Kant Studien 75 (1-4):460-468 (1984)

Rafael Ferber
University of Zürich
The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a sentence and the form of a fact.
Keywords Kant, Wittgenstein, Identity between form of experience and the form of object of experience, identity between form of sentence and form of fact
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DOI 10.1515/kant.1984.75.1-4.460
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Kant and Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Necessity and Representation.Hans-Johann Glock - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):285-305.

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