Guardians of Republicanism examines the relationship between the Valori family and the political and intellectual evolution of the Florentine Renaissance. Following the family's fortunes over five generations, Jurdjevic retraces its involvement in the political struggles that marked this turbulent period in the history of Florence.

The East/West divide seems to be as old as history itself, the roots of Orientalism and anti-Semitism lying far beyond the origins of modern Western imperialism. The very project of Western classical republicanism had its darker side: to purloin the legacy of the Greeks, distancing them from Eastern systems deemed 'despotic' and 'other'. Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince is a thoroughly revisionist book, challenging not only the comfortable view the West has of its own political evolution, but (...) the negative stereotypes of non-Western systems. Not only did these images serve to legitimate early modern European nation states struggling for an identity, but they also served to justify slavery and other forms of domination over subject peoples. Drawing upon archaeological and epigraphic evidence, Springborg discusses the Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian contribution of political forms and cultic institutions to classical Graeco-Roman civilization, an Eastern legacy to the West long obscured for political reasons. A different reading of the foundation myths of Athens and Rome, certain texts of Plato, Aristotle, and the writings of Herodotus, Isocrates, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, permits us to restore possible lines of filtration. Renaissance thought, long believed to have ushered in the Western classical republican tradition, demonstrates a curious ambivalence towards powerful Eastern system, objects of fascination as much as fear. We do not yet find sedimented the divide between Western Democracy and oriental despotism, in which post-Reformation thought as been set in stone. This major new study will be of interest to students of political history, political theory, comparative politics and political archaeology. (shrink)

In this brief article we will seek to support the thesis that there is in the thought of Coluccio Salutati, 14th century Florentine chancellor and prominent humanist, a clear republicanism that turns to the issue of the freedom of the republic and the active life of the individuals participating in it. However, in connection with this demonstration, we will also maintain that such republicanism has strong traces of Augustinian influence, mainly in view of the disposition of laws in (...) the political arrangement, as well as the relationship between active life and the search for a human being’s own good. In view of this, we intend to demonstrate that, in general, Salutati’s Renaissance republicanism turns to the defence of the republic, its freedom and its characteristic of the proper scenario for the active life of individuals, however, it still maintains an ethical-political perspective typical of the medieval period, centrally influenced by Augustinian thought. (shrink)

The idea that a republic is the only legitimate form of government and that non-elective monarchy and hereditary political privileges are by definition illegitimate is an artifact of late eighteenth century republicanism, though it has roots in the “godly republics” of the seventeenth century. It presupposes understanding a republic to be a non-monarchical form of government. The latter definition is a discursive practice that goes back only to the fifteenth century and is not found in Roman or medieval sources. (...) This article explains how the definition emerged in Renaissance Italy. (shrink)

In the 1960s republic and republicanism hardly figured in political theory. Today they are prominent, if highly contested, topics in political thought in the English‐speaking world. While there may be many reasons for this, undoubtedly a particularly important factor was one of the periodic convulsions in the American search for identity. From the late 1960s onwards, American scholars launched a sustained criticism of the assumption that America was founded on the institutionalization of a complex of ideas identified broadly as (...) individualistic liberalism and began a long and fertile search for alternative roots, which were soon identified as republican. This endeavour on the part of American historians was quickly supplemented by a magisterial interpretation of the whole of Anglo‐American political culture in the early modern period as predominantly a development of the civic humanist republicanism hammered out in Renaissance Italy, a topic that was undergoing its own rapid development. The result was a rich historical panorama of the development of republican ideas and practices from the Renaissance to our own time: the Italian cities attempting to avoid princely rule by basing republican government on the virtues of an aristocracy; the Dutch provinces shoring up their independence from Iberian monarchy by developing that new and controversial government, republics based on commercial, not landed, wealth; the English Commonwealth which, though short‐lived, helped to secure the continuing influence of republican ideas and enabled people in the eighteenth century to see Britain's mixed constitution as that apparent paradox, a monarchical republic – and one based on representation; the American Revolution which, by renewing the idea of federation, refuted the traditional republican dogma that a republic could not exist in a large country and, in the process, made republicanism decisively anti‐aristocratic; the French Revolution which transformed so much of republican thought into a still continuing debate about democracy. (shrink)

Republicanism is contrasted with liberalism with special reference to the notions of presence, absence and representation. The contrast is more conspicuous in the Platonic tradition of republicanism than it is in the Aristotelian tradition, the former being more likely to degenerate into some form of totalitarianism. Examples thereof are given in accordance with the distinction between a strong and a soft iconoclasm, as it is found both in Antiquity and in Eastern and Western Europe’s quest for absolute presence (...) or—as in avantgarde art of modernity—for absolute self-presence of the work of art. Having left such political and artistic utopias behind it, the pendulum is now swinging back in the direction of representation, but no longer in the illusionist sense which has dominated Western art form the Renaissance to the beginning of our century. Tied to the question of iconoclasm is the debate about the end of art inaugurated by Hegel in the general introduction to his Aesthetics and resumed in our days. (shrink)

This paper wants to address the Aristotelian analysis of the concept of mimesis from a social and cultural angle. It is going to show that mimesis is crucial if we want to understand why the institution of the theatre played such a crucial role in the civic educational programme of classical Athens. The paper’s argument is that the magic spell of theatrical imitation, its aesthetic machinery was exploited by the city for civic educational function. Dramas, and in particular tragedies helped (...) to articulate the city’s political expectations from the citizens, and they achieved it with far better efficiency than any other medium of propaganda which was available in those days. It will first reconstruct the duality within the internal structure of the Aristotelian account of mimesis in Poetics: it will show both 1.) the aesthetic and 2.) the socio-cultural dimensions of his theory of civic initiation through dramatic imitation. In the second part it will compare this Greek cultural context with a similar context in Rome in the activity and writings of Cicero. Finally, the paper presents the Renaissance republican context of early modern Europe, which also connected politico-moral education with the idea of mimesis. (shrink)

The mid-thirteenth-century theorist and rhetorician Brunetto Latini proposed a vigorous republican account of the art of government and the nature of community in his encyclopedic treatise, Li Livres dou Tresor. The interpretation of Latini's republicanism has been heavily based on its literary sensibilities, its attachment to rhetoric, and its praise for classical civic virtues. But Latini deserves to be classified as a republican insofar as he founds social and political order upon commercial principles-the production and exchange of material goods (...) for profit-and consequent economic defense of republican government. Hence, the example of Latini challenges one of the principal remaining barriers that supposedly separates medieval defenses of republicanism from Renaissance versions. The essay contends that Latini holds that self-governing institutions depend upon and are especially well suited to sustain a society whose conception of the common good includes the creation and exchange of those material necessities required for physical welfare and comfort. (shrink)

The mid-thirteenth-century theorist and rhetorician Brunetto Latini proposed a vigorous republican account of the art of government and the nature of community in his encyclopedic treatise, Li Livres dou Tresor. The interpretation of Latini's republicanism has been heavily based on its literary sensibilities, its attachment to rhetoric, and its praise for classical civic virtues. But Latini deserves to be classified as a republican insofar as he founds social and political order upon commercial principles—the production and exchange of material goods (...) for profit—and consequent economic defense of republican government. Hence, the example of Latini challenges one of the principal remaining barriers that supposedly separates medieval defenses of republicanism from Renaissance versions. The essay contends that Latini holds that self-governing institutions depend upon and are especially well suited to sustain a society whose conception of the common good includes the creation and exchange of those material necessities required for physical welfare and comfort. (shrink)

Convulsed by a civilizational crisis, the great thinkers of the Renaissance set out to reconceive the nature of society. Everywhere they saw problems. Corrupt and reckless tyrants sowing discord and ruling through fear; elites who prized wealth and status over the common good; military leaders waging endless wars. Their solution was at once simple and radical. "Men, not walls, make a city," as Thucydides so memorably said. They would rebuild their city, and their civilization, by transforming the moral character (...) of its citizens. Soulcraft, they believed, was a precondition of successful statecraft. A dazzlingly ambitious reappraisal of Renaissance political thought by one of our generation's foremost intellectual historians, Virtue Politics challenges the traditional narrative that looks to the Renaissance as the seedbed of modern republicanism and sees Machiavelli as its exemplary thinker. James Hankins reveals that what most concerned the humanists was not reforming laws or institutions so much as shaping citizens. If character mattered more than constitutions, it would have to be nurtured through a new program of education they called the studia humanitatis: the humanities. We owe liberal arts education and much else besides to the bold experiment of these passionate and principled thinkers. The questions they asked-Should a good man serve a corrupt regime? What virtues are necessary in a leader? What is the source of political legitimacy? Is wealth concentration detrimental to social cohesion? Should citizens be expected to fight for their country?-would have a profound impact on later debates about good government and seem as vital today as they did then. (shrink)

Between about 1500 and 1620, the Roman censors were repeatedly invoked as a useful political model. Besides being discussed by antiquarians and political theorists, they were actually imitated in early sixteenth-century Venice, and figured in polemics over office-holding in early seventeenth-century France. This episode throws an interesting light on civic humanism. The censors were generally seen not as a means of creating the virtuous citizen body of classical republicanism, but as a supplement to the modern legal system, capable of (...) creating a capable and honest class of magistrates. A few theorists even suggested that they might be adapted to promote purely economic efficiency. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 721-743 [Access article in PDF] Virtue, Commerce, and the Enduring Florentine Republican Moment: Reintegrating Italy into the Atlantic Republican Debate Mark Jurdjevic Republicanism has dominated the historiographies of English and American political thought for the past two decades. 1 Its success derives principally from J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment, which presents a sweeping vision of an ancient Aristotelian (...) republican language that persisted for centuries in the mental landscape of the western world. Resurrected in Renaissance Florence, the language of republicanism continued to resonate powerfully in Stuart and Hanoverian Britain and colonial America. Pocock and those sympathetic to his work attributed the power and significance of republicanism to its internal discursive coherence over time; because of its deep roots in the European classical and Renaissance past, republicanism--not liberalism--provided the intellectual weapon with which the English and the Americans rebelled against the Stuart and Hanoverian monarchies. Pocock's provocative repudiation of the significance of John Locke and liberalism, as well as his suggestion that the revolutions of 1641, 1688, and 1776 were animated not by a utopian, forward-looking political ideology but by a backward-looking desire to restore a classical political order, generated a still-ongoing academic debate. 2 [End Page 721]This debate has not appreciated a crucial point: Pocock misunderstood Florentine political thought and mischaracterized its central tenets. 3 Unnecessary confusion has been generated by the lack of communication between specialists in Renaissance political thought and historians of English and early American political thought, as well as by the total dependence of English and American historians on Pocock for their understanding of "civic humanism." 4 Most historians of England and America skeptical of Pocock's argument have shown that republican language, where it did occur in England and America, differed in substantial and significant ways from the Florentine variety. 5 What they have actually shown, I hope to make clear, is that manifestations of republicanism in England and America differed only from Pocock's misunderstanding of the Florentine variety; Florentine republican language echoes strongly in the English and American republicanism that recent scholarship emphasizes.In this essay I seek to reintegrate Italy into the republican debate and, by doing so, to revitalize the argument that structural linguistic similarities pervaded the republicanism of Florence, England, and America. 6 I concentrate on the most important and contested point in English and American revisionism, the dialectical engine of TheMachiavellian Moment: the alleged incompatibility between virtue and commerce in "classical" republican theory. Pocock asserted that Florentine republicans mistrusted commerce and private wealth as corrupting forces in public life and he employed this perceived virtue-commerce antipathy as the link between his republican moments.The most leveling critiques of Pocock's republican tradition have rejected it on this point. Recent research on the relationship between commerce and virtue in the English and American republican contexts has reached a quite different conclusion: that republican theory was frequently elaborated in harmonious conjunction with a new ideology of commercial society. [End Page 722]Pocock, however, misunderstood civic humanism and the role of commerce in Renaissance republicanism. Florentine humanists believed that commerce and the private pursuit of wealth made possible the survival and integrity of the republic. Florentine republicanism of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was the ideology of an ascendant merchant elite; it provided a political language that integrated republican virtue with the habits, values, and mentality of the merchant. We should not therefore be surprised to see republicanism flourishing in later commercial societies. Although the virtue-commerce relationship in Renaissance republicanism was precisely the opposite of Pocock's claim, it directly anticipates the commercial element of republicanism that recent English and American scholarship emphasizes.I undertake three tasks; first, I survey and compare recent work on republicanism in America, England, and Italy; second, I show how Pocock selectively read the primary and secondary sources on Renaissance Florence; third and most importantly, I analyze the economic attitudes of Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini, Girolamo Savonarola, and Florentine... (shrink)

The creation of a citizen militia is a characteristic pretension of the Renaissance republicanism. The republic cannot lack defense nor defend themselves with mercenary armies. For Machiavelli, Guicciardini or Giannotti the citizen has a set of virtues, like austerity, discipline, patriotism or bravery, that make him the best soldier. Therefore, the Republican regime needs the citizens to be soldiers, because the military discipline itself is a means necessary to forge such civic virtues without which no republic can survive.

ABSTRACT This article aims to explain the family resemblance between the early socialism that emerged in France from the aftermath of the Revolution and Owenite socialism, which emerged out of the very different political and religious circumstances of late Georgian Britain. While the ‘sciences’ of Henri Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier were conceived to end the crisis produced by the French Revolution, Owen’s newfound principle, what he called the ‘science of the influence of circumstance’, emerged from his A New View of (...) Society and his ideas on formation of character, was directed to the solution of the problems of industrial Britain during the French wars and after. The article shows that, contrary to the arguments of the pathbreaking work of Gregory Claeys, Owen’s ideas had less to do with a Republicanism that, for Claeys in following the work of J.G.A. Pocock, had its roots in the Renaissance, and more to do with the emergence of the science of society whose origins lay in the late Enlightenment and the shared concerns of English, Scottish, and French thinkers on trying to understand an emerging and new social order. (shrink)

In den letzten drei Dekaden ist es zu einer Renaissance des Republikanismus gekommen. Ein spezifisch republikanisches Freiheitsverstandnis und die Debatte um entpolitisierende Wirkungen komplexer liberaler Demokratien haben sich dabei als in hohem Masse anschlussfahig an eine Vielzahl gegenwartiger Diskurse - von Global Governance bis hin zu Postdemokratie - erwiesen. Das Verstandnis von Republikanismus als einer modernen politischen Theorie wurde so weiter gestarkt und republikanische Ansatze gelten wieder als der zentrale Gegenspieler eines liberalen Staats- und Politikverstandnisses. Der Sammelband greift diese (...) Renaissance auf und bietet einen fur den deutschen Sprachraum bis dato fehlenden Uberblick uber Entwicklungstendenzen und Debatten im modernen republikanischen Denken. Er liefert eine Systematisierung von Ansatzen und Stromungen und erortert die Leistungsfahigkeit republikanischer Theorie gerade mit Blick auf Gegenwartsfragen. Mit Beitragen von: Richard Bellamy, Dorothea Gadeke, Philip Holzing, Sebastian Huhnholz, Marcus Llanque, Horst Mewes, Andreas Oldenbourg, Emanuel Richter, Daniel Schulz, Winfried Thaa, Thorsten Thiel, Christian Volk, Florian Weber und Sabrina Zucca-Soest. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.1 (2001) 141-160 [Access article in PDF] The Politics of Character in John Milton's Divorce Tracts David Hawkes nunquam privatum esse sapientum --Cicero I. There has recently been a great deal of debate over the relative influence on Milton's politics of two discordant revolutionary ideologies: classical republicanism and radical Protestant theology. 1 In the mid-seventeenth century the search for intellectual precedents and (...) rationalizations of the English revolution brought these two traditions into an uneasy alliance, and Milton, like many other revolutionary apologists, drew on both of them. Of course the two schools of thought are not necessarily incompatible. J. G. A. Pocock notes one point of connection between them: The context in which men attain their final end--or recover their prima forma, though this concept might not have been antinomian enough for the radical saints of the New Model--is that of apocalypse; the "end" of Aristotelian teleology is still united with the eschatological "end" of prophetic time. 2The Aristotelian "end" of man is the good, defined as "an activity of soul in accordance with virtue," and the belief that one can or has fulfilled that end is [End Page 141] certainly amenable to Protestant antinomianism. 3 Furthermore, as Sharon Achinstein points out, Milton's "conception of virtue... melds the religious notion of conscience with a classical sense of civic duty." 4 On the other hand there are significant differences between the classical and the Christian notions of "virtue" and the "good," which dictate that, as Nigel Smith puts it, "[c]lassical republicanism, properly conceived, would in many ways be in conflict with the millenarian, chiliastic and perfectionist Protestantism of the sects." 5 The problem faced by Milton as a Protestant Republican is that the definition of the "good" offered by millennial sanctification and that attainable through Aristotelian virtue are in many ways mutually exclusive and contradictory. They have been characterized as such ever since Augustine's City of God asserted that pagan ethics are incompatible with true, Christian virtue. 6 Millennialism relies on faith; civic humanist virtue relies on works. Antinomianism abolishes the law; republicanism institutes the rule of law. The saints are sanctified by grace; the virtuous are distinguished by their own strength of character. Radical Protestant freedom is negative and private--it is the ability to speak and worship according to the dictates of conscience; civic humanist liberty is positive and public, the ability to participate fully in the government of the res publica. While daunting, however, these contradictions are not quite insuperable. I believe that Milton finds a common denominator in the accounts given by these two traditions of psychological objectification and that the agreement of Roman and Christian morality on this point leads him to make the tendency to objectification (or rather the ability to resist that tendency) the central issue of his mature political theory.The political ideas of the classical republicans and their descendants, the Renaissance civic humanists, were based upon Aristotle's Politics and Nico-machean Ethics, while the intellectual sources of radical Protestantism can be traced to Luther's commentaries on Paul's epistles. During the English revolution the Pauline exegesis of the relationship between the old and the new covenants provided intellectual ammunition against custom and tradition, as well as inspiring the antinomianism of the radical fringe to which Milton was falsely accused of adhering during the divorce controversy. In the divorce tracts Milton points out that Aristotle and Paul share one fundamental tenet: they argue that interior and exterior slavery are of the same nature and therefore concomitant [End Page 142] and inseparable. Furthermore, Milton notes, Aristotle and Paul both claim that exterior and interior slavery consist in "carnality," the subjection of the spirit to the flesh. This identification of carnality with servility becomes a constant strain which runs throughout Milton's career and provides the consistent element in his apparently vacillating theories of politics and religion.II. Although this argument recurs throughout Milton's career, it is first hammered into shape during the divorce controversy... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 555-557 [Access article in PDF] Quentin Skinner. Visions of Politics. Vol. I, Regarding Method. Pp. xvi + 209. Vol. II, Renaissance Virtues. Pp. xix + 461. Vol. III, Hobbes and Civil Science. Pp. xvii + 386. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Cloth, $180.00. Paper, $65.00. Quentin Skinner's Visions of Politics consists of three volumes of his essays, most of (...) which have been previously published. Volume I concerns the nature of historical interpretation. It contains the classic, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas"; much of his "Reply to My Critics," from Meaning and Context (James Tully, editor [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988]);"Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts"; and other notable essays. Volume II focuses on aspects of the Renaissance, especially discussions of the concept of liberty and various theories of civic republicanism. Volume III focuses on the life and thought of Thomas Hobbes, although its chapters also contain an enormous amount of information about ancient rhetoric, Renaissance humanism, and other things. As my brief description of the contents of these volumes indicates, Skinner's knowledge is [End Page 555] not just encyclopedic; it is Britannic. The range and depth of his scholarship, evident in each article written over several decades, is all the more impressive when they are gathered together. Unfortunately, he has stopped short of reprinting all of his articles in their entirety; for example, only part of "Hobbes on Sovereignty" (1965), is included.Although the Journal of the History of Philosophy does not normally review works of previously published essays, an exception is being made in this case because of the importance of Skinner's thought and because these volumes contain significant new material. Although most of the chapters are reprinted largely as they originally appeared, some chapters were extensively rewritten. Many readers will wish that he had changed less and provided more commentary on the views of his younger self.Given the number and originality of Skinner theses, every reader will disagree with some of them. In the rest of this review, I will discuss a few of these. Skinner makes the provocative claim that "our goals as historians should [not] be to recount [facts]... as objectively as possible" (I:1). This looks relativistic but he says that he is not a relativist. Shortly later, he makes the disturbing, but not unfamiliar, claim that "the concept of truth is irrelevant to the enterprise of explaining beliefs" (I:2). A major problem for this view is that anyone who makes a statement is, or purports to be, aiming at the truth. The fact that a speaker might not use the word 'true' or 'truth' does not show that the concept is not operating. Moreover, to be rational is to pursue the truth.Skinner is particularly interested in political rhetoric, and the rhetorical feature he studies most closely is paradiastole. Simplifying it, let's say that paradiastole is the technique of rejecting one description-cum-evaluation, say, "The prince is stubborn," for another, say, "The prince is resolute." Since redescriptions of things can go in either direction, many philosophers thought that the possibility of paradiastole undermined the objectivity of ethics. Rhetoricians fostered this belief by teaching students to argue for either side of an argument.Skinner thinks Hobbes "undoubtedly" provided a solution to the problem of paradiastole and that the solution "has the great merit of confronting the problem in a uniquely uncompromising way" (III:141). The solution depends on recognizing that the goodness of virtues "resides in the fact that they form 'the meanes of peaceable, sociable and comfortable living'" (III:137). So, when a dispute about morality arises, one simply asks "whether the effect of the action will or will not be conducive to the preservation of peace" (III:137). I do not see that this solves the problem. In early 2003, one side called the American invasion of Iraq a means to peace by defeating terrorism, the other side a provocation of war against Muslim nations; either side can be argued. Tending toward peace cannot be part... (shrink)

A common perception of Spinoza casts him as one of the precursors, perhaps even founders, of modern humanism and Enlightenment thought. Given that in the twentieth century, humanism was commonly associated with the ideology of secularism and the politics of liberal democracies, and that Spinoza has been taken as voicing a “message of secularity” and as having provided “the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul” and “the decisive impulse to… modern republicanism which takes it bearings by the dignity (...) of every man,” it is easy to understand how this humanistic image developed. Spinoza’s deep interest in, and extensive discussion of, human nature may have contributed to the emergence of this image as well. In this paper, I will argue that this common perception of Spinoza is mistaken and that Spinoza was in fact the most radical anti-humanist among modern philosophers. Arguably, Spinoza rejects any notion of human dignity. He conceives of God’s - and not man’s - point of view as the only objective perspective through which one can know things adequately, and it is at least highly questionable whether he allows for any genuine notions of human autonomy or morality. The notions of ‘humanism’ and ‘anti-humanism’ have been discussed extensively -mainly among continental philosophers - since the end of World War II. Because these notions carry a variety of historical, ideological, and philosophical meanings, it is important to provide at the outset at least a rudimentary clarification of my use of these two terms. By ‘humanism’ I mean a view which (1) assigns a unique value to human beings among other things in nature, (2) stresses the primacy of the human perspective in understanding the nature of things, and (3) attempts to point out an essential property of humanity which justifies its elevated and unique status. This definition of philosophical humanism has only little in common with the historical notion of Renaissance humanism, and seems to match quite well the common understanding of philosophical humanism suggested by current philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias. This notion of humanism should be understood in contrast to two competing positions. On the one hand, in contrast to the theocentric position that considers humanity to be radically dependent upon God, humanism affirms at least some degree of human independence. On the other hand, in contrast to the naturalist position which endorses the scientific examination of human beings just like any other objects in nature, humanists affirm the existence of a metaphysical and moral gulf between humanity and nature. This gulf assigns a special value to humanity and does not allow us to treat human beings like any other things in nature. For many humanists the nature/humanity gulf does not allow the application of the methods of natural sciences to the disciplines of the humanities. Humanism does not begin with modernity. In order to see how far back we can trace this position, we may recall Protagoras’ saying: “Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not.” In modern philosophy, the humanistic position had regained dominant status since the Renaissance, and variants of this position were vigorously argued for by prominent thinkers such as Pico della Mirandola, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and finally, Hegel. In this paper, I will argue that Spinoza was a foe, and not a friend, of this tradition. I suggest that, in contrast to these humanist philosophers, Spinoza considers man as a marginal and limited being in nature, a being whose claims and presumptions far exceed its abilities. “To what length will the folly of the multitude not carry them?.... [T]hey imagine Nature to be so limited that they believe man to be his chief part.” Arguably, Spinoza locates the origin of our most fundamental metaphysical and ethical errors in a human hubris which not only tries to secure humanity an exceptional place in nature but also attempts to cast both God and nature in its own human image. (shrink)

It is often assumed that cosmopolitan thinkers since the Renaissance have simply adopted and refined concepts from classical antiquity. This study argues that modern European cosmopolitanism should be perceived as a unique phenomenon, distinct from Greek and Roman forms of cosmopolitan thinking. One key feature is its dynamism, or the idea of change built into modern theories of cosmopolitanism. Covering the period from the 1530s to the 1920s, this book investigates various manifestations of cosmopolitanism, including normative individualism, the dawn (...) of historical thinking, and the dynamic conceptions of law and rights and of the international community. It analyses the international legal theories of selected authors from Francisco de Vitoria to Austrian lawyers Heinrich Lammasch and Alfred Verdross. The author focuses in particular on the development of hospitality rights and the right to immigration, republicanism and cosmopolitanism, and cosmopolitan education. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.1 (2002) 107-124 [Access article in PDF] Shakespeare and Political Philosophy John D. Cox Though Shakespeare has been praised as one of the greatest thinkers who ever lived, he has no standing in the history of Western philosophy, being at best a footnote to the derivative neo-Platonists and skeptics of the late Renaissance. He died in 1616, more than twenty years before Descartes's Discourse on (...) Method heralded the autonomous rationalism of the Enlightenment, and Shakespeare did not achieve a reputation as a deep thinker until the nineteenth century, as a consequence of admiration for his characters. People seemed to think that a reflective and witty prince who could say to his friend, "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy" must be the product of a keenly philosophical intelligence—never mind that Hamlet is referring to the "antique Roman" philosophy he so admires in Horatio, i.e., Stoicism, which by 1599 was little more than an oft-repeated set of moral and social platitudes. 1 To assert that there are more things in heaven and earth than late Renaissance Stoicism is not to assert very much.But other ways of thinking about Shakespeare philosophically are more promising than character analysis. He was indeed a thoughtful playwright, and though he had no university education, he was a voracious and incisive reader, so the influences on his plays and poems include many writers who have some standing in the history of philosophy. More complex than discerning historical philosophical influences on Shakespeare is what might be called the hermeneutical approach, i.e., the interpretation of the plays and poems with particular philosophers and philosophies in mind, regardless of their possible historical influence in the sixteenth century. To survey the range of philosophical influences and hermeneutical approaches is impossible [End Page 107] in a single essay, but a manageable example of Shakespeare's thinking is his political philosophy, where both ways of understanding him can be discerned. The most influential interpreter of Shakespeare's history plays for the second half of the twentieth century, for example, was E. M. W. Tillyard, who purported to excavate the neo-Platonic assumptions of Shakespeare's political culture: order, degree, hierarchy, and obedience. 2 Though questions were increasingly raised concerning Tillyard's assumptions and documentation, the decisive challenge to his authority was issued in the 1980s by New Historicists and Cultural Materialists, whose allegiance was more or less explicitly Marxist, and who therefore interpreted Shakespeare in light of a particular nineteenth-century philosophy. 3 A clearer example of the difference between history and hermeneutics in understanding Shakespeare is hard to imagine.The clarity of the difference, however, does not mean that the two approaches are mutually exclusive. Tillyard construed Shakespeare's emphasis on hierarchical order as an advocacy of divine-right monarchy, and much in the plays of Shakespeare supports this construal. Despite his sympathetic portraits of particular characters, including commoners, remarks in his plays about commoners taken together ("the people") are always slighting and mistrustful—often indeed scornful—and the proportion of upper-class to lower-class characters reflects their perceived social importance, for the former invariably outnumber the latter, even in the comedies, whereas the aristocracy were a tiny fraction of the total population in Shakespeare's England. Shakespeare's portrayal of pre-imperial Rome, in Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra, and Coriolanus, shows little understanding of, and less sympathy with, republican alternatives to one-person rule. Shakespeare was not responsive to Calvin's spirited defense of the "poor common people" against rapacious kings (even, or especially, under godly magistrates), and Shakespeare's plays offer no support to the nascent republicanism of those who took arms against the king of England in the mid-seventeenth century, largely inspired by Calvinism. 4 Shakespeare, in short, was no Milton.This is not to say, however, that he was an uncritically idealizing royalist, as we can see from his first venture into writing about English history: his four early plays on the civil unrest of the fifteenth century. Three of these plays... (shrink)

This article revisits the question of the modernity of the Renaissance by examining the political language of Florentine civic humanism and by critically analyzing the debate over Hans Baron’s interpretation of the movement. It engages two debates that are usually conducted separately: one concerning the originality of civic humanism in comparison to medieval thought, and the other concerning the political and social function of the civic humanists’ political republicanism in fifteenth-century Florence. The article’s main contention is that humanist (...) political discourse rejected the perception of social and political reality as being part of, or reflecting, a metaphysical and divine order or things, and thus undermined the traditional justifications for political hierarchies and power relations. This created the conditions of possibility for the distinctively modern aspiration for a social and political order based on liberty and equality. It also resulted in the birth of a distinctively modern form of ideology, one that legitimizes the social order by disguising its inequalities and structures of domination. Humanism, like modern political thought generally, thus simultaneously constructs and reflects the dialectic of emancipation and domination so central to modernity itself. (shrink)

The mid-thirteenth-century theorist and rhetorician Brunetto Latini proposed a vigorous republican account of the art of government and the nature of community in his encyclopedic treatise, Li Livres dou Tresor. The interpretation of Latini's republicanism has been heavily based on its literary sensibilities, its attachment to rhetoric, and its praise for classical civic virtues. But Latini deserves to be classified as a republican insofar as he founds social and political order upon commercial principles—the production and exchange of material goods (...) for profit—and consequent economic defense of republican government. Hence, the example of Latini challenges one of the principal remaining barriers that supposedly separates medieval defenses of republicanism from Renaissance versions. The essay contends that Latini holds that self-governing institutions depend upon and are especially well suited to sustain a society whose conception of the common good includes the creation and exchange of those material necessities required for physical welfare and comfort. (shrink)

Recent research has emphasized the continuities in European republican political thought from the late Middle Ages until well into the Renaissance and even beyond. Two of the central figures in the story of the persistence of republicanism are Ptolemy of Lucca, who is commonly viewed as the quintessential late medieval republican, and Niccolò Machiavelli, whose work is generally regarded as the classic statement of early modern republicanism. We argue that these two remain conceptually at considerable remove from (...) one another, a claim we illustrate by analyzing the impact of the reception, Latin translation and transmission of the Histories of Polybius, and especially the theory of constitutional change proposed in Book 6. The unavailability of the Histories to Ptolemy and its rather ample use by Machiavelli at the beginning of the Discourses signal an important divergence in the theoretical principles underlying the defense of republican institutions. In turn, this variation captures one facet of the distinct qualities of republican thought that separated the intellectual terrain of the early fourteenth century from that of the sixteenth century. (shrink)

In this paper we intend to present some medieval foundations, especially Franciscan, of the revitalized civic republicanism of the 20th century. There is an unjustified leap from Rome to the Renaissance that has its origin in the forgetfulness and simplistic view that Hanna Arendt has of medieval thought and Aristotelianism, caused by the historiographic criteria of her time. For this we will show some characteristics of the thought of this new republicanism in order to present the central (...) ideas of four Franciscan authors: Francesc Eiximenis, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus and Alfonso de Castro. First we will try to show the continuity that exists between the Middle Ages and the Modern Age. With this historical approach we intend to analyze that the legitimate aspiration of this new republicanism is distorted and limited if it leaves aside medieval contributions that help to understand more fully the republican pretension the republican pretension that, without rejecting the autonomy of the individual or the sense of community, highlights the interactive nature of social life and instigates him to persevere in the pursuit of the common good. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 555-557 [Access article in PDF] Quentin Skinner. Visions of Politics. Vol. I, Regarding Method. Pp. xvi + 209. Vol. II, Renaissance Virtues. Pp. xix + 461. Vol. III, Hobbes and Civil Science. Pp. xvii + 386. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Cloth, $180.00. Paper, $65.00. Quentin Skinner's Visions of Politics consists of three volumes of his essays, most of (...) which have been previously published. Volume I concerns the nature of historical interpretation. It contains the classic, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas"; much of his "Reply to My Critics," from Meaning and Context (James Tully, editor [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988]);"Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts"; and other notable essays. Volume II focuses on aspects of the Renaissance, especially discussions of the concept of liberty and various theories of civic republicanism. Volume III focuses on the life and thought of Thomas Hobbes, although its chapters also contain an enormous amount of information about ancient rhetoric, Renaissance humanism, and other things. As my brief description of the contents of these volumes indicates, Skinner's knowledge is [End Page 555] not just encyclopedic; it is Britannic. The range and depth of his scholarship, evident in each article written over several decades, is all the more impressive when they are gathered together. Unfortunately, he has stopped short of reprinting all of his articles in their entirety; for example, only part of "Hobbes on Sovereignty" (1965), is included.Although the Journal of the History of Philosophy does not normally review works of previously published essays, an exception is being made in this case because of the importance of Skinner's thought and because these volumes contain significant new material. Although most of the chapters are reprinted largely as they originally appeared, some chapters were extensively rewritten. Many readers will wish that he had changed less and provided more commentary on the views of his younger self.Given the number and originality of Skinner theses, every reader will disagree with some of them. In the rest of this review, I will discuss a few of these. Skinner makes the provocative claim that "our goals as historians should [not] be to recount [facts]... as objectively as possible" (I:1). This looks relativistic but he says that he is not a relativist. Shortly later, he makes the disturbing, but not unfamiliar, claim that "the concept of truth is irrelevant to the enterprise of explaining beliefs" (I:2). A major problem for this view is that anyone who makes a statement is, or purports to be, aiming at the truth. The fact that a speaker might not use the word 'true' or 'truth' does not show that the concept is not operating. Moreover, to be rational is to pursue the truth.Skinner is particularly interested in political rhetoric, and the rhetorical feature he studies most closely is paradiastole. Simplifying it, let's say that paradiastole is the technique of rejecting one description-cum-evaluation, say, "The prince is stubborn," for another, say, "The prince is resolute." Since redescriptions of things can go in either direction, many philosophers thought that the possibility of paradiastole undermined the objectivity of ethics. Rhetoricians fostered this belief by teaching students to argue for either side of an argument.Skinner thinks Hobbes "undoubtedly" provided a solution to the problem of paradiastole and that the solution "has the great merit of confronting the problem in a uniquely uncompromising way" (III:141). The solution depends on recognizing that the goodness of virtues "resides in the fact that they form 'the meanes of peaceable, sociable and comfortable living'" (III:137). So, when a dispute about morality arises, one simply asks "whether the effect of the action will or will not be conducive to the preservation of peace" (III:137). I do not see that this solves the problem. In early 2003, one side called the American invasion of Iraq a means to peace by defeating terrorism, the other side a provocation of war against Muslim nations; either side can be argued. Tending toward peace cannot be part... (shrink)

The author argues that the interpretation of Machiavelli’s political theory is to be prominently a republican one, escaping its commonly simplified and stereotypical interpretations, which reduce his theoretical legacy to so-called ‘Machiavellianism’. The article claims that while elements of ‘Machiavellianism’ do exist in all of his books (especially in The Prince), they do not define the core line and purpose of Machiavelli’s political theory. This article presents how Machiavelli followed the legacy of republican Rome and of the medieval and (...) class='Hi'>Renaissance city-republics of Italy (including Florence) in developing his republican conception. Furthermore, it is argued that the theory of the humours – used as a basis of his interpretation of republican tradition – resulted in the anticipation of modern liberal republicanism in Machiavelli’s legacy. His statements that conflicts of interests among different humours/classes/estates were not only unavoidable, but were also useful in enacting good laws, did anticipate modern pluralism. The author argues that the theory of the humours served Machiavelli as the core background he used in differentiating the main forms of political orders: monarchy/principality, republic and lizenzia (institutionally, a republic, but effectively, an imbalanced quasi-aristocratic rule). The criterion Machiavelli used was the quality of relations existent among those humours, in the sense that only the republic secured the satisfaction of the needs and interests of all humours, and insofar represented a well-balanced, healthy body politic. Machiavelli’s intention was to offer ‘practical lessons from the study of history’ through comparison of the ‘ancient events’ of the Roman republic with the ‘modern events’ of the existing lizenzia in Florence, so that a real republican order be (re)established in the Florence of his days. (shrink)

Partindo da recente renascença da tradição republicana, o presente trabalho aponta para a pluralidade de tal tradição, para em seguida distinguir entre dois tipos de solução que ela oferece aos problemas da salvaguarda da república e do controle dos efeitos negativos das ações dos indivíduos, a saber, a solução internalista e a solução externalista. Ao analisar esta última, serão discutidas questões como: a ficção democrática do “one head, one vote” e a relação entre poder político e poder econômico e social. (...) PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Republicanismo. Democracia. Poder. Madison. ABSTRACT Taking the recent renaissance of the republican tradition as a starting point, this paper points out to the plurality of this tradition and makes a distinction between the two kinds of solution this tradition gives to the problems of saving the republic and of controlling the negative effects of individual actions: the internalist and the externalist solution. Focusing on the latter, we’ll discuss questions such as: the democratic fiction of “one head, one vote” and the relationship between political power and socioeconomic power. KEY WORDS – Republicanism. Democracy. Power. Madison. (shrink)

Partindo da recente renascença da tradição republicana, o presente trabalho aponta para a pluralidade de tal tradição, para em seguida distinguir entre dois tipos de solução que ela oferece aos problemas da salvaguarda da república e do controle dos efeitos negativos das ações dos indivíduos, a saber, a solução internalista e a solução externalista. Ao analisar esta última, serão discutidas questões como: a ficção democrática do “one head, one vote” e a relação entre poder político e poder econômico e social. (...) PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Republicanismo. Democracia. Poder. Madison. ABSTRACT Taking the recent renaissance of the republican tradition as a starting point, this paper points out to the plurality of this tradition and makes a distinction between the two kinds of solution this tradition gives to the problems of saving the republic and of controlling the negative effects of individual actions: the internalist and the externalist solution. Focusing on the latter, we’ll discuss questions such as: the democratic fiction of “one head, one vote” and the relationship between political power and socioeconomic power. KEY WORDS – Republicanism. Democracy. Power. Madison. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to MiltonWilliam WalkerMachiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton, by Victoria Kahn; xv & 3l4 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, $29.95.The premise of this book is that the account of Machiavelli’s politics given by Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock is fundamentally inadequate. It is inadequate in that it fails to recognize that the Machiavelli of force and fraud—what Kahn calls (...) the “rhetorical Machiavel”—is inseparable from the republican, and that his politics “could be used not only pro and contra republicanism but pro and contra secular thought” (p. 12). This failure is answerable to a flawed methodology: reading Machiavelli’s texts for content, Skinner and Pocock neglect Machiavelli’s rhetorical techniques which “fragment, subvert, or otherwise qualify the literal sense” of his texts (p. 5). By paying attention to these rhetorical techniques, Kahn claims to correct Skinner and Pocock’s misunderstanding of Machiavelli as a virtuous, secular republican and “to provide a revised history of Renaissance Machiavellism, particularly in England” (p. 4).The main reason for the failure of this project is Kahn’s crude understanding of Skinner and Pocock. Rather than seeing Machiavelli assimilating virtù with classical virtue, Skinner observes that Machiavelli’s exclusion of justice from republican virtù is an epoch-making break with the classical republican analysis of the cardinal virtues as expounded in Cicero’s Of Duties. Pocock, too, clearly recognizes that Roman republican virtù as it is documented by Machiavelli includes what Kahn calls “the resources of the Machiavel” (p. 124). In addition, rather than equating Machiavellism with secular republicanism, Pocock observes that it was difficult for not just Machiavelli but everyone in the Renaissance to conceive the moment of recreating the republic without making recourse to the apocalyptic moment, the moment at which grace acted in history. And to think as Kahn does that Pocock needs to be told that Machiavellism could be “used for sectarian religious purposes” (p. 8) is simply to disregard Pocock’s own assertion of this fact and his tremendous meditation on how this actually occurred in the millennially oriented society of seventeenth-century England.The claims which Kahn makes on the basis of her perceptive close readings [End Page 370] of the rhetoric of Machiavelli’s The Prince and The Discourses, then, do not significantly revise Pocock and Skinner. Neither do her considerations of readings of Machiavelli by counter-Reformation thinkers such as Zuccolo, Caterino, and Botero, sixteenth-century Englishmen such as Starkey, Gardiner, Ralegh, Bacon, and Shakespeare, and the seventeenth-century Englishmen who were involved in civil war and Interregnum political debates. These considerations simply make the point that Machiavelli was read in very different ways and was used to support very different political agendas—an interesting point, and one which is entirely consistent with the views of Skinner and Pocock. Kahn’s revised history of English Machiavellism is further compromised by her construal, beginning in chapter five, of Machiavellism as “the Machiavellian topics of legitimacy and force, virtue and success, intention and effect, means and ends” (p. 156). Kahn seems to suppose that because Machiavelli writes about these topics, these topics are Machiavellian, and anyone who writes about them in English is therefore a subscriber to “English Machiavellism.” This move allows her to consider all kinds of texts which only seem remotely connected to Machiavelli—from sixteenth-century debates over things indifferent, to Coriolanus, to masques by Jonson and Carew, to Milton’s Areopagitica, Comus, and Paradise Lost—as cases of “English Machiavellism.” Kahn ends up defining Machiavellism so widely, that is, that she finds it everywhere. On the other hand, she ignores it where it is most conspicuous: she gives passing attention to Marchamont Nedham’s fully articulated republicanism and no attention whatsoever to the most comprehensive English reading of Machiavelli in the seventeenth century: James Harrington’s Oceana.A revised history of Renaissance Machiavellism, particularly in England? Hardly. Skinner and Pocock still rule.William WalkerUniversity of Canterbury, New ZealandCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

The republican tradition has long been ambivalent about markets and commercial society more generally: from the contrasting positions of Rousseau and Smith in the eighteenth century to recent neorepublican debates about capitalism, republicans have staked out diverse positions on fundamental issues of political economy. Rather than offering a systematic historical survey of these discussions, this chapter will instead focus on the leading neo-republican theory—that of Philip Pettit—and consider its implications for market society. As I will argue, Pettit’s theory is even (...) friendlier to markets than most have believed: far from condemning commercial society, his theory recognizes that competitive markets and their institutional preconditions are an alternative means to limit arbitrary power across the domestic, economic, and even political spheres. While most republican theorists have focused on political means to limit such power—including both constitutional means (e.g., separation of powers, judicial review, the rule of law, federalism) and participatory ones (democratic elections and oversight)—I will examine here an economic model of republicanism that can complement, substitute for, and at times displace the standard political model. Whether we look at spousal markets, labor markets, or residential markets within federal systems, state policies that heighten competition among their participants and resource exit from abusive relationships within them can advance freedom as non-domination as effectively or even more effectively than social-democratic approaches that have recently gained enthusiasts among republicans. These conclusions suggest that democracy, be it social or political, is just one means among others for restraining arbitrary power and is consequently less central to (certain versions of) republicanism than we may have expected. So long as they counteract domination, economic inroads into notionally democratic territory are no more worrisome than constitutional ones. (shrink)

Republicanism and Political Theory is the first book to offer a comprehensive and critical survey of republican political theory. Critically assesses its historical credentials, conceptual coherence, and normative proposals Brings together original contributions from leading international scholars in an interactive way Provides the reader with valuable insight into new debates taking place in republican political theory.

Socialist republicans advocate public ownership and control of the means of production in order to achieve the republican goal of a society without endemic domination. While civic republicanism is often attacked for its conservatism, the relatively neglected radical history of the tradition shows how a republican form of socialism provides powerful conceptual resources to critique capitalism for leaving workers and citizens dominated. This analysis supports a programme of public ownership and economic democracy intended to reduce domination in the workplace (...) and wider society. I defend this socialist republicanism from both the Marxist objection that it overlooks the impersonal nature of domination under capitalism and the left-liberal objections that property-owning democracy or worker codetermination are sufficient to suppress dominating relationships. The resulting position identifies the need for more ambitious institutional grounds for republican liberty than is often supposed, while offering us a distinctive emancipatory justification for socialism. (shrink)

In response to the dominance of liberalism, some theorists have recently embraced the republican model as an attractive alternative. The overriding appeal of these moves seems to be the robust emphasis that forms of republicanism place on citizenship and civic virtue in light of what many commentators see as a decline in the social nature of modern politics. However, many of these discussions about republicanism are inconsistent and fail to capture the essence of a classical republican theory for (...) today's complex modern world. The result is that the ideals and values of classical republicanism have become diluted and misappropriated as they are utilized by both philosophers and politicians without a clear and consistent sense of their historical pedigree and their relevance to the contemporary world. Republicanism in the Modern World develops and extends the theoretical implications of a distinctive republican conception of liberty as non-domination. Building on the recent work of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, Maynor explores the complex interdependent relationship between liberty as non-domination and conflict, citizenship, and civic virtue to develop a modern theory of republicanism. Maynor argues that modern republicanism, inspired and informed by classical versions, can be the basis for a renewed effort to rejuvenate the political ideals and institutions of the modern democratic nation-state. This book will be invaluable to students and scholars in politics, political philosophy and international relations. (shrink)

This is the first full-length presentation of a republican alternative to the liberal and communitarian theories that have dominated political philosophy in recent years. The latest addition to the acclaimed Oxford Political Theory series, Pettit's eloquent and compelling account opens with an examination of the traditional republican conception of freedom as non-domination, contrasting this with established negative and positive views of liberty. The first part of the book traces the rise and decline of this conception, displays its many attractions, and (...) makes a case for why it should still be regarded as a central political ideal. The second part of the book looks at what the implementation of the ideal would imply for substantive policy-making, constitutional and democratic design, regulatory control and the relation between state and civil society. Prominent in this account is a novel concept of democracy, under which government is exposed to systematic contestation, and a vision of relations between state and society founded upon civility and trust. Pettit's powerful and insightful new work offers not only a unified, theoretical overview of the many strands of republican ideas, but also a new and sophisticated perspective on studies in related fields including the history of ideas, jurisprudence, and criminology. (shrink)

Commercial republicanism is the idea that a properly-structured commercial society can serve the republican end of minimizing the domination of citizens by states (imperium) and of citizens by other citizens (dominium). Much has been written about this idea in the last half-century, including analyses of individual commercial republicans (e.g., Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant) as well as discussions of national traditions of the same (e.g., in America, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Italy). In this chapter, I review five kinds (...) of arguments that have been historically offered for how commercial society so understood advances the republican ideal of non-domination: first, by simply realizing non-dominating relationships in the marketplace itself (Instantiation); second, by encouraging the growth of a wide middle class that can offer a counterweight to other, dominating classes (Internal Check-and-Balance); third, by increasing the wealth and power of republics vis-à-vis other, dominating states in the international arena (External Check-and-Balance); fourth, by helpfully nurturing bourgeois-civic virtues in republican citizens (Cultivating Virtue); and finally, by transforming dangerous passions into more readily regulable, even socially beneficial material interests (Sublimating Vice). I end the chapter by briefly considering commercial republicanism’s prospects as a continuing research program. (shrink)

The article elaborates an original intertwined reading of republican theory, deliberative democracy and political equality. It argues that republicans, deliberative democrats and egalitarian scholars have not paid sufficient attention to a number of features present in these bodies of scholarships that relate them in mutually beneficial ways. It shows that republicanism and deliberative democracy are related in mutually beneficial ways, it makes those relations explicit, and it deals with potential objections against them. Additionally, it elaborates an egalitarian principle underpinning (...) the resulting model that I label Equality of Access and Deliberation. The upshot of these considerations is a novel and mutually reinforcing interrelated three-tiered theoretical and institutional proposal. (shrink)

The first comprehensive analysis of the philosophical issues raised by the hijab controversy in France, this book also conducts a dialogue between contemporary Anglo-American and French political theory and defends a progressive republican solution to so-called multicultural conflicts in contemporary societies. It critically assesses the official republican philosophy of laïcité which purported to justify the 2004 ban on religious signs in schools. Laïcité is shown to encompass a comprehensive theory of republican citizenship, centered on three ideals: equality (secular neutrality of (...) the public sphere), liberty (individual autonomy and emancipation) and fraternity (civic loyalty to the community of citizens). Challenging official interpretations of laïcité, the book then puts forward a critical republicanism which does not support the hijab ban, yet upholds a revised interpretation of three central republican commitments: secularism, non-domination and civic solidarity. Thus, it articulates a version of secularism which squarely addresses the problem of status quo bias - the fact that Western societies are historically not neutral towards all religions. It also defends a vision of female emancipation which rejects the coercive paternalism inherent in the regulation of religious dress, yet does not leave individuals unaided in the face of religious and secular, patriarchal and ethnocentric domination. Finally, the book outlines a theory of immigrant integration which places the burden of civic integration on basic socio-political institutions, rather than on citizens themselves. Critical republicanism proposes an entirely new approach to the management of religious and cultural pluralism, centred on the pursuit of the progressive ideal of non-domination in existing, non-ideal societies. (shrink)

Civic Republicanism is a valuable critical introduction to one of the most important topics in political philosophy. In this book, Iseult Honohan presents an authoritative and accessible account of civic republicanism, its origins and its problems. The book examines all the central themes of this political theory. In the first part of the book, Honohan explores the notion of historical tradition, which is a defining aspect of civic republicanism, its value and whether a continued tradition is sustainable. (...) She also discusses the central concepts of republicanism, how they have evolved, in what circumstances civic republicanism can be applied and its patterns of re-emergence. In the second part of the book, contemporary interpretation of republican political theory is explored and question of civic virtue and participation are raised. What is the nature of the common good? What does it mean to put public before private interests and what does freedom mean in a republican state? Honohan explores these as well as other questions about the sustainability of republican thought in the kind of diverse societies we live in today. Civic Republicanism will be essential reading for students of politics and philosophy. (shrink)

In the nineteenth century a group of “labor republicans” argued that the system of wage-labor should be replaced by a system of cooperative production. This system of cooperative production would realize republican liberty in economic, not just political, life. Today, neo-republicans argue that the republican theory of liberty only requires a universal basic income. A non-dominated ability to exit is sufficient to guarantee free labor. This essay reconstructs the more radical, labor republican view and defends it against the prevailing the (...) neo-republican one. It argues that neorepublicanism lacks an adequate conception of structural domination, which leaves it without theoretical resources to address certain forms of economic domination. The concept of structural domination allows us to comprehend the coherence of the nineteenth century, labor republican view and identify its relevance to modern labor markets. Labor republicanism takes us beyond a universal basic income to a concern with control over productive assets and workplace organization. As such, it shows us how the republican theory of liberty can support an argument for the transformation of work, not just the escape from it. (shrink)

This essay revisits the long-standing debate concerning the sources for the underlying political beliefs and commitments held by the “founding generation,” those colonists who came to the conclusion that separation from the mother country was necessary and inevitable. It uses a mixed mode of enquiry and analysis, blending standard close reading of texts with computer-aided inspection of the archive at scale. It seeks to clarify the extent to which a set of political assumptions and theories widely assumed to be gathered (...) under the rubric of “republicanism” could have shaped the thinking of this founding generation. Given that the term “republicanism” was very infrequent until the last decade or so of the eighteenth century, the essay proposes ways of interrogating the historical formation of concepts for which no label can be easily discerned. Following the consideration of some candidate terms or phrases that might, at the time of the American Revolution, have effectively been hosts for the political idea of “republicanism,” the essay arrives at the conclusion that the founding generation reimagined the role that “republicanism” had played in their thinking at the time. (shrink)

In his most recent book, Philip Pettit presents and defends a “republican” political philosophy that stems from a tradition that includes Cicero, Machiavelli, James Harrington, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Madison. The book provides an interpretation of what is distinctive about republicanism—namely, Pettit claims, its notion of freedom as nondomination. He sketches the history of this notion, and he argues that it entails a unique justification of certain political arrangements and the virtues of citizenship that would make those arrangements possible. (...) Of historical and philosophical interest, he stresses, is the fundamental contrast between freedom as nondomination and slavery. Joseph Priestly, for instance, invoked this contrast in defending the cause of the American Revolution, and in 1769 declared, incredibly, that if the parliament of Great Britain continued to tax the American colonies, “the colonists will be reduced to a state of as complete servitude, as any people of which there is an account in history”. Those opposed to American independence, among them Jeremy Bentham, relied instead on a Hobbesian notion of freedom as noninterference, using it to argue that the colonists were no more interfered with by the British government than were citizens of Britain. Drawing out this contrast, Pettit aims to establish that a republican view of freedom better supports the institutions of a constitutional democracy than does liberalism. His account of the distinguishing characteristics and strengths of republicanism is, however, only partially successful. Neither his case that a republican notion of freedom provides for a more solid defense of democratic institutions and constitutional protections than is available within liberalism, nor his argument that republicanism can better address “private” injustices, is convincing. (shrink)

The revival of republicanism was meant to challenge the hegemony of liberalism in contemporary political theory on the grounds that liberals show insufficient concern with institutional protection against political misrule. This article challenges this view by showing how neorepublicanism, particularly on Philip Pettit’s formulation, demands no greater institutional protection than does political liberalism. By identifying neutrality between conceptions of the good as the constraint on institutional requirements that forces neorepublicanism into the liberal framework, the article shows that neutrality is (...) what neorepublicans must jettison to offer a tenable critique of liberalism. Only then can neorepublicans ensure greater protection against misrule by demanding that citizens participate more actively in politics. They can then also criticize liberalism for failing to appreciate the importance of such protection. (shrink)

Interest in republicanism as a political theory has burgeoned in recent years, but its implications for the understanding of law have remained largely unexplored. Legal Republicanism is the first book to offer a comprehensive, critical survey of the potential for creating republican accounts of fundamental issues in law and legal theory.