When The Teachers of Gurdjieff was first published some 25 years ago, it made a very considerable stir. George Gurdjieff was one of the most famous mystics before the war, a teaching master who had many fashionable and influential pupils. He had a striking appearance and manner of teaching, one that was to prove influential. The meaning of his teaching and the sources of it were a puzzle. How did he come by his knowledge? What was to become of it? (...) These were questions that engaged many seekers. This book offers, among the adventures of the search and the souks of Baghdad and Aleppo, striking and timeless advice to those interested in finding spirituality. Its appeal is far beyond that of one seeker in one era, but offers us information, today, on how to evaluate different forms of teaching, how to study, and even some tantalizing information on the role of Jesus. (shrink)

The paper deals with the "deuteros plous", literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s "Phaedo", the key passage being Phd. 99e4–100a3. The second voyage refers to what Plato’s Socrates calls his “flight into the logoi”. Elaborating on the subject, the author first (I) provides a non-standard interpretation of the passage in question, and then (II) outlines the philosophical problem that it seems to imply, and, finally, (III) tries to apply this philosophical problem to the "ultimate (...) final proof" of immortality and to draw an analogy with the ontological argument for the existence of God, as proposed by Descartes in his 5th "Meditation". The main points are as follows: (a) the “flight into the logoi” can have two different interpretations, a common one and an astonishing one, and (b) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’s ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th "Meditation" and the "ultimate final proof" for the immortality of the soul in the "Phaedo". (shrink)

El objeto del presente artículo es el estudio y comparación del transhumanismo de Julian Huxley y del trasumanar de Dante Alighieri. Aunque sean autores separados en el tiempo, están conectados por el hecho de que el trasumanar de Dante inspiró la formulación de la palabra con la que Huxley definió su filosofía, el transhumanismo. De este modo, se recorre a lo largo del artículo el pensamiento de Dante hasta llegar, después, al de Huxley con el objetivo de compararlos y comprobar (...) el alcance antropológico de ambas propuestas filosóficas. (shrink)

Qual o lugar da filosofia nos dias atuais? Diante das inúmeras respostas possíveis a esta questão, nos debruçaremos em alguns tópicos que podemos inserir na chamada Ética Informacional, um ramo de investigação filosófico-interdisciplinar relativamente recente que discute problemas oriundos da relação ser humano/tecnologias digitais. Temas como privacidade informacional, arrogância epistêmica e divisão digital serão discutidos e relacionados, com o intuito de ilustrar o papel da filosofia na compreensão da complexidade inerente às dinâmicas sociais no contexto da sociedade da informação. Argumentaremos (...) que pensar o mundo contemporâneo a partir do viés da ética informacional se faz cada dia mais imprescindível para que possamos entrar em sintonia com as rápidas mudanças que a revolução informacional impõe à vida em sociedade e não sermos levados pelas enxurradas informacionais que presenciamos diariamente. (shrink)

The paper gives (I) a short introduction to Aristotle’s theory of the soul in distinction to Plato’s and tries again (II) to answer the question of whether the individual or the general active mind of human beings is immortal by interpreting “When separated (χωρισθεìς)” (de An. III, 5, 430a22) as the decisive argument for the latter view. This strategy of limiting the question has the advantage of avoiding the probably undecidable question of whether this active νοῦς is human or divine. (...) The paper closes with an outlook (III) on the Christian belief in the resurrection of body and soul in a spiritual body (σῶμα πνευματικóν) (1 Corinthians: 15, 44) by accentuating the ethical aspect of the belief in individual immortality as a “need of reason” (Vernunftbedürfnis) (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, A 256–258). (shrink)

Book review of: Donald R. Morrison (Hg.), The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010.

The article again treats the question of whether ≪the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent?≫. Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being in dignity and power, but, on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and (...) Brisson. Then, it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third, it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9‑10, and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good. (shrink)

The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a sentence (...) and the form of a fact. (shrink)

A critically acute summary of the main theories about the 'State', from Greek antiquity to the present. The authors highlight the importance of archaeology to our knowledge of how the first States were formed and how they functioned. They also ask what conditions of social production led to the State arising as the self-interested regulator of social relationships.

Plato’s “Apology of Socrates” is a masterpiece of the philosophical literature. The question remains as to how much it has been influenced by earlier works, e.g. of Gorgias of Leontinoi and Euripides. Nevertheless, comparative studies on Hippolytus’ defense in Euripides’ tragedy of the same name, on Gorgias’ “Defense of Palamedes” and on Plato’s “Apology” do not exist. The short paper gives an introduction into the status quaestionis.

Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word “is”, their theories share a common feature: “is” does not have a normative meaning. This paper, however, (I) shows (a) that there is a normative meaning of “is” (and correspondingly a constative meaning of the word “ought”) and (b) that the ambiguity of “is” is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, it proposes (c) a performative criterion for making a distinction between constative and (...) normative “is”. Thereby, (II) a new interpretation of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument (CPR A 598/B626) makes sense: The difference between being as a real predicate and being as a position depends on the difference between “is” as a descriptive and “is” as a normative predicate. (III) The criterion also makes possible a new answer to Leibniz’s and Schelling’s question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”: The “is” in “there is something” is normative and the question means “Why shall there be something rather than nothing?”. As “there shall be nothing” is self-refuting, the question evokes an ultimate foundation in a practical sense. (shrink)

The article treats again the question of whether «the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent ?» (Rufus Jones, 1863 1948). Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940 2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) in dignity and power, but on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first (...) (I.) the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Then (II.), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third (III.), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9 10 and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good. (shrink)

Abstract: It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: (...) If moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y” means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. In “Key concepts in philosophy”, Sankt Augustin 2015, institutionalism is explained further (p.184-191) and confined to what Hegel has called “Sittlichkeit” that is customary morality in in distinction to the “morality” of my personal consciousness (p.212-213):. (shrink)

The tricarboxylic acid (TCA) or Krebs cycle, which takes place in prokaryotic cells and in the mitochondria of eukaryotic cells, is central to life on Earth and participates in key events such as energy production and anabolic processes. Despite its relevance, it is not perceived as tightly regulated compared to other key metabolisms such as glycolysis/gluconeogenesis. A better understanding of the functioning of the TCA cycle is crucial due to mitochondrial function impairment in several diseases, especially those that occur with (...) neurodegeneration. This article revisits what is known about the regulation of the Krebs cycle and hypothesizes the need for large‐scale, rapid regulation of TCA cycle enzyme activity. Evidence of mitochondrial enzyme activity regulation by activation/deactivation of protein kinases and phosphatases exists in the literature. Apart from indirect regulation via G protein‐coupled receptors (GPCRs) at the cell surface, signaling upon activation of GPCRs in mitochondrial membranes may lead to a direct regulation of the enzymes of the Krebs cycle. Hormonal‐like regulation by posttranscriptional events mediated by activable kinases and phosphatases deserve proper assessment using isolated mitochondria. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/aBpDSWiMQyI. (shrink)

O artigo busca evidenciar os pontos de contato entre as análises de Foucault e Kant sobre o Iluminismo. Ademais, cumpre explicitar a relação ambivalente da filosofia contemporânea com a razão esclarecida, ora considerada responsável por práticas de dominação, ora como condição de possibilidade para a autonomia e liberdade. Partindo da declaração de Foucault sobre seu trabalho situar-se na tradição crítica kantiana, trata-se de compreender como os dois filósofos problematizaram o processo de saída do homem de sua menoridade.

Las órdenes europeas de detención y entrega emitidas por los tribunales españoles con relación a los implicados en el intento de derogación de la Constitución en Cataluña en el año 2017 han supuesto una prueba para el instrumento. En este trabajo se analizan las razones por las que en los distintos países que han conocido del caso (Bélgica, Alemania, Reino Unido e Italia) no han sido ejecutadas, mostrando de esta forma en qué errores han incurrido las autoridades de estos países (...) y cómo influyen estos errores en el deterioro de la confianza mutua entre los Estados miembros de la UE. (shrink)

The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms “the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori” in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a sentence (...) and the form of a fact. Both transform the identity of thinking and being first formulated by Parmenides “... to gar auto noein estin te kai einai“ (D/K.B3). (shrink)

The paper deals with the beginning and the main properties of the science of nature (he peri physeos historiê). According to Themistius (DK 12 A 7), the founder of this kind of Ionic philosophy is Anaximander of Miletus because he was the first who wrote about nature (especially a cosmography and a cosmogony) and developed three main principles of nature: 1. Nature has a mathematical structure (Arist. De coelo I3 295b10-14.32); 2. nature has a physical structure (DK 12 A 10-11); (...) and 3. nature follows natural laws (DK 12 A 9). The origin of this introduction lies in the prolongation of primitive expectations of constancy. It is especially argued that the shift from mythos to logos is characterized by the depersonalization of nature and the introduction of theoretical terms. In fact, the "apeiron" of Anaximander seems to be something similar to a theoretical term, because Anaximander seems to have realized that the explanans of nature cannot be one of its explananda like water (Thales) or air (Anaximenes). (shrink)

In this paper we present a reconstruction of Hegel's critique of Kant. We try to show the congruence of that critique in both theoretical and practical philosophy. We argue that this congruence is to be found in Hegel's criticism of Kant's hylemorphism in his theoretical and practical philosophy. Hegel is much more sympathetic to Kant's response to the distinction between matter and form in his theoretical philosophy and he credits Kant with ‘discovering’ here that thinking is an activity that always (...) takes place within a greater whole. He, however, argues that the consequences of this are much more significant than Kant suspects and that, most importantly, the model of cognition in which thought (form) confronts something non-thought (matter) is unsustainable. This leads to Hegel's appropriation of Kantian reflective judgements, arguing that the greater whole in which thinking takes place is a socially shared set of meanings, something resembling what Kant calls a sensus communis. From here, it is not far to Hegel's Geist, which eventually gains self-consciousness in Sittlichkeit, a whole of social practices of mutual recognition. In practical philosophy, Hegel argues for the importance of situating oneself within such a whole in order to attain the self-knowledge required for autonomous, or ethically required, action. For this to happen, he claims, it is necessary to recognise the status of Kantian Moralität as a form of Sittlichkeit or social practice. This would justify our practices without an appeal to a ‘fact of reason’ and also allow a wider range of actions that could count as autonomous. (shrink)

It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: If (...) moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the still undetected error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. (shrink)

The book is an english translation with revisions and updates of the "Philosophische Grundbegriffe 1" and provides an introduction to six key concepts in philosophy - philosophy, language, knowledge, truth, being and good. At the same time, it aims to initiate its readers into the process of philosophical thinking. The book is addressed to students and laypeople, but also contains new ideas for specialists. It is written in a clear, accessible and engaging style, and its author 'shares, and manages to (...) convey, something of Plato's own commitment to philosophy'. (shrink)

This is an obituary notice on Henri Lauener (1933-2002).

In this chapter, I explain why cultural preservation is important, and in particular, why it is important enough to justify immigration restrictions. I also attempt to explain why one rarely encounters this type of argument in philosophy.

This paper aims at analyzing the missionary discourse in the final document of Aparecida, in order to concern about the mission and the consequent search for dialogue outside the religious pluralism of the continent. The central question we try to answer: how does the discourse of the document is positioned in front of religious pluralism? What interpretation can we give speeches in the mission document? The central hypothesis is that the mission is the central document of Aparecida. The missionary position, (...) mediated by the speeches, varies according to the theological positions. As we review the text of the document have the foundations for a project of the Church missionary and liberating. (shrink)

En el año 2017, el profesor Antonio Diéguez Lucena nos brindó la oportunidad de conocer sintéticamente el pensamiento transhumanista cuando publicó Transhumanismo. La búsqueda tecnológica del mejoramiento humano. Fue una gran oportunidad para el público de habla hispana la recepción de una obra de estas características, pues Diéguez logró, con rigor académico y profundo diálogo filosófico, abordar las principales cuestiones —tanto desde un punto de vista cultural como tecnológico— que el pensamiento transhumanista plantea. La labor investigadora y divulgadora del profesor (...) Diéguez no acabó con esa publicación. Por eso, en plena pandemia del COVID-19, publicó en el año 2021 su último libro sobre el pensamiento transhumanista, en el que continúa reflexionando sobre algunos temas tratados en el anterior y los desarrolla. La obra se titula Cuerpos inadecuados. El desafío transhumanista a la filosofía. Con su estilo sutil y discreto, Diéguez cuestiona las promesas transhumanistas de nuevo y nos invita a leerle con detenimiento, pues paulatinamente desarticula parte del andamiaje filosófico del transhumanismo enfriando, como en su primera obra sobre este tema, las promesas de este movimiento tecnocultural. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to six key concepts within philosophy: philosophy itself, language, knowledge, truth, being and the good. At the same time, it aims to initiate its readers into the processes of philosophical thinking. The book is addressed to students and lay persons, but also contains new ideas for specialists. It is written in a clear, accessible and engaging style. The German version appeared in eight editions and the second revised and updated English editon has the potential to (...) become a key textbook for an international audience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone by Bruno CentroneRafael FerberBruno Centrone. La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone. Rome: Carocci Editore, 2021. Pp. 348. Paperback, €32.30.After the death of some of the great Italian scholars who devoted a considerable part of their lifetimes to the study of Socrates and Plato, including Gabriele Giannantoni (1932–98), Margherita Isnardi Parente (1928–2008), Giovanni Reale (1931–2014), and Mario Vegetti (1937–2018), (...) a new generation of Italian scholars has moved to center stage. One outstanding member of this group is Bruno Centrone of the University of Pisa, who has been productive for decades, even more so in recent years. After editing, inter alia, the collected articles of Gabriele Giannantoni in Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005) and publishing numerous translations with commentary of Platonic dialogues, he has now also written an extensive introduction to Plato's Laws.The Laws is one of Plato's last dialogues. Its main speaker is an Athenian, in whose voice we may discover, at least in part, the voice of Plato. In his soul, according to a saying of Paul Friedländer (1882–1968), cohabited "Socrates and Solon" (Platone [Milan: Bompiano, 2004], 1127). On the one hand, Plato remains a loyal pupil of Socrates in the Laws, one who defends and refines the Socratic dicta that virtue is knowledge and that nobody does wrong willingly (see 731c1–5, 860d1). On the other hand, he lays out the laws for the imaginary city of Magnesia. Hence, Aristotle writes, "Most of the Laws consists, in fact of laws, and [Plato] has said little about the constitution. He wishes to make it more generally attainable by actual city-states, yet he gradually turns it back towards the Republic" (Politics 2, 1265a1–4). Surely, the Laws was also written for "actual city-states," and especially also "for the ears of the younger generation" and the "Guardians of the Laws in charge of education" (811d4–6, trans. Trevor Saunders [London: Penguin Books, 1970]). It is interesting to note in this context that the Athenian starts from an institutionalist view of the law as the "common dogma of a state [dogma poleôs koinon]" (644d3) before proceeding to his own conception of the law as "reason's distribution": "we should run our public and our private life, our homes and our cities, in obedience to what is immortal in us, and dignify this distribution of reason [tou nou dianomê] with the name of 'law' [nomos]" (713e8–714a2, trans. Trevor Saunders with modification).The Third Letter, whether or not it was written by Plato, tells us that Plato had been working with Dionysius on "preambles" (prooimia) (Ep. III, 316a3). In fact, in a passage in the Laws, we are told that the legislator ought to use two methods: persuasion and force (722b6). Force corresponds to the laws themselves and persuasion to the preambles to the laws (prooimia nomôn) (722d2). The Laws contains not only laws, but also prefaces to the laws, which are persuasive in a way that is similar to the discourses of the free physician addressed to his patients, with logoi "close to philosophizing" (tou philosophein engys chrômenon tois logois) (875d2). Notably, the word 'philosophy' (philosophia) does not appear in the Laws, which is not really a "pure" philosophical work and was not intended by its author to be so, with the exception of some passages in the tenth book, where the deus-mensura thesis is stated (716c) and which also contains proof of the priority of the soul (see 896a–d). The Laws represents Plato's descent into the cave.Centrone rightly draws our attention to the fact that Plato, who via Socrates in the famous digression in the Theaetetus recommends the flight from "here to there [enthenden ekeise]" [End Page 325] (176b8–c1), descends into the cave in the Laws, that is, addresses the details of legislation. But, as Centrone rightly observes, these are merely two sides of the same coin (321). In the Theaetetus, Plato, in the guise of the Platonic Socrates, recommends leaving the cave, while in the Laws, he returns... (shrink)

In order to raise the question of a potential compatibility between the awareness of Otherness on the one hand, and a form of universality on the other, some hypotheses should first be formulated and defined. 1) How does moral relativism equate to the rejection of universal discourses? 2) Consequently, how can this rejection be understood as a result of Modernity? 3) How can Modernity be understood as recognition of Otherness? The current paper will attempt to outline some answers to these (...) questions based on a comparative reading between Kelsen and Lefort. Firstly, in order to explicate the main lines of the Kelsenian relativistic axiology it seems crucial to consider his second edition of the Pure Theory of Law, since one can find within it the grounds for a limitation of human cognition. His Farewell Lecture, “What is justice?”, is also relevant to this theme since in it he claims that the human world is a world of relative and conflicting values. The combination of these two ideas leads to the rejection of Universalist discourses – identified with the ones of Natural Law theories – in the name of science. Secondly, three of Lefort’s articles seem to be relevant. The first, “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism”, enables us to understand his symbolic political philosophy, and more importantly, to introduce his definition of Modernity. “Dissolution of Marks and Democratic Challenge” focuses more on the concept of moral relativism, whilst interpreting it as a consistent reaction to modern indeterminacy. Finally, “Politics and Human Rights” offers a restricted concept of Human Rights, reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s views, namely that human rights mean the rights to have rights. (shrink)

This is a book review of “Malte Hossenfelder: Die Philosophie der Antike 3, Stoa, Epikureismus und Skepsis”.

Claude Lefort is one of the leading social and political theorists in France today. This anthology of his most important work published over the last four decades makes his writing widely accessible to an English-speaking audience for the first time. With exceptional skill Lefort combines the analysis of contemporary political events with a sensitivity to the history of political thought. His critical account of the development of bureaucracy and totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is a (...) timely contribution to current debates about the nature and shortcomings of these societies. His incisive analyses of Marx's theory of history and concept of ideology provide the backdrop for a highly original account of the role of symbolism in modern societies. While critical of many traditional assumptions and doctrines, Lefort develops a political position based on a reappraisal of the idea of human rights and a reconsideration of what "democracy" means today. The Political Forms of Modern Society is a major contribution to contemporary social and political theory. The volume includes a substantial introduction that describes the context of Lefort's writings and highlights the central themes of his work. (shrink)

The question of the oeuvre -- The concept of Machiavellianism -- Reading The prince. First signs -- The logic of force -- The social abyss and attachment to power -- Good and evil, the stable and the unstable, the real and the imaginary -- The present and the possible -- Reading The discourses. From The prince to The discourses -- Rome and the "historical" society -- Class difference -- War, and the difference of times -- Authority and the political subject (...) -- The oeuvre, ideology, and interpretation. (shrink)

This article offers a new reading of Heidegger's thesis of the animal in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Framing Heidegger's text through a brief analysis of Protagoras' genetic story of nature and of man's nature in Plato's eponymous dialogue, our reading brings out three key elements common to both texts: living nature as a normative rather than a physical order, the poverty of man's world in relation to the animal, and the attempted redemption of the latter through the acquisition of (...) Weltbildung. Staying with the way Heidegger brings out man's poverty in world in the text allows us (i) to undo once for all the oft-repeated charge of Heidegger's anthropocentric interpretation of the animal, (ii) to stage the hypothesis that philosophy and the life sciences of his day draw upon a common basic experience of the autonomy of life in relation to everything human, all-too-human, and (iii) to demonstrate the normativity and poverty of life. (shrink)

Rafael Malach is currently a professor in the department of Neurobiology at the Weizmann Institute in Israel. His current research is aimed at understanding how the neuronal circuitry in the human brain translates a stream of sensory stimuli into meaningful perception. Rafael Malach received his PhD in physiological optics from UC Berkeley and did his post-doctorate research at MIT. Originally doing research on the organization of neuronal connections in the primate brain, his focus has recently shifted to the (...) study of the human cerebral cortex using fMRI. Professor Malach has begun this research at Massachusetts General Hospital, exploring a new object-related region called the lateral occipital complex. Since then he expanded this research, studying the human visual cortex using a variety of methods, including adaptation paradigms, backward masking, and more recently naturalistic stimuli--all aimed at deciphering the intriguing link between perceptual experience and brain activity. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to compare two authors: Hans Kelsen and Leo Strauss. More specifically, it will compare Kelsen’s “What is Justice?”—his Farewell Lecture given at Berkeley in 1952—and Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History—one of the main works on political philosophy published in twentieth century America. Both are key texts dealing with the same subject, justice. Although the two texts were written around the same time by authors who shared a similar history, they seem to defend radically (...) opposed points of view. However, despite and beyond their otherwise real differences, the two texts articulate the same important idea: if one wants to think about political issues, one has to address the question of justice. This chapter will attempt to illustrate through a comparison of these two texts the importance of addressing the question of justice, especially in our modern democracies. (shrink)