Basing ourselves on the writings of Hans Jonas, we offer to psychosomatic medicine a philosophy of life that surmounts the mind-body dualism which has plagued Western thought since the origins of modern science in seventeenth century Europe. Any present-day account of reality must draw upon everything we know about the living and the non-living. Since we are living beings ourselves, we know what it means to be alive from our own first-hand experience. Therefore, our philosophy of life, in addition (...) to starting with what empirical science tells us about inorganic and organic reality, must also begin from our own direct experience of life in ourselves and in others; it can then show how the two meet in the living being. Since life is ultimately one reality, our theory must reintegrate psyche with soma such that no component of the whole is short-changed, neither the objective nor the subjective. In this essay, we lay out the foundational components of such a theory by clarifying the defining features of living beings as polarities . We describe three such polarities: 1) Being vs. non-being: Always threatened by non-being, the organism must constantly re-assert its being through its own activity. 2) World-relatedness vs. self-enclosure: Living beings are both enclosed with themselves, defined by the boundaries that separate them from their environment, while they are also ceaselessly reaching out to their environment and engaging in transactions with it. 3) Dependence vs. independence: Living beings are both dependent on the material components that constitute them at any given moment and independent of any particular groupings of these components over time. We then discuss important features of the polarities of life: Metabolism; organic structure; enclosure by a semi-permeable membrane; distinction between "self" and "other"; autonomy; neediness; teleology; sensitivity; values. Moral needs and values already arise at the most basic levels of life, even if only human beings can recognize such values as moral requirements and develop responses to them. (shrink)

Psychosomatic medicine, with its prevailing biopsychosocial model, aims to integrate human and exact sciences with their divergent conceptual models. Therefore, its own conceptual foundations, which often remain implicit and unknown, may be critically relevant. We defend the thesis that choosing between different metaphysical views on the ‘mind–body problem’ may have important implications for the conceptual foundations of psychosomatic medicine, and therefore potentially also for its methods, scientific status and relationship with the scientific disciplines it aims to integrate: biomedical (...) sciences, psychology and social sciences. To make this point, we introduce three key positions in the philosophical ‘mind–body’ debate and investigate their consequences for the conceptual basis of the biopsychosocial model in general and its ‘psycho-biological’ part in particular. Despite the clinical merits of the biopsychosocial model, we submit that it is conceptually underdeveloped or even flawed, which may hamper its use as a proper scientific model. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a rapidly increasing interest in self-management strategies in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. Among the conditions in which self-management is currently investigated in these contexts are bipolar disorder, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome (Meng, Friedberg, &...

Self-management interventions are a heterogeneous group of interventions that are regarded as important tools for the management of chronic diseases. They consist of a broad range of techniques and are available for a large variety of chronic organic as well as mental conditions or illnesses, which are by definition generally chronic. These interventions aim that the individual concerned takes substantial responsibility for managing the symptoms, treatment, and physical and psychosocial consequences associated with having a chronic medical condition, disability or disease. (...) Alternate terms used in this context, among others, are self-care... (shrink)

THE ARTICLE CONSIDERS HOW THE CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOSOMATIC DISORDER FITS INTO THE DUALISTIC AND MONISTIC VIEWS OF DOCTORS ON THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, AND POINTS OUT HOW THE DIFFICULTY OF FITTING IT INTO THE CURRENT KIND OF MONISM WOULD BE LESSENED IF PSYCHOSOMATIC DISORDERS WERE DEFINED AS SOMATIC SYMPTOMS WHICH CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY TREATED BY METHODS USED TO TREAT PSYCHIC SYMPTOMS.

Combining theological and medical perspectives is indispensable for the historical study of the interconnections between mind, body, and soul. This article explores these relations through the history of Finnish psychosomatic medicine, and uses published and archival materials to examine the intellectual biography of the Finland-Swedish theologian turned psychiatrist Asser Stenbäck (1913–2006). Stenbäck's career, which evolved from priesthood to psychiatry and politics, reveals a great deal about the tensions between religion and medicine, the spiritual and scientific groups that impinged upon (...) psychosomatic medicine, and ideas on how health and Christian morality were interconnected. The biographical approach is adopted to unearth the values encoded in medical concepts, and through this, to point towards another, underexplored dimension of the health–religion relationship. In addition to their emotional aspect, religious doctrines are intended to organise life and give it meaning. Stenbäck's ideas tied these experiential and normative spheres together by defending an irrationalist substratum of the world in the secular age of medicine. His work illustrates how the inner experience of faith can become both medically and politically purposive. It is worth combining these perspectives in historical research as well in order to better understand how the theological, medical, and political worlds are in dialogue when it comes to human problems. (shrink)

BackgroundStress is a major risk factor for the impairment of psychological well-being. The present study aimed to evaluate the empirical evidence of the Transactional Stress Model proposed by Lazarus and Folkman in patients with psychosomatic health conditions.MethodsA structural equation model was applied in two separate subsamples of inpatients from the Department of Psychosomatic Medicine for consecutive model building and confirmatory analyses using self-reported health status information about perceived stress, personal resources, coping mechanisms, stress response, and psychological well-being.ResultsThe initial (...) model was created to reflect the theoretical assumptions by Lazarus and Folkman about their transactional stress concept. This model was modified until a sufficient model fit was reached. The modified model was confirmed in a second sample. Perceived external stressors and personal resources explained 91% of the variance of the stress response, which was closely related to symptoms of depression. The attenuating effect of resources on stress response was higher than the impact of perceived stressors on stress response.ConclusionThe empirical data largely confirmed the theoretical assumption of the Transactional Stress Model, which was first presented by Lazarus and Folkman, in patients with a wide range of psychosomatic conditions. However, data analyses were solely based on self-reported health status. Thus, proposed inner psychological mechanisms such as the appraisal process could not be included in this empirical validation. The operationalization and understanding of coping processes should be further improved. (shrink)

There are two standing, incompatible accounts of Descartes’ contributions to the study of psychosomatic phenomena that pervade histories of medicine, psychology, and psychiatry. The first views Descartes as the father of “rational psychology” a tradition that defines the soul as a thinking, unextended substance. The second account views Descartes as the father of materialism and the machine metaphor. The consensus is that Descartes’ studies of optics and motor reflexes and his conception of the body-machine metaphor made early and important (...) contributions to physiology and neuroscience but otherwise his impact was minimal. These predominately negative assessments of Descartes’ contributions give a false impression of the role his philosophy played in the development of medicine and psychiatry in seventeenth-century France and beyond. I explore Descartes’ influence in the little-known writings of a doctor from Toulouse, and . A study of Bayle gives us occasion to rethink the nature and role of psychosomatic explanation in Descartes’ philosophy. The portrait I present is of a Cartesian science that had an actual and lasting effect on medical science and practice, and may offer something of value to practitioners today. (shrink)

Modern socio?cultural studies of medicine demonstrate the symbolic character of much of medical reality. This symbolic reality can be appreciated as mediating the traditional division of medicine into biophysical and human sciences. Comparative studies of medical systems offer a general model for medicine as a human science. These studies document that medicine, from an historical and cross?cultural perspective, is constituted as a cultural system in which symbolic meanings take an active part in disease formation, the classification and cognitive management of (...) illness, and in therapy. Medicine's symbolic reality also forms a bridge between cultural and psychophysiological phenomena; the basis for psychosomatic and socioso?matic pathology and therapy. This in turn becomes a central problem for medical theory and for a philosophical reinvestigation of medicine. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between automatic and involuntary language in the work of Samuel Beckett and late nineteenth-century neurological conceptions of language that emerged from aphasiology. Using the work of John Hughlings Jackson alongside contemporary neuroscientific research, we explore the significance of the lexical and affective symmetries between Beckett’s compulsive and profoundly embodied language and aphasic speech automatisms. The interdisciplinary work in this article explores the paradox of how and why Beckett was able to search out a longed-for language (...) of feeling that might disarticulate the classical bond between the language, intention, rationality and the human, in forms of expression that seem automatic and “readymade”. (shrink)

This special issue is a follow-up on a previous issue in this journal on self-management in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. It is the concluding chapter of a research project that sought to unpack and develop the implications of an understanding of self-management in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine as “management of the self.”Over the last, 20 years, self-management has gained a central place in treatment programs across various medical disciplines. It positions patients as “expert-clients,” who share knowledge, responsibilities and (...) expertise with health professionals, and it actively involves them in the management of their own care (Crawford, Lee, May, & Active Self-Care... (shrink)

On psychosomatics based on Jaina philosophy.

Using exemplary historical scenarios, the present cultural history traces the transdisciplinary development of a psychosomatic discourse between the 18th and 20th centuries, thus closing a gap in research.

In Your Body Speaks Your Mind, renowned teacher and best-selling author Deb Shapiro shows you how mastering the language of your symptoms can actually increase ...

Im Jahr 1926 veroffentlichte Viktor von Weizsacker im ersten Jahrgang der von ihm gemeinsam mit Martin Buber und Joseph Wittig begrundeten Zeitschrift "Die Kreatur" einen Essay unter dem Titel "Die Schmerzen." Als sprachliche Form des Umgangs mit dem Schmerz wird dieser Text gleichwohl zum Pladoyer fur das Problematische am Verhaltnis von Schmerz und Sprache. Die Not der Unsagbarkeit lasst den Schmerz zum Indikator fur den Verlust einer Ordnung werden, die Sprache wie Leben allererst ermoglicht. "So wird die Wahrnehmung des Schmerzes (...) verwandelt in eine Kritik der Wirklichkeit, in ein Instrument der Scheidung von echt und unecht in der Erscheinung des Lebendigen."Weder war bislang der literarische und philosophische Wert dieses Essays im Blick, noch ist gesehen worden, dass mit dem hier dargestellten besonderen Zusammenhang von Schmerz und Sprache eine Grundlegung der therapeutischen Kompetenz Medizinischer Anthropologie erfolgt.So wirft der vorliegende Band nicht nur neues Licht auf die Genese eines bedeutsamen Versuchs zur Revision der Grundlagen moderner Medizin, er gibt uberdies Einblicke in eine faszinierende geistige Konstellation zu Beginn des vergangenen Jahrhunderts. Ihrer antiken Herkunft entsprechend, werden Literatur, Philosophie und Theologie zu Gefahrten der Medizin in der Sorge um den Menschen.Der Band ist dem Andenken an den Heidelberger Philosophen Reiner Wiehl gewidmet. (shrink)

Ce livre propose une réflexion théorico-clinique sur un outil psychanalytique encore trop méconnu, que l'auteur intitule: Cet autre divan. Il traite d'une autre façon d'utiliser la méthode psychanalytique de Freud pour les pathologies non névrotiques actuelles. Cet autre divan peut éveiller la curiosité, car ici le divan lui-même est un outil de la cure. Ce concept de la Psychothérapie Psychanalytique Corporelle (PPC) est issu de la rencontre des travaux de Julian de Ajuriaguerra et des recherches post-freudiennes sur les pathologies des (...) limites. Avec de nombreuses illustrations, l'auteur montre que la PPC permet le dégagement de l'archaïque traumatique à l'aide de la médiation corporelle. L'originalité de cet abord psychanalytique est de faire travailler les paramètres oubliés parce que silencieux dans le cadre psychanalytique classique, qui est mis en difficulté par les patients non névrotiques. Ce livre, qui donne au corps toute son importance organisatrice pour la psyché, montre que nous pouvons innover à partir de Freud pour aider psychanalytiquement ces personnes qui présentent des souffrances identitaires et narcissiques et qui s'adressent à nous. (shrink)

Between Sickness and Health is about illness rather than disease, and recovery rather than cure. The book argues that illness is an experience, represented by the feeling that 'I am not myself'. From the book's phenomenological point of view, feelings of illness cannot be 'unreal' or 'fake', whatever their biological basis, nor need they be categorised as 'physical', 'psychosomatic' or 'psychiatric'. The book challenges the disease-centred ethos of medicine and medical education. It demonstrates that a clearer conception of illness, (...) as distinct from disease, is therapeutic. The feeling that 'I am once again myself' can return, in some degree, whatever state the body is in. Resilience becomes more available when it is seen as a set of personal skills that can be developed, rather than as an inborn trait. Possibilities of wellness are enhanced by recognising that medical and other therapies can either support or impede recovery, as can human relationships and the socio-political environment. The book's many clinical examples are drawn from the author's broad experience as a neurologist, rehabilitation physician and systemic family therapist. Between Sickness and Health will be useful for students, practitioners and academics, and also for anyone who has been or might one day be ill. (shrink)

Montaigne’s writings on medicine and the body have always been seen as part of a larger project about knowing ourselves. Responding to medical developments that seemed to privilege the anatomical body over the mind or the emotions, Montaigne defended the humoral link between mind and body. His essays make use of word play, puns, and anecdotes based on his own experience and reports from antiquity to counter what he perceived to be an increasingly one-sided approach to medicine. The result is (...) a witty but nuanced argument for a more balanced outlook to what is now known as psychosomatic medicine. (shrink)

This paper aims to interpret the role of the soul as ontological, intellectual or cognitive and as the moral principle within the frame of the holistic conception of human psychosomatic health that emerges from the context of Zalmoxian medicine in the proemium of Plato’s Charmides. It examines what the ontological status of the soul is in relation to the body and the body–soul complex of man considered as a psychosomatic whole. By comparing the presentation of the soul as (...) principle in the Charmides and the Phaedrus, the paper defends the thesis that in the former dialogue, Plato develops his own anthropological ontology, which paves the way for the salvation of human existence and health. The soul is bestowed with an ontological primacy that determines the philosophical and medical presuppositions for treating human illness under a holistic view. The interpretation of the ontological relation of the soul to the body and the entire human being in the context of Zalmoxian holistic medicine is based on Hermias Alexandrinus’ exegesis of the conception of the soul as principle in the Phaedrus. This paper demonstrates that, from both the medical holistic viewpoint and the anthropological philosophical perspective, the soul is the principle and πρῶτον with regard to the body and the body–soul complex without being the whole that the corresponding medical epistemology must apprehend. (shrink)

After nearly fifty years of mea culpas and explanatory additions, the biopsychosocial model is no closer to a life of its own. Bolton and Gillett give it a strong philosophical boost in The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, but they overlook the model’s deeply inconsistent position on dualism. Moreover, because metaphysical confusion has clinical ramifications in medicine, their solution sidesteps the model’s most pressing clinical faults. But the news is not all bad. We can maintain the merits of holism (...) as we let go of the inchoate bag of platitudes that is the biopsychosocial model. We can accept holism as the metaphysical open door that it is, just a willingness to recognize the reality of human experience, and the sense in which that reality forces medicine to address biological, psychological, and social aspects of health. This allows us to finally characterize Engel’s driving idea in accurate philosophical terms, as acceptance of consciousness in the context of medical science. This will not entirely pin down medicine’s stance on dualism, but it will position it clearly enough to readily improve patient care. (shrink)

In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other 'mental interventions' can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this (...) has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in science, philosophy and in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: (1) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention. (2) One is not conscious of one's own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? (3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. This paper suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggests that 'conscious mental control' needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind, and that this allows an account of biological determinism that is compatible with experienced free will. (shrink)

The symbiotic resonance of the planetary and psychosomatic bodies was one of the most ancient religious and philosophical assumptions in ancient China. A number of contemporary scholars have explored this assumption in various branches of Chinese thought. Here, I would like to investigate this ancient assumption further in relation to the classical medical traditions, arguing that it was the medical thinkers who first attempted a systematic treatment and modeling of the macrocosm and the somatic body as a microcosm. Specifically, (...) I suggest that the mutual trust between cosmology and medicine yields a cosmological synthesis of.. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, the first author provides a summary and translation from the Latin of an important early medical lecture on vampires by Nils Retzius. The lecture was delivered in Sweden, at Lund University, in 1737, and was published almost immediately thereafter. This important text has been overlooked by modern scholars of vampires. This article will bring the lecture back into circulation in its first English translation. The second author then offers an analysis of the intellectual background to this (...) rational debunking of vampires. He demonstrates how Retzius’s attempt at a comprehensive rational explanation for vampires, typical of much Enlightenment thinking, nevertheless employs a fusion of Galenic medical thinking with more modern medical and psychosomatic notions of medicine, as well as certain Lutheran notions concerning the devil and the spirit world. His argument scotches the belief in the idea of sympathetic magic affecting the dreams of the living, while emphasising the psychosomatic effects of the imagination on the physical body. (shrink)

In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other ‘mental interventions’ can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this (...) has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in science, philosophy and in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: 1) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention. 2) One is not conscious of one’s own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? 3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. This paper suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggests that “conscious mental control” needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind, and that this allows an account of biological determinism that is compatible with experienced free will. (shrink)

Uncovering the wealth of traditional African knowledge and techniques has direct implications for the future development of the continent. This book is written against the background of the tragedy that most Africans are profoundly ignorant of the achievements of the past, let alone the traditions that are still upheld today. It is an exploration and analysis of Africa's historical roots, and the editor is one of Africa's most distinguished philosophers. Rich in detailed and original field research, the volume covers a (...) wide variety of topics, from the probability theory of cowry shell diviners, to hydrology and rainmaking, and the links between sorcery and psychosomatic medicine. Chapters include the use of number systems, ingredients used in pharmaceutical practice, and the mysterious phenomena of foreign objects projected into human bodies. (shrink)

_The first part called the Preamble tackles: (a) the issues of silence and speech, and life and disease; (b) whether we need to know some or all of the truth, and how are exact science and philosophical reason related; (c) the phenomenon of Why, How, and What; (d) how are mind and brain related; (e) what is robust eclecticism, empirical/scientific enquiry, replicability/refutability, and the role of diagnosis and medical model in psychiatry; (f) bioethics and the four principles of beneficence, non-malfeasance, (...) autonomy, and justice; (g) the four concepts of disease, illness, sickness, and disorder; how confusion is confounded by these concepts but clarity is imperative if we want to make sense out of them; and how psychiatry is an interim medical discipline. The second part called The Issues deals with: (a) the concepts of nature and nurture; the biological and the psychosocial; and psychiatric disease and brain pathophysiology; (b) biology, Freud and the reinvention of psychiatry; (c) critics of psychiatry, mind-body problem and paradigm shifts in psychiatry; (d) the biological, the psychoanalytic, the psychosocial and the cognitive; (e) the issues of clarity, reductionism, and integration; (f) what are the fool-proof criteria, which are false leads, and what is the need for questioning assumptions in psychiatry. The third part is called Psychiatric Disorder, Psychiatric Ethics, and Psychiatry Connected Disciplines. It includes topics like (a) psychiatric disorder, mental health, and mental phenomena; (b) issues in psychiatric ethics; (c) social psychiatry, liaison psychiatry, psychosomatic medicine, forensic psychiatry, and neuropsychiatry. The fourth part is called Antipsychiatry, Blunting Creativity, etc. It includes topics like (a) antipsychiatry revisited; (b) basic arguments of antipsychiatry, Szasz, etc.; (c) psychiatric classification and value judgment; (d) conformity, labeling, and blunting creativity. The fifth part is called The Role of Philosophy, Religion, and Spirituality in Psychiatry. It includes topics like (a) relevance of philosophy to psychiatry; (b) psychiatry, religion, spirituality, and culture; (c) ancient Indian concepts and contemporary psychiatry; (d) Indian holism and Western reductionism; (e) science, humanism, and the nomothetic-idiographic orientation. The last part, called Final Goal, talks of the need for a grand unified theory. The whole discussion is put in the form of refutable points._. (shrink)

In this paper we analyse some misleading theses concerning the oldcontroversy over the relation between mind and body presented incontemporary medical literature. We undertake an epistemologicalclarification of the axiomatic structure of medical methods. Thisclarification, in turn, requires a precise philosophical explanation ofthe presupposed concepts. This analysis will establish two results: (1)that the mind-body dualism cannot be understood as a kind of biologicalvariation of the subject-object dichotomy in physics, and (2) that thethesis of the incompatibility between somatic and psychosomatic medicineheld (...) by naturalists and others lacks solid epistemologicalfoundation. (shrink)

The mind-body problem lies at the heart of the clinical practice of both psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. In their recent publication, Schwartz and Wiggins address the question of how to understand life as central to the mind-body problem. Drawing on their own use of the phenomenological method, we propose that the mind-body problem is not resolved by a general, evocative appeal to an all encompassing life-concept, but rather falters precisely at the insurmountable difference between.

In Renaissance and early modern times, the concept of imagination was essential for the philosophical explanation of magic processes, especially in the anthropology of Paracelsus. He assumed that imaginatio was a natural vital power including cosmic, mental, psychical, and physical dimensions. The Paracelsians criticized traditional humor pathology ignoring their theory of ‚natural magic’. On the other hand, they were criticized by their adversaries as charlatans practicing ‚black magic’. About 1800, in between enlightenment and romanticism, the healing concept of ‚animal magnetism’ (...) evoked an analogous debate, whether ‚magnetic’ phenomena originated from a real power or were just due to fantasy or imagination . At the end of the 19th century, the French internist Hippolyte Bernheim created — against the background of medical hypnosis as a consequence of Mesmerism — his theory of suggestion and autosuggestion: a new paradigm of psychological respectively psychosomatic medicine, which became the basis for the concept of ‚placebo’ in modern biomedicine. From now on, all the effects of ‚alternative medicine’ could easily be explained by the ‚placebo-effect’, more or less founded — at least unconsciously — on fraud. (shrink)

Psychological traumatisation, as we understand it today, was—in terms of the history of ideas—anticipated by various approaches which have had a lasting impact on modern psychiatry, psychotherapy, and psychosomatic medicine. On the one hand, there is the traditional concept of possession and exorcism with its impressive psychodynamics. On the other hand, there is the theory of the imagination, of an illusion in the sense of a pathogenic infection. Especially the pathological teachings of Paracelsus (sixteenth century) and Johann Baptist van (...) Helmont (seventeenth century)—the latter having advanced the former’s alchemist approach—demonstrate the extent to which demonological, parasitological, and psychological ideas were amalgamated in their ontological notion of a disease. Only the introduction of hypnotism in the middle of the nineteenth century made possible a psychological or psychodynamic understanding of psychological trauma in the modern sense. Hypnotism was striving to strictly dissociate from the magical and natural philosophical speculations of mesmerism and its theory was quite compatible with the model representations of scientific medicine. Sigmund Freud was able to tie in his ideas of hysteria and neurosis with this concept and especially to define repression of (infantile) sexuality as the cause of a culturally ineluctable psychological trauma. Finally, a brief survey of medical history is given to explore artificial trauma as a healing factor. (shrink)