There is an obvious role for self-assertion within discourse. It is much less obvious what role self-withdrawal might play. Indeed, it is far from obvious what role it could play. For how can we enter into discourse at all if we pull ourselves from the fray? Heidegger, however, claims not only that self-withdrawal has a role to play but that reticence is the authentic mode of discourse. In this paper, I develop an account of reticence that explains its (...) importance to Being and Time. I argue that Heidegger's conception of reticence is central to his explanation of how the understanding can be developed in terms of the things themselves, rather than in terms of what one says about things. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is 'transparent' in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem 'mental'. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in (...) nature. This, in turn, means that, by itself, transparency does not speak in favour of (and against) the theories it is often thought to speak in favour of (and against). My positive thesis is that the phenomenon referred to as the 'transparency' of visual phenomenal character is best characterized in spatial, not mental, terms. (shrink)

Rawls: Reticent Socialist. By EdmundsonWilliam A. ).

This article discusses implicit conceptions of reticence in the early philosophical writings of Mikhail Bakhtin. Contrary to the image of Bakhtin as a thinker of dialogue, polyphony, and voice, it finds a strand in Bakhtin's thought that suggests that there might be good reasons for remaining silent and not stepping into the world in speech: in reticence, the human being avoids both judgment and being judged, eludes the risk of the addressee's absence or unreliability, and resists the finality (...) of utterance that shares in the finality of death. This essay makes a case for a Bakhtinian apology for quietism and seeks to contribute to recent work in Common Knowledge on that subject. Bakhtin's conception of reticence is usefully understood with reference to threshold situations: in withholding a future word, a human being hovers on the borders of nonbeing and being, on the borders of the present, future, and past. In this sense, reticence is allied to conceptions of fuzziness and blur that have also been concerns of this journal in recent years. In making these claims, the essay relates Bakhtin's thought to a Russian literary tradition of thinking about silence (Tiutchev's and Mandelstam's Silentium poems), as well as to a more broadly European intellectual context (Arendt and Heidegger, for example), where thinkers understand being in terms of becoming and understand disclosure through speech. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de montrer les limites des théories de la ressemblance en musique. Ces théories cherchent à justifier que nous puissions attribuer des émotions à une musique, et soutiennent que l’expression musicale des émotions est analogue à l’expression émotionnelle chez les êtres humains. Une musique triste devrait alors posséder quelque propriété en vertu de laquelle elle puisse ressembler à l’expression de la tristesse chez une personne. Ces approches ont le défaut de reposer sur une notion de (...) similarité qui est à la fois vague et inadéquate. Elles ne parviennent jamais à spécifier en quoi, précisément, la musique et les émotions pourraient bien se ressembler. Je montrerai qu’il est fort peu probable que cette notion de ressemblance, fondée sur un réquisit d’objectivité, puisse nous aider à mieux comprendre la façon dont nous pouvons correctement attribuer des propriétés expressives à une œuvre musicale. (shrink)

This book is the first detailed reconstruction of the late work of John Rawls, who was perhaps the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century. Rawls's 1971 treatise, A Theory of Justice, stimulated an outpouring of commentary on 'justice-as-fairness,' his conception of justice for an ideal, self-contained, modern political society. Most of that commentary took Rawls to be defending welfare-state capitalism as found in Western Europe and the United States. Far less attention has been given to Rawls's 2001 book, Justice (...) as Fairness: A Restatement. In the Restatement, Rawls not only substantially reformulates the 'original position' argument for the two principles of justice-as-fairness but also repudiates capitalist regimes as possible embodiments. Edmundson further develops Rawls's non-ideal theory, which guides us when we find ourselves in a society that falls well short of justice. (shrink)

For perhaps obvious reasons, reticence is not likely to recommend itself as a category with which to perform cross-cultural studies in philosophy. Again, to risk stating the obvious, the theme of reticence would in this context concern what philosophical arguments and texts leave unsaid as well as explicitly advise an audience to leave unsaid. By fixing our attention to gaps, silences, and times where the subject is changed as well as when any of the advice above is explicitly (...) recommended, new insights on how philosophical clarification and ethical cultivation are performed will come into view. That, at least, is the ambition of the present article on the Analects and Wittgenstein. The... (shrink)

This paper tries to answer the question: why did Paul Ricœur keep a nearly total silence after 1963 about Soren Kierkegaard, and was there from the beginning a reticence with regard to Kierkegaard? An answer can be found in the beginning of Ricœur’s work, in his first book written with Mikel Dufrenne on Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de I ’existence. This book that is full of references to Kierkegaard also shows that it was Jaspers’ particular appropriation of the (...) Danish thinker that affected him. But, like Jaspers, Ricœur became too preoccupied with external historical, social and political life to be a true disciple of Kierkegaard. (shrink)

This article argues for a distinction between reticence and lying, on the basis of what Kant says about reticence in his correspondence with Maria von Herbert, as well as in his other ethical writings, and defends this distinction against the objections of Rae Langton ("Duty and Desolation", 1992). I argue that lying is necessarily deceptive, whereas reticence is not necessarily deceptive. Allowing another person to remain ignorant of some matter is a form of reticence that is (...) not deceptive. This form of reticence may be ethically permissible. (shrink)

Like several prominent moral philosophers before him, such as St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, Kant held that it is never morally permissible to tell a lie. Although a great deal has been written on why and how he argued for this conclusion, comparatively little has been written on what, precisely, Kant considered a lie to be, and on how he differentiated between being truthful and being candid, between telling a lie and being reticent, and between telling a lie and (...) other forms of linguistic deception. That is to say, very little has been written on the scope of Kant's prohibition against lying. In this article I will argue that the scope of the prohibition against lying is narrower than it is commonly supposed to be. (shrink)

Using as guiding thread the difference between being and beings, this article traces and questions the movement of Heidegger’s thinking in his non-public writings from Contributions to Philosophy to The Event and ends with references to the thought of Gelassenheit. In 1941–42 this movement takes the form of a “downgoing” into the abyssal, withdrawing dimension of being. Heidegger rethinks the event in terms of inception as he attempts to let go of any form of representational thinking more radically than in (...) Contributions and seeks to respond in imageless saying to nothing but the silent call of beyng. Heidegger’s downgoing brings with it a transformed relation to history and to what he calls “machination,” as well as a shift from dispositions marked by decision, strife, and endurance to thinking in terms of releasing, following, and thanking. (shrink)

The most disturbing gift that Disgrace presents to its readers is the hushed resolve with which Lucy Lurie emerges from her rape to reaffirm her way of life. To consider that way of life, the reader is first invited to align oneself with David Lurie's initial normative reading of his daughter's rape; but then, in a second important step, to join in the change of mind by which David overcomes this initial blindness. Imagine what accepting the invitation to take both (...) of these steps demands of the reader: Will you let yourself undergo a change of mind with David to resee Lucy as resolute and proactive? Will you allow yourself to think along with Lucy that horrific violence does not demand retaliation?Descriptions of... (shrink)

The translation of the Guru Granth Sahib (GGS), or Sikh ‘scripture’, within the discourse of (European) colonial/modernity was enacted by the use of hermeneutics—which oversaw the shift from the openness of praxis to the closure of representation and knowledge. Such a shift demoted certain indigenous interpretive frames, wherein the GGS is assumed to enunciate an excess that far transcends the foreign demand to fix the text’s ‘call’ into singular meanings (beyond time), but rather transforms the hermeneutic desire into a process (...) of learning (Sikhi) through multiple meanings (in time). Thus the GGS is not translated according to a particular life-world, but actively transforms the life-world of those that respond to its excessive call. How should hermeneutics be reformed in this case? If the GGS as text demands interpretation, then the text as Guru demands engagement, and together they would necessarily call forth a radicalization of hermeneutics via a certain poetic reticence to all philosophical messengers. (shrink)

In this paper, the author is trying to disentangle and analyse the principles of Tolkien’s implicit soteriology in The Lord of the Rings. The paper argues that Tokien’s novel is a metaphysical statement about redemption which only adumbrates, and does not clarify, how mankind is saved by divine grace. At the same time, The Lord of the Rings is unambiguous about the Fall. Hence it seems reasonable to say that Tolkien’s work is a reticent soteriology. In order to find an (...) adequate framework for its historical interpretation, the paper also refers to Thomas Mann’s and T. S. Eliot’s respective oeuvres. (shrink)

At a time when the public is increasingly exposed to public scandals, moral defences of privacy are hard to come by. Privacy, it is argued, is merely a cloak for deception and vice. Since the virtuous have nothing to hide, full disclosure of ourselves to others must be a moral obligation. Given the rigour with which Kant defends the prohibition on lying, many have inferred that Kantian ethics must be equally strict on the necessity of truth telling. Do we in (...) fact owe others the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? (shrink)

Healthcare providers have a professional obligation to protect vulnerable patients from harm. An extension of that obligation is the legal mandate in the United States to report any concerns about...

Edmundson has written an admirably concise yet powerful book. It blends a critical account of Rawls’ work with an original case for democratic socialism hewn from Rawlsian stone. In my opinion, this case has some flaws but it remains a timely contribution to the enduring quest for justice and social stability.

This study links Cressey’s established fraud triangle theory to a recently developed academic fraud risk triangle as a platform for identifying the determinants of academic fraud risk factors. The study then evaluates the magnitude and extent to which students are willing to confront the realities of academic fraud and move towards a culture of academic integrity. Most of the studies pertaining to combating academic fraud have primarily been the opinions of the researchers, namely, the faculty. Although students may not be (...) expected to police the fight against academic fraud, their opinions as to what would work and what would not, have not been sufficiently examined, and this study contributes to filling that void. We explore the agreement among students and groups of students concerning specific deterrent strategies. We find two types of strategies, student action and faculty/administration action . Results from 740 students surveyed found that the most widely supported strategies are stronger penalties, parental notification, an anonymous tip line, and administering a uniform policy. The least supported strategies were academic honor code, no strategy at all, requiring an ethics course, and leaving individual instructors to determine penalties. Further, full time, domestic, undergraduate, and male students favor student action strategies, which are more reactionary and less punitive. (shrink)

The reticence of scholars of ethics to enter into fundamental moral reasoning is well known. William Casebeer’s ambitious new book, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, which is the publication of his 2001 University of California, San Diego, Ph.D. dissertation, stands in stark contrast. Casebeer, who teaches philosophy at the U.S. Air Force Academy, has undertaken the project of developing a comprehensive moral theory derived from what he terms “methodological naturalism.” Methodological naturalism, he explains, is a system (...) of moral reasoning derived exclusively from the empirically verifiable claims of science. His ethic starts with the materialist premise that all reality is reducible to matter and energy; since matter and energy are sufficiently explainable in terms of facts derived from the scientific method; morality too, as real—he is undeniably a moral realist—must be sufficiently explained in terms of such facts. With particular attention given to the cognitive sciences and evolutionary biology, Casebeer’s naturalism boldly asserts that ethics is reducible to science, moral norms to empirical facts, and practical judgments to theoretical propositions. This of course implicates the author in what critics refer to as the “naturalistic fallacy,” that is, the illicit inference from facts to norms. Aware of this, Casebeer attempts to show that such an inference is not only not illicit but itself the substance of fundamental moral reasoning. Unfortunately his refutation of the naturalistic fallacy is selective. He reduces the entire complex discussion to a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, then successfully throws into doubt the existence of such a distinction and judges himself done with the whole question. Using David Hume and G. E. Moore as his principal foils, his refutation entirely ignores the most enduring and plausible argument against deriving “ought” from “is,” proposed by the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas and his contemporary expositor, the Oxford philosopher John Finnis. (shrink)

Miss Arendt is more reticent than, perhaps, she should be, about what actually went on in this public realm of the Greeks. —W. H. Auden.

Malgré l’évidente réticence du parti anticlérical à adopter une nouvelle religion avec un dogme et des sacrements, la promotion philosophico-politique du lien social sous la Troisième République a conduit à revisiter en théorie, sinon en pratique, quelques thèmes majeurs du positivisme religieux. Le parcours ici proposé va de la politique (Ferry, Léon Bourgeois, Jaurès, la libre-pensée) à la philosophie morale et sociale (Jean-Marie Guyau, Alfred Fouillée, Gustave Belot, Émile Boutroux) et de celle-ci à la sociologie (Durkheim) et à l’analyse de (...) la pensée (Alain). L’usage ambigu, sélectif, des textes et des idées de Comte, mélange d’hommage et d’aversion, reflète la liberté d’interprétation qui parvient à féconder une philosophie au-delà de son cadre d’origine. L’enquête privilégie cet axe de recherche et met au jour les transactions par lesquelles s’est monnayé un héritage que l’on aurait tort de croire aujourd’hui disparu. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science are ontologically committed to a lush rainforest of special science entities ), but are often reticent about the criteria that determine which entities count as real. On the other hand, the metaphysics literature is much more forthcoming about such criteria, but often links ontological commitment to irreducibility. We argue that the irreducibility criteria are in tension with scientific realism: for example, they would exclude viruses, which are plausibly theoretically reducible and yet play a sufficiently important role (...) in scientific accounts of the world that they should be included in our ontology. In this paper, we show how the inhabitants of the rainforest can be inoculated against the eliminative threat of reduction: by demonstrating that they are emergent. According to our account, emergence involves a screening off condition as well as novelty. We go on to demonstrate that this account of emergence, which is compatible with theoretical reducibility, satisfies common intuitions concerning what should and shouldn't count as real: viruses are emergent, as are trouts and turkeys, but philosophically gerrymandered objects like trout-turkeys do not qualify. (shrink)

0. My aims in this paper are largely expository: I am more interested in presenting the picture theory than deciding its truth. Even so, I hope that the arguments by which I develop the theory will do something to support it, since I believe that what I will present as Wittgenstein's view is indeed the truth. This is not an admission of insanity, though some things that have been thought intrinsic to the picture theory are things it would be insane (...) to believe. So clearly the view I will present, when compared to the most embracing interpretations, is a partial and selective one. It would be another kind of madness, one I am just as eagre to disown, to suppose that my own favoured selection is the only possible one. That is pretty well the last remark in this paper about other commentators. I trust my reticence entitles me to be presumed catholic until proven nonconformist. (shrink)

The moral status of professional boundaries and the ethical nature of dual and multiple overlapping human relationships in contemporary clinical practice remain enduring problems in all health care disciplines. In this paper I explore the ethics of dual or multiple overlapping relationship and apply a virtue ethics framework to the case of psychotherapy.After clarifying the context and meaning of commonly used terminology, and considering what some of the key Australian codes of ethics relevant to psychotherapy advise about dual relationships, I (...) identify some commonly occurring situations where overlapping relationships are unavoidable. A case study from a rural context where size, isolation, and community expectations profoundly impact on the capacity of a psychotherapist to maintain clearly defined professional therapeutic relationship boundaries is analysed. The rural example is pertinent. A virtue ethics approach goes some way toward alleviating perceptions about the nature of dual relationships that contribute to an enduring reticence amongst psychotherapists (and other professionals) to practice in rural settings.Clearly, if a dual relationship involves exploitation then that relationship is a boundary crossing that should rightly be categorised as a boundary violation. Boundary violations are exploitative and unethical. However, some dual relationships may involve boundary crossings that are not necessarily boundary violations. Despite their general prohibition by Australian (and many other countries’) codes of ethics relevant to psychotherapy, I argue that in certain situations, if a psychotherapist (who crosses a professional relationship boundary) acts with professional integrity from the distinct professional role-related virtues and/or regulative ideals that ensure the goals of psychotherapy (to increase autonomy and psychological wellbeing) are met, then a dual or multiple overlapping relationship in psychotherapy will be ethical. (shrink)

Dans Adv. math., X, 216-218, Sextus Empiricus rapporte une mystérieuse doctrine d' « Énésidème selon Héraclite » d'après laquelle le temps est identifié à un corps. L'hypothèse défendue ici est que cette formule exprime une théorie à usage dialectique et critique, construite par Énésidème afin d'inserer la thèse d' Héraclite dans un débat fictif où interviennent d'autres positions dogmatiques. Alors que la plupart des historiens de la philosophie nient l'authenticité héraclitéenne de ce témoignage, dans ses Leçons sur l'histoire de la (...) philosophie Hegel l'accepte sans réticence, aussi bien du point de vue historique que du point de vue théorique et y voit l'anticipation de sa propre notion du temps comme première forme du devenir. In Adv. Math., X, 216-218, Sextus Empiricus recalls a mysterious doctrine of a so-called « Enesidemus according to Heraclitus » according to which time is identified to a body. The hereby sustained hypothesis goes to saying that such a saying expresses some kind of theory meant to be used both dialectically and critically. It is said to have been erected by Enesidemes so as to be able to insert Heraclitus' thesis into a fictitious debate in which other dogmatic positions may interplay. Whereas most historians of philosophy deny the Heraclitean authenticity of such a testimony, Hegel, in his Lessons on the History of Philosophy, accepts it without any form of reticence, both on the historical point of view and on the theoretical point of view, thus viewing in it the foresight of his own concept of time as first form of the becoming. (shrink)

Buchanan highlighted the inconsistencies that arise when public services are financed by general taxation. Citizens increase their demand for services, even though citizens are reticent to increase taxation. Buchanan invited readers to explore the impact of different assumptions of politicians’ behaviour. In this chapter, attention focuses on the way that vote maximising governments are likely to respond to the divorce between receipt and payment for services. Buchanan illustrated his analysis with reference to the National Health Service in the UK. Predictions (...) are tested with reference to the pattern of excess demand in the National Health Service between 1970 and 2012. (shrink)

In Voyous, Jacques Derrida develops his argument starting from the presupposition that democracy as such is the entity whose integrity and immunity are at stake and, therefore, under investigation. This gesture reflects the setting in which ten years before, in Foi et savoir, he had cast his reasoning about the logic of immunity. There, it was one of the sources of religion, the immunity of the sacred, that operated according to this logic. The hyphen between these two essays, beside Derrida’s (...) own crossed references, is the genealogical reasoning on the meaning and essence of the concept of democracy: contrary to what Derrida claims, it will be maintained that Athenian democracy had a clear immune matrix, whose constant exercise is clearly defined, in spite of himself, by Vernant, and it will be shown how modern democracy has been forced to change policy. Modern democracy is an entity characterized by an immune deficiency. In order to save Derrida’s intuition from both the collapse of different vantage points and from a quite bizarre reticence in taking into account of the immune value of rituals, our starting point will be René Girard’s œuvre and his reading of the role of immune logic in sacred systems and, more generally, in modernity. The threshold between the auto-immune reaction, immune deficiency and auto-immune disease, between the sacrifice who delimits and constitutes the self and the holocauste du peuple en détail, is the space where, constantly exposed to the risk of auto-denial, democracy lives. (shrink)

Devenue mixte de façon très empirique depuis les années 1960, l’école est souvent mise en question pour son enseignement inégalitaire. L’auteure pose donc dans ce livre la question de la notion de l’égalité entre les sexes à l’école, une égalité qui se heurte à de fortes réticences provenant des traditions sociales et disciplinaires, des préjugés, des comportements hérités et même plus vraiment réfléchis. L’enjeu pédagogique, social et citoyen est majeur puisque, au-delà des savoirs, les manu...

Les auteurs dont il est principalement question dans cet ouvrage (Durkheim, Weber, Habermas et Bourdieu) poursuivent, quoi qu'on en pense, le même objectif. Chacun est soucieux de la spécificité et de la relative autonomie des sciences humaines et sociales. Chacun emprunte cette nouvelle voie dans l'histoire des sciences en reconnaissant de facto les liens qui continuent exister entre sociologie et philosophie. Lorsqu'il est question de problèmes moraux, ils les situent dans le cadre général de l'action, si bien que leur sociologie (...) de la morale est intimement intégrée à leur théorie propre de l'action. La réticence vis-à-vis des particularismes et vis-à-vis d'un pur relativisme, réputés indépassables, leur est pour l'essentiel commune. Aucun d'eux ne fait basculer la morale dans l'irrationnel et ceci en raison du rapport à leurs yeux indestructible qui existe entre raison et morale. On peut penser que cette proximité saisissante de quatre sociologies par ailleurs divergentes indique une affinité avec la philosophie kantienne et, plus loin, avec l'éthique aristotélicienne. C'est pourquoi la première partie de l'ouvrage débute par une lecture de l'Ethique à Nicomaque et de la Critique de la raison pratique. Ces lectures sont celles d'un sociologue à la recherche des racines de sa propre discipline et d'un parcours possible de la raison pratique. La seconde partie de l'ouvrage procède à une mise au point critique de concepts nécessaires à l'élaboration d'une sociologie de l'éthique : la personne, l'espace public, la responsabilité, le long terme. (shrink)

In this paper, we reflect on our experience as science and technology studies researchers who were members of the working group that produced A Synthetic Biology Roadmap for the UK in 2012. We explore how this initiative sought to govern an uncertain future and describe how it was successfully used to mobilize public funds for synthetic biology from the UK government. We discuss our attempts to incorporate the insights and sensibilities of STS into the policy process and why we chose (...) to use the concept of responsible research and innovation to do so. We analyze how the roadmapping process, and the final report, narrowed and transformed our contributions to the roadmap. We show how difficult it is for STS researchers to influence policy when our ideas challenge deeply entrenched pervasive assumptions, framings, and narratives about how technological innovation necessarily leads to economic progress, about public reticence as a roadblock to that progress, and about the supposed separation between science and society. We end by reflecting on the constraints under which we were operating from the outset and on the challenges for STS in policy. (shrink)

Based on the concept of the third paradigm of the «first philosophy», the article analyzes the theo- retical and practical philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel. The role of discursive practices as a paradig- matic basis of the philosophy of communication and meta-institutions of all the rest institutions of society is revealed. The author considers the achievements of Ukrainian philosophers in the study of Apel’s heritage, as well as the possibilities of applying Apel’s philosophical theorizing in the study of Ukrainian realities, development (...) of the Ukrainian ethos, and possibility of theo- retical substantiation and practical legitimization of institutions and values. In addition to this, it is also about the relationship between universalist morality and the particular ethos of local worlds, as well as the relationship between the concepts of universalist ethics and global ethos. Using Apel’s methodology, the author of the article argues that the revival of the conventional ethos and the institutional stage of development of moral consciousness does not end the problem of moral development of the Ukrainian nation. The next, no less important, task is the transition to a potentially democratic postconventional morality, which is achieved by communicative ratio- nalization of the world, the creation of institutions of deliberative democracy. The great role and influence of Apel’s philosophy in the world, which is manifested in the fact that there is a kind of communicative international, which unites many supporters of the Apel paradigm in such well known organization as the “Karl-Otto Apel Centro Filosofico Internazionale”, and in such journals as “Topologik”, “Ethik+Diskurs”, etc., which conduct researches based on the Apel paradigm. (shrink)

This paper empirically investigates the contention that the folk concept of time is a functional concept: a concept according to which time is whatever plays a certain functional role or roles. This hypothesis could explain why, in previous research, surprisingly large percentages of participants judge that there is time at worlds that contain no one-dimensional substructure of ordered instants. If it seems to participants that even in those worlds the relevant functional role is played, then this could explain why they (...) judge that there is time in those worlds. While our experiment supported the finding that participants are reticent to judge that there is no time, actually, we found no evidence that this is because they deploy a functionalist concept, at least of the kind proposed in recent research. Our findings are, however, consistent with the folk deploying a much more minimal functionalist concept according to which time is just whatever it is—regardless of its nature—that plays the role of grounding our temporal phenomenology. (shrink)

Although Kant’s moral philosophy is often presented as a kind of secularized Christianity, Kant seems to have very little to say about forgiveness, a topic of some traditional Christian interest. This reticence is particularly striking when we consider the central role in Kant’s thought played by ideas of obligation, responsibility and guilt.

This paper aims to clarify the status of capability in Sen’s idea of justice. Sen’s name is so widely associated with the concept of capability that commentators often assume that his contribution to the study of justice amounts to a capability theory, albeit underdeveloped. We argue that such a reading is misleading. Taking Sen’s reticence about operationalization seriously, we show that his contribution is inconsistent with a capability theory. Instead, we defend the idea that the capability approach plays a (...) heuristic role: capability is a step in his argument against alternative materials, but is not meant as a definitive end. Sen defends a critical perspective primarily to encourage public reasoning and respect for agency as regards the definition of what should count in the evaluation of social states. (shrink)

The epistemological literature on conspiracy theory has established that strict generalism about conspiracy theories is untenable. This chapter argues, however, that this does not license a move to naive or strict particularism. Rather, any consideration of specific conspiracy claims needs to address conspiracy theory not simply as a formal category of explanation, but as a distinctive social practice, with a history and explanatory repertoire that can give us important, if defeasible, reasons for rejecting at least some such types of claim. (...) These reasons are not merely epistemic. The moral costs of participating in such practices, and of levelling conspiracy accusations in general, generate corresponding ethical requirements for reticence about entertaining conspiracy theories. This doesn’t mean we can retreat to generalism; but it does mean particularism must be governed by a reluctance that, in practice, will rule out a great many conspiracy theory claims as candidates for serious investigation. (shrink)