Abstract

Several contemporary epistemologists have been intrigued by the discussion of the distinction between knowledge and correct opinion in Plato’s Meno (97a–98b); a number of them have suggested that Plato is appealing to the idea that to know a proposition one must be ‘safe from error’ regarding that proposition. In fact, although there is evidence that Plato assumes that knowledge requires something like safety, this passage in the Meno imposes a different requirement on knowledge—namely, what Robert Nozick called ‘adherence’, the requirement that knowledge must resiliently ‘adhere’ to the truth. Adherence is much more controversial than safety, but it seems that Plato accepted both, and it is argued that he was right to do so. Both adherence and safety can be understood in a ‘contextualist’ manner, but it seems that Plato rejects contextualism in favor of understanding both conditions in their most demanding form.