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  1. Plato on Natural Kinds: The Promethean Method of the Philebus.John Proios - forthcoming - Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science.
    Plato’s invention of the metaphor of carving the world by the joints (Phaedrus 265d-66c) gives him a privileged place in the history of natural kind theory in philosophy and science; he is often understood to present a paradigmatic but antiquated view of natural kinds as possessing eternal, immutable, necessary essences. Yet, I highlight that, as a point of distinction from contemporary views about natural kinds, Plato subscribes to an intelligent-design, teleological framework, in which the natural world is the product of (...)
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  2. Conhecimento e Definição no Mênon de Platão.Davi Heckert César Bastos - 2020 - Kinesis 12 (31):172-185.
    Through detailed analysis of Plato’s Meno, I identify and set general argumentative rules (useful both to scientists and philosophers) concerning how to use definitions. I show how the character Socrates establishes strong requirements for knowledge in general, i.e., that the knowledge of the definition of a thing must be prior to the knowledge of properties or instances of that thing. Socrate’s requirements and the way he characterizes a definition (as coextensive to the definiendum, not circular, true and explanatorily relevant) lead (...)
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  3. Differentiating Philosopher From Statesman According to Work and Worth.Jens Kristian Larsen - 2020 - Polis 37 (3):550-566.
    Plato’s Sophist and Statesman stand out from many other Platonic dialogues by at least two features. First, they do not raise a ti esti question about a single virtue or feature of something, but raise the questions what sophist, statesman, and philosopher are, how they differ from each other, and what worth each should be accorded. Second, a visitor from Elea, rather than Socrates, seeks to addressed these questions and does so by employing what is commonly referred to as the (...)
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  4. Being In Late Plato.Eric Sanday - 2018 - In A Companion to Ancient Philosophy. pp. 147-159.
    This chapter [of the edited volume, A Companion to Ancient Philosophy] examines the shift in Plato’s account of the eidē or ‘forms’ from the Republic to the Parmenides. Forms in the Republic are characterized in terms of perfection, purity, and changelessness, with the form being an ultimate explanatory principle for being-X. Participants, while being-X, are also capable of not-being-X, either through qualitative change and coming-to-be, or through external changes in perspective or opinion, by which they “appear [φανήσεται]” not-X (R. V.479a7). (...)
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  5. Socrates on Why We Should Inquire.David Ebrey - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (1):1-17.
    This paper examines whether Socrates provides his interlocutors with good reasons to seek knowledge of what virtue is, reasons that they are in a position to appreciate. I argue that in the Laches he does provide such reasons, but they are not the reasons that are most commonly identified as Socratic. Socrates thinks his interlocutors should be motivated not by the idea that virtue is knowledge nor by the idea that knowledge is good for its own sake, but rather by (...)
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  6. Meno's Paradox in Context.David Ebrey - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):4-24.
    I argue that Meno’s Paradox targets the type of knowledge that Socrates has been looking for earlier in the dialogue: knowledge grounded in explanatory definitions. Socrates places strict requirements on definitions and thinks we need these definitions to acquire knowledge. Meno’s challenge uses Socrates’ constraints to argue that we can neither propose definitions nor recognize them. To understand Socrates’ response to the challenge, we need to view Meno’s challenge and Socrates’ response as part of a larger disagreement about the value (...)
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  7. Difference in Kind: Observations on the Distinction of the Megista Gene.David Ambuel - 2013 - In Beatriz Bossi & Thomas M. Robinson (eds.), Plato's Sophist Revisited. de Gruyter. pp. 247-268.
    It is argued that the analysis by which the gene are differentiated in the dialogue is an exercise in studied ambiguities informed by an Eleatic logic of strict dichotomy that was the underpinning of the Sophist's method of division. By this dialectical drill, Plato shows that the metaphysics underlying the Visitor's method fails to adequately distinguish what it means to have a character from what it means to be a character, and therefore remains inadequate to track down the sophist or (...)
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  8. Conocimiento, descubrimiento Y reminiscencia en el menón de platón.Alejandro Farieta - 2013 - Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.
    This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the Recollection theory, as (...)
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  9. Knowledge, Discovery and Reminiscence in Plato's Meno.Alejandro Farieta - 2013 - Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.
    This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the Recollection theory, as (...)
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  10. Plato, Wittgenstein and the Definition of Games.Catherine Rowett - 2013 - In Luigi Perissinotto & Begoña Ramón Cámara (eds.), Wittgenstein and Plato: connections, comparisons and contrasts. Palgrave. pp. 196-219.
    In this paper I argue, controversially, that Plato's Meno anticipates Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism. Plato is usually read as an essentialist of the very kind that Wittgenstein was challenging, and the Meno in particular is usually taken as evidence that Plato thought that to know something you must be able to define it, and that if you can't define it you can't investigate any other questions on the topic. I suggest instead that Plato shows Socrates proposing such a position (much (...)
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  11. What Do the Arguments in the Protagoras Amount To?Vasilis Politis - 2012 - Phronesis 57 (3):209-239.
    Abstract The main thesis of the paper is that, in the coda to the Protagoras (360e-end), Plato tells us why and with what justification he demands a definition of virtue: namely, in order to resolve a particular aporia . According to Plato's assessment of the outcome of the arguments of the dialogue, the principal question, whether or not virtue can be taught , has, by the end of the dialogue, emerged as articulating an aporia , in that both protagonists, Socrates (...)
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  12. To What Extent Can Definitions Help Our Understanding? What Plato Might Have Said in His Cups.John W. Powell - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (5):698-713.
    There are grounds for taking Plato's agenda of searching for definitions to be ironic, and he points toward good arguments for being wary of trust in definitions.
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  13. Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's 'Types of Definition in the Meno'.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.
    According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.
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  14. Socrates on the Definition of Figure in the Meno.Theodor Ebert - 2007 - In Corrigan Stern-Gillet (ed.), Reading Ancient Texts. Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Brill. pp. 113-124.
    This paper argues that Socrates’ second definition of figure in Plato’s Meno (76a5–7) is deliberately insufficient: It states only a necessary condition for something’s being a figure, not a condition that is necessary as well as sufficient. For although it is true that every figure (in plane geometry) is (or corresponds to) a limit of a solid, not every limit of solid is a figure, i.e. not if the solid has a curved surface. It is argued that this mistake is (...)
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  15. Teoría de la Definición En El Hipias Mayor de Platón.Simon Enrique Noriega-Olmos - 2007 - Editorial Venezolana.
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  16. Was wir nicht verlieren dürfen.Erwin Sonderegger - 2007 - Studia Philosophica 66:197-210.
    Different reasons give rise to the question, what philosophy really is, and by tradition we know many answers. Plato’s answer can be found by examining his explicit statements about philosophy in his dialogues, or by analyzing his representation of Socrates – philosophy become fl esh. But an other way to fi nd an answer to the question lies in examining the things which – according to Plato – we cannot do without. There are three of them, namely the idea, logos (...)
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  17. Types of Definition in the Meno.Charles David - 2006 - In Lindsay Judson & Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.), Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 110.
  18. Definition in Plato's Meno.Vassilis Karasmanis - 2006 - In Lindsay Judson & Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.), Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
  19. Identification and Definition in the Lysis.Gale Justin - 2005 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 87 (1):75-104.
    In this paper, I make a case for interpreting the Lysis as a dialogue of definition, designed to answer the question of “What is a friend?” The main innovation of my interpretation is the contention – and this is argued for in the paper – that Socrates hints towards a definition of being a friend that applies equally to mutual friendship and one-way attraction – the two kinds of friend relation very clearly identified by Socrates in the dialogue. The key (...)
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  20. Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s Early Dialogues.Jyl Gentzler - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):587-590.
    A review of John Beversluis' "Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues".
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  21. Plato and the "Socratic Fallacy".William Prior - 1998 - Phronesis 43 (2):97 - 113.
    Since Peter Geach coined the phrase in 1966 there has been much discussion among scholars of the "Socratic fallacy." No consensus presently exists on whether Socrates commits the "Socratic fallacy"; almost all scholars agree, however, that the "Socratic fallacy" is a bad thing and that Socrates has good reason to avoid it. I think that this consensus of scholars is mistaken. I think that what Geach has labeled a fallacy is no fallacy at all, but a perfectly innocent consequence of (...)
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  22. Plato "Theaetetus" 145-147.David Sedley & Lesley Brown - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1):229-242.
  23. Plato, Wittgenstein and Artificial Intelligence.Asher Seidel - 1991 - Metaphilosophy 22 (4):292-306.
  24. Plato and Aristotle on Division and Definition.Marguerite Deslauriers - 1990 - Ancient Philosophy 10 (2):203-219.
  25. Is the Lysis a Dialogue of Definition?David Sedley - 1989 - Phronesis 34 (1):107-108.
  26. Socratic Definition: Real or Nominal?Jeffrey Gold - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:573-588.
    In Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates frequently asks questions of the form “What is X?” seeking definitions of the substitution instances of X (e.g., Justice, Piety, and Courage). In attempting to elucidate Socratic definition, a number of interpreters have invoked a distinction between real and nominal definition (the distinction between the definition of a thing and the definition of a word. In using that distinction, several interpreters have pointed out that, when Socrates asked his “What is X” question (e.g., “What is (...)
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  27. Musings on the Meno, A New Translation with Commentary. By John E. Thomas. Martinus NijhotI: 1980. Pp. 222 + Xi. [REVIEW]Kenneth Seeskin - 1983 - Ancient Philosophy 3 (2):216-219.
  28. Euthyphro 9d-11b: Analysis and Definition in Plato and Others.Richard Sharvy - 1972 - Noûs 6 (2):119-137.
  29. Definition in Plato's Meno: An Inquiry in the Light of Logic and Semantics Into the Kind of Definition Intended by Socrates When He Asks 'What is Virtue?' By Laura Grimm. (Skrifter Utgitt Av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi I Islo II. Hist.-Filos. Klasse. Ny Serie. No. 2. Oslo University Press. 1962. Pp. 53. Kr. 8,00.). [REVIEW]A. R. Lacey - 1965 - Philosophy 40 (152):177-.
  30. GRIMM, LAURA-"Definition in Plato's Meno: An Inquiry in the Light of Logic and Semantics Into the Kind of Definition Intended by Socrates When He Asks 'What is Virtue"?'. [REVIEW]A. R. Lacey - 1965 - Philosophy 40:177.
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  31. Definition and Hypothesis in Plato'smeno(II).Laura Grimm - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):227-230.
  32. Definition and Hypothesis in Plato'smeno(III).Arne Naess - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):231-234.
  33. Definition in Plato's Meno an Inquiry in the Light of Logic and Semantics Into the Kind of Definition Intended by Socrates When He Asks "What is Virtue?".Laura Grimm - 1962 - Oslo University Press.