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  1. The relevance of the philosophical ‘mind–body problem’ for the status of psychosomatic medicine: a conceptual analysis of the biopsychosocial model.Lukas Van Oudenhove & Stefaan Cuypers - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (2):201-213.
    Psychosomatic medicine, with its prevailing biopsychosocial model, aims to integrate human and exact sciences with their divergent conceptual models. Therefore, its own conceptual foundations, which often remain implicit and unknown, may be critically relevant. We defend the thesis that choosing between different metaphysical views on the ‘mind–body problem’ may have important implications for the conceptual foundations of psychosomatic medicine, and therefore potentially also for its methods, scientific status and relationship with the scientific disciplines it aims to integrate: biomedical sciences, psychology (...)
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  • Neuropragmatism: A Neurophilosophical Manifesto.Tibor Solymosi & John Shook - 2013 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 5 (1).
    Over the past three decades, cognitive science has been making a turn towards pragmatism. Here we outline steps towards completing this turn. As a handful of cognitive scientists and philosophers have been arguing more recently, the insights of William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead are not only being re-discovered, they are also proving rather prescient in light of growing research. The new field of neuropragmatism aims to take these insights seriously and further into new directions for both pragmatism (...)
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  • No departure to.Jann E. Schlimme, Catharina Bonnemann & Aaron L. Mishara - 2010 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 5:15.
    The mind-body problem lies at the heart of the clinical practice of both psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. In their recent publication, Schwartz and Wiggins address the question of how to understand life as central to the mind-body problem. Drawing on their own use of the phenomenological method, we propose that the mind-body problem is not resolved by a general, evocative appeal to an all encompassing life-concept, but rather falters precisely at the insurmountable difference between.
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  • The phenomenological-existential comprehension of chronic pain: going beyond the standing healthcare models.Daniela D. Lima, Vera Lucia P. Alves & Egberto R. Turato - 2014 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 9:2.
    A distinguishing characteristic of the biomedical model is its compartmentalized view of man. This way of seeing human beings has its origin in Greek thought; it was stated by Descartes and to this day it still considers humans as beings composed of distinct entities combined into a certain form. Because of this observation, one began to believe that the focus of a health treatment could be exclusively on the affected area of the body, without the need to pay attention to (...)
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  • Respice...prospice: Philosophy, ethics and medical care- past, present, and future. [REVIEW]James Giordano - 2010 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 5:1-3.
    Respice...prospice: Philosophy, ethics and the character of medical care for the future.
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  • No departure to "Pandora"? Using critical phenomenology to differentiate "naive" from "reflective" experience in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine.Bonnemann Catharina, E. Schlimme Jann & L. Mishara Aaron - 2010 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 5 (1):15.
    The mind-body problem lies at the heart of the clinical practice of both psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. In their recent publication, Schwartz and Wiggins address the question of how to understand life as central to the mind-body problem. Drawing on their own use of the phenomenological method, we propose that the mind-body problem is not resolved by a general, evocative appeal to an all encompassing life-concept, but rather falters precisely at the insurmountable difference between "natural" and a "reflective" experience built (...)
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