La réception de la théologie politique schmittienne a été différente en Allemagne et en Italie, en particulier dans le groupe de philosophes connu sous le nom de « l’École de Ritter » et chez les postmarxistes italiens issus de l’opéraïsme, dans les années 1970 et 1980. Cet article examine cette réception philosophiquement et politiquement contrastée. Il expose aussi les emprunts essentiels que les philosophes italiens comme Tronti, Marramao ou Esposito ont faits à leurs collègues allemands. Alors qu’outre-rhin l’École de Ritter (...) interprète la théologie politique schmittienne comme une simple enquête généalogique et considère que la dépolitisation de la religion est l’un des pricipaux acquis des Lumières, aux philosophes italiens cette dépolitisation semble en partie un mythe politique. Les uns se tournent vers le paradigme du droit naturel ou de la religion civile, les autres engagent une réflexion métapolitique qui souligne le lien entre théologie politique et philosophie politique. (shrink)

L’usage de la notion de religion civique s’est imposé aux historiens, et notamment aux historiens médiévistes, du fait sans doute de sa souplesse conceptuelle. Le présent article part de l’hypothèse que les historiens auraient beaucoup à gagner à mettre au jour les relations, parfois subreptices, que la notion entretient avec des concepts contigus – ceux, notamment, de la religion civique gréco-romaine, de la religion civile du temps des Lumières ou de la religion séculière telle que (...) les penseurs du XXe siècle l’ont élaborée. (shrink)

Hasta ahora gran parte de la literatura crítica sobre la cuestión de la religión en Maquiavelo ha limitado su atención a las religiones romana y cristiana, sin haber considerado la recepción italiana y florentina de otros monoteísmos no cristianos (ya sean semitas o paganos), la filosofía política medieval árabe y judía (es decir, la profetología), o el nuevo platonismo que fuera introducido en la Italia renacentista por la llamada «diáspora» de los filósofos bizantinos. Una vez que se tienen en cuenta (...) todos estos elementos se hace muy difícil no reconocer que la cultura florentina que albergó a Ficino, Pico, Savonarola y Maquiavelo se vio profundamente influenciada, como analizamos en el presente trabajo, tanto por la recepción de lo que se conoce como «teología antigua» (_prisca theologia_) como también por la «profetología» árabe y judía, especialmente en la obra de Alfarabi. En el presente texto sostengo por tanto que el análisis de la estrecha relación entre la «teología antigua» y la «profetología» que tuvo lugar en Florencia décadas antes de que Maquiavelo compusiera su obra nos permite comprender mejor la concepción maquiaveliana de la religión civil, que estaría fuertemente condicionada por una interpretación de la república romana desde la perspectiva de la república hebrea y la profecía mosaica. (shrink)

Postulo que a través de una lectura hegeliana del trasfondo ontológico que subyace a la doctrina del liberalismo político es posible expandir su alcance teórico más allá de las cuestiones normativas de la filosofía política en las cuales suele quedar restringido bajo las lecturas más comunes; pragmática y kantiana. Hegel reconoce en la afirmación histórica del principio de igual-libertad la herencia del mensaje cristiano, pero como ha sostenido J. Doull, es sólo en Norteamérica que el ideal hegeliano de la libertad (...) encarnada en el Estado se ha cumplido sobre esta base. A partir de aquí se deduce una diferencia fundamental en el modo como son experimentados el paradigma y el ethos del liberalismo en los Estados Unidos y Europa, respectivamente. (shrink)

Civil Religion offers philosophical commentaries on more than twenty thinkers stretching from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. The book examines four important traditions within the history of modern political philosophy and delves into how each of them addresses the problem of religion. Two of these traditions pursue projects of domesticating religion. The civil religion tradition, principally defined by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, seeks to domesticate religion by putting it solidly in the service of politics. (...) The liberal tradition pursues an alternative strategy of domestication by seeking to put as much distance as possible between religion and politics. Modern theocracy is a militant reaction against liberalism, and it reverses the relationship of subordination asserted by civil religion: it puts politics directly in the service of religion. Finally, a fourth tradition is defined by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Aspects of their thought are not just modern, but hyper-modern, yet they manifest an often-hysterical reaction against liberalism that is fundamentally shared with the theocratic tradition. Together, these four traditions compose a vital dialogue that carries us to the heart of political philosophy itself. (shrink)

Christophe Litwin | : Au sens strict, la démocratie est pour Jean-Jacques Rousseau la forme de gouvernement où les corps du gouvernement et du peuple souverain sont identiques. Rousseau jugeant cette forme de gouvernement impossible, les commentateurs opposent à cette acception du terme une acception plus large : « démocratie » désignerait non plus la forme du gouvernement, mais celle de la souveraineté populaire elle-même. Cet article réfute cette interprétation encore trop formelle. Partant du constat que la démocratie est impossible (...) comme forme de gouvernement, sauf pour « un peuple de dieux », je montre d’une part que son idée doit moins se comprendre comme forme que principe de gouvernement, et d’autre part que l’emploi du législateur s’identifie rigoureusement à la mise en application initiale de ce principe. Je dégage ensuite la relation entre ce sens principiel du concept de démocratie et la vertu politique dont Rousseau reprend de façon critique le concept à Montesquieu. Dans la dernière partie, je discute du problème que pose cette conception de la démocratie et de la vertu – qui suppose qu’on mette la loi au-dessus de l’homme – dans le contexte historique et moral de l’Europe moderne où la vertu ne peut plus s’appuyer sur un ressort religieux national. | : According to Rousseau, “democracy” in the strict sense is a specific form of government in which the bodies of government and of the sovereign people are identical. Since Rousseau considers democracy in this formal sense to require a “people of gods” to be possible, commentators often identify “democracy” in Rousseau with the broader notion of popular sovereignty. I argue that they thus substitute one formal conception of democracy for another and that democracy in Rousseau names not so much an impos-sible form of government or form of sovereignty as it does the active principle of every l egitimate state. I identify the initial enactment of this democratic principle with the action of the legislator and his ability to “make the gods speak” to the people and I show the relationship between democracy as such a principle and Montesquieu’s concept of political virtue. Then, I examine how this principle operates in Rousseau’s Project of Constitution for Corsica. Finally, I discuss the problems raised by this conception of democracy and virtue—which requires that the laws be placed above men—in the historical and moral context of modern Europe in which virtue cannot stem from a national religion. (shrink)

In recent years scholars have begun to question the usefulness of the category of ''religion'' to describe a distinctive form of human experience and behavior. In his last book, The Ideology of Religious Studies (OUP 2000), Timothy Fitzgerald argued that ''religion'' was not a private area of human existence that could be separated from the public realm and that the study of religion as such was thus impossibility. In this new book he examines a wide range of (...) English-language texts to show how religion became transformed from a very specific category indigenous to Christian culture into a universalist claim about human nature and society. These claims, he shows, are implied by and frequently explicit in theories and methods of comparative religion. But they are also tacitly reproduced throughout the humanities in the relatively indiscriminate use of ''religion'' as an a priori valid cross-cultural analytical concept, for example in historiography, sociology, and social anthropology. Fitzgerald seeks to link the argument about religion to the parallel formation of the ''non-religious'' and such dichotomies as church-state, sacred-profane, ecclesiastical-civil, spiritual-temporal, supernatural-natural, and irrational-rational. Part of his argument is that the category ''religion'' has a different logic compared to the category ''sacred,'' but the two have been consistently confused by major writers, including Durkheim and Eliade. Fitzgerald contends that ''religion'' imagined as a private belief in the supernatural was a necessary conceptual space for the simultaneous imagining of ''secular'' practices and institutions such as politics, economics, and the Nation State. The invention of ''religion'' as a universal type of experience, practice, and institution was partly the result of sacralizing new concepts of exchange, ownership, and labor practices, applying ''scientific'' rationality to human behavior, administering the colonies and classifying native institutions. In contrast, shows Fitzgerald, the sacred-profane dichotomy has a different logic of use. (shrink)

Introductory: Civil Society, Participation, and Religion1.

Respect for human dignity and the common good in democratic regimes cannot be sustained by reason alone. Citizen faith commitments endorsing both of these values are necessary. However, negotiating in practice the relationship between civic values and religious morality is extremely challenging in a democracy. As a contribution to greater balance in these matters, Ingram argues that the capacity of religion to promote democratic reform in a way that respects fair procedures (rule of law) must extend beyond the liberal (...) principle of tolerance. It must extend to recognizing the republican principle of non-domination. Ingram provides a thorough comparative analysis of the situations in Indonesia, Lithuania, and Peru to support his argument. (shrink)

In the last few years, there has been a notable surge of interest in the themes of civil religion and the battle against “priestcraft” among historians of political thought. Examples include Eric Nelson’s The Hebrew Republic; Paul Rahe’s Against Throne and Altar; Jeffrey Collins’s The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes; Jonathan Israel’s work on the legacy of Spinoza; Justin Champion’s work on John Toland; and my own book, Civil Religion. Within the intellectual space created by this recent scholarship, this (...) article focuses on relevant themes in the work of the one of the two thinkers who J.G.A. Pocock identified as most responsible for the “implantation of the values of civic humanism in English political thought” – namely, James Harrington (the other being the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury). (shrink)

Does Civilization Need Religion? sets out from the fact that religion's inability to make its ethical and social resources available for the solution of the moral problems of modern civilization is one, and the neglected one, of the two chief causes responsible for its debilitated condition. It is convinced that if Christian idealists are to make religion socially effective they will be forced to detach themselves from the dominant secular desires of the nations as well as from (...) the greed of economic groups. It aims to show that though neither the orthodox nor the modern wing of the Christian Church seems capable of initiating a genuine revival which will evolve a morality capable of challenging and maintaining itself against the dominant desires of modern civilization's needs, there are resources in the Christian religion which make it the inevitable basis of any spiritual regeneration of Western civilization. Does Civilization Need Religion? maintains that the task of redeeming Western society rests in a peculiar sense upon Christianity, which has reduced the eternal conflict between self-assertion and self-denial to the paradox of self-assertion through self-denial and made the Cross the symbol of life's highest achievement. It is persuaded that the idea of a potent but yet suffering divine ideal which is defeated by the world but gains its victory in the defeat must continue to remain basic in any morally creative worldview. (shrink)

Does Civilization Need Religion? sets out from the fact that religion's inability to make its ethical and social resources available for the solution of the moral problems of modern civilization is one, and the neglected one, of the two chief causes responsible for its debilitated condition. It is convinced that if Christian idealists are to make religion socially effective they will be forced to detach themselves from the dominant secular desires of the nations as well as from (...) the greed of economic groups. It aims to show that though neither the orthodox nor the modern wing of the Christian Church seems capable of initiating a genuine revival which will evolve a morality capable of challenging and maintaining itself against the dominant desires of modern civilization's needs, there are resources in the Christian religion which make it the inevitable basis of any spiritual regeneration of Western civilization. Does Civilization Need Religion? maintains that the task of redeeming Western society rests in a peculiar sense upon Christianity, which has reduced the eternal conflict between self-assertion and self-denial to the paradox of self-assertion through self-denial and made the Cross the symbol of life's highest achievement. It is persuaded that the idea of a potent but yet suffering divine ideal which is defeated by the world but gains its victory in the defeat must continue to remain basic in any morally creative worldview. (shrink)

In this essay I deal with two conceptions of the political—one that entails a clash of civilizations associated with an Schmittian critique of liberalism, and a second that envisions the political as an emerging domain in relationship to the idea of overlapping consensus. The discovery of the emerging domain of the political in the later work of John Rawls separates the comprehensive from the political in a way that breaks the link between modernization and secularization. In so doing Rawls accommodates (...) the rise of religion that has become a major issue in the twenty-first century. I follow Rawls's development from…. (shrink)

A collection of essays on civil religion in modern political philosophy, exploring the engagement between modern thought and the Christian tradition.

Many sociologists have drawn attention to the puzzling absence of a detailed discussion of religion in Elias’s investigation of the European civilizing process. Elias did not develop a sociology of religion, but he did not overlook the importance of beliefs in the ‘spirit world’ in the history of human societies. In his writings such convictions were described as fantasy images that could be contrasted with ‘reality-congruent’ knowledge claims. Elias placed fantasy–reality balances, whether religious or secular, at the centre (...) of the analysis of how societies have dealt with collective fears that arise in response to largely uncontrolled conditions. He located religious orientations within a broader framework of analysis regarding fantasy–reality balances in the first human groups and in current state-organized societies. Elias stressed how balances changed in ‘civilized’ societies with the rise of the natural sciences. But his writings emphasized the continuing influence of fantasy images in technologically sophisticated societies, particularly in the context of national and international power struggles. His analysis of how fantasy images acquired considerable influence under conditions of fear is important for studies of social responses to global challenges including climate change. Connections with Weber’s sociology of religion point the way to theoretically informed empirical research on balances between fantasy and reality-congruence in a tumultuous and unpredictable era. (shrink)

For decades, the United States has supported the development of civil society in various places around the world. Promoted as integral to democracy, civil society projects have come to include religion and religious freedom as significant components. U.S. experts point to tolerance of all faiths and the presence of voluntary religious association as essential checks to state power and necessary to a free society. Because of its unique relationship with Cuba, the United States support of civil society there has (...) addressed religion in a way unlike that in other countries. This article examines very recent developments there, placing them in larger social and historical context of politics and church/state relations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In volume two of his work Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that religion could guarantee individual liberties against the tyranny of the majority. However, in volume one of this work, Tocqueville presented a conventional ‘civil religion’ as a phenomenon that was identical to or subsumed by American social mores or opinions. Thus, the following questions are raised: How can such a religion represent a brake on potential tyranny? How can genuine religion be distinguished (...) from common opinion? Consequently, understanding Tocqueville’s approach to religion remains a major problem. This article demonstrates that in the second volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville suggested a different type of civil religion, one that has a transcendent authority that distinguishes it from public opinion but that, nevertheless, facilitates intellectual liberty. It also shows how Tocqueville resolved the dilemmas of authority and liberty in the civil religion, by focusing on, with his observations of American Christianity, his reading of Blaise Pascal’s works regarding religious authority and human reason, in which Pascal exhorted human beings to willingly recognise the limits of reason. (shrink)

Essays in the field of comparative world religions and corresponding axial civilizations.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Islam: Religion, History, and CivilizationZain AliIslam: Religion, History, and Civilization. By Seyyed Hossein Nasr. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2003. Pp. 224. Paper $9.71."Islam," writes Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "is like a vast tapestry," and in his book Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization he aims to survey the masterpiece that is Islam. The present work is part of a trilogy including Ideal and Realities of Islam (...) and The Heart of Islam. Nasr states that the common theme in the trilogy "is the universalist perspective and respect for other religions" (p. xxiv). In addition, Nasr clarifies that his approach, as with all of his Islamic writings, is to write from an Islamic perspective, which he terms "traditional Islam" (p. xxiii). Nasr stands opposed to either the secular modernist or fundamentalist perspectives, both of which he regards as forms of extremism.This book, initially published as part of Our Religions, edited by A. Sharma, is significantly revised and includes a new introduction and bibliography. It can best be described as a primer on Islam, consisting of eight chapters that focus on a variety of pertinent themes.Chapter 1 deals with the self-understanding of Islam and the Islamic world. Islam, Nasr notes, sees itself as a return to the primordial faith of humanity, a faith that affirms the unity and oneness of God. This chapter also presents an overview [End Page 495] of the various ethnic and cultural groupings within the Muslim world, and charts the spread and demographic growth of Islam.Chapter 2 introduces the notion of al-din, an Arabic term that corresponds closely to the word "religion." Nasr contrasts the two words, where religion means "to bind" while al-din means "debt" (p. 25). Thus, religion, as framed by Islam, involves the notion of debt, in particular humanity's debt to the Divine. The chapter also discusses the significance of the Qur'an and Muhammad as the messenger of God.Chapter 3 begins with an exposition of the nature of Divinity, which is at the heart of Islamic doctrine. As Nasr explains, the Divine is understood as being "at once the Absolute, the Infinite, and the Perfect Good" (p. 59). The remainder of the chapter deals with various Islamic doctrines and beliefs, including prophecy and revelation, human nature, the Qura'nic view of men and women, and eschatology.Chapter 4 deals with the content, codification, and schools of Shariah, the Divine Law of Islam. There is also an interesting discussion of Sufism, which Nasr claims "is like the heart of the body of Islam" (p. 81). Controversially, Nasr claims that "the spread of Islam outside of the Arab and Persian worlds up to the present day has been mostly through Sufism" (p. 87).Chapter 5 delves into the central pillars of Islam, which accompany the belief in God and in Muhammad as the messenger of God. The pillars are salah (canonical prayer), sawn (fasting), hajj (pilgrimage), and zakah (religious tax or charity). Associated with these pillars is the notion of jihad, and here Nasr writes, "jihad... is usually mistranslated into English as 'holy war,' but literally means 'exertion' or 'effort' in the path of God" (p. 91). Also covered are the topics of family, ethics, and economic and political institutions.Chapter 6 presents the historical evolution of Islam beginning with the migration of Muhammad to Medina, and the events leading to the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.Chapter 7 discusses the early Islamic community, who found themselves in the "throes of disputes over such issues as whether human beings are saved by faith or works, whether there is freewill or determinism, and questions concerning the sacred text as the Word of God" (p. 154). Nasr then explores the various schools of theology and philosophy that arose in order to address these questions of faith.Chapter 8, the final chapter of the book, attempts to evaluate the place of Islam in the contemporary world. Nasr concludes by noting that despite the challenges of secular modernism and fundamentalism the vast majority of Muslims remain committed to the truth of Islam, and bear witness to the Oneness of God and the Oneness of humanity.The one quibble... (shrink)