This essay develops a theory of representation that confirms realism – an objective dependent on establishing that reality is autonomous of representation. I argue that the autonomy of reality is not incompatible with epistemic access and that an adequate account of representation is capable of satisfying both criteria. Pursuit of this argument brings the work of C. S. Peirce and Roy Bhaskar together. Peirce’s doctrine of semiotics is essentially a realist theory of representation and is thus relevant to the project (...) of critical realism. However, critical realism is also required to finesse Peirce’s intricate over-theorising. Although a complete treatment remains absent from Bhaskar’s writings, his philosophy, I discovered, incorporates an implicit theory of representation. Peirce can be employed to extract this theory and amplify it. The only way the problem of representation can be addressed adequately is to locate it in a realist framework. This, however, is contingent on re-conceiving representation as a process rather than an object. Such a ‘perspectival switch’ reconfirms the intentional structure of representation but also suggests that it be considered in teleological terms as an activity oriented to a trans-representational object. Representation finally emerges as a form of inquiry with the aim to make being accessible in its autonomy. (shrink)

What does ordinary language philosophy contribute to the solution of the problems it diagnoses as violations of linguistic use? One of its biggest challenges has been to account for the epistemic asymmetry of mental states experienced by the subject of those states and the application of psychological properties to others. The epistemology of other minds appears far from resolved with reference to how sensation words are used in everyday language. In this paper, I revisit the Wittgensteinian arguments and show how (...) they engage the ordinary language method (in the modified form of grammatical investigation) to ‘dissolve’ the problem. Several important results are generated by way of this reconstruction. An expressive view of the vocabulary of sensation is defended which facilitates a discussion of sensation discourse emphasising the normative grammatical conditions for the communication of psychological states. This motivates a reassessment of criterial justification for the ascription of psychological concepts in the third person. In the final sections, I mobilise a normative approach to expose the moral relevance of the epistemology of other minds. Even if it is conceded that belief in other minds lacks warrant from an epistemological standpoint, this does not justify adopting the skeptical attitude from an ethical standpoint. In light of this, a normative justification for the a priori belief that others are subjects of consciousness is defended. (shrink)

This essay builds on a review of Iain Thomson’s recent monograph, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, the theme of which is Heidegger’s post-Kehre thinking. Through a series of close textual exegeses, and attentive analyses of concepts, Thomson traces the philosopher’s concern to envisage a means of escaping the late-modern comprehension of being. The latter is characterized, in Thomson’s interpretation, by the ‘technological’ or Nietzschesque understanding of ontology in terms of the eternally recurring will-to-power, according to which objects are identified as intrinsically (...) meaningless, optimifically available, utilitarian resources. Thomson argues that Heidegger’s engagement with modern painting seeks to develop an alternative paradigm, characterized as a concrete, phenomenological attempt to show how modernity can be transcended from within through reflection on art. Thomson amplifies Heidegger’s conviction that modernity implicitly influences the conceptual substrate of modern aesthetics into a critique of the motivating framework that continues to normatively determine the continuing grounding assumptions of the philosophy of art. I show that Thomson’s book, by revisiting Heidegger in this form, importantly intimates a way of transcending the philosophical disenfranchisement of art, by releasing art from its alethic alienation and reversing the inured philosophical narrative that still defines the relationship between representation and truth and, in the process, leads to a potentially radical reevaluation of aesthetic value. (shrink)

This essay reviews Theatre, Communication, Critical Realism (2010) by Tobin Nellhaus. It begins by outlining the objective of the book and proceeds to evaluate its central argument. The objective is to develop a theory of theatre founded on the premises of critical realism and thereby theoretically situate theatrical performance in its socio-cultural matrix. The argument is that critical realism is effective for developing a comprehensive account of theatrical performance because it has the capacity to reveal truths about the structure of (...) social reality (that correspond to those articulated by critical realism). In the second part of the review, employing the methods of conceptual analysis, I propose that Nellhaus’s thesis of ‘ontological doubling’ (which claims that performance doubles human agency) is undermined by certain epistemological presuppositions regarding the ontology of fictional characters. (shrink)

Wittgenstein (1993), Derek Jarman’s biopic of the Austrian-born Cambridge philosopher is a fascinating – if perplexing – film. In equal measure aesthetic and didactic, its status is ambiguous, and not only because didacticism in the philosophy of art is often assumed to diminish aesthetic value. Nothing, however, of the film’s aesthetic is depreciated by the intention to instruct. Even if the objective was to teach, the film is also highly aestheticised. Composed of a series of richly theatrical set-pieces, Jarman’s film (...) aspires to a painterly aesthetic. This paper examines the aesthetic and epistemic dimensions of Wittgenstein . The consensus among professional philosophers is that the film, while idiosyncratic and stylised, nevertheless says something important about Wittgenstein’s philosophy. It is as if he has used the project to innovate ways of translating Wittgenstein’s philosophy to aesthetic form. The resultant representational strategies are best understood with reference to the picture theory developed in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. In the Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus (1922) Wittgenstein characterised the proposition as an articulation of elements that, by virtue of shared logical form, corresponds to the disposition of objects in a possible fact. Under Jarman’s direction, cinematic tableaux are transformed into propositions in the Wittgensteinian sense. In this film, therefore, Jarman has refined his cinematic process into what, following the picture theory, I have called tractarian montage. It is because the philosophy is embedded in the film as a structural component of its form (and not just presented didactically) that Wittgenstein seems oddly right to Wittgensteinian viewers. The aesthetic and epistemic consequences that result from Jarman’s approach are precisely what make the film philosophically interesting – indeed they provide a valuable opportunity to reflect not only on the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy but also, uniquely, on the relationship between his philosophy and his life. (shrink)

The hypothesis of this paper is that we maintain a relationship with the dead precisely in their death, and this relationship is best understood in terms of Peirce's semiotics and its influence on the work of Jacques Derrida. Roland Bardies' theory of photography illustrates this semiotics of death. The subsistent and continuous reality of the non-extant, absent and silent being of the dead individual is manifested—and continues to communicate—through indexical signs, i.e., any traces left behind by the dead individual (such (...) as photos, clothes, glasses, writings, recordings). (shrink)

William H. Poteat’s critique of Cartesianism is an amplification of the philosophical work of Michael Polanyi. Poteat applies Polanyian methods to articulate an alternative to the metaphysical dualism that, he argues, still dominates Western reflective thought at a tacit level. His argument is that the novel logic of Polanyi’sPersonal Knowledge puts the presuppositions of the modern philosophical tradition in question. In the elaboration of this focal argument, Poteat’s subsidiary acceptance of Polanyi’s anterior work is total. Nevertheless it remains important to (...) disambiguate the thought of the two philosophers. In this essay, I argue that Poteat’s reliance on Polanyi as means of elaborating his own original philosophical position is perhaps what is most distinctive of this relationship. For Poteat relies on Polanyian grounds ontologically to the extent that, once assimilated, these supporting grounds are finally cancelled. I argue that even if it is ultimatelyimpossible to locate the precise point where Polanyi ends and Poteat begins, it remains necessary to attempt a clean separation. For only in this way can Poteat’s unique contribution to philosophy be focally appreciated. (shrink)

William H. Poteat’s critique of Cartesianism is an amplification of the philosophical work of Michael Polanyi. Poteat applies Polanyian methods to articulate an alternative to the metaphysical dualism that, he argues, still dominates Western reflective thought at a tacit level. His argument is that the novel logic of Polanyi’sPersonal Knowledge puts the presuppositions of the modern philosophical tradition in question. In the elaboration of this focal argument, Poteat’s subsidiary acceptance of Polanyi’s anterior work is total. Nevertheless it remains important to (...) disambiguate the thought of the two philosophers. In this essay, I argue that Poteat’s reliance on Polanyi as means of elaborating his own original philosophical position is perhaps what is most distinctive of this relationship. For Poteat relies on Polanyian grounds ontologically to the extent that, once assimilated, these supporting grounds are finally cancelled. I argue that even if it is ultimatelyimpossible to locate the precise point where Polanyi ends and Poteat begins, it remains necessary to attempt a clean separation. For only in this way can Poteat’s unique contribution to philosophy be focally appreciated. (shrink)