While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and return (...) of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

Em maio de 1643, Elisabeth da Bohemia endereçou uma questão a Descartes que inaugurou uma Correspondência de seis anos, até a morte do filósofo. Ele dedica à Princesa o seu trabalho de maturidade metafísica (Princípios de Filosofia Primeira, 1644) e redige Paixões da Alma (1649) como um dos resultados do diálogo com a filósofa. O silenciamento dos últimos cem anos de historiografia sobre o legado de Elisabeth da Bohemia nesta troca epistolar causou distorções e, em alguns casos, lastreou o viés (...) como regra e como a história. Uma das consequências dessa distorção está na leitura de que a questão da filósofa consistiria em uma crítica ao dualismo substancial. Neste estudo busco oferecer uma interpretação da natureza da primeira questão, com o intuito de esclarecer o pensamento da filósofa e o seu papel no diálogo, de uma maneira compreensiva, sem subscrever o paradigma literário do solilóquio cartesiano, e seu viés na literatura filosófica. (shrink)

O estudo das Cartas de Descartes a Elisabeth ocupou a literatura, ao passo que a fortuna da contribuição de Elisabeth foi soterrada pela historiografia. Essa negligência intelectual merece registro, visto que as cartas de Elisabeth foram descobertas no Século XIX e publicadas pela primeira vez em 1876 (Ebbersmeyer 2020, p. 4). O fato de que Elisabeth tenha sido ignorada pela historiografia explicita a precariedade a que o viés pode condenar uma narrativa, e torna o estudo sobre Elisabeth da Bohemia difícil. (...) Como se sabe, de 1876 para cá a história do racionalismo moderno levou muito a sério as Respostas de Descartes a Elisabeth, sobretudo quando foram estudados os problemas da interação entre mente e corpo, da união substancial e as concepções de movimento. Assim, uma relevante literatura resultou do estudo de respostas a questões ignoradas. -/- Somente a partir da década de noventa do Século XX, historiadoras da filosofia começaram a levar a sério que Descartes não estava em um solilóquio diante de Elisabeth. Em um período de intensa troca epistolar, no qual as cartas veicularam larga medida a nova filosofia (tanto do racionalismo como do empirismo), não era comum, estranhamente, a mudança de posições. Este não foi o caso do impacto que as questões de Elisabeth causaram em Descartes e, por isso, a literatura sobre as Respostas de Descartes à filósofa configura um caso paradigmático do viés misógino que contaminou a história da filosofia, desafiando a sua seriedade e rigor. Isto ficará demonstrado a seguir. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

O século XX trouxe uma ciência impossível: a ciência da mente. Esta ciência ignora os problemas semiológico, nosológico e sociocultural a ela inerentes e que a inviabilizam. Como resultado, observamos a criação de uma pandemia global de transtornos mentais, majoritariamente administrados através de psicofármacos. Em contraponto, o pensamento filosófico desafia esta logica desde Canguilhem, passando por Michel Foucault, Deleuze & Guattari, dentre tantos outros. E da Éticaespinosana dos afetos e afecções, nasceu a Heterogênese Urbana (HU), que tem como objeto original (...) a revitalização criativa das potências humanas através do contato entre subjetividades diversas. Etimologicamente, “criação a partir e com a diversidade”. Com a circulação dos afetos, dos desejos, das ideias nos espaços públicos, a HU promove, fenomenologicamente, a expressão daquilo que, antes permanecia invisível e indizível face o silêncio da vida da cidade. Os campos de afetações intersubjetivo e intercorpóreo entre vidas tão distintas desloca e descola o olhar fundado na psicopatologia clássica para atravessar a vida da cidade pelas potências que cada indivíduo é capaz nas experiências coletivas.A HU denuncia a multicomplexidade do conceito “produção de saúde”, que apenas inicia-se nas práticas biomédicas, compreendendo todos os saberes para a construção do cidadão autônomo e afetivo. (shrink)

In An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications, W. Feller established a way of ending the St. Petersburg paradox by the introduction of an entrance fee, and provided it for the case in which the game is played with a fair coin. A natural generalization of his method is to establish the entrance fee for the case in which the probability of heads is θ. The deduction of those fees is the main result of Section 2. We then propose (...) a Bayesian approach to the problem. When the probability of heads is θ the expected gain of the St. Petersburg game is finite, therefore there is no paradox. However, if one takes θ as a random variable assuming values in the paradox may hold, which is counter-intuitive. In Section 3 we determine necessary conditions for the absence of paradox in the Bayesian approach and in Section 4 we establish the entrance fee for the case in which θ is uniformly distributed in, for in this case there is a paradox. (shrink)

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

Argumentos evolutivos debunking (AEDs), de maneira geral, têm o objetivo de danificar o status epistêmico de um domínio de crenças ao se apelar para suas origens evolutivas. No horizonte da metaética, AEDs normalmente são direcionados a teses realistas da moralidade e consistem essencialmente em afirmar que se nossas crenças morais sofreram influência significativa de pressões seletivas durante nossa história evolutiva, então se segue algum tipo de ceticismo moral. Um dos argumentos paradigmáticos articulados nessa direção é o Dilema Darwiniano de Sharon (...) Street. Nossa proposta no artigo presente é colocarmos o argumento evolutivo contra o naturalismo (AECN) de Alvin Plantinga – um AED oriundo da filosofia analítica da religião – como possível resposta ao problema do ceticismo moral proposto por Street. Dessa forma, Plantinga pontua que considerações evolutivas tomadas dentro do framework do naturalismo ontológico acarretam em um conflito epistêmico para o sujeito que deseja manter em seu sistema doxástico tanto a crença na teoria contemporânea da evolução, quanto a crença no naturalismo ontológico. Argumentamos, a partir dessa questão, que o Dilema Darwiniano sofre de um problema estrutural por causa do seu comprometimento com a ontologia naturalista, o que faz com que o dilema se generalize em seu escopo e afete, de maneira nociva, crenças não-morais, se tornando autorreferencialmente incoerente. Palavras-chave: realismo moral. Naturalismo. Crenças. (shrink)

Schopenhauer como educador é a terceira, das quatro Considerações Intempestivas e, nesta obra, o então mestre de Nietzsche figura como modelo de educador. Schopenhauer é visto por Nietzsche, neste momento, como um exemplo de gênio, pois figurou na sociedade como exceção, não como regra. A universidade da época e a estrutura estatal são reprovadas por Nietzsche, e, para as confrontar, ele as utiliza como chave de leitura crítica o pensamento do autor conterrâneo. Estudaremos, perpassando as análises que Nietzsche de que (...) modo este autor figurou como alguém que apontou para uma educação intempestiva. Como essa postura de esforço de priorizar a singularidade pode ser configurada como perspectiva também artística. (shrink)

pt. I. Matter: 1. Philosophy as worldview ; 2. Classical matter: bodies and fields ; 3. Quantum matter: weird but real ; 4. General concept of matter: to be is to become ; 5. Emergence and levels ; 6. Naturalism ; 7. Materialism -- pt. II. Mind: 8. The mind-body problem ; 9. Minding matter: the plastic brain ; 10. Mind and society ; 11. Cognition, consciousness, and free will ; 12. Brain and computer: the hardware/software dualism ; 13. Knowledge: (...) genuine and bogus -- pt. III. Appendices: 14. Appendix A: Objects ; 15. Appendix B. Truths. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 1 Seiten: 146-164.

Let M be an o-minimal expansion of a real closed field. Let G be a definably compact definably connected abelian n-dimensional group definable in M. We show the following: the o-minimal fundamental group of G is isomorphic to ℤn; for each k>0, the k-torsion subgroup of G is isomorphic to n, and the o-minimal cohomology algebra over ℚ of G is isomorphic to the exterior algebra over ℚ with n generators of degree one.

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...) no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism. (shrink)

A função e o sentido do casamento são apresentados por Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), em “Reivindicação dos direitos da mulher” (1792). Escrito em formato de reunião de panfletos e publicado antes de partir para a França revolucionária, com o propósito de acompanhar o levante republicano contra o Antigo Regime, “Reivindicação dos direitos da mulher” contém uma denúncia generalizada da desigualdade de gênero e de seus efeitos deletérios, e um projeto de reforma das instituições e da sociedade. É nesse texto que a (...) filósofa teoriza de maneira consistente e fecunda, sobre o casamento como instituição central a ser transformada, e é também ao tratar do casamento que a filósofa de fato opera com os conceitos de direitos e obrigações. “Reivindicação dos direitos da mulher” tem “direitos” no título, mas é de fato um livro sobre educação e sua argumentação se ergue sobre um pressuposto metafísico, a partir e contra a teoria da liberdade de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Neste estudo, apresento como a categoria do casamento como instituição pedagógica e política desempenhar papel estruturante na transformação da sociedade. A função do casamento, para a filósofa, é articular as esferas privada e pública, de maneira engajada nos requisitos revolucionários, como uma categoria da transformação social. Este é o sentido da noção de “cimento da sociedade” que pretendo apresentar. (shrink)

This collection of essays deals with three clusters of problems in the philo sophy of science: scientific method, conceptual models, and ontological underpinnings. The disjointedness of topics is more apparent than real, since the whole book is concerned with the scientific knowledge of fact. Now, the aim of factual knowledge is the conceptual grasping of being, and this understanding is provided by theories of whatever there may be. If the theories are testable and specific, such as a theory of a (...) particular chemical reaction, then they are often called 'theoretical models' and clas sed as scientific. If the theories are extremely general, like a theory of syn thesis and dissociation without any reference to a particular kind of stuff, then they may be called 'metaphysical' - as well as 'scientific' if they are consonant with science. Between these two extremes there is a whole gamut of kinds of factual theories. Thus the entire spectrum should be dominated by the scientific method, quite irrespective of the subject matter. This is the leitmotiv of the present book. The introductory chapter, on method in the philosophy of science, tackles the question 'Why don't scientists listen to their philosophers?'. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo se inicia discutindo um tema relativamente clássico na epistemologia, qual seja, analogia, conceito e teoria, explorando uma perspectiva contemporânea do fazer científico e, em alguma medida, da filosofia. A partir daí, busca reacender o debate, sempre necessário, sobre teoria, analogia e conceito, à luz da produção do conhecimento científico, destacando abordagens supradisciplinares e transparadigmáticas. Para tanto, socorre-se de diferentes áreas do conhecimento científico, a sociologia clássica e contemporânea, elementos da biologia, aspectos da cibernética, para demostrar que a (...) ciência, de modo geral, considerando suas múltiplas disciplinas, intercambia de forma cada vez mais dinâmica raciocínios analógicos, com vistas a dar conta da crescente complexidade em que se encontra.: This paper begins by discussing a classical theme in epistemology, namely analogy, concept, and theory using. It explores a contemporary perspective on scientific practies, Including some aspects of philosophical thinking. So it seeks to rekindle the always necessary debate on theory, analogy and concept about scientific production based on supradisciplinary and transparadigmatic approaches. In order to do so, we draw from different areas of scientific knowledge, classical and contemporary sociology, elements of biology, aspects of cybernetics, in order to demonstrate that science, considering its multiple disciplines, increasingly exchanges analogical reasoning. This is done to account for the growing complexity of current scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Let R be an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group R has no poles, R cannot define a real closed field with domain R and order R is eventually linear and every R -definable set is a finite union of cones. As a corollary we get that Th has quantifier elimination and universal axiomatization in the language with symbols for the ordered group operations, bounded R -definable sets and a symbol for each definable endomorphism of the group.

There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan’s meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot be shown to be even partially true, while present best theories are demonstrably (...) completely true. I argue that this position, running counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide. The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones. (shrink)

We argue that the asymmetry between diverging and converging electromagnetic waves is just one of many asymmetries in observed phenomena that can be explained by a past hypothesis and statistical postulate (together assigning probabilities to different states of matter and field in the early universe). The arrow of electromagnetic radiation is thus absorbed into a broader account of temporal asymmetries in nature. We give an accessible introduction to the problem of explaining the arrow of radiation and compare our preferred strategy (...) for explaining the arrow to three alternatives: (i) modifying the laws of electromagnetism by adding a radiation condition requiring that electromagnetic fields always be attributable to past sources, (ii) removing electromagnetic fields and having particles interact directly with one another through retarded action-at-a-distance, (iii) adopting the Wheeler-Feynman approach and having particles interact directly through half-retarded half-advanced action-at-a-distance. In addition to the asymmetry between diverging and converging waves, we also consider the related asymmetry of radiation reaction. (shrink)

Background The perception of organ donation and brain death among Syrian population has not been previously explored. The goal of this study is to evaluate the attitude and knowledge of organ donation among Syrians and the willingness of this population to donate their organs. Methods We conducted a survey-based cross-sectional study in four hospitals in Aleppo, Syria in November 2019. Patient demographic, awareness of brain death; and attitude toward organ donation were collected and analyzed. Results A total of 350 individuals (...) were invited to participate in the survey among whom 303 agreed to participate in the study. The majority of our participants heard about organ donation with television, social media, and the internet being the most common sources of information. When assessing knowledge about brain death, only 40% answered 3 or more questions correctly. Fifty-eight percent of respondents agreed with the idea of organ donation and 183 would like to donate their organs one day. The leading motivation to organ donation was the desire to help, while the most common reason to refuse donation was the refusal to disfigure a dead body by removing an organ. Religious reasons were cited as motivation for organ donation by 43% of participants, and a reason for refusing to donate organs by 24%. Most respondents were unaware of the laws and legislations related to organ donation in Syria. When asked if religion and law were encouraging organ donation, 76% of respondents would donate their organs. Although more positive attitude was found in those with better brain death knowledge, this did not translate into more willingness to donate organs in this group of participants. Conclusions The promotion of organ donations from deceased donors is a necessity given the rising shortage of organs. The information provided by this study could help policy makers build future strategies to promote deceased organ donation programs and overcome current obstacles preventing such initiatives from achieving their goals. (shrink)

Philosophy is sometimes perceived as an abstract and nerdy discipline dealing with problems of its own creation in an isolated chamber of the Ivory Tower. And there is some truth to this view. But philosophy can help us deal with common problems, such as the disagreements we have in our everyday lives.

The subject of life, birth and death constitutes one of the main topics in Democritus’ reflection on human questions. He seeks to understand what men think about the processes of birth and death and how they, accordingly, determine their behavior and attitudes. His reflections comprise a wide range of perspectives and aspects that include examining human behaviour and investigating how it reveals a certain temperament or inclination, inquiring about the nature of these processes and extending the analyses of the processes (...) of birth and death to whole beings through the couple generation-corruption. In the present paper, I intend to examine the main theses and arguments which appear in the testimonies and fragments through which Democritus’ thought was transmitted from antiquity. Furthermore, I will also discuss the hypotheses that for Democritus the most important opposition was not life-death, but rather birth-death and that, at the same time, his idea of nature and life comprises both processes in the perspective of atomistic philosophy. I shall show that corruption has to be considered in two different ways, that is, in the context of physical processes that keep the kosmos in its persistence and in the context of the existence of natural beings, both living and lifeless. (shrink)

This paper seeks to establish whether the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics as applied to business organizations are meaningful in a non-western business context. It does so by building on research reported in Moore : 363–387, 2012) in which the application of virtue ethics to business organizations was investigated empirically in the UK, based on a conceptual framework drawn from MacIntyre’s work. Comparing these results with an equivalent study in Sri Lanka, the paper finds that the categories are meaningful but (...) that there are both similarities to and considerable differences in the content of these categories from the UK study. The paper draws on aspects of institutional theory to explore and explain these findings. Overall, there is supportive evidence that the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics are generalizable, and so can be used to characterize problems of organizational virtue and vice around the world, while providing evidence that there may be polities which are more conducive to the ‘practice-like conduct of production’ : 77–91, 2008). (shrink)

In this essay I will put forward an account of the emotion of shame that draws from Bernard Williams’ groundbreaking work on Shame and Necessity. The main novelty will be a distinction between two senses of shame, “basic shame” and “complex shame”. Basic shame is related to what Williams refers to as a “loss of power” in relation to others that can be real or imaginary spectators and is a sense of diminishment towards those others. Complex shame, in turn, appears (...) when this diminishment is felt in relation to an “internalised other” that embodies the values she recognises as her own as well as other values she respects. Borrowing a page from Cheshire Calhoun, I argue that many accounts of shame face what I call the “challenge of unrespected judgments”: people are vulnerable to shame even when they do not endorse or respect the judgments of those shaming them. I claim that the proposed Williamsian account of the emotion can dissolve the challenge, because for one to feel basic shame there is no need for any further attitude of the ashamed person towards the shamer besides a sense of diminishment caused by the perception of loss of power. In addition to that, oppression can influence the internalised other of marginalised people in a way that makes them vulnerable to complex shame. I will conclude with some brief remarks about how moral education in the Aristotelian sense can help us to deal with the morally problematic instances of shame. (shrink)

Suppose G is a definably connected, definable group in an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group. We show that the o-minimal universal covering homomorphism equation image: equation image→ G is a locally definable covering homomorphism and π1 is isomorphic to the o-minimal fundamental group π of G defined using locally definable covering homomorphisms.

The contrast between the past-future symmetry of mechanical theories and the time-arrow observed in the behaviour of real complex systems doesn’t have nowadays a fully satisfactory explanation. If one confides in the Laplace-dream that everything be exactly and completely describable by the known mechanical differential equations, the whole experimental evidence of the irreversibility of real complex processes can only be interpreted as an illusion due to the limits of human brain and shortness of human history. In this work it is (...) surmised that in the description of real events it would be more reasonable to renounce exactness and completeness of mechanical differential equations, assuming that also further effects exist in nature, governed by different kinds of rules, in spite of being so weak to be directly unobservable in single motions. This surmise can explain not only the time-arrow, but also why, in particular cases, it can happen that approximate and/or statistical models represent an improvement of mechanical theories instead of an approximation: this happened for Boltzmann gas-model and also for the famous work of Max Planck on blackbody-radiation. And it also appears as a more promising “working hypothesis”, stimulating and guiding us to learn more about limits and origin of the basic equations, and also about the nature of chance and the meaning of probability, which is nowadays not clear in spite of the fundamental role it plays in physics. Particularly that kind of probability which gives the connection between quantum–mechanical differential equations and observable events. (shrink)

In May 1643 Elisabeth of Bohemia addressed a question to Descartes which inaugurated a six-year Correspondence, until his death. He dedicates his mature metaphysical work to the Princess (Principles of First Philosophy, 1644) and writes Passions of the Soul (1649) as one of the results of the dialogue with the philosopher of Bohemia. The silencing of the last hundred years of historiography on Elisabeth of Bohemia's legacy in this epistolary exchange caused distortions and, in some cases, underpinned the bias as (...) a rule and as the history. One of the consequences of this distortion is the interpretation according to which her first question would consist of a critique of substantial dualism. In this study I suggest an interpretation of the nature of the first question, in order to clarify the philosopher's thinking and her role in dialogue, in a comprehensive way, without subscribing to the literary paradigm of the Cartesian soliloquy, and its bias. (shrink)

This book presents Latin American Perspectives on women philosophers, comprising selected articles from the First International Conference of Women in Modern Philosophy that took place in Rio de Janeiro City, Brazil, Latin America, in June of 2019. The conference brought together over twenty national, transnational, and international philosophers from seven countries, whose work combines historical and analytical insight to recover the philosophical legacy of women philosophers. Historical and analytical work on women’s philosophical thought constitute efforts to re-conceptualize what counts as (...) philosophical knowledge and re-appraise the epistemic relevance of written material that women thinkers produced for most of history. This collection and the conference that gave origin to it are testimony to the enduring power of multinational and multicultural philosophical collaboration. (shrink)

In this article I want to focus on a specific function that promises fulfil in our lives: their role as a way of shaping our character. To make my case, I will present an account of truth-telling based on Bernard Williams’ work on genealogy and on the virtues of truth. This account will highlight how our selves (or characters) are not static entities in time, that they are not immediately transparent to us. Nonetheless, we seem to have what I call (...) a drive to be someone, to have a character. We need ways to ‘steady the mind’, that is, ways of shaping our selves to whom we are or want to be. The argument I will put forward is that promises are one of the resources we have for doing so. By making promises, we commit ourselves to acting in a certain way and by doing that we also shape our selves. The argument will help us to answer some philosophical challenges raised against promises, notably about their rationality and about their relationship with vows and resolutions. Additionally, it will impact our thinking about contract law. What emerges from this article is an account of an important role played by promises that has been often neglected by the literature. (shrink)

Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's normative naturalism does neither rest (...) on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency. (shrink)