds, are properly within that category. Surely, for any definiendum the definiens ought to pick out all and only those things that have the necessary and sufficient properties for being labeled by the definiendum. (shrink)

This paper deals with what a government funded development agency should do when a developing country imposes restrictions on the development process which discriminate on the basis of gender against some members of the development agency’s staff. The conclusion is that there are circumstances in which development agencies should continue their work in the face of gender discrimination but they should not instigate development projects if doing so would involve them in gender discrimination. A set of procedures for a development (...) agency to follow in these difficult circumstances is outlined. It is argued that an agency is entitled to violate a moral principle when so doing will reduce violations of that same principle. (shrink)

I argue that Plato's psychological theories are motivated by concerns he had about moral theory. In particular, Plato rejects the modern account of rationality as the maximization of subjectively evaluated self-interest because, had he adopted such an account, his theory of justice would be subject to criticisms which he holds are fatal to the contractarian theory of justice. While formulating a theory to remain within ethical constraints sometimes violates the canons of scientific theorizing, Plato avoids this mistake.

Many of the problems we face can usefully be modeled as prisoners’ dilemmas. All the standard game-theoretic solutions to prisoners’ dilemmas lead, in the real world, to assurance games. But too often some aspects of our social interaction are as much obscured by, as illuminated by, game theory. Removing some of the epistemic constraints often accepted by game theorists will enable us to distinguish between productive and destructive prisoners’ dilemmas. Doing so is an important step in understanding the nature of (...) some of our social problems. (shrink)

Aristotle's account of the fact that neither being nor unity can be defined has more to do with the genus/species model of definition he used than any major metaphysical point.

This paper suggests a strategy for constructing a contemporary Humean theory of distributive justice which would serve to ground what I call an entrepreneurial welfare state. It is argued that blending David Hume's insights about the origins and purposes of justice with Ronald Dworkin's insurance-based reasoning supporting his equality of resources model of distributive justice will yield a state which, as a matter of justice, encourages its members to engage in entrepreneurial activities and which protects them from the worst extremes (...) of market economies. (shrink)

Irrational thinking, religious fundamentalism, cults, magical beliefs and esoteric themes increasingly dominate western public life and philosophical debates, while rationality and logical thinking is continuously and increasingly being vilified. This has led to a state of utmost helplessness, when dealing with claims of (religious) fundamentalism and illegitimate metaphysics of power, while conversely the day-to-day living environment remains highly technical and positivistic. Puzzled by this increasing division, this book tries to elucidate: The emergence of the concept “irrational”, after Kant’s Critique of (...) Pure Reason and the metamorphosis from its origins at the end of the 18th century into the 20th century. The methodical consequences of the Copernican revolution, which split off domains of the individual such as the body, nature, singularities, coincidence, will, life or the soul (which had been recognized as an organic compartment of the individual) as representations, converting them into new and dynamic elements for post-Kantian philosophies: body – Nietzsche, will – Schopenhauer, life – Lebensphilosophie, singularity/coincidence – existentialism, nature – romanticism, soul – early psychoanalysis etc. Finally, criteria for irrational philosophies are being presented. (shrink)

Grant that Hume is a contractarian. Justice then arises from more basic features of humans and their circumstances. Among these more basic features from which justice arises Hume includes (in addition to self-interest narrowly construed) the widely held passions of benevolence and sympathy. But it is mysterious why he included them in his contractarian theory for the derivation of justice does not need them, and may even be weaker with them included. This paper suggests that Hume’s philosophy of mind, in (...) particular his account of the imagination, forced him to include benevolence and sympathy along with self-interest as the passions on which justice is based. (shrink)

Grant that Hume is a contractarian. Justice then arises from more basic features of humans and their circumstances. Among these more basic features from which justice arises Hume includes (in addition to self-interest narrowly construed) the widely held passions of benevolence and sympathy. But it is mysterious why he included them in his contractarian theory for the derivation of justice does not need them, and may even be weaker with them included. This paper suggests that Hume’s philosophy of mind, in (...) particular his account of the imagination, forced him to include benevolence and sympathy along with self-interest as the passions on which justice is based. (shrink)

This paper provides a systematic statement of Ronald Dworkin’s political (as opposed to legal) philosophy. Dworkin’s defence of democratic institutions constrained by civil rights is shown to be linked to his defence of the economic market constrained by economic welfare rights. The theory is defended against attacks from H.L.A. Hart and L. Haworth. The possibility that the theory can be given a Kantian grounding is explored.

This paper provides a systematic statement of Ronald Dworkin’s political (as opposed to legal) philosophy. Dworkin’s defence of democratic institutions constrained by civil rights is shown to be linked to his defence of the economic market constrained by economic welfare rights. The theory is defended against attacks from H.L.A. Hart and L. Haworth. The possibility that the theory can be given a Kantian grounding is explored.

This paper argues that Plato’s version of the contractarian theory of justice is superior to all other statements of that theory. The conditions any adequate theory of justice must meet are outlined and it is shown how contractarian theories attempt to meet these conditions. The great contractarian theories---those of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Rawls, and Gauthier---are shown not to provide an adequate account of the nature of justice. The source of these failures is identified and, finally, it is shown that Plato’s (...) version of contractarianism is immune to this sort of failure. (shrink)

This paper argues that Plato’s version of the contractarian theory of justice is superior to all other statements of that theory. The conditions any adequate theory of justice must meet are outlined and it is shown how contractarian theories attempt to meet these conditions. The great contractarian theories---those of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Rawls, and Gauthier---are shown not to provide an adequate account of the nature of justice. The source of these failures is identified and, finally, it is shown that Plato’s (...) version of contractarianism is immune to this sort of failure. (shrink)

The main sources of the style of contemporary philosophy, sources which run counter to the style of classical philosophy, come together in the intellectual development and works of Jean-Paul Sartre. In him can be seen the styles of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and perhaps even of Wittgenstein. Sartre's L'être et le néant was one focal point of these influences. A re-evaluation of Marx is characteristic of his later works. Marx's philosophical theory is more than just a theory:… it was (...) not the idea which unsettled us; nor was it the condition of the worker, which we knew abstractly but which we had not experienced. No, it was the two joined together. It was—as we would have said then in our idealist jargon even as we were breaking with idealism—the Proletariat as the incarnation and vehicle of an idea. (shrink)

The semantic confusion in Europe about the term “anthropology” has of late been considerable. On the one hand there is meant by it, and quite justifiably, human biology and medical anthropology. On the other hand, the work of some contemporary thinkers, under the name of “philosophical anthropology,” has recently gone beyond the narrower compass. This has been noticeable at both the German and the international European philosophical conventions since the last war. In addition to this, there appeared the term “Kulturanthropologie,”—for (...) the first time probably as the title of E. Rothacker's contribution to Systematische Philosophie, a collection of essays edited by Nicolai Hartmann and published in 1942. But “Kulturanthropologie,” in Rothacker's sense, is not a translation of “cultural anthropology,” which has in recent years grown to such eminence among scholarly fields in England and America. In the United States, “anthropology” designates a group of scholarly fields ranging on the one hand from biological anthropology to archaeology and the study of the beginnings of history on the other, often including history, linguistics, and other realms of research; it is neither one of the natural sciences nor of the humanities but one of the social sciences; and the actually new results of this young discipline, especially at Harvard, Yale, and the University of Chicago, are arrived at by means of team work by anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists, which in Germany has not been the case so far. (shrink)

The current literature expands the existing knowledge of the antecedents of proactive environmental strategies (PES) in family firms from the perspectives of institutional, market and family involvement logics. However, scholars have not considered the influence of key family decision-makers and their characteristics in this regard. Based on the ability and willingness framework, this study focuses on how founders' religiosity affects family firms' PES. Using data from the 2010 Chinese Private Enterprise Survey conducted by Chinese officials, we found that founders' religiosity (...) drives family firms to implement PES. Altruistic and long-term orientation are the internal mechanisms of this effect. Founders' political status enhances the positive impact of their religiosity on PES, whereas the founders' need for socioemotional wealth protection weakens the relationship between founders' religiosity and family firms' PES. We also found that Eastern and Western founders' religiosity has an asymmetric effect on family firms' PES. This study contributes to the literature on the PES of family firms, the family firm's ability and willingness framework, and family business heterogeneity. (shrink)

In this book the author aims to single out in Hegel’s work what is not speculative, what refers to phenomena found in interpersonal relationships, phenomena vindicated by our own experience. His main purpose is to criticize the onesided teleology of Hegel’s as well as of Marx’s philosophy of history; he attempts to show that both are based upon a wrong anthropology. The book covers phenomenology of the human predicament. The author analyses this predicament in terms of an open system of (...) polarities: the subjective vs. the objective, subjectivism vs. objectivism, egoism vs. altruism, the private vs. the public spheres, etc. What is real is constituted in the ‘dimensions’ between these ‘poles’. We ‘live’ the dimensions, not the static, isolated extremes. The realistic meaning of ‘Dialectic’ is the critique of all radicalisms. The dynamic wholeness of man’s practical self–realization can be split into extremes only by faulty theories. The dangerous trend to actualize such extremist theories is based upon a deluded anthropology, i.e., on the delusion that one is able to ‘fix’, to ‘establish’ man in this or that onesided way. Philosophical anthropology supersedes Hegelian dialectical metaphysics and Marxist dialectical antimetaphysics. It is a science–in–the–making. (shrink)

Talk.origins has officially archived Richard Wein's critique of my book No Free Lunch at http://www.talkorigins.org/design/faqs/nfl. I responded on the ISCID website at http://www.iscid.org/papers/Dembski_ObsessivelyCriticized_050902.pdf. Wein has now responded to that response at http://www.talkorigins.org/design/faqs/nfl/replynfl.html. This is my response to Wein's latest. My response here is copyright © 2002 and may be reprinted only for personal use.

Talk.origins has now officially archived Richard Wein's critique of my book No Free Lunch at http://www.talkorigins.org/design/faqs/nfl. Prior to that, the critique went through several revisions. I take it the critique is now substantially finished. In any case, I am responding to Version 1.0 last modified 04.23.02. My response here is copyright © 2002 and may be reprinted only for personal use.

Dieses Buch möchte eine Revolution der Denkungsart auf den Weg bringen. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit den Dogmen des Empirismus und der erschlaffenden und konformistischen Analytischen Sprachphilosophie, versucht es eine Synthese aus den Lehren jener Genies zu generieren, welche das Fundament der,westlichen Kultur? gelegt haben: Platon? Descartes? Kant? und im 20. Jahrhundert, Ernst Cassirer. Das neuentdeckte,visuelle Denken?, welches offenbar eine Vorstufe der Sprache und des menschlichen Denkens darstellt und in der Philosophie stets immanent präsent war, soll wieder in seine Rechte gesetzt (...) werden. Zudem soll die Substanzlosigkeit der naturalistischen und realistischen Strömungen aufgezeigt werden, welche uns glauben machen wollen, der menschliche Geist sei bloss Gehirn, bzw. eine Maschine. (shrink)

So the philosopher's way to be is the source (Quelle) of his values and of his basic model; it is an important way of understanding thrall. It appears, now, that the thought of this paper could be simplified. The primary notion is the philosopher's "way to be." Style, locus of interest, nisus and way of thought can then be seen as growing out of this, as particular aspects or expressions of it. This entire paper then would be an attempt to (...) come to grips with the primary notion. How is a "way to be" related to what is normally called a philo sopher's views or theories (the formulable core)? Is it not irrelevant as non-implicatory fact, like biographical details or social background? I do not think so. A philosopher's way to be is not external fact to the formulable core of his thought. It is not "internal" either in the logical sense. It is what allows us to comprehend his explicit views. (shrink)

When an activity is unwanted, administrators often adopt a zero tolerance policy towards that activity. The background assumption is that, by adopting a zero tolerance policy, one is doing everything that one can to reduce or eliminate the activity in question. Yet which policy best serves to reduce an unwanted behavior is always an empirical question. Thus, those who adopt a zero tolerance policy towards some behavior without first investigating and finding that they are in a set of circumstances where (...) that policy is the most cost-effective way of reducing or eliminating the undesirable behavior are committing the zero tolerance fallacy. (shrink)

The zero tolerance fallacy occurs when someone advocates or adopts a zero tolerance policy towards some activity or behaviour without seeing if there is evidence to support the view that such a policy is the best or most cost-effective way of preventing or reducing the unwanted behaviour. This paper explores the idea that, instead of thinking about what the zero tolerance fallacy is, argumentation theorists should try to characterize what features good arguments for zero tolerance policies must have.

die Behandlungsweise kann jedoch sehr verschieden sein. Diese letztere charakterisiert nicht nur eine bestimmte Auffassung von Philosophie, sondern ebenso den Philosophen, der sie anwendet. In dem Sinne ist jede Erörterung eines philosophischen Gedankens zugleich eine bio graphische Notiz. Der erfahrungswissenschaftliche Charakter der in diesem Band ge sammelten philosophische Gedankengänge entstammt zu einem er heblichen Teil der Kenntnisnahme der (ursprünglich amerikanischen) Kulturanthropologie. Ihr Schöpfen aus den Initiativen der alther kömmlichen Ethnologie wie auch aus der vergleichenden Völkerkunde hat, zusammen mit dem fruchtbaren (...) «:field-work», auf einer anthropo logischen Basis neue und neuartige Erfahrungen über den Menschen hervorgehoben. Dadurch ist mehr als ein bloßes Kooperieren von Philosophie und Wissenschaft gewachsen: hier hat sich der Charakter des Philosophischen selbst gewandelt. Diese Kooperation, ja vielmehr tiefgreifende Verschränkung ist ein Merkmal moderner Philosophie. Besonders im Denken von Hermann Wein ist dieses Charakteristikum zu einem fruchtbaren philosophischen Ausgangspunkt geworden. Das wäre sowohl für seine philosophisch-anthropologischen wie auch für seine sprachphilosophischen Erörterungen nachzuweisen. Eben in der Abschätzung und Durchdenkung jener Bereiche bekommt die Idee der Erfahrung ihre Gestaltungskraft. Als Grundmotiv wäre diese Idee zu betrachten - nicht als ein regelmässig wiederkehrender Hinweis oder die Formulierung irgendeiner Wünschbarkeit in philosophicis. Betrachtet man unsere Philosophie der Gegenwart, so ergibt sich, dass ein solcher Ausgangspunkt außer in anthropologischen und be stimmten sprachphilosophischen Erwägungen auch in ethischen Frage stellungen fruchtbar geworden ist - wir weisen auf die amerikanischen und anderen. (shrink)

Consider the following problem. A multinational corporation is expanding its operations to a developing country. The developing country in question is now a democracy or is in the process of becoming one, it has a (fairly) independent and corruption-free judiciary (or is in the process of establishing one), its human rights record, while not perfect, is improving, and its bureaucracy and police are not now terribly corrupt. But not too long ago, none of these things were true. A few years (...) back, the nation was run by a dictator, and the bureaucracy, judiciary, and police were all corrupt. Business people, and everyone else, had to operate within this corrupt system, and for business people this usually involved—at a minimum—lending tacit support to the existing regime, paying bribes, making financial “donations” to the ruling party, overlooking various “activities”, and so forth. (shrink)