The essays in this 1996 volume explore the ways in which traditional philosophical problems about self-knowledge, self-identity, and value have migrated into literature since the Romantic and Idealist periods. How do so-called literary works take up these problems in a new way? What conception of the subject is involved in this literary practice? How are the lines of demarcation between philosophy and literature problematised? The contributors examine these issues with reference both to Romantic and Idealist writers and to some of (...) their literary and philosophical inheritors and revisers. Their essays offer a philosophical understanding of the roots and nature of contemporary literary and philosophical practice, and elaborate, powerful and influential, but rarely decisively articulated, conceptions of the human subject and of value. (shrink)

C'est en mettant en oeuvre l'Idée de la philosophie comme métaphysique scientifique que Kant met au jour l'"être" de l'homme, c'est-à-dire l'a priori transcendantal qui fonde l'existence proprement humaine. Il y aurait donc cooriginarité de l'existence de l'homme et de l'essence de la "philosophie". De ce point de vue, l'existence, à proprement parler, est"philosophique". Ainsi, 1'"éthique" existentielle peut être pensée comme l'Idée même de la "vérité", "vérité" de l'homme, "être" - "devoir-être" qui fonde la représentation de toute (...) "vérité" théorique, esthétique et pratique. Mais comment penser l'origine même de cette Idée d'une "vérité" de l'existence humaine, c'est-à-dire d'un "propre" de l'homme? Donc l'origine de l'Idée même de "philosophie"? Ce qui est le plus originaire, ne serait-ce pas la résolution d'exister (et de concevoir l'existence) d'une manière spécifique, que nous qualifions de "philosophique"? Mais si l'Idée de l'existence humaine se conçoit en termes de décisionnisme "philosophique", quel est le "sens" de ce décisionnisme? Autrement dit, puisque la question "qu'est-ce que l'homme" est, comme le soutient Kant, la question de la "philosophie", qu'est-ce donc que la "philosophie"? (shrink)

Five leading figures in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science debate the central topic of mental representation. Each author's contribution is specially written for this volume, and then collectively discussed by the others. The editor frames the discussions and provides a way into the debates for new readers. An exciting feature of this collection is the transcribed discussion among all the contributors following each exchange. This is the latest thinking on mental representation carefully and critically analysed by the leading (...) thinkers in the field. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Representation -- The Transition -- The Sign-Systems of 1908 -- Rhetorical Concerns -- Interpretation, Worldviews and the Object.

Philosophie du langage et philosophie de l'esprit constituent désormais un tout indissociable. Les expressions linguistiques «signifient». Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? François Recanati distingue trois réponses possibles. Selon la première, signifier c'est (pour une expression linguistique) être associée à des représentations mentales. Selon la deuxième, signifier c'est «faire référence» et renvoyer à quelque chose dans le monde – une réalité extralinguistique. Selon la troisième, enfin, signifier, c'est jouer un rôle distinctif dans cette activité sociale qu'est la parole. La (...) première réponse renvoie aux représentations mentales. Mais qu'est-ce, pour une représentation mentale, que d'avoir un contenu? La vraie question, est-on tenté de penser, est plus générale : qu'est-ce que signifier ou avoir un contenu? Qu'est-ce qu'une représentation (linguistique ou mentale)? Les philosophes contemporains recherchent une théorie du contenu qui soit suffisamment générale pour s'appliquer à la pensée aussi bien qu'au langage. François Recanati nous introduit à leurs efforts, et conclut en faveur de l'approche «pragmatique» inspirée de Wittgenstein. Ce qui fait que la pensée et le langage représentent le monde, c'est avant tout le fait que la pensée et le langage sont dans le monde, qu'ils y ont leur place et y jouent leur rôle. (shrink)

Deleuze’s philosophy of painting can be seen to pose certain challenges to a phenomenological approach to philosophy. While a phenomenological response to Deleuze’s philosophy is clearly needed, I show in this article how an approach taken in a recent paper by Christian Lotz proves inadequate. Lotz argues that through Deleuze’s refusal to accept the place of representation in art, he is unable to distinguish art from decoration, or to give a coherent account of how the content of art can be (...) represented. I show that this criticism emerges from a misreading of the place of representation in Deleuze’s philosophy. I will argue that by failing to take account of some of the key features of Deleuze’s wider ontology, such as the importance of both the virtual and the actual for his analysis of objects, Lotz’s critique proves unsuccessful. In particular, I want to show that Lotz’s criticisms rest on a failure to attend to the systematic nature of Deleuze’s philosophy, and in particular, the place of Deleuze’s analysis of Bacon within the system as a whole. I will further show that Lotz’s phenomenological defence commits the fallacy of petitio principii, assuming the validity of the phenomenological method in order to justify the phenomenological approach. (shrink)

It is supposed to be common knowledge about the history of ideas that one of the few medieval philosophical contributions preserved in modern philosophical thought is the idea that mental phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality, their directedness toward some object. As is usually the case with such commonplaces about the history of ideas, this claim is not quite true. Medieval philosophers routinely described ordinary physical phenomena, such as reflections in mirrors or sounds in the air, as (...) exhibiting intentionality, while they described what modern philosophers would take to be typically mental phenomena, such as sensation and imagination, as ordinary physical processes. Still, it is true that medieval philosophers would regard all acts of cognition as characterized by intentionality, on account of which all these acts are some sort of representations of their intended objects. This course is going to provide a broad survey of the conceptual relationships between intentionality, cognition and mental representation as conceived by some of the greatest medieval philosophers, including Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and Buridan, and some of their lesser known contemporaries. The clarification of these conceptual connections sheds some light not only on the intriguing historical relationships between medieval and modern thought on these issues, but also on some fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind as it is conceived today. (shrink)

This book provides an original perspective on the debate about anti-representationalism and the nature of philosophy. This debate has come to prominence in recent years through the work of people like Richard Rorty, Paul Horwich, Huw Price and Amie Thomasson. It is the first book to explicitly consider this well-known pragmatist kind of anti-representationalism in relation to anti-representationalist views in other areas of philosophy, in particular the philosophy of perception and cognitive science. Taking as its point of departure the neo-pragmatism (...) of Rorty and Price, it critiques the way these (and other) thinkers develop, on this basis, a positive view of philosophy and its remit. By examining the debate about representationalism versus anti-representationalism in perception and cognitive science it provides a different way of understanding the significance of neo-pragmatism, as well as providing an independently interesting perspective on these other debates. A central idea in this perspective involves distinguishing between a world-for-us and a world-in-itself, though in a different way from Kant and many other philosophers. The book extends these reflections to examine questions about realism and the limits of metaphysics for anti-representationalist pragmatism, arguing the view can uphold a common sense kind of realism, as well as the value of distinctively philosophical enquiry in metaphysics. (shrink)

I argue that it is possible and useful for moral philosophy to provide surveyable representations of moral vocabulary. I proceed in four steps. First, I present two dominant interpretations of the concept “surveyable representation”. Second, I use these interpretations as a background against which I present my own interpretation. Third, I use my interpretation to support the claim that Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics” counts as an example of a surveyable representation. I conclude that, since the lecture qualifies as a surveyable (...) representation, it is possible to provide surveyable representations of moral vocabulary. Fourth, I argue that it is useful for contemporary moral philosophy to provide surveyable representations, because it may help to dissolve problems in current debates. I provide an example of such a debate, namely, the debate between cognitivists and non-cognivitists. (shrink)

This essay develops a theory of representation that confirms realism – an objective dependent on establishing that reality is autonomous of representation. I argue that the autonomy of reality is not incompatible with epistemic access and that an adequate account of representation is capable of satisfying both criteria. Pursuit of this argument brings the work of C. S. Peirce and Roy Bhaskar together. Peirce’s doctrine of semiotics is essentially a realist theory of representation and is thus relevant to the project (...) of critical realism. However, critical realism is also required to finesse Peirce’s intricate over-theorising. Although a complete treatment remains absent from Bhaskar’s writings, his philosophy, I discovered, incorporates an implicit theory of representation. Peirce can be employed to extract this theory and amplify it. The only way the problem of representation can be addressed adequately is to locate it in a realist framework. This, however, is contingent on re-conceiving representation as a process rather than an object. Such a ‘perspectival switch’ reconfirms the intentional structure of representation but also suggests that it be considered in teleological terms as an activity oriented to a trans-representational object. Representation finally emerges as a form of inquiry with the aim to make being accessible in its autonomy. (shrink)

This is the first collection of essays focused on the many-faceted work of Kendall L. Walton. Walton has shaped debate about the arts for the last 50 years. He provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the arts in terms of the human capacity of make-believe that shows how different arts--visual, photographic, musical, literary, or poetic--can be explained in terms of complex structures of pretense, perception, imagining, empathy, and emotion. His ground-breaking work has been taken beyond aesthetics to address foundational issues (...) concerning linguistic and scientific representations--for example about the nature of scientific modelling or to explain how what we say is mostly quite different from the literal meanings of our words. Contributions from a diverse group of philosophers probe Walton's detailed proposals and the themes for research they open to provide an overview of important debates that have Walton's work at their core. This book will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working on aesthetics across the humanities, as well as those interested in the topic of representation and its intersection with perception, language, science, and metaphysics. (shrink)

The notions of mental representation and intentionality are thought to have originated with Descartes in the seventeenth century. The authors in this book challenge this assumption and show that the history of these ideas can be traced back to the medieval period. They conclude that there is no clear dividing line between western late medieval and early modern philosophy.

La place généralement attribuée à Kierkegaard dans l'histoire de la philosophie témoigne toujours d'un certain embarras. Lui qui, ironiquement, prétendait avoir, au moment même où il écrivait, une place déjà réservée dans la grande nécropole des philosophies disparues, il n'a cessé d'importuner ceux qui ont voulu l'enterrer. Qu'était-il? Philosophe anti-hégélien, incarnant la réaction de la subjectivité concrète contre le système abstrait de la métaphysique à son achèvement? Père de l'existentialisme? Chrétien torturé? Ironiste et " penseur privé "? Polémiste? " (...) Poète du religieux "? Simplement écrivain? Cet essai voudrait montrer que cette incertitude tient au fait que Kierkegaard ne construit pas seulement des catégories philosophiques qui vont marquer l'histoire de la philosophie au XXe siècle, de Heidegger à Gadamer ou Wittgenstein, mais qu'il invente surtout une nouvelle manière de philosopher. Car la " pensée existentielle ", une philosophie qui veut penser le fait même de l'existence dans ce qu'il a d'irréductible au Concept, nécessite un autre discours- une autre façon de parler, de bâtir des concepts, mais aussi de s'adresser au lecteur et de se faire comprendre de lui. Et pour remplir cette exigence, la littérature peut venir au secours de la philosophie : elle construit des fictions et installe un philosophe en première personne dans un discours jusqu'alors funestement voué à l'impersonnalité, elle se donne un lecteur singulier et des jeux complexes de représentation qui doivent indiquer ce qui échappe généralement à l'objectivité du discours. Il faut alors moins examiner le contenu de cette philosophie que la forme qui en rend possible la production, cette singulière façon de philosopher, cette manière de philosopher au singulier et pour le singulier- la réinvention de l'acte de philosopher et d'écrire. (shrink)

Spatial Representation presents original, specially written essays by leading psychologists and philosophers on a fascinating set of topics at the intersection of these two disciplines. They address such questions as these: Do the extraordinary navigational abilities of birds mean that these birds have the same kind of grip on the idea of a spatial world as we do? Is there a difference between the way sighted and blind subjects represent the world 'out there'? Does the study of brain-injured subjects, such (...) as 'blind seers', tell us anything about the working of normal spatial consciousness? -/- The essays are arranged into five sections, each of which reflects a central area of research into spatial cognition, and opens with a short introduction by the editors, designed to facilitate cross-disciplinary reading. The volume as a whole offers a rich and compelling expression of the view that to advance our understanding of the way we represent the external world it is necessary to draw on both philosophical and psychological approaches. (shrink)

Ce livre traite de l'image, mais aussi, plus generalement, de la copie, du double, de la representation, du calque, du sosie... La philosophie, a juste titre, a mis en garde contres ces si dangereux reflets. Ne doit-on pas preferer ce qui est a ce qui l'imite ou le mime? Mefions-nous des leurres! Cependant, on est revenu sur cette seculaire et injuste condamnation. La technologie moderne a peu a peu sauve celle qu'on avait trop inferiorisee et eloignee. Et quelle victoire! (...) L'image numerique, donc celle de synthese, l'arrache a une servitude que les philosophes classiques et meme plus modernes avaient scellee. L'electro-optique, la tomodensitometrie (scannographie), l'holographie, entre autres, multiplient les prouesses liberatrices. Dans le passe, la photographie, voire la radiographie avaient deja ebranle les anciennes positions. La guerre commencait. L'imagerie deferle donc, ainsi que l'industrie noire des contrefacons, des plagiats, des pseudo-repliques, du pastiche. Les trucages et la fraude. Mais ou situer aujourd'hui le vrai et le faux? Comment distinguer le modele et son equivalent? Les vieilles frontieres, comme on le montrera, s'estompent. Quel branle-bas et quelle fete aussi! On a voulu prendre acte de cette nouveaute. Hatons-nous, malgre le danger de nous y perdre, d'engager la philosophie que nous croyons reticente dans ce tourbillon. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Is Philosophy Part of Web Science?; Representations and the Web; Enactive Search; Cognitive Extension and Cognitive Intelligence; From the Extended Mind to the Web; and the Web as Collective Intelligence.

Cet ouvrage proposé un panorama complet des débats contemporains en philosophie de la biologie. Il consacre une large place à la représentation des principes fondateurs de la théorie de l'évolution et des principaux concepts et lois génétiques, ainsi qu'à l'examen des questions posées par la sélection naturelle comme par la notion de fitness et l'unité de sélection. L'auteur discute en ces pages la définition du vivant et la potion de fonction biologique, et développe notamment une conception causale et (...) mécaniste des processus biologiques dans une perspective réductionniste originale. Clair et didactique, cet ouvrage résume systématiquement l'état actuel des connaissances, présente les différents concepts et positions, propose une évaluation des résultats et montre que les questions ouvertes dépasse largement le seul cadre de la biologie. Il vise ainsi à contribuer au développement d'une philosophie de la biologie nouvelle, en lien étroit avec la philosophie des sciences dans son ensemble. (shrink)

L’essai analyse la structure de la philosophie politique de Fichte en l’inscrivant dans le contexte formé par les concepts politiques mis en place par la doctrine du droit naturel. De cette science, qui a pour éléments principaux les droits des individus, la souveraineté et la représentation, Fichte découvre la logique, qu’il poursuit jusqu’à son aporie constitutive. Dans la période de maturité de sa pensée, le philosophe paraît dépasser l’autosuffisance du droit naturel en direction d’une philosophie de la (...) pratique, ce qui semble conforme à l’évolution de la Doctrine de la Science.Duso’s essay focuses on Fichte’s political philosophy stressing its relation to the context of modern political concepts and their origin within the modern science of natural right. Fichte analyses its elements and thinks back over its logic, showing its aporetical core. In the years of his maturity Fichte seems to go beyond the self-sufficiency of natural rights theories towards a philosophy of practice more consonant with the developments of his Doctrine of the Science. (shrink)

This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. If (...) there are indeed two different kinds of representations, and the non-standard ones are the ones referred to in some areas of cognitive neuroscience, then we will have to give up the idea that appealing to inner representations with intentional contents is the defining distinction between cognitive neuroscience and behaviorist psychology (Montgomery, 1995). Further, if the conclusions of this paper are correct, many general accounts of how neural states represent are either false or theoretically ill-motivated. (shrink)

La considération de « l’élément germanique » chez Comte participe d’un projet de réorganisation européenne. Madame de Staël avait légué l’image d’une Allemagne rêveuse et métaphysicienne. Comte développe une autre représentation : celle d’un pays marqué par l’esprit protestant (négatif et critique) et la philosophie de la nature (un panthéisme philosophique). Ces caractéristiques incitent Comte à dégrader le rang de l’Allemagne dans le classement des cinq nations européennes susceptibles de participer à la construction d’une république occidentale positiviste. Toutefois, (...) Comte a hésité avant de déclasser l’Allemagne, car celle-ci possède aussi un formidable atout : le sens des généralités et de la systématisation, indispensable à la philosophie positive. C’est la « situation » de l’Allemagne qui est jugée, et non la nation allemande. Ainsi est-ce à travers l’histoire, et la loi qui en règle le cours, qu’il convient d’étudier cette question. (shrink)

The problem of values has given rise to a bewildering variety of theories. Louis Lavelle set himself the task of expounding and systematizing these diverse doctrines, of making “une sorte de tableau de toutes les directions dans lesquelles s’est engagée la reflection humaine au cours de son histoire, lorsqu’il s’est agi de definir pour elle la valeur absolue et les valeurs particulières”. He tried to bring order into the work of ages, situating it in a vaster order according to his (...) own views of man’s privileged place in the universe. Of course the study of values made by this great psychologist–metaphysician was far more than a lifeless gathering together of dry concepts: it involved a representation, from a new angle, of his entire philosophy of being. “Le problème essentiel de la métaphysique, le seul dont la solution puisse éclairer notre vie et guider notre conduite, c’est le problème du rapport entre l’être et la valeur”. M. Wesley Piersol now presents a fine compendium of Lavelle’s thought on value. He divides his study into four parts, aiming at thus keeping close to the line of development of the philosopher’s views. In the first part is found Lavelle’s analysis of the faculties of the moi, sentiment, will, preference, judgment of value. From this analysis is derived his understanding of the characters of value. Next comes a section on the incarnation of value by liberty in time: thus a psychology of value develops into a metaphysics of value. Finally, there is a section on the relation between axiology and ontology. The book is well planned and the matter clearly presented but, as anybody who is acquainted with Lavell’s writings must know, clarity and charm in presentation do not eliminate difficulty. (shrink)

Le livre de Borkenau, „Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild“ développe une nouvelle théorie de la naissance de la pensée moderne. Il s’attache à rechercher l’origine, moins de telles ou telles idées particulières que des concepts fondamentaux et des méthodes de penser de l'époque moderne. Borkenau considère avant tout la représentation mécaniste du monde telle qu'elle a été fondée dans la philosophie de Descartes et de ses successeurs comme décisive pour la pensée moderne et il élucide ses (...) conditions sociologiques.L'étude de Grossmann part du livre de Borkenau qu'il soumet à la critique et il essaye d'indiquer de manière indépendante une meilleure voie qui mène à la compréhension de la formation de la pensée bourgeoise. Ses arguments se rapportent avant tout à deux groupes de problèmes. D'après Borkenau, c'est au début du xvne siècle que la conception mécaniste du monde l'a emporté sur la philosophie qualitative qui régnait auparavant. Cette interprétation est jugée par Grossmann comme une méconnaissance de l'histoire réelle des idées et des faits. L'origine des questions fondamentales de la mécanique doit être cherchée à la Renaissance et Léonard de Vinci est un de ses créateurs. Ces théories nouvelles, dégagées en grande partie de l'étude des machines de son temps, se sont développées par différentes voies jusqu'à Galilée et Descartes, dont les doctrines ne marquent donc pas le début de la pensée mécaniste.L'autre critique fondamentale est étroitement liée à celle-ci. Elle concerne l'explication que donne Borkenau de la représentation mécaniste. Si celle- ci a pris naissance au xvne siècle, la condition essentielle de cette réalisation doit donc s’être produite à peu près à cette époque. D'après Borkenau cette condition serait la diffusion des manufactures. Avec la division de l'activité artisane en activités uniformes non qualifiées à l'intérieur de la manufacture, serait né le concept d'un travail social abstrait. La décomposition du processus de travail en mouvements simples dans la manufacture aurait rendu comparables les heures de travail. Le calcul avec du travail abstrait constituerait la base de la représentation mécaniste du monde. Grossmann montre en s'appuyant sur Marx que le plus souvent il ne saurait être question de division de travail dans les manufactures, mais que, en règle générale, des artisans qualifiés travaillaient réunis dans un même local. Ce n’est pas le calcul avec les heures de travail, mais l'évolution du machinisme qui aurait été la cause immédiate de la mécanique scientifique. Cette genèse remonte sans doute à la Renaissance et a très peu à faire avec les manufactures qui ont été finalement refoulées par l'industrie des machines.Alors que Borkenau, lorsqu'il vient à parler du conditionnement social des philosophes et des savants, remonte surtout aux batailles des partis politiques, Grossmann ne voit dans les partis qu’un facteur de l'ensemble de la situation complexe, à partir de laquelle s'explique le mouvement des idées modernes. Une théorie suffisante de l'évolution de la pensée moderne implique qu'on tienne compte de la totalité des forces sociales.Franz Borkenau's book „The Transition from Feudal to Modern Thought“ („Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild“), serves as background for Grossmann's study. The objective of this book was to trace the sociological origins of the mechanistic categories of modern thought as developed in the philosophy of Descartes and his successors. In the beginning of the 17th century, according to Borkenau, mechanistic thinking triumphed over mediaeval philosophy which emphasized qualitative, not quantitative considerations. This transition from mediaeval and feudal methods of thought to modern principles is the general theme of Borkenau's book, and is traced to the social changes of this time. According to this work, the essential economic change that marked the transition from mediaeval to modern times was the destruction of the handicraft system and the organization of labor under one roof and under one management. The roots of the change in thought are to be sought here. With the dismemberment of the handicraft system and the division of labor into relatively unskilled, uniform, and therefore comparable activities, the conception of abstract homogeneous social labor arises. The division of the labor process into simple, repeated movements permits a comparison of hours of labor. Calculation with such abstract social unities, according to Borkenau, was the source from which modern mechanistic thinking in general derived its origin.Grossmann, although he considers Borkenau’s work a valuable and important contribution, does not believe that the author has achieved his purpose. First of all, he contends that the period that Borkenau describes as the period of the triumph of modern thought over mediaeval should not be placed at the beginning of the 17th century, but in the Renaissance, and that not Descartes and Hobbes but Leonardo da Vinci was the initiator of modern thought. Leonardo's theories, evolved from a study of machines, were the source of the mechanistic categories that culminated in modern thought.If Borkenau’s conception as to the historical origin of these categories is incorrect in regard to time, Grossman claims it follows that it is incorrect also in regard to the social sources to which it is ascribed. In the beginning, the factory system did not involve a division of labor into comparable homogeneous processes, but in general only united skilled handicraftsmen under one roof. The development of machinery, not the calculation with abstract hours of labor, is the immediate source of modern scientific mechanics. This goes back to the Renaissance and has relatively little to do with the original factory system that was finally superseded by the Industrial Revolution.While Borkenau, in tracing the social background of the thought of the period, relies chiefly on the conflicts and strife of political parties, Grossmann regards this as one element only in the formation of the general social situation, which in its entirety and in the interaction of its elements explains the development of modern thought. (shrink)

‘Metaphysical painting’ (‘pittura metafisica’) is a paradoxical term: extrasensory sensuousness, as it were. Painting is the representation of visible surfaces; metaphysics rejects surfaces, as deceptive, in favour of the deeper essence. But Giorgio de Chirico (1888–1978) who coined the term ‘pittura metafisica’ in 1919 was a follower of the anti-essentialist Nietzsche. ‘Metaphysics’, then, is not about discovering the essence of things but about shaping their appearances, their ‘physique’. This is an intriguing concept and the corollary to a subtle artistic oeuvre.

In this inaugural lecture I offer, against the background of a discussion of knowledge representation and its tools, an overview of my research in the philosophy of science. I defend a relational model-theoretic realism as being the appropriate meta-stance most congruent with the model-theoretic view of science as a form of human engagement with the world. Making use of logics with preferential semantics within a model-theoretic paradigm, I give an account of science as process and product. I demonstrate the power (...) of the full-blown employment of this paradigm in the philosophy of science by discussing the main applications of model-theoretic realism to traditional problems in the philosophy of science. I discuss my views of the nature of logic and of its role in the philosophy of science today. I also specifically offer a brief discussion on the future of cognitive philosophy in South Africa. My conclusion is a general look at the nature of philosophical inquiry and its significance for philosophers today. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25 (4) 2006: pp. 275-289. (shrink)

Three exemplary models of how philosophical thinking is defined in the encounter with different cultures are critically discussed: 1. the self-centred model, in which other cultures are seen as preliminary stages of one's own way of thinking, 2. the competitive model, which calculates different traditions according to comparitve strengths and weaknesses, 3. the model of philosophy based upon the distinction between scientific and mythical ways of thinking, and which determines the value of philosophical assertions by reference to the employment of (...) specific methods of representation. (shrink)

Teaching philosophy at pre-tertiary levels faces some fundamental challenges, including the misconception that philosophy is an abstract and esoteric field of study. This mind-set hinders teaching philosophy at all levels, particularly in the pre-tertiary stage. Nonetheless, philosophy holds significant cognitive values when taught to children. Therefore, it is crucial to find ways to simplify the process of learning philosophy, especially when children are in their formative years and have a greater capacity for learning. Children possess qualities necessary for engaging with (...) philosophy, such as curiosity. Leveraging these qualities makes it less daunting to introduce philosophy at pre-tertiary levels. Additionally, children have a visual and imaginative mind, enabling them to quickly grasp ideas and concepts through the use of modern technology. Integrating pictures, movies, and cartoons into philosophy education can enhance comprehension. For example, the movie “Divergent” contains philosophical themes that aid in understanding Plato’s concept of societal stratification. This article seeks to compare “Divergent” with Plato’s “The Republic” in terms of society’s hierarchical structure. Its objective is to demonstrate the value of movies and visual aids in teaching and learning philosophy, while also advocating for sensitivity to the underlying class dynamics in contemporary society. (shrink)

Comprise au sein d’une phénoménologie radicale de la vie, notre Terre révèle la vie dans sa donation primordiale. Considérée comme un non-objet pour la conscience subjective constituante, elle manifeste un excès de la vie sur la représentation. Dans le but de lutter contre les pratiques multiformes que les États appliquent à l’échelle mondiale et qui contribuent directement au déracinement progressif de l’homme de son sol pré-originaire, nous sommes appelés à agir individuellement et communautairement pour reconvertir notre rapport à la (...) Terre en le refondant précisément dans la source de la relation, dans la vie. (shrink)

The paper discusses the conceptualisation of mental disorder as a representation, rather than an illness, and relates this perspective to the modern understanding of mental health as a healthy »narrative« or life story. The author proceeds to briefly consider the evolution of concepts of illness in psychiatry and a gradual reappearance of Lacanian psychoanalysis and psychiatry. The key concepts of Lacanian psychotherapy pave the way to a growing together of standard psychotherapy and modern philosophical practice within the novel concept of (...) integrative psychotherapy. (shrink)

Book Information Philosophy of Mental Representation. Philosophy of Mental Representation Hugh Clapin , ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2002 , xv + 332 , £40 ( cloth ), £18.99 ( paper ) Edited by Hugh Clapin . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xv + 332. £40.

This thesis is concerned with John Stuart Mill’s democratic theory. In chapter I, I examine the relations between political philosophy and political theory and science before providing a detailed outline of the aims of the dissertation. In chapter II, I argue that in order to reconcile the concepts of progress and equality within a utilitarian theory, a Millian political system needs to devise institutions that promote general happiness, protect individual autonomy, safeguard society from mediocrity. Chapter III discusses what different authors (...) have said about Mill and liberty, then explores James Mill’s theory of education and Coleridge’s influence on John Stuart Mill’s thought. I conclude by criticising Richard Arneson’s interpretation according to which the Considerations and On Liberty are inconsistent, and some of Gregory Claeys’ conclusions on Mill and paternalism. Chapter IV explores the methodology of the social sciences and the philosophy of history as found in Mill’s writings; then it considers Mill’s thought in regard to his father’s Radical proposals. I also discuss at some length the idea of the tyranny of the majority. Chapter V begins with a discussion of Hanna Pitkin’s theory of representation. I then provide a critical account of Richard Krouse and Nadia Urbinati’s interpretations of Mill. I conclude by arguing that, in a Millian democracy, the higher is the degree of complexity or the need for expertise in dealing with affairs, the greater is the bearing of the principle of competence in assessing whether a representative should act as a trustee or a delegate. I also introduce the idea of rational debate as a sort of ‘influence multiplier’, arguing that this would help to make a democracy rational and effective along Millian lines. In the last two chapters, I stress the relevance of Mill’s political philosophy as for some contemporary issues (nationalism, European federalism, current social and economic changes) while suggesting some potential further investigations, and summarise my conclusions. (shrink)

Ce qui est dit est dit par ceux qui savent ce que parler veut dire. En choisissant de regrouper quelques considérations métalogiques sur les moments qui ont traversé l'histoire contemporaine de la philosophie contemporaine de l'esprit, en termes de nature et limites des représentations, valeur et portée de la théorie de la signification cognitive de Frege à Quine, cet ouvrage donne une idée de l'âge de la science logique, à la lisière de la sémantique et l'épistémologie. En restituant de (...) manière critique la diversité des projets de ces derniers, ces lectures philosophiques font écho à la complexité des rapports entre logique et ontologie du sens. Elles posent donc le problème de la démarcation de la signification et de la représentation dans le débat contemporain de Quine avec Frege. Une telle clarté critique face à l'imprécision des mots au coeur des modèles représentationalistes, en alerte, présente néanmoins d'importantes difficultés épistémologiques. Elle ne manque pas de soulever une série d'objections, dont la suite des enjeux et des débats autour de la question de la signification qui est désormais confrontée à la thèse controversée défendue par les philosophes de la perception en la situant entre phénoménologie, grammaire philosophique et sciences cognitives. (shrink)

Here is an overview of what is to come. In Sections I and II, I will sketch two of the projects frequently pursued by moral philosophers, and the methods typically invoked in those projects. I will argue that these projects presuppose (or at least suggest) a particular sort of account of the mental representation of human value systems, since the methods make sense only if we assume a certain kind of story about how the human mind stores information about values. (...) The burden of my argument in Section III will be that while the jury is still out, there is some evidence suggesting that this account of mental representation is mistaken. If it is mistaken, it follows that two of the central methods of moral philosophy have to be substantially modified, or perhaps abandoned, and that the goals philosophers have sought to achieve with these methods may themselves be misguided. I fear that many of my philosophical colleagues will find this a quite radical suggestion. But if anything is clear in this area, it is that the methods we will be considering have not been conspicuously successful, though it certainly has not been for want of trying. So perhaps it is time for some radical, empirically informed rethinking of goals and methods in these parts of moral philosophy. (shrink)

It is clear that philosophy has a “woman problem”. Despite the recent acceptance of this fact, it is less clear what ought to be done about it. In this paper, we argue that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely well-positioned to think through the marginalisation suffered by women and other minorities. We therefore interrogate two values that already undergird conversations about inclusion— representation and intersectionality—in order to think about the path ahead. We argue that, once we have done so, it (...) becomes clear that the slow pace of improvement over the last few decades is unacceptable and more radical steps need to be taken. First, we outline the current state of women in philosophy focusing on three areas: levels of employment, publishing, and sexual harassment. Then we turn to representation and intersectionality respectively. We conclude by arguing that many women and people of colour have been arguing for a more radically diverse philosophy for many years. What we are facing is a lack of ambition on the one hand and problem of attention on the other. (shrink)

The Book Focuses On Meaning And Linguistic Representations , And Links Them To Propose A Representational Theory Of Meaning. It Shows That Meaning As Truth-Conditions And As Justification-Conditions Are Equally Rooted In The Semantic Space Of Language-Use.

This book is the first to explore in detail the role that symbolic representation plays in the architecture of Kant's philosophy. Symbolic representation fulfills a crucial function in Kant's practical philosophy because it serves to mediate between the unconditionality of the categorical imperative and the inescapable finiteness of the human being. By showing how the nature of symbolic representation plays out across all areas of the practical philosophy - moral philosophy, legal philosophy, philosophy of history and philosophy of religion - (...) Heiner Bielefeldt offers a unique perspective on how these various facets of Kant's philosophy cohere. (shrink)

En 1819, Arthur Schopenhauer fait paraître son grand ouvrage, Le Monde comme volonté et représentation, et s’attend à rencontrer un vif succès. Très vite, ses espoirs se dissipent devant l’indifférence qui entoure la réception de ce qui reste néanmoins à ses yeux un chef-d’œuvre. Il n’hésite pas d’ailleurs à voir derrière ce silence pesant le signe d’une cabale menée par les plus médiocres philosophes, c’est-à-dire ceux qui ne vivent pas, comme lui, pour la philosophie mais de la (...) class='Hi'>philosophie.... (shrink)

For Mary Wollstonecraft, the moral purpose of government is to act on the principle of equality and protect the weak against the fact of inequality. The political day-to-day is characterized by classes and groups with competing interests, some more powerful than others. Wollstonecraft was a republican thinker and so it is reasonable to expect in her writings a notion of political society as representative, but how? After placing Wollstonecraft in relation to contemporary republicanism, we can see that Wollstonecraft’s notion of (...) representation operates on different levels of right: constitutional and political. The “what” that is represented on is, respectively, authority of the people and the perspectives of groups or classes. The people as an abstract, idealized union, so crucial for many republicans, makes sense only on the constitutional level. The political field of law making and policy is an agonistic one where representation has to be practical and no unity is to be expected beyond class or group interests. That is why women and the labouring classes need to have their own interests represented by representatives who share their interests and perspectives. (shrink)

Sequence on modern ontology -- From theology to philosophy -- The four pillars of modern philosophy -- Modern philosophy : a theological critique -- Analogy versus univocity -- Identity versus representation -- Intentionality and embodiment -- Intentionality and selfhood -- Reason and the incarnation of the logos -- The passivity of modern reason -- The baroque simulation of cosmic order -- Deconstructed representation and beyond -- Passivity and concursus -- Representation in philosophy -- Actualism versus possibilism -- Influence versus concurrence (...) -- Transition -- Sequence on political ontology -- Cosmos, law and morality -- Metaphysics and modern politics -- The fate of the rational animal -- The irony of representation -- On legal concurrence -- The fate of the social animal -- Representation and mixed government -- Bureaucracy and the formal distinction -- Form, matter and contract -- The antiquity of historicism -- The sovereignty of the artist -- Eucharistic creativity and political power -- The conundrum of kingship -- The truth of political fiction -- The two rival constructions -- Creativity and mixed constitution -- Christological constitutionalism -- The fate of the fabricating animal -- The fate of the beast-angel -- The death of charity -- Augustine's three cities -- Church as cosmopolis -- Aquinas and kingship -- The theology of ruling -- The ecumenico-political problem -- Supernatural charity and global order -- Socialism beyond the left -- Critique of all materialisms. (shrink)

How do thought and language manage to be 'about' aspects of the world? J. Robert G. Williams investigates how representation arises out of a fundamentally non-representational world, showing the explanatory relations between the representational properties of language, of thought, and of perception and intention.

Une relation causale appropriée à une scène vécue dans le passé est-elle nécessaire pour qu’une représentation de cette scène en soit le souvenir épisodique? Le présent article expose les réponses qui sont actuellement apportées à ce débat central en philosophie de la mémoire. Il introduit d’abord les conditions définitionnelles avancées par la théorie causale standard, avant d’examiner les critiques qui ont été formulées à leur encontre. L’article présente et discute alors deux familles de théories qui ont été proposées (...) en réaction à ces critiques : les théories causales réformatrices, d’une part, et la théorie anti-causale simulationniste, d’autre part. (shrink)

La philosophie Ricœurienne de la religion suit l’anthropologie kantienne, la bonté originaire et le mal radical de la nature humaine. Ricœur, toutefois, considère le problème du mal plus profondément que Kant. Il cherche alors, dans le kérygme religieux, la motivation plus profonde que le motif autonome, alors que Kant, par l’interprétation allégorique, s’adonne à la démystication de la religion historique. Le Dieu nommé s’addresse, au-delà du Dieu conceptuel kantien, au sens super-abondant au millieu du non-sens de la vie et (...) ouvre l’horizon de théonomie. Celle-ci fait du commandement de l’amour un appel non-violent; l’amour qui réunit la forme universelle et la matière particulière de la norme morale. (shrink)

Résumé Nous proposons de considérer la place stratégique accordée aux sourds et muets dans les théories du langage aux xvii e et xviii e siècles comme une voie royale pour interroger ces théories. Nous soutenons en conséquence l’existence de trois paradigmes pour décrire les rapports entre langage et pensée : un paradigme expressif et communicationnel, un paradigme ampliatif et extensionnel, enfin un paradigme corrélationnel. En suivant les transitions entre ces paradigmes, nous expliquons pourquoi Descartes reconnaît aux sourds les mêmes capacités (...) intellectuelles qu’aux autres hommes, alors que Kant les leurs dénie. (shrink)

La philosophie analytique est ici considérée à son point de départ. Les conditions de l’expression sont vues comme synonymes de celles de la pensée. Une entreprise d’explicitation est à cette suite appliquée en retour à la méthode scientifique qui était auparavant le modèle. La distinction de la syntaxe et de la sémantique, commandée par l’analyse logique, est alors appliquée à l’ensemble des systèmes de représentation: oeuvre d’art, action humaine, esprit. Cette évolution montre un souci essentiel: l’instrument technique de (...) la connaissance. (shrink)

Wie ist es zu erklären, dass wir uns vermittels geistiger Akte auf Gegenstände beziehen können? Und wodurch sind uns geistige Akte bewusst? René Descartes und Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz geben faszinierende Antworten auf diese beiden zentralen Fragen der Philosophie des Geistes. In dieser Studie werden die Konzeptionen beider Autoren im Detail analysiert, miteinander verglichen und mit heutigen Positionen in Beziehung gesetzt. Die Analysen zeigen, dass Descartes eine deflationäre Konzeption des Bewusstseins (conscientia) vertritt. Bewusstsein ist „nur“ ein Aspekt der Intentionalität, die (...) das wesentliche Merkmal des cartesischen Geists ausmacht. Die Analysen zu Leibniz weisen nach, dass er im Vergleich zu Descartes eine weitaus komplexere und anspruchsvollere Konzeption des Geistes vertritt, die aus heutiger Sicht anschlussfähiger erscheint. Die herausragenden Merkmale seiner Position sind die strukturelle Auffassung der Intentionalität und die Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Formen von Bewusstsein (apperception und conscientia), die dem phänomenalen Bewusstsein und dem reflexiven Selbstbewusstsein entsprechen. Im Unterschied zu Descartes weist Leibniz auch nicht-rationalen Tieren Bewusstsein in Form der Apperzeption zu. Conscientia bleibt dagegen den rationalen Substanzen vorbehalten. (shrink)