It has been recently argued that by Leifer and Pusey, and Price, that time-symmetric quantum mechanics must entail retrocausality. Adlam responds that such theories might also entail ‘spooky action at a distance’. This paper proposes a third alternative: time-symmetric quantum mechanics might entail temporal global correlations. Unlike the traditional analysis of time symmetries in quantum mechanics, which consider linear and unitary interpretations, this paper considers the time-symmetric collapse models advanced by Bedingham and Maroney. These models are specially interesting since it (...) has been widely believed that collapse theories cannot be time-reversal invariant. (shrink)

La thèse défendue est celle de la pertinence de l’articulation entre la pensée complexe et l’approche des systèmes complexes. Alors que la première pourrait trouver dans la seconde la dimension méthodologique semblant lui manquer, la seconde pourrait emprunter à la première un riche cadre épistémologique qui apparaît lui faire défaut. Deux projets en cours témoignent de tentatives pour concrétiser cette articulation.The argument is that the relevance of the relationship between complex thinking and approach of complex systems. While the first can (...) be found in the second dimension methodological seeming to miss the second could take the first rich epistemological framework that appears to be lacking. Two projects illustrate attempts to achieve this articulation. (shrink)

Elaboramos una versión del disposicionalismo experimental que esclarece la relación entre capacidades y leyes fenomenológicas. Tras algunas consideraciones introductorias, presentamos el disposicionalismo experimental en vistas de las nociones de modalidad física y ambiente de estímulo. Trazamos las líneas generales para una epistemología experimentalista de las capacidades y esclarecemos la modalidad física e invariancia de las leyes fenomenológicas. Luego examinamos las generalizaciones físicas y extrapolaciones de las leyes fenomenológicas y exponemos el caso de la ley de Fresnel, que ilustra aspectos de (...) nuestro argumento. Concluimos con algunas consideraciones sobre los límites del disposicionalismo experimental. (shrink)

Marx says of alienated labor that it does not "belong" to the worker, that it issues in a product that does not belong to her, and that it is unfulfilling, unfree, egoistically motivated, and inhuman. He seems to think, moreover, that the first of these features grounds all the others. All of these features seem quite independent, however: they can come apart; they share no obvious common cause or explanation; and if they often occur together this seems accidental. It is (...) not clear, then, how Marx's concept of alienated labor could possess the strong unity which he takes it to have. I defend a reinterpretation of the concept which explains this unity. The various features of alienated labor, I argue, all follow from a single, hitherto underappreciated feature of its formal motivational structure: the fact that such labor is motivated not by its product but by an incentive. (shrink)

This original article outlines a theoretical path and posterior critical analysis regarding two relevant matters in modern nursing: patterns of knowing in nursing and commodification contexts in contemporary health systems. The aim of our manuscript is to examine the development of basic and contextual nursing knowledge in commodified contexts. For this purpose, we outline a discussion and reflexive dialogue based on a literature search and our clinical experience. To lay the foundation for an informed discussion, we conducted a literature search (...) and selected relevant articles in English, Spanish, and Portuguese that included contents on patterns of knowing, commodification, and nursing published from 1978 to 2017. Globalization, commodification, and austerity measures seem to have negative effects on nursing. Work conditions are worsening, deteriorating nurse–patient relationships, and limiting reflection on practice. Nurses must develop knowledge to challenge and participate in institutional organization and public health policies. Development of nursing knowledge may be difficult to achieve in commodified environments. Consequently, therapeutic care relationships, healthcare services, and nurses' own health are compromised. However, by obtaining organizational, sociopolitical, and emancipatory knowledge, nurses can use strategies to adapt to or resist commodified contexts while constructing basic knowledge. (shrink)

The field of bioethics is increasingly coming into contact with empirical research findings. In this article, we ask what role empirical research can play in the process of ethical clarification and decision-making. Ethical reflection almost always proceeds in three steps: the description of the moral question,the assessment of the moral question and the evaluation of the decision-making. Empirical research can contribute to each step of this process. In the description of the moral object, first of all, empirical research has a (...) role to play in the description of morally relevant facts. It plays a role in answering the “reality-revealing questions” (what, why,how, who, where and when), in assessing the consequences and in proposing alternative courses of action. Secondly, empirical research plays a role in assessing the moral question. It must be acknowledged that research possesses “the normative power of the factual,” which can also become normative by suppressing other norms. However, inductive normativity should always be balanced out by a deductive form of normativity. Thirdly, empirical research also has a role to play in evaluating the decision-making process. It can rule out certain moral choices by pointing out the occurrence of certain unexpected consequences or effects. It can also be useful, however, as a sociology of bioethics in which the discipline of bioethics itself becomes an object of research. (shrink)

I defend a necessary condition of local autonomy inspired by Aristotle and Marx. One does something autonomously, I argue, only if one does it for its own sake and not for the sake of further ends alone. I show that this idea steers an attractive middle path between the subjectivism of Dworkin- and Frankfurt-style theories of autonomy on the one hand and the objectivism of Raz-style theories on the other. By doing so, it vindicates and explains two important pieces of (...) common sense of which those theories struggle to make sense. First, it explains how external sources of compulsion, such as coercion by other people and duress by unfavorable circumstances, can compromise the autonomy of an activity. Second, it explains this by articulating the sense in which to act autonomously is to do what one really or truly wants to do, and the correlative sense in which to do something unfreely is instead to be forced or necessitated to do it. At the same time, my proposal brings into view distinctive species of external unfreedom beyond the traditional paradigm cases of coercion and duress. Most importantly, it implies that toil—labor which is not valued intrinsically but is done purely on account of its instrumental necessity—is essentially unfree. (shrink)

Recent work in biology, cognitive psychology, and archaeology has renewed evolutionary perspectives on the role of natural selection in the emergence and recurrent forms of religious thought and behavior, i.e., mental representations of supernatural agents, as well as artifacts, ritual practices, moral systems, ethnic markers, and specific experiences associated with these representations. One perspective, inspired from behavioral ecology, attempts to measure the fitness effects of religious practices. Another set of models, representative of evolutionary psychology, explain religious thought and behavior as (...) the output of cognitive systems (e.g., animacy detection, social cognition, precautionary reasoning) that are not exclusive to the religious domain. In both perpectives, the question remains open, whether religious thought and behavior constitute an adaptation or a by-product of adaptive cognitive function. (shrink)

This paper tries to say in what sense truth is a norm, a thesis that Donald Davidson, whose view are examined, denies. After skteching his conception of rationality, it is argued that truth is a norm in only the sense that we ought to believe what we believe is true, not that we all to believe everything which is true. This minimal norm of truth is isolated and defended.

Contemporary literature distinguishes two ways to defend the claim that cognition is a matter of representations: one, cognition involves representation-hungry tasks; two, cognition involves a complex form of informational covariation between subcomponents of a system with an adaptive function. Each of these conceptions involves a different notion of representation, and promotes a particular view of the architecture of cognition. But despite the differences, each of them aims to support the claim that cognition is a matter of representations on architectural constraints. (...) The objective of this article is twofold: one, it is argued that architectural constraints do not entail either of those two ways to defend the claim that cognition is a matter of representations; two, it is claimed that both notions of representation share an objectionable common element – namely, the idea of a model that grounds the representational reading– that must be abandoned, in favor of a more economical explanation in terms of causal relations, in order to get a clear view of cognition. (shrink)

The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name.

The book introduces Ramsey's main doctrines and assesses their contemporary significance. In particular, Jérôme Dokic and Pascal Engel are interested in Ramsey's thoughts on truth and belief, and his pragmatic thesis that the truth of one's beliefs guarantees the success of one's actions. From this, it is a short step to what may be called "Ramsey's principle": the content of a belief is constituted by the success of one's actions. This principle finds its current expression in the work of (...) philosophers who offer evolutionary conceptions of mental states, according to which the success conditions of a belief are constituted by its biological functions. (publisher, edited). (shrink)

En los últimos treinta años se ha transitado desde una concepción del capital humano como una macromagnitud económica a una idea de capital humano corporeizada en el individuo. Hemos asistido a una progresiva infiltración de dicha ideología del capital humano también en la vida de la juventud precaria. Nos centramos aquí en los jóvenes universitarios, para quienes el capital humano, ya de forma hegemónica, dirige y marca sus recorridos laborales y vitales. El análisis de los discursos de estos jóvenes nos (...) permitirá explorar desde la imposición de la lógica de la movilidad laboral, a la sujeción a las formas de "emprendedor de sí mismo" y a la normalización, como parte del proceso de incorporación de capital humano, de formas de empleo progresivamente al margen de los derechos y garantías laborales clásicas del trabajo salariado.In the last thirty years it has been gone from a conception of the human capital as an economic macro magnitude to an idea of human capital embodied in the individuals. We have been witnesses of the progressive infiltration of this ideology of the human capital also in the life of precarious youth. We focus in the university young people, for those who the human capital, already of hegemonic form, directs and marks its labour and vital routes. The analysis of the discourses of these young people will allow us to explore the imposition of the logic of labour mobility, the subjection to the forms of «entrepreneur of itself» and also the normalization of forms of work progressively excluded from the rights and classic labour guarantees as a part of the process of incorporation of human capital. (shrink)

The commodification of health care, particularly primary care, presents challenges to care and knowledge development. The purpose of this study is to examine how nurses perceive and develop their knowledge in a commodified context. A mixed‐methods study was conducted that included a closed‐question survey and in‐depth interviews with nurses in public primary care in Catalonia. There were 104 valid responses to the questionnaire and 10 in‐depth interviews. The main findings of the survey were related to workload and limited time for (...) nursing care. Six themes emerged from the in‐depth interviews: (1) limited time for nursing, (2) feelings of burnout, (3) awareness of patient and family satisfaction, (4) organizational factors that favor nurses' needs, (5) organizational factors that hinder nurses' needs, and finally (6) public administration requirements. Participants perceive excessive workload and time constraints and feel that this affects their nursing care and their physical and mental health. However, nurses purposefully use knowledge patterns to cope with the problems associated with commodification. Nurses have multidimensional, contextualized, and integrated knowledge that allows them to optimize their care based on the needs of their patients. This research examines many challenges related to nursing practice and the nursing discipline and opens the door for further research that encompasses all areas of nursing. (shrink)

Este trabajo ha sido seleccionado para la V Olimpiada de Filosofía queorganiza FICUM en la modalidad de secundaria y bachillerato, para promocionar la filosofía entre los jóvenes.

En este escrito se presentan las bases de una estrategia pragmática, contextualista e inferencialista para articular una teoría que dé cuenta de los grados de justificación de nuestras aserciones. Se arguye que hay contextos de emisión de aserciones configurados con ciertos criterios inferenciales, los cuales responden a propósitos prácticos o teóricos, y conforman, en consecuencia, diferentes estándares de justificación en esos contextos. Finalmente, a partir de una caracterización de tipos de proposiciones, inferencias, compromisos asertivos y esquemas de justificación, se muestra (...) cómo determinar el grado de justificación alto, medio o bajo de una aserción con respecto a un contexto de emisión de aserciones dado. (shrink)

Le sceptique nous demande " Comment sais-tu que tu as deux mains? Peut-être rêves-tu, ou es-tu trompé par quelque Malin Génie? Peut-on même définir ce que c'est que la connaissance? Va savoir! " Lui rétorquer, comme le faisaient G.E. Moore et la tradition de la philosophie du sens commun : " Mais je sais bien que j'ai deux mains! " semble à la fois une pétition de principe et une bien mauvaise réponse. Le mieux, depuis que nous avons perdu le (...) souci de fonder nos croyance sur des raisons ultimes, serait, tout simplement, de ne pas se soucier des questions du sceptique. Ce que l'on sait dépend, nous dit-on, des circonstances, et toutes nos connaissances sont faillibles. N'y a-t-il pas plutôt des savoirs, dont l'histoire nous montre combien leurs modes de validations sont variés? Ce livre entend refuser ce type de réponse contextualiste et relativiste. Il propose de revenir à la réponse de sens commun de Moore, à partir des reformulations contemporaines des raisonnements sceptiques issues de la philosophie analytique de la connaissance. Personne ne peut nous envoyer savoir quelque chose que nous ne pourrions pas savoir. De fait, nous savons, mais notre savoir n'est pas transparent : nous n'avons pas besoin de savoir que nous savons. Pour parvenir à cette réponse, il faut replacer la notion de connaissance, plutôt que celle de croyance justifiée ou rationnelle, au centre de l'épistémologie, et reformuler des questions traditionnelles comme celles de la nature de la perception, du témoignage, et de la connaissance a priori. On peut aussi reprendre le vieux projet d'une enquête sur la nature de la connaissance en général. (shrink)

Los distintos intentos por aclarar el concepto de justificación epistémica han dado lugar a los más intrincados debates en la epistemología analítica contemporánea. Da cuenta de ello la controversia entre el internismo y el externismo de la justificación, y las discusiones que han surgido allí entre el fiabilismo y la epistemología de la virtud. Estas disputas han tomado un nuevo aire tras el surgimiento de la tesis de la mente extendida propuesta por Clark y Chalmers (1998), que sugiere la posibilidad (...) de conocimiento extendido más allá de la mente o el cerebro individual del sujeto. El objetivo de este capítulo es mostrar y evaluar cómo un debate que en su origen fue epistemológico ha recibido influencia de una tesis metafísica, proveniente de la filosofía de la mente. En la primera parte de este capítulo identificaremos las principales corrientes que surgieron en el marco del debate sobre el internismo y el externismo de la justificación, esto es, grosso modo, el debate acerca de si la justificación de una creencia debe estar al alcance del sujeto (internismo) o si esa justificación se determina independientemente de tal alcance (externismo). Seguidamente, abordaremos este debate desde el punto de vista del fiabilismo y la epistemología de la virtud, y finalmente presentaremos las tesis de la mente extendida y la cognición distribuida para mostrar cómo estas tesis pueden ser influyentes en las discusiones epistemológicas entre posturas internistas y externistas. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify some issues about what is usually called “doxastic voluntarism”. This phrase often hides a confusion between two separate (although connected) issues: whether beliefis or can be, as a matter of psychological fact, under the control of the will, on the one hand, and whether we can have practical reasons to believe something, or whether our beliefs are subject to any sort of “ought”, on the other hand. The first issue -- which I prefer to call (...) the issue of volitionism about belief -- is psychological, and I take the answer to be negative, along the lines of the conceptual arguments against believing at will adduced by writers such as Bernard Williams. The second issue -- which I call voluntarism proper -- is normative, and the answer that I give is a qualified yes. Belief is not a matter of the will, although there are certain things that we ought to believe. (shrink)

A la hora de plantearse la realización de actividades relacionadas con la enseñanza de los aspectos astronómicos, se presentan problemas prácticos evidentes que no ayudan a desarrollar una adecuada actividad científica escolar. Las TIC son un instrumento de gran utilidad para sortear estas dificultades, dado que permiten reproducir los fenómenos celestes y experimentar con ellos. El objetivo de este artículo es, en concreto, reflexionar sobre la utilidad de las simulaciones informáticas para la enseñanza de los aspectos histórico-astronómicos. Como muestra de (...) sus posibilidades se presentan simulaciones que pueden realizarse para visualizar diversos fenómenos astronómicos descubiertos por Galileo Galilei. (shrink)

I argue that the normative dimension in mental content does not figure in the content as a direct feature of this content. But I do not take is as an extrinsic feature due to the properties of our ascriptions either. I suggest that the normativity has to do with the possibility of self attribution of mental states. The views of Robert Brandom are examined in this respect.

This chapter analyzes stupidity as a problem for epistemology. Its proper home belongs to virtue epistemology, as a specific epistemic vice, which has to be studied along the lines of both reliabilist virtue epistemology and of responsibilist virtue epistemology. The author distinguishes between two kinds of stupidity: stupidity proper and foolishness. The former is a defect in the competence of an agent, as well as in the performance of judgment, and it is generally studied as a failure of rationality along (...) intellectualist lines. The second is a failure to evaluate properly the nature of the epistemic goal, and is a form of epistemic indifference, which involves an insensitivity to epistemic values and norms. This chapter analyzes their varieties, and suggest that the boundaries between stupidity and foolishness are often less clear than it is suggested by the author’s taxonomy. (shrink)

In the last few decades, great progress has been made in both genetic and genomic research. The development of the Human Genome Project has increased our knowledge of the genetic basis of diseases and has given a tremendous momentum to the development of new technologies that make widespread genetic testing possible and has increased the availability of previously inaccessible genetic information. Two examples of this exponential evolution are the increasing implementation of next-generation sequencing technologies in the clinical context and the (...) expanding commercial offer of genetic tests directly-to-consumers.Firstly, the rapid development of next generation sequencing technologies has substantially reduced both the cost and the time required to sequence an entire human genome. These technologies are increasingly being used in the clinical setting with the goal of diagnosing conditions of presumed genetic origin that cannot be explained by targeted sequencing approaches. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza las estrategias utilizadas por Descartes para «desencantar el mundo», a fin de suprimir los elementos herméticos de las explicaciones científicas cartesianas y someter todos los fenómenos naturales a nuestro control. Para ello, apelo a la distinción entre elementos causales —cualidades ocultas— y sus efectos —efectos admirables— como las dos dimensiones que deben ser incorporadas bajo las explicaciones científicas para garantizar el cálculo de los fenómenos y su dominio.

In her helpful response, Carrie Figdor provides answers to the two criticisms I raised against her defense of literalism in my review article. In doing so, she usefully clarifies the argument for t...

This paper argues that the weaker elements in the anti-sceptical strategy deployed by Sosa in "A Virtue Epistemology" can be improved, within the general framework provided by virtue epistemology, if internalism about perceptual experience is abandoned.

The topic of this paper is the conceptual possibility of being someone else. This thought occurs in the first person, and in principle it could be entertained by any subject of experience. The paper will focus on the examination of the content of such a thought: i.e., what exactly is meant by the possibility of being someone else? By way of comparing this thought with other possibilities (e.g., the possibility of being taller), it will be shown that the possibility of (...) being someone else lacks coherence, mainly because it goes against many reasonable and well-established beliefs held about ourselves and our identity. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl intentó excluir supuestos metafísicos y ajustarse a lo dado en la experiencia inmediata, con el fin de buscar una verdad primera e indubitable sobre la cual basar verdades ulteriores, teóricas. Pero, en la segunda etapa de su pensamiento, él abandonó ese camino para usar, sin tematizarlo, el supuesto subjetivista de René Descartes. Para reconducir la fenomenología al proyecto original de ir a las cosas mismas, eliminando supuestos y ateniéndose a la experiencia inmediata, el lósofo español Antonio González Fernández (...) propone la praxeología. Esta aproximación reemplaza el concepto de sujeto, que considera al ser humano como una cosa pensante, por el de persona, entendida como acto encarnado. Esta definición antropológica, coherente con la visión teológica del ser humano como imagen y semejanza de Dios, posibilita orientaciones éticas de las acciones en pro de la descosificación y dignificación del ser humano y el cuidado de la naturaleza. (shrink)

Bernardo de Monteagudo en su texto: Diálogo entre Atahualpa y Fernando VII en los Campos Eliseos, parte de una crítica a las atrocidades llevadas a cabo por los españoles contra los americanos en la Conquista –atrocidades que sobrepasan las llevadas a cabo por Napoleón contra Fernando VII–, para proponer una integración social y cultural que movilice a los pueblos latinoamericanos a la independencia del colonialismo español. Sin embargo, su propuesta no reivindica al indígena, sino que su imagen es usada por (...) el escritor como símbolo de una Latinoamérica que se limita a los criollos. Es decir, el indígena quedará, luego de las independencias latinoamericanas, en una situación similar a la colonial, sólo que ahora bajo el dominio de los criollos. De igual manera, esto nos puede suceder en nuestra realidad bogotana: pensar que Latinoamérica, y especialmente Colombia, se reduce a los Andes, a las ciudades del interior, excluyendo así al Caribe. (shrink)

Regarding the epistemological borderlines between science and philosophy, this article approaches the human mind and ethics from biological and philosophical theories. For this purpose, the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection provides a scientific foundation to understand the human mind and ethics. However, not only Charles Darwin has studied mental faculties and ethics, this is also a topic researched by eminent contemporary paleontologists and biologists. Prior to modern biology, going back to Greek philosophy, philosophers have traditionally studied the human (...) mind and ethics, separating human beings and the rest of nature ontologically. Following modern biology, the philosopher Hans Jonas has developed a philosophical biology from the perspective of hermeneutical phenomenology to understand life. With the help of his hermeneutical phenomenology, Jonas has presented an ontological theory of organism-metabolism to understand the phenomenon of life from simple living beings to the human mind in relation to nature, based on the body. Recently, the evolutionary biologist Francisco Ayala has proposed a coherent scientific and philosophical theory about biological and cultural roots for ethics, considering the evolution of human mental and intellectual capacities and the three conditions for ethical behavior as a part of human intellectual capacity, which scientifically complements and informs Hans Jonas’s philosophical biology and ethics of responsibility. (shrink)

Children with complex communication needs (CCN) regularly have barriers to express and discuss emotions, and have fewer opportunities to participate in emotional conversations. The study explores and analyzes the changes after a training program focused on offering an interactive home learning environment that encouraged and modeled emotion-related conversations between a parent and a child with CCN within storybook-reading contexts. An observational design (nomothetic/follow-up/multidimensional) was used to explore and analyze the changes in the communicative interaction around emotions between mother-child. Augmentative and (...) alternative communication (AAC) technologies were used to provide the child access to emotion-related vocabulary. The training program resulted in the mother providing more opportunities to engage her child in emotional conversations, suggesting that when opportunities and resources to talk about emotions were promoted, the child showed more engagement in emotion-related conversations using his AAC system. The mother–child communicative patterns and behavioral relationships observed during the phases are also presented. This case study illustrates the importance of a primary communication partners’ role in facilitating emotional conversations, and the promising efficacy of a training program implemented in a storybook interactive learning environment to promote conversations about emotion-related events while encouraging children with CCN to learn, explore, express, and discuss emotions. (shrink)