Easy to understand philosophy papers in all areas. Table of contents: Three Short Philosophy Papers on Human Freedom The Paradox of Religions Institutions Different Perspectives on Religious Belief: O’Reilly v. Dawkins. v. James v. Clifford Schopenhauer on Suicide Schopenhauer’s Fractal Conception of Reality Theodore Roszak’s Views on Bicameral Consciousness Philosophy Exam Questions and Answers Locke, Aristotle and Kant on Virtue Logic Lecture for Erika Kant’s Ethics Van Cleve on Epistemic Circularity Plato’s Theory of Forms Can we trust our (...) senses? Yes we can Descartes on What He Believes Himself to Be The Role of Values in Science Modern Science Kant’s Moral Philosophy Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy Schopenhauer on Human Suffering Bertrand Russell on the Value of Philosophy The Philosophical Value of Uncertainty Logic Homework: Theorems and Models Searle vs. Turing on the Imitation Game Hume, Frankfurt, and Holbach on Personal Freedom Manifesto of the University of Wisconsin, Madison Secular Society Michael’s Analysis of the Limits of Civil Protections Bentham and Mill on Different Types of Pleasure Set Theory Homework Aristotle on Virtue Nagel On the Hard Problem Wittgenstein on Language and Thought Camus and Schopenhauer on the Meaning of Life Camus’ Hero as Rebel without a Cause My Little Finger: Camus’ Absurdism Illustrated Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? Does Mathematics Assume the Truth of Platonism? The Self-defeating Nature of Utilitarianism and Consequentialism Generally What is The Good Life? Bentham and Mill regarding types of pleasures Kant’s Moral Philosophy Five Short Papers on Mind-body Dualism Tracy Latimer’s Father had the Right to Kill Her: Towards a doctrine of generalized self-defense Arguments Concerning God and Morality Goldman, Rousseau and von Hayek on the Ideal State J.S Mill on Liberty and Personal Freedom A Kantian Analysis of a Borderline Date-rape Situation Living Well as Flourishing: Aristotle’s Conception of the Good Life Three Essays on Medical Ethics: Answers to Exam Questions on Elective Amputation, Vaccination, and Informed Consent Hobbes, Marx, Rousseau, Nietzsche: Their Central Themes De Tocqueville on Egoism Mill vs. Hobbes on Liberty Exam-Essays on the Moral Systems of Mill, Bentham, and Kant Kant’s Moral System Aristotle on Virtue Plato’s Cave Allegory An Ethical Quandary Superorganisms The Tuskegee Experiment A Rawlsian Analysis Why Moore’s Proof of an External World Fails A Defense of Nagel’s Argument Against Materialism A Utilitarian Analysis of a Case of Theft The Paradox of the Self-aware Wretch: An Analysis of Pascal’s Moral Philosophy Jean-Paul Sartre: Decline and Fall of a Marxist Sell-out A One Page Proof of Plato’s Theory of Forms Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy The problem of the one and the many Four Short Essays on Truth and Knowledge What is ‘the Good Life?’ The Ontological Argument Different Political Philosophies: Plato, Locke, Madison, Rousseau, Hayek, and Mill on the State What do I know with certainty? Skepticism about skepticism Neuroscience and Freewill Operant Conditioning What makes us special? Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? No Two Papers on Epistemology: Gettier and Bostrom Examination Nietzsche on Punishment God’s Foreknowledge and Moral Responsibility . (shrink)

The dissertation analyzes the ontological and epistemological arguments that motivate Plato's theory of Forms.

This paper offers an interpretation of self-Predication (the idea that justice is just) in plato, Given that self-Predication is accepted as obvious both by plato and by his audience, Which entails that "all" self-Predications are clearly, Though not trivially, True. More strongly, It is suggested that "only" self-Predications can be accepted as clearly true by plato. This is to deny that plato had at his disposal an articulated notion of predication, And his middle theory of forms, Primarily the (...) relation of participation, Is seen as his attempt to arrive at that notion. It is argued that his metaphysical and semantical views are heavily influenced by eleatic monism. But this monism is incompatible with the very idea of predication. It is only in his later works, Where he attacks parmenides directly, That plato manages to lay the groundwork for what can be considered as the discovery of predication. (shrink)

This lecture was designed as an introduction to Plato's theory of Forms. Reference is made to key passages of Plato's dialogues, but no guidance on further reading is offered, and numerous controversies about the theory's interpretation are left in the background. An initial sketch of the theory's origins in the inquiries of Plato's teacher Socrates is followed by an explanation of the Forms’ primary characteristic, Plato's metaphysical separation of them from the (...) sensible world. Other aspects discussed include the Forms’ metaphysical relation to sensible particulars, their ‘self-predication’, and the range of items that have Forms. Finally, the envisaged structure of the world of Forms is illustrated by a look at Plato's famous Cave simile. (shrink)

The stream of books and papers devoted to the bearing of modern physics upon philosophical problems is apparently endless. Nevertheless, I am, I think, safe in asserting that the relations between physics and philosophy are still far from satisfactory. If, then, I venture to add one more paper to the stream, it is not because I believe that I am in a position to succeed where so many have failed, but because I have a suggestion to offer which, while it (...) has not hitherto to my knowledge been made, would, if it could be accepted, throw some light upon one aspect of the vexed question of the status of the physical world. (shrink)

The Peri ide^on is the only work in which Aristotle systematically sets out and criticizes arguments for the existence of Platonic forms. Gail Fine presents the first full-length treatment in English of this important but neglected work. She asks how, and how well, Aristotle understands Plato's theory of forms, and why and with what justification he favors an alternative metaphysical scheme. She examines the significance of the Peri ide^on for some central questions about Plato's (...) class='Hi'>theory of forms--whether, for example, there are forms corresponding to every property or only to some, and if only to some, then to which ones; whether forms are universals, particulars or both; and whether they are meanings, properties or both. Fine also provides a general discussion of Plato's theory of forms, and of our evidence about the Peri ide^on and its date, scope, and aims. While she pays careful attention to the details of the text, she also relates it to contemporary philosophical concerns. The book will be valuable for anyone interested in metaphysics ancient or modern. (shrink)

Scholars of Plato are divided between those who emphasize the literature of the dialogues and those who emphasize the argument of the dialogues, and between those who see a development in the thought of the dialogues and those who do not. In this important book Russell Dancy focuses on the arguments and defends a developmental picture. He explains the Theory of Forms of the Phaedo and Symposium as an outgrowth of the quest for definitions canvassed in the Socratic (...) dialogues, by constructing a Theory of Definition for the Socratic dialogues based on the refutations of definitions in those dialogues, and showing how that theory is mirrored in the Theory of Forms. His discussion, notable for both its clarity and its meticulous scholarship, ranges in detail over a number of Plato's early and middle dialogues, and will be of interest to readers in Plato studies and in ancient philosophy more generally. (shrink)

In several recent issues of this journal, I argued for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. While this account has stuck some as being highly idiosyncratic in nature, it is not entirely something new under the sun, since as I will argue in this paper, it turns out to have a historic precedent in Plato⠀™ s theory of forms. Indeed, the purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to show that my account (...) of property possession can be utilized to provide a novel interpretation of Plato⠀™ s theory of forms. And the second is to show that once it has been divorced from a variety of implausible doctrines with which it has historically been wedded, Plato⠀™ s central insight that all properties possess themselves, far from being of mere historical interest, is independently plausible, ironically enough, even from an empirical point of view. (shrink)

An account of Plato’s theory of knowledge is offered. Plato is in a sense a contextualist: at least, he recognizes that his own use of the word for “knowledge” varies – in some contexts, it stands for the fullest possible level of understanding of a truth, while in other contexts, it is broader and includes less complete levels of understanding as well. But for Plato, all knowledge, properly speaking, is a priori knowledge of necessary truths – based on recollection (...) of aspects of the Forms – and so in contemporary terms, it meets the conditions of “safety” and “adherence” (or “indefeasibility”) to the highest degree. This account is defended on the basis of the text of Meno, Phaedo, and the Republic, against some objections – especially objections that are due to Gail Fine. (shrink)

First published in 1962, this book provides a systematic account of the development of Plato’s theory of knowledge. Beginning with a consideration of the Socratic and other influences which determined the form in which the problem of knowledge first presented itself to Plato, the author then works through the dialogues from the Meno to the Laws and examines in detail Plato’s progressive attempts to solve the problem.

First published in 1962, this book provides a systematic account of the development of Plato’s theory of knowledge. Beginning with a consideration of the Socratic and other influences which determined the form in which the problem of knowledge first presented itself to Plato, the author then works through the dialogues from the Meno to the Laws and examines in detail Plato’s progressive attempts to solve the problem.

Scholars often assume that when Plato said that Forms are paradeigmata he meant that they were exemplars of the property they represent. I argue that "paradeigma" is better read as "pattern" than "exemplar." This reading is compatible with Plato's use of the term in all passages except Parm. 132d, where Parmenides misinterprets the term to make the theory of Forms susceptible to the Third Man Argument.

BOOK REVI~WS 137 Gail Fine. On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 4oo. Cloth, $55.oo. To many readers it will no doubt seem odd at first that an author could spend over four hundred printed pages discussing a portion of a treatise comprising just a scant five pages of Greek text, even supposing that the work faithfully reports Aristotelian doctrine. However, in working through Fine's book , (...) one comes to see that it contains not only a thorough treatment of the first book of the Peri Ide0n, but also comprehensive interpretations of the metaphysical systems of Socrates, Plato , and Aristotle, and the parallels and differences among these systems. The book also contains clearheaded and instructive accounts of so-called "Third Man" arguments, and critical discussion of some influential interpretive hypotheses put forward in the writings of G. E. L. Owen. In the end, it is actually something of a marvel.. (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest a way of resolving the whole-part dilemma suggested in the Parmenides. Specifically, I argue that grabbing the second horn of the dilemma does not pose a significant challenge. To argue for this, I consider two theses about Forms, namely, the oneness and indivisibility theses. More specifically, I argue that the second horn does not violate the oneness thesis if we treat composition as identity and that the indivisibility thesis ought to be reinterpreted given Plato’s (...) later dialogues. By doing so, I suggest a com-positional understanding of Plato’s theory of Forms, which can resolve the whole-part dilemma. (shrink)

The theory of forms makes a very poor theory of universals. It-or at least the "phaedo's" version of it-makes excellent sense as a theory of the elemental stuffs from which everything is made. This is shown by a detailed examination of all that this "phaedo" has to say about forms.

Christine Jean Thomas - Plato's Introduction of Forms - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.3 485-486 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Christine J. Thomas Dartmouth College R. M. Dancy. Plato's Introduction of Forms. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xii + 348. Cloth, $75.00. Russell Dancy's recent book could easily bear the title, 'A Socratic Theory of Definition'. The first two-thirds of the text (...) extract and examine various tenets of a "theory of definition" operative in a variety of Socratic dialogues. The bulk of the theory is captured in three conditions on adequacy for a definition : the definiens must be substitutable salve veritate for the definiendum; the.. (shrink)

DISCUSSIONS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS of Plato’s forms too often take for granted that immanence and transcendence are opposed to each other: if the forms are in instances then they are not separate from them, while if the forms are separate then they are not in instances. This assumption is sometimes associated with the theory that there is a change in Plato’s thought between the early or Socratic dialogues, in which forms are regarded as immanent, (...) and the middle dialogues and Timaeus, in which they are seen as separate. I will argue, however, that immanence and transcendence are not opposed but that, on the contrary, the former implies the latter. That is to say, precisely in that the forms are present in their instances, they are ipso facto also separate from them in all the senses which Plato claims. The idea of sensibles as images of the forms, in turn, is an expression not of transcendence alone, but rather of the conjunction of immanence and transcendence: the paradigm is at once transcendent to and immanent in the image. The movement from the early to the middle dialogues, then, is not the rejection of one position and the adoption of another, but simply the express articulation of what was implicit in the original position. Thus we find, not a fundamental change in Plato’s thought from one period to another, but a single consistent and coherent theory of forms which is developed throughout these dialogues. (shrink)

Plato in his discussion of the Divided Line introduces a distinction between knowledge of the Forms in and by themselves () and . The first distinguishing characteristic of is that it ‘is compelled to employ assumptions, while knowledge of the Forms tries to advance to a certain first principle’ . The second distinguishing characteristic of is that it employs the ordinary objects of sense-perception as images . The geometer, in order to find out about ‘the Square’ and ‘the (...) Diagonal’, draws diagrams and makes models. (shrink)

This interpretation of Plato on epistëmë is refreshing and stimulating. Its central claim that forms are powers, and not predicates or transcendental universals, is not new. It is not now common either. As presented, the interpretation is timely, lucid, comprehensive and notably one which keeps readers close to the expressions Plato uses.

In Chapter 9 of the first book of the Metaphysics Aristotle criticizes “those who posit the Ideas as causes”. His second group of criticisms urges that “the ways in which we try to prove that the forms exist” are unsatisfactory, and he enumerates five such ‘ways’. Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his commentary on the passage, offers to explain in more detail what the five ways were and why each is a cul-de-sac. Gail Fine’s On Ideas is a commentary on (...) this section of Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle. (shrink)

BOOK REVI~WS 137 Gail Fine. On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 4oo. Cloth, $55.oo. To many readers it will no doubt seem odd at first that an author could spend over four hundred printed pages discussing a portion of a treatise comprising just a scant five pages of Greek text, even supposing that the work faithfully reports Aristotelian doctrine. However, in working through Fine's book, one (...) comes to see that it contains not only a thorough treatment of the first book of the Peri Ide0n, but also comprehensive interpretations of the metaphysical systems of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and the parallels and differences among these systems. The book also contains clearheaded and instructive accounts of so-called "Third Man" arguments, and critical discussion of some influential interpretive hypotheses put forward in the writings of G. E. L. Owen. In the end, it is actually something of a marvel... (shrink)

Several contemporary epistemologists have been intrigued by the discussion of the distinction between knowledge and correct opinion in Plato’s Meno (97a–98b); a number of them have suggested that Plato is appealing to the idea that to know a proposition one must be ‘safe from error’ regarding that proposition. In fact, although there is evidence that Plato assumes that knowledge requires something like safety, this passage in the Meno imposes a different requirement on knowledge—namely, what Robert Nozick called ‘adherence’, the requirement (...) that knowledge must resiliently ‘adhere’ to the truth. Adherence is much more controversial than safety, but it seems that Plato accepted both, and it is argued that he was right to do so. Both adherence and safety can be understood in a ‘contextualist’ manner, but it seems that Plato rejects contextualism in favor of understanding both conditions in their most demanding form. (shrink)

I argue that Plato believes that the soul must be both the principle of motion and the subject of cognition because it moves things specifically by means of its thoughts. I begin by arguing that the soul moves things by means of such acts as examination and deliberation, and that this view is developed in response to Anaxagoras. I then argue that every kind of soul enjoys a kind of cognition, with even plant souls having a form of Aristotelian discrimination (...) (krisis), and that there is therefore no completely unintelligent, evil soul in the cosmos that can explain disorderly motions; as a result, the soul is not the principle of all motion but only motion in the cosmos after it has been ordered by the Demiurge. (shrink)