En el siglo XX se ha realizado un " punto de inflexión " en la filosofía, que ha sido conocido por muy pocos, que ha sido abandonado apenas entrevisto. Este libro es el intento de tomarlo en serio y ensayar una visión de los problemas morales que no lo pase por alto; dicho con otras palabras, que no sea arcaico.

Is democracy a requirement of justice or an instrument for realizing it? The correct answer to this question, I argue, depends on the background circumstances against which democracy is defended. In the presence of thin reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value democracy only instrumentally (if at all); in the presence of thick reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value it also intrinsically, as a necessary demand of justice. Since the latter type of disagreement is pervasive in real-world politics, I (...) conclude that theories of justice designed for our world should be centrally concerned with democracy. (shrink)

Ten countries have established quotas for female representation on publicly traded corporate and/or state-owned enterprise boards of directors, ranging from 33 to 50 %, with various sanctions. Fifteen other countries have introduced non-binding gender quotas in their corporate governance codes enforcing a “comply or explain” principle. Countless other countries’ leaders and policy groups are in the process of debating, developing, and approving legislation around gender quotas in boards. Taken together, gender quota legislation significantly impacts the composition of boards of directors (...) and thus the strategic direction of these publicly traded and state-owned enterprises. This article outlines an integrated model of three institutional factors that explain the establishment of board of directors gender quota legislation based on the premise that the country’s institutional environment co-evolves with gender corporate policies. We argue that these three key institutional factors are female labor market and gendered welfare state provisions, left-leaning political government coalitions, and path-dependent policy initiatives for gender equality, both in the public realm as well as in the corporate domain. We discuss implications of our conceptual model and empirical findings for theory, practice, policy, and future research. These include the adoption and penalty design of board diversity practices into corporate practices, bottom-up approaches from firm to country-level gender board initiatives, hard versus soft regulation, the leading role of Norway and its isomorphic effects, the likelihood of engaging in decoupling, the role of business leaders, and the transnational and international reaction to board diversity initiatives. (shrink)

In his recent bookThe Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen suggests that political philosophy should move beyond the dominant, Rawls-inspired, methodological paradigm – what Sen calls ‘transcendental institutionalism’ – towards a more practically oriented approach to justice: ‘realization-focused comparison’. In this article, I argue that Sen's call for a paradigm shift in thinking about justice is unwarranted. I show that his criticisms of the Rawlsian approach are either based on misunderstandings, or correct but of little consequence, and conclude that the Rawlsian (...) approach already delivers much of what Sen himself wants from a theory of justice. (shrink)

A globalized world, some argue, needs a global democracy. But there is considerable disagreement about whether global democracy is an ideal worth pursuing. One of the main grounds for scepticism is captured by the slogan: “No global demos, no global democracy.” The fact that a key precondition of democracy—a demos—is absent at the global level, some argue, speaks against the pursuit of global democracy. The paper discusses four interpretations of the skeptical slogan—each based on a specific account of the notion (...) of “the demos”—and concludes that none of them establishes that the global democratic ideal must be abandoned. In so doing, the paper (i) systematizes different types of objections against global democracy, thus bringing some clarity to an otherwise intricate debate and (ii) offers a robust but qualified defense of the global democratic ideal. (shrink)

This article provides a conceptual map of the debate on ideal and non‐ideal theory. It argues that this debate encompasses a number of different questions, which have not been kept sufficiently separate in the literature. In particular, the article distinguishes between the following three interpretations of the ‘ideal vs. non‐ideal theory’ contrast: (i) full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; (iii) end‐state vs. transitional theory. The article advances critical reflections on each of these sub‐debates, and highlights (...) areas for future research in the field. (shrink)

The book outlines the historical development of Public Law and the state from ancient times to the modern day, offering an account of relevant events in parallel with a general historical background, establishing and explaining the relationships between political, religious, and economic events.

In this article, Laura Quintana elaborates on a conceptual distinction between violence and rage. Along with this distinction, she recognises that while rage may possess a destructive potential, it can also be politicised in emancipatory practices that confront conditions of injustice and structural violence. Her analysis centers on contemporary political movements in Latin America, which she views as collective manifestations of rage. Within these movements, the manifestation of rage is intertwined with forms of care and communal labor. Quintana characterises (...) such movements as embodying a “dignified rage” (digna rabia) that calls for an emancipatory transformation of the status quo. She contends that these practices can be understood in terms of the notion of “anti-violence,” as it has been coined by Étienne Balibar. In this she diverges from Judith Butler, since, according to Quintana’s analysis, such practices challenge the demand for non-violence that has often served to neutralise the disruptive force of such manifestations and movements. (shrink)

In this article I present a disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity regarding the predicative status of so-called generalised inductive definitions. I begin by offering some motivation for an enquiry in the predicative foundations of constructive mathematics, by looking at contemporary work at the intersection between mathematics and computer science. I then review the background notions and spell out the above-mentioned disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity. Finally, I look at possible ways of defending the constructive (...) predicativity of inductive definitions. (shrink)

In this article I argue that characterizations of anger as a hostile emotion may be mistaken. My project is empirically informed and is partly descriptive, partly diagnostic. It is descriptive in that I am concerned with what anger is, and how it tends to manifest, rather than with what anger should be or how moral anger is manifested. The orthodox view on anger takes it to be, descriptively, an emotion that aims for retribution. This view fits well with anger being (...) a hostile emotion, as retribution is punitive. I will argue that a different view of anger deserves our attention. On this alternative view, anger aims for recognition of harms done, rather than for the punishment of those who have committed them. I argue that we have reason to favour a strong view that excludes retribution from anger’s main aims. In addition, I offer a diagnosis of the reasons that led the retributive view of anger to become, and remain, orthodoxy. This diagnosis provides indirect reason to give my descriptive proposal serious consideration, for it highlights that the orthodox view has dominated folk and philosophical conceptions of anger for reasons that do not speak in favour of the view’s veracity. The view that anger is a hostile emotion will therefore emerge as in need of serious scrutiny. (shrink)

Frank Jackson often writes as if his descriptivist account of public language meanings were just plain common sense. How else are we to explain how different speakers manage to communicate using a public language? And how else can we explain how individuals arrive at confident judgments about the reference of their words in hypothetical scenarios? Our aim in this paper is to show just how controversial the psychological assumptions behind in Jackson’s semantic theory really are. First, we explain how Jackson’s (...) theory goes well beyond the commonsense platitudes he cites in its defence. Second, we sketch an alternative explanation of those platitudes, the jazz model of meaning, which we argue is more psychologically realistic. We conclude that the psychological picture presupposed by Jackson’s semantic theory stands in need of a much more substantial defence than he has so far offered. (shrink)

Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant's own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein's Kantian project successful? In this (...) research note I argue that it is not. First, I suggest that Ripstein's notion of freedom is viciously circular. It is meant to ground all rights, but in fact it presupposes an account of those rights. Second, I show that—independently of its inability to ground a whole political morality—such a moralized understanding of freedom is normatively unappealing. (shrink)

In this article, I sketch a Kant-inspired liberal account of human rights: the freedom-centred view. This account conceptualizes human rights as entitlements that any political authority—any state in the first instance—must secure to qualify as a guarantor of its subjects' innate right to freedom. On this picture, when a state (or state-like institution) protects human rights, it reasonably qualifies as a moral agent to be treated with respect. By contrast, when a state (or state-like institution) fails to protect human rights, (...) it loses its moral status and becomes liable to both internal and external interference. I argue that this account not only steers a middle course between so-called natural-law and political approaches to human rights but also satisfies three important theoretical desiderata— explanatory power, functional specificity, and critical capacity. (shrink)

Reference to the state is ubiquitous in debates about global justice. Some authors see the state as central to the justification of principles of justice, and thereby reject their extension to the international realm. Others emphasize its role in the implementation of those principles. This chapter scrutinizes the variety of ways in which the state figures in the global-justice debate. Our discussion suggests that, although the state should have a prominent role in theorizing about global justice, contrary to what is (...) commonly thought, acknowledging this role does not lead to anti-cosmopolitan conclusions, but to the defense of an “intermediate” position about global justice. From a justificatory perspective, we argue, the state remains a key locus for the application of egalitarian principles of justice, but is not the only one. From the perspective of implementation, we suggest that state institutions are increasingly fragile in a heavily interdependent world, and need to be supplemented—though not supplanted—with supranational authorities. (shrink)

Predicativity is a notable example of fruitful interaction between philosophy and mathematical logic. It originated at the beginning of the 20th century from methodological and philosophical reflections on a changing concept of set. A clarification of this notion has prompted the development of fundamental new technical instruments, from Russell's type theory to an important chapter in proof theory, which saw the decisive involvement of Kreisel, Feferman and Schütte. The technical outcomes of predica-tivity have since taken a life of their own, (...) but have also produced a deeper understanding of the notion of predicativity, therefore witnessing the " light logic throws on problems in the foundations of mathematics. " (Feferman 1998, p. vii) Predicativity has been at the center of a considerable part of Feferman's work: over the years he has explored alternative ways of explicating and analyzing this notion and has shown that predicative mathematics extends much further than expected within ordinary mathematics. The aim of this note is to outline the principal features of predicativity, from its original motivations at the start of the past century to its logical analysis in the 1950-60's. The hope is to convey why predicativity is a fascinating subject, which has attracted Feferman's attention over the years. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relevance that emotions can play in our epistemic life considering the state of the art of the philosophical debate on emotions. The strategy is the one of focusing on the three main models on emotions as evaluative judgements, bodily feelings, and perceptions, following the fil rouge of emotion intentionality for rising questions about their epistemic functions. From this examination, a major challenge to mainstream epistemology arises, the one that asks to provide (...) prominence to the epistemic agent and to her affects. This chapter discusses these implications, also providing an overview of the many alternatives available nowadays in epistemology, arguing for an open, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach to emotions in knowledge. (shrink)

Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. (...) Thus reformulated, the notion of epistemic injustice can help us to achieve an even deeper understanding of the relationship between knowledge and privilege. (shrink)

A life without liberty and material resources is not a good life. Equally, a life devoid of meaningful social relationships—such as friendships, family attachments, and romances—is not a good life. From this it is tempting to conclude that just as individuals have rights to liberty and material resources, they also have rights to access meaningful social relationships. I argue that this conclusion can be defended only in a narrow set of cases. ‘Pure’ social relationship deprivation—that is, deprivation that is not (...) caused, or accompanied, by deficits in liberties and material resources— mostly generates demands of private beneficence. I suggest that social relationship deprivation is unjust, hence a rights violation, only when it is due to factors—such as one’s race—that are irrelevant to one’s being a good participant in social relationships. I thus conclude that access to meaningful social relationships is not a fundamental concern for theories of justice. (shrink)

It is often assumed that the capability to make inferences requires language. Against this assumption, I claim that inferential abilities do not necessarily require a language. On the contrary, certain cartographic systems could be used to explain some forms of inferences, and they are capable of warranting rational relations between contents they represent. By arguing that certain maps, as well as sentences, are adequate for inferential processes, I do not mean to neglect that there are important differences between maps and (...) sentences. Instead, the purpose of this paper is to highlight interesting distinctions that might affect the way that cartographic thinking works. (shrink)

Inmersos en un ambiente sociocultural impregnado por la increencia, el creyente se encuentra hoy fuertemente confrontado: convocado para anunciar a Dios a sus contemporáneos, y a un tiempo persistentemente rechazado por ello. De ahí que sea una urgencia reflexionar sobre cuáles son las claves antropológicas del hombre contemporáneo que le han conducido a tal cerrazón en su estructura íntima hasta instalarlo en la increencia. El presente artículo aborda no sólo en el por qué el anuncio cristiano no interesa al hombre (...) contemporáneo, sino, más radicalmente, por qué Dios ha dejado de ser significativo al hombre. Y también algunas consideraciones desde donde proponer la fe hoy, alcanzar nuevos caminos para el anuncio del Evangelio. (shrink)

Si bien la obra de Joseph Ratzinger es rica en interpolaciones sobre la esperanza, carece sin embargo de una presentación sistemática. La presente investigación, recogiendo todo el corpus ratzingeriano, pretende ofrecer una sistematización del tema esperanza, su fundamento bíblico, su estructura antropológica y su composición teológica.

La lectura de obras literarias constituye una herramienta para contribuir al desarrollo cognoscitivo, valorativo y empático del estudiante, así como a la aprehensión y transformación de la realidad. Por lo que el objetivo consistió en valorar la importancia de los talleres de apreciación literaria como contribución a la praxis humana en la Educación Médica mediante el criterio de especialistas. Reading literary works is a tool to contribute to students' cognitive, assessable and empathetic development as well as to capture and transform (...) reality. Therefore, the objective is to assess the importance of literary appreciation as a contribution to human praxis in the educational context of a medical university. (shrink)

Las universidades de Ciencias Médicas tienen el reto de graduar un profesional que posea una amplia cultura general integral. El diagnóstico y caracterización del estado actual de la formación socio-humanista de los estudiantes que ingresan a la Casa de Altos Estudios reveló las insuficiencias que existen, por lo cual el objetivo consistió en la elaboración de un sistema de talleres de apreciación literaria para la formación socio-humanista de los estudiantes de Medicina de primer año de la Universidad de Ciencias Médicas (...) de Camagüey que forma parte de un proyecto aprobado en el programa de ciencia, tecnología e innovación nacional número 2, Organización, eficiencia y calidad de los servicios de salud, con el código 152049. El mismo constituye un aporte al Trabajo Educativo y de Extensión Universitaria en la institución. Medical universities face the challenge of graduating a professional with a comprehensive cultural background. The diagnosis and characterization of the current situation in regards to the socio-humanistic education of the students entering Camaguey´s Medical University revealed several insufficiencies. Due to this, the objective of this research was to prepare a system of literary analysis workshops to enable the socio-humanistic education of first year Medical students at Camaguey´s Medical University. This investigation has been approved as a project belonging to a national science, technology and innovation program with the code 152049 and is a contribution to the educational work of the university. (shrink)

Corruption poisons corporations in America and around the world, and has devastating consequences for the entire social fabric. In this article, we focus on organizational corruption, described as the abuse of authority for personal benefit, and draw on Weber’s three ideal-types of legitimate authority to develop a theoretical model to better understand the antecedents of different types of organizational corruption. Specifically, we examine the types of business misconduct that organizational leaders are likely to engage in, contingent on their legitimate authority, (...) motives, and justifications. We conclude by suggesting managerial implications of our theoretical model and propose directions for future research. (shrink)

Various philosophers authors have argued—on the basis of powerful examples—that we can have compelling moral or practical reasons to believe, even when the evidence suggests otherwise. This paper explores an alternative story, which still aims to respect widely shared intuitions about the motivating examples. Specifically, the paper proposes that what is at stake in these cases is not belief, but rather acceptance—an attitude classically characterized as taking a proposition as a premise in practical deliberation and action. I suggest that acceptance’s (...) theoretical usefulness in the ethics of belief has been hidden by its psychological obscurity. I thus aim to develop an empirically adequate and mechanistically specific psychological profile of acceptance. I characterize acceptance as centrally involving a cognitive gating function, in which we prevent a target belief state from having its characteristic downstream effects on reasoning, cognition, and action, and restructure those downstream processes. I then argue that there is substantial empirical support for the existence of the cognitive mechanisms needed to instantiate this view, coming from the science of emotion regulation. I argue that acceptance involves deploying the same mechanisms used in emotional response modulation to belief states: acceptance is doxastic response modulation. I then propose that having a better understanding of the psychological profile of acceptance leaves us better positioned to appreciate its potential usefulness for making progress on various puzzles within the ethics of belief. (shrink)

We prove a number of results on the determinacy of σ-projective sets of reals, i.e., those belonging to the smallest pointclass containing the open sets and closed under complements, countable unions, and projections. We first prove the equivalence between σ-projective determinacy and the determinacy of certain classes of games of variable length <ω^2 (Theorem 2.4). We then give an elementary proof of the determinacy of σ-projective sets from optimal large-cardinal hypotheses (Theorem 4.4). Finally, we show how to generalize the proof (...) to obtain proofs of the determinacy of σ-projective games of a given countable length and of games with payoff in the smallest σ-algebra containing the projective sets, from corresponding assumptions (Theorem 5.1, Theorem 5.4). (shrink)

En las primeras páginas de la Ciencia de la lógica, el pensar tiene la pretensión de iniciar su propio movimiento sin aceptar ningún pensamiento dado o presuposición como la paradójica y pura autorreferencia del vínculo de ser y nada. De acuerdo conesto, proponemos una lectura que afirma la presencia de una negatividad que explica la actividad inmanente del pensar en el inicio de la Ciencia de la lógica.

El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar cómo en la novela Ciudad de cristal de Paul Auster tiene lugar una aproximación a lo singular mediante el lenguaje. Sin embargo, esta adecuación entre las palabras y las cosas tiene que sucumbir frente al movimiento y cambio constante de estas últimas, lo que produce que la adecuación perfecta de lo singular y el lenguaje no se pueda llevar a cabo, transformándose el lenguaje en silencio. Creemos que esto se confirma en la actitud (...) de dos de los personajes de esta novela, cuya única alternativa y escapatoria consiste en fundirse con la ciudad, convirtiendo el espacio en una nueva articulación lingüística. The aim of this article is to show how in Paul Auster’s novel City of Glass, an approach to singularity through language takes place. Nevertheless, this adjustment between words and things fails because of the constant movement and change of things, resulting in failure of the perfect adjustment between the singular and language, turning the language into silence. We think that this is confirmed in the behaviour of two of this novel’s characters, whose only alternative and escape consists of merging with the city, transforming the space into a new linguistic articulation. (shrink)

RESUMEN El propósito de este artículo es demostrar que Hegel, al cuestionar la idea de progreso e introducir la noción de Presente Absoluto en su introducción a las Lecciones sobre la Filosofía de la Historia Universal, propone una nueva forma de pensar el tiempo histórico gracias a una concepción de la eternidad entendida como reunión negativa de los momentos del tiempo. Esta concepción hace posible comprender el presente histórico en su apertura y fragilidad, encontrando sus raíces lógicas en el conflicto (...) de la Idea Absoluta consigo misma. ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to demonstrate that Hegel in his Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History proposes a new way of thinking historical time thanks to a notion of eternity understood as the negative reunion of the moments of time by questioning the idea of progress and introducing the notion of absolute pre-sent. This notion makes possible comprehending the historical present in its openness and fragility finding its logical roots in the conflict of the Absolute Idea with itself. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es demostrar que Hegel, al cuestionar la idea de progreso e introducir la noción de Presente Absoluto en su introducción a las Lecciones sobre la Filosofía de la Historia Universal, propone una nueva forma de pensar el tiempo histórico gracias a una concepción de la eternidad entendida como reunión negativa de los momentos del tiempo. Esta concepción hace posible comprender el presente histórico en su apertura y fragilidad, encontrando sus raíces lógicas en el conflicto de (...) la Idea Absoluta consigo misma. (shrink)

When and why do socially constructed norms—including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs—generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call “agency respect.” This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people’s commitments as agents and (ii) they (...) do not conflict with morality, they place moral demands on us on agency-respect grounds. This view of the moral force of socially constructed norms, I suggest, is superior to views that deny the moral force of such norms, and it elegantly explains certain instances of wrongdoing that would otherwise remain unaccounted for. (shrink)