It is widely agreed by philosophers that the so-called “Frege-Russell definition of natural number” is actually an assertion concerning the nature of the numbers and that it cannot be regarded as a definition in the ordinary mathematical sense. On the basis of the reasoning in this paper it is clear that the Frege-Russell definition contradicts the following three principles (taken together): (1) each number is the same entity in each possible world, (2) each number exists in each possible world, (3) (...) some entities existing in the actual world do not exist in every possible world. Since these principles seem to be true, the paper is a refutation of the Frege-Russell definition. The paper does more. It shows that the contradictory of the Frege-Russell definition follows even when principles 2 and 3 are replaced by one considerably weaker principle. The ideas contained in the paper are related to two earlier objections to the definition. The first, sometimes attributed to the mathematician, C. S. Keyser, is that existence of the numbers as defined implies the existence of infinitely many particulars in each possible world. The second is, in effect, an idea which is said to have led Whitehead to reject the definition of number to which he had subscribed in Principia Mathematica. Whitehead is supposed to have said that he could not believe that the number two changes every “time twins are born”. The mathematician H. Jeffreys expressed similar ideas [Philos. of Sci. 5 (1938), 434–451]. One of the merits of the author’s work is that it refutes the Frege-Russell definition without the need to take sides on controversial points presupposed by the Keyser and Whitehead objections. The objections made by the author are therefore not to be identified with the Keyser and Whitehead objections. Even if the author’s work is to be regarded as a refinement and integration of previous ideas, it is nevertheless a contribution—not only because the basic points are well worth repeating but also because the refinements are logically significant improvements and because the author has stated them clearly and concisely in the idiom of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Peter H. Hare (1935-2008) developed informed, original views about the proposition: some published (Hare 1969 and Hare-Madden 1975); some expressed in conversations at scores of meetings of the Buffalo Logic Colloquium and at dinners following. The published views were expository and critical responses to publications by Curt J. Ducasse (1881-1969), a well-known presence in American logic, a founder of the Association for Symbolic Logic and its President for one term.1Hare was already prominent in the University of Buffalo's Philosophy Department in (...) 1969 when I was appointed. Soon after, he became Chair. As his Associate Chair from 1971to 1975, I spent many hours with him in Buffalo and on professional trips .. (shrink)

Excerpts and paraphrases of this memoir appeared in 2008 and 2009. I posted it in full here in happy memory of Peter Hare and my joyful years with him. -/- 2008. Remembering Peter Hare 1935–2008. Philosophy Now. Co-authors: T. Madigan and A. Razin. Issue 66 March/April 2008. Pages 50–2. PDF -/- 2009. Remembering My Life with Peter Hare. Remembering Peter Hare 1935–2008. Ed. J. Campbell. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. pp. 9–16. http://american-philosophy.org/documents/RememberingPeterHare_final.pdf -/- Peter H. Hare, Distinguished Professor (...) Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Buffalo (SUNY at Buffalo), died peacefully in his sleep on Thursday, January 3, 2008. I would like to share my memories of my life with him. Others have eulogized him, enumerated his virtues and accomplishments, and written his obituaries. I am revisiting my personal relationship with him. These memories are as much about me as about him. (shrink)

This paper combines personal reminiscences of the philosopher John Corcoran with a discussion of certain conflicts between historians of logic and philosophers of logic. Some mistaken claims about the history of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem are analyzed in detail and corrected.

Volume 19 of _The Annual of Psychoanalysis_ turns to the ever-intriguing relationship between "Psychoanalysis and Art." This introductory section begins with Donald Kuspit's scholarly reflections on the role of analysis in visual art and art criticism, and then proceeds to a series of topical studies on Freud and art introduced by Harry Trosman. Egyptologist Lorelei Corcoran explores the Egypt of Freud's imagination, thereby illuminating our understanding of the archaeological metaphor. Marion Tolpin offers new insights into Freud's analysis of (...) the American writer Hilda Doolittle by focusing on the meaning of the Goddess Athene - whose statue rested on Freud's desk - to both analyst and analysand. Stephen Toulmin examines Freud's artistic sensibility - and places the historical significance of Freud's art collection in bold relief - by looking at the many contemporary art objects Freud chose _not_ to collect. Danielle Knafo identifies key events in the early life of Austrian Expressionist Egon Schiele that were "primary determinants" of the content and form of his self-portraits. And Barbara Almond examines the spontaneous healing process depicted in Margaret Drabble's novel _The Needle's Eye _as an analogue to the kind of growth and development mobilized by the psychoanalytic process. Section II, "Psychoanalysis and Development," begins with Barbara Fajardo's appreciation of the contribution of biology to analyzability; she reviews findings from both infant research and biogenetic research that tend toward an understanding of "constitution" as resilience in development and, subsequently, in treatment. Benjamin Garber adds to the psychoanalytic understanding of childhood learning disabilities by presenting the three-and-a-half-year analysis of a learning-disabled child. In a fascinating two-part contribution, "Bridging the Chasm Between Developmental Theory and Clinical Theory," Joseph Palombo sheds light on some of the knottiest problems in contemporary analysis, including the relationship between childhood events and the reconstruction of those events in treatment. In Section III, "Psychoanalysis and Empathy," Mary Newsome presents case material in support of her claim that the analyst's empathic understanding catalyzes the coalescence of the patient's affect and aim, that is, the patient's capacity to believe in and then realize his ambitions. The acquisition of the capacity, she contends, not only betokens a specific kind of structure formation, but is the bedrock of emerging self-cohesion. Her challenging paper is thoughtfully discussed by David Terman and Jerome Winer. Section IV of _The Annual_ offers Jerome Kavka's appreciation of the work of N. Lionel Blitzsten. Blitzsten, the first Chicago psychoanalyst and one of America's most gifted clinicians and teachers, anticipated modern concepts of narcissism in identifying "narcissistic neuroses" with special treatment requirements. Morris Sklansky furthers our understanding of Blitzsten in his discussion of Kavka's essay. Ranging across the analytic canvas with presentations as edifying as they are provocative, volume 19 of _The Annual of Psychoanalysis_ challenges readers to wrestle with issues at the cutting edge of the discipline. It takes a well-deserved place in the preeminent continuing series in the field. (shrink)

This paper defends a 'punctivist' conception of consciousness from recent attacks by Ian Phillips and Matthew Soteriou. As we intend it, 'punctivism' is the view that a subject's experience over some interval is determined by their experiential states at each instant during it. Phillips and Soteriou both offer ingenious arguments purporting to show that the punctivist is unable to make sense of motion perception; and that only by adopting an 'holistic' conception -- whereby a subject's instantaneous experiences are determined by (...) their experience over the interval -- can we make sense of the puzzles such phenomena pose. We contend that both arguments invoke dubious claims, their proffered solutions come with highly controversial commitments, and, if we take punctivism seriously, it is difficult to see why the so-called puzzles should be puzzling in the first place. A punctivist model of motion perception is proposed in response, and objections anticipated. (shrink)

Prichard's concern here is whether a person's obligation depends either on features of his or her situation or on features of his or her thoughts about that situation. Related to this contrast between the objective view and the subjective view is the issue of whether an obligation is an obligation to do some action. To the latter issue, Prichard responds that an obligation is not an obligation to do something, but an obligation to set ourselves to do something; as a (...) consequence, it is necessary to modify the terms of Prichard's primary concern. This modification diminishes the force of the objective view and does nothing to eliminate the central difficulty in the subjective view, namely, that the obligation to do some action is said to depend not on the character that the action would have, but on our belief that it would have that character. The belief that some general character picks out obligations derives from the mistaken habit of regarding the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as equivalent to ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’. Having highlighted this mistake, Prichard holds that in instances where we have considered the circumstances fully, our thoughts about the situation decide whether we ought to perform a given activity. (shrink)

Maintaining that the existence of Moral Philosophy, as it is usually understood, rests on a mistake, Prichard undertakes to formulate our true attitude towards moral obligations. The right action does not depend upon either our own good or what is good. Obligations are underivative, immediate, and self‐evident, and therefore, we do not come to appreciate them through argument or a process of non‐moral thinking. The mistake on which Moral Philosophy rests, which links obligation to virtue or desire, parallels the mistake (...) underpinning the Theory of Knowledge. Like moral obligation, knowledge is immediate; it need not be vindicated or improved by additional knowledge. (shrink)

The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange can be expressed in terms of resolve. In binding oneself, one thinks that if the other binds himself or herself to perform a given action, then he or she will do that action. In cases in which one person's action does not precede the other's, one's promise involves (...) thinking that if the other binds himself or herself, then he or she will carry out the promised action. (shrink)

Medicine; religious aspects; laws and legislations.

Anecdotes from early Islamic history; includes moral of these stories reflecting on Islamic religious life and Islamic ethics.

A social planner who evaluates risky public policies in light of the other risks with which their society will be faced should judge favourably some such policies even though they would deem them too risky when considered in isolation. I suggest that a longtermist would—or at least should—evaluate risky polices in light of their prediction about future risks; hence, longtermism supports social risk-taking. I consider two formal versions of this argument, discuss the conditions needed for the argument to be valid, (...) and briefly compare these conditions to some risky policy options with which actual public decision-makers are faced. (shrink)

Dion is a human person, Lefty is his left foot, and Theon is Lefty-Complement, a proper part of Dion. Lefty is annihilated and Dion survives left-footless. After Lefty’s annihilation Theon, if he survives, occupies the same region as Dion. I suggest that this scenario be understood as a fusion case in which Dion and Theon, initially overlapping but distinct, are identical after Lefty’s annihilation and propose an account of proper names that allows us to say that Dion and Theon have (...) ‘become identical’ without commitment to occasional identity or other controversial metaphysical doctrines. The proposed solution employs the semantics developed by Wolfgang Schwarz to address the ‘paradox of occasional identity’, posed by puzzle cases of fission, to deal with the problem of Dion and Theon, a body-minus puzzle. (shrink)

To the many moral theorists who have sought to establish a necessary connection between duty and interest, Prichard replies that their project ought not to be undertaken as it commits us to the view that our only duty is to do what is to our advantage. In discussing the attempts of Plato, Butler, and Green to link duty and interest, Prichard, like Kant, maintains that the rightness of action does not depend either upon our own good or upon our belief (...) that it depends upon our own good. Similarly, Prichard dismisses the view that our desire for our own good is our only motive. (shrink)

Analyses Green's rather obscure treatment of two important questions: ‘Why does a subject have the duty to obey the ruler or sovereign?’; and ‘Why is the receipt of an order backed by a threat sufficient to establish this duty when the order comes from a ruler?’ Prichard considers Green's position regarding the grounds and justification for obedience to law to be part of a larger theory of moral obligation that is inconsistent with our ordinary moral ideas. To Green's seeming denial (...) of the existence of any natural rights or duties, Prichard responds that Green in fact has failed to state a sense in which there really are natural rights and obligations. Moreover, Green's denial that we can answer the question ‘Why ought we to obey the government?’ can be formulated only by maintaining the existence of an obligation independent of our government's commands. The core of truth in Green's position, according to Prichard, lies in his recognition that a factor necessary to secure obedience is the subject's unselfish interest in the welfare of other members of her community. (shrink)

Endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, this term seems to mean simply ‘that being desired’ or a person's ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim. In other contexts, αγαθον takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as a good. Prichard argues that by αγαθον Aristotle actually means ‘conducive to happiness’, and holds (...) that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to be happy. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of our ultimate aim. (shrink)

Concerning the nature of desires that pertain to actions, considers the view that we cannot desire something unless we know or think, first, that it does not exist, and second, that it does not exist now. Finds a core of truth in this, but modifies the formula to claim that ‘we can only desire the existence of that of the existence of which in the past, present, or future, as the case may be, we are uncertain.’ Put more simply, a (...) desire is not a desire for the existence of something, but rather a desire for something to be. It follows from this view that we cannot desire something to be the case when we think that, without a doubt, it will be the case. (shrink)

Often an action causes both evil and benefit for the agent. No general account can be given for what happens when one considers in light of this evil and benefit whether to undertake the action in question. Prichard maintains that in willing a movement, there are two acts of will. First, there is the willing to think more of what one shall gain in willing x, which results from the desire to will x. Second, there is the willing of the (...) change x. (shrink)

In discussing the fact that it takes time to perform an action, distinguishes statements such as ‘I shall do x’ from statements such as ‘I shall be under an obligation to do x’ and ‘I was doing x’ from ‘I was under an obligation to do x’. The truth of the ‘ought’ statements is independent of whether the action is done, as it is not necessary that one not do the action at the time required in order to be under (...) an obligation to do it at that time. For some contrasts between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ statements, the obligation, such as the obligation to go to bed, refers to the future. The statement ‘I am under an obligation to go to bed’ is equivalent to ‘from now on I shall be under an obligation to go to bed’, and does not require either that I shall not do the action or that I have not done the action for it to be true. (shrink)

I develop an account of ecological role functions—the functions of species within ecosystems—which is informed by alternative regime phenomena in ecology. My account is a causal-role theory which includes a counterfactual sensitivity condition. The account tracks and explains a distinction ecologists make between functions and various activities which are not functions. My counterfactual sensitivity condition resolves the liberality problem often attributed to causal-role theories of function, while also illuminating the explanatory centrality of role functions within ecology.

In this chapter the explanatory value of four conceptions of human dignity to account for two seemingly contradictory intuitions is tested. One is that many people think poverty violates the humanity of poor people. The other intuition is that poor people often act with remarkable dignity despite their trying circumstances. First Immanuel Kant’s influential view on human dignity that claims it is grounded in humans’ capability to make moral judgments is examined. Next, Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the capability approach is (...) tested, which is hugely influential across many academic disciplines and in the world of economic development. Thereafter, two related, though distinctly different African theories of human dignity, as offered by Thaddeus Metz and Polycarp Ikuenobe are assessed. Both base their theories on the core capacity of humans to engage in harmonious relationships within communities. Last, it is investigated the theory that Avishai Margalit provides of honour and humiliation as concepts that illuminate the value and risks for humans’ possession of dignity. His theory is linked to aspects of the recognition theory of Axel Honneth. In the end, it is concluded that these theories either cannot fully, or adequately, explain the complex relationship between poverty and human dignity. (shrink)

al-Kindī. - al-Fārābī. - Ibn Sīnā. - Ibn Khaldūn.

On the propagation and preaching in Islam against evil deeds and on the process of accountability in Islam.

Study and teaching of Islam with refererence to Qurʼan and Hadith.

Islamic sects; Islam; doctrines; Islamic philosophy.

This paper addresses the stalemate on the question whether biodiversity has intrinsic value. I distinguish between a “weak” conception and two “strong” conceptions of intrinsic value in the environmental ethics literature. The strong conceptions of intrinsic value are connected, respectively, to moral standing and to a strongly objectivist account of value. Neither of these forms of value likely applies to biodiversity. However, the weak conception of intrinsic value is neutral about both moral standing and the nature of value and plausibly (...) applies to biodiversity. In addition, weak intrinsic value avoids common objections to the claim that biodiversity is intrinsically valuable. I develop a cumulative argument showing that environmentalists should presume that biodiversity has intrinsic value in the weak sense. (shrink)