본 연구는 기하학에 대한 구조-구성주의 인식론을 정당화하는 것이다. 즉 구조주의와 구성주의를 융합하는 필자의 고유한 인식론으로 기하학적 인식의 본성을 해명하는 것이다. 그러나 현재의 연구는 이러한 큰 주제에 접근하기 위한 예비적 연구로서 칸트의 기하학적 직관 개념에 대한 역사-비판적 분석을 제공하는 데 한정된다. 잘 알려져 있는 것처럼, 칸트는 수학적 인식, 특히 기하학적 인식을 위해서 직관이 핵심적으로 중요하다고 주장했다. 그런데 칸트가 말하는 기하학적 인식을 위한 직관의 역할이 무엇인지는 여전히 논쟁적이다. 이점과 관련해서 역사적으로 대립적인 두 가지 해석이 있다. 하나는 베스(E. Beth), 힌티카(J. Hintikka), 프리드만(M. Fridman) (...) 등으로 이어지는 논리적 해석이며, 다른 하나는 파슨스(Parsons)와 칼슨(E. Carson)에 의해 제공된 현상학적 해석이다. 이에 필자는 특히 프리드만과 칼슨의 논쟁을 중심으로 두 해석의 내용을 재구성하고, 다음에 두 해석의 종합 가능성을 해명하고자 한다. 이를 위해 헬름홀츠-피아제의 인식론, 즉 “군 이론”에 근거한 새로운 구성주의 인식론을 제안할 것이다. 그러나 본고에서는 1차적 근사의 차원에서 그 개략적 구조만을 소개하는 데 만족하고, 종합의 구체적 내용인, 헬름홀츠-피아제의 공간 인식론에 근거한 구조-구성주의 공간 이론은 다른 지면에서 전개될 것이다. (shrink)

The paper attempts to summarize the debate on Kant’s philosophy of geometry and to offer a restricted area of mathematical practice for which Kant’s philosophy would be a reasonable account. Geometrical theories can be characterized using Wittgenstein’s notion of pictorial form . Kant’s philosophy of geometry can be interpreted as a reconstruction of geometry based on one of these forms — the projective form . If this is correct, Kant’s philosophy is a reasonable reconstruction of such theories (...) as projective geometry; and not only as they were practiced in Kant’s time, but also as architects use them today. (shrink)

While interest in Kant's philosophy has increased in recent years, very little of it has focused on his theory of science. This book gives a general account of that theory, of its motives and implications, and of the way it brought forth a new conception of the nature of philosophical thought. To reconstruct Kant's theory of science, the author identifies unifying themes of his philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of physics, both undergirded by his distinctive (...) logical doctrines, and shows how they come together to form a relatively consistent system of ideas. A new analysis of the structure of central arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena draws on recent developments in logic and the philosophy of science. Professor Brittan's unified account of the philosophies of mathematics and physics explores the nature of Kant's commitment to Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics as well as providing an integrated reading of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Contemporary ideas help both to illuminate Kant's position and to show how that position, in turn, illuminates contemporary problems in the philosophy of science. Originally published in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Kant's theory of arithmetic is not only a central element in his theoretical philosophy but also an important contribution to the philosophy of arithmetic as such. However, modern mathematics, especially non-Euclidean geometry, has placed much pressure on Kant's theory of mathematics. But objections against his theory of geometry do not necessarily correspond to arguments against his theory of arithmetic and algebra. The goal of this article is to show that at least some (...) important details in Kant's theory of arithmetic can be picked up, improved by reconstruction and defended under a contemporary perspective: the theory of numbers as products of rule following construction presupposing successive synthesis in time and the theory of arithmetic equations, sentences or "formulas"—as Kant says—as synthetic a priori. In order to do so, two calculi in terms of modern mathematics are introduced which formalise Kant's theory of addition as a form of synthetic operation. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of arithmetic is not only a central element in his theoretical philosophy but also an important contribution to the philosophy of arithmetic as such. However, modern mathematics, especially non-Euclidean geometry, has placed much pressure on Kant’s theory of mathematics. But objections against his theory of geometry do not necessarily correspond to arguments against his theory of arithmetic and algebra. The goal of this article is to show that at least some important details (...) in Kant’s theory of arithmetic can be picked up, improved by reconstruction and defended under a contemporary perspective: the theory of numbers as products of rule following construction presupposing successive synthesis in time and the theory of arithmetic equations, sentences or “formulas”—as Kant says—as synthetic a priori. In order to do so, two calculi in terms of modern mathematics are introduced which formalise Kant’s theory of addition as a form of synthetic operation. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically discuss Frege’s philosophy of geometry with special emphasis on his position in The Foundations of Arithmetic of 1884. In Sect. 2, I argue that that what Frege calls faculty of intuition in his dissertation is probably meant to refer to a capacity of visualizing geometrical configurations structurally in a way which is essentially the same for most Western educated human beings. I further suggest that according to his Habilitationsschrift it is through spatial intuition that (...) we come to know the axioms of Euclidean geometry. In Sect. 3, I argue that Frege seems right in claiming in The Foundations, §14 that the synthetic nature of the Euclidean axioms follows from the fact that they are independent of one another and of the primitive laws of logic. If the former were dependent on the latter, they would be analytic in Frege’s sense of analyticity. But then they would not be independent of one another and due to their mutual provability would lose their status as axioms of Euclidean geometry, since according to Frege an axiom of a theory T is per definitionen unprovable in T. I further argue that only by invoking pure spatial intuition can Frege “explain” the epistemological status of the axioms of Euclidean geometry completely: their synthetic a priori nature. Finally, I argue that his view about independence in The Foundations, §14 seems to clash with his conception of independence in his mature period. In Sect. 4, I scrutinize Frege’s somewhat vague, but unduly neglected remarks in The Foundations, §26 on space, spatial intuition and the axioms of Euclidean geometry. I argue that for the sake of coherence Frege should have said unambiguously that space is objective, that it is independedent not only of our spatial intuition, but of our mental life altogether including our judgements about space, instead of encouraging the possible conjecture that in his view it contains an objective and a subjective component. I further argue that for Frege the objectivity of both space and the axioms of Euclidean geometry manifests itself in our universal and compulsory acknowledgement of the Euclidean axioms as true. I conclude Sect. 4 by arguing that there is a conflict between the subjectivity of our spatial intuitions as stressed in The Foundations, §26 and Frege’s thesis in his dissertation that the axioms of Euclidean geometry derive their validity from the nature of our faculty of intuition. To resolve this conflict, I propose that in the light of his avowed realism in The Foundations Frege could have replaced his early thesis by saying that although we come to know the axioms of Euclidean geometry through spatial intuition and are justified in acknowledging them as true on the basis of geometrical intuition, their truth is independent not only of the nature of our faculty of intuition and singular acts of intuition, but of our mental processes and activities in general, including the inner mental act of judging. In Sect. 5, I argue that Frege most likely did not adopt Kant’s method of acquiring geometrical knowledge via the ostensive construction of concepts in spatial intuition. In contrast to Kant, Frege holds that the axioms of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry express state of affairs about space obtaining independently of our spatial intuition. In Sect. 6, I conclude with a summarized assessment of Frege’s philosophy of geometry. (shrink)

Both Kant's architectonic and the Yijing can be structured as four perspectival levels: 0 + 4 + 12 + = 64. The first, unknowable level is unrepresentable. The geometry of logic provides well‐structured maps for levels two to four. Level two consists of four basic gua , corresponding to Kant's category‐headings . Level three's twelve gua, derived logically from the initial four, correspond to Kant's twelve categories. Level four correlates the remaining 48 gua to Kant's (...) theory of the four university faculties , and to four categorially organized domains comprising his philosophical system. (shrink)

Both Kant’s architectonic and the Yijing can be structured as four perspectival levels: 0 + 4 + 12 + = 64. The first, unknowable level is unrepresentable. The geometry of logic provides well-structured maps for levels two to four. Level two consists of four basic gua, corresponding to Kant’s category-headings. Level three’s twelve gua, derived logically from the initial four, correspond to Kant’s twelve categories. Level four correlates the remaining 48 gua to Kant’s theory of the four university (...) faculties, and to four categorially organized domains comprising his philosophical system. (shrink)

While not paramount among Kant scholars, issues in the philosophy of mathematics have maintained a position of importance in writings about Kant’s philosophy, and recent years have witnessed a rejuvenation of interest and real progress in interpreting his views on the nature of mathematics. My hope here is to contribute to this recent progress by expanding upon the general tacks taken by Jaakko Hintikka concerning Kant’s writings on geometry.Let me begin by making a vile suggestion: Kant did not have (...) a philosophy of mathematics. When Kant was writing about mathematics, essentially he was reporting the views of others. The texts provide sufficient evidence to make this suggestion plausible. Generally, when Kant writes about mathematics in his mature works, he does so in order to illustrate or argue for a philosophical point. There are important references to mathematical method in the preface to the 1787 edition of Critique of Pure Reason; however, Kant’s purpose is to describe those basic features of a method that he intended to incorporate in his theory of philosophical method: ‘our new method of thought, namely, that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them.’ Indeed, Kant makes it clear in this preface that he thought there to be no extant problems to be solved in mathematical methodology; such was the state of the science, he thought. It was for this reason that Kant felt some confidence in borrowing from this method to improve the state of metaphysics; it is also for this reason that one should not expect to find Kant engaging in basic research in mathematical methodology. Similarly, the material on syntheticity added to the second edition Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason occurs in the context of a discussion of the syntheticity of metaphysical principles; that the propositions of both disciplines are synthetic a priori lends credence to the extrapolation of some features from the mathematical method for use in developing a metaphysics. Many writers find a philosophy of mathematics in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’; it is clear, however, that in this section his concern is to support his theory of the nature of space, time, and sensation. What is said about geometry, for example, is restricted to those of its features relevant to the subjectivity of space. The other major discussion of mathematics and its method is found in the section, ‘Doctrine of Method.’ Here we find Kant’s fullest account of the mathematical method and of constructions. It must be borne in mind, though, that his purpose is to argue against views that the proper methods of mathematics and metaphysics are identical, that the disciplines differ in subject matter alone. The result of the discussion is not a theory of mathematical method, but an account of the method proper to the philosopher.2 Kant simply is mentioning certain features of mathematical method sufficient to support the claim that the philosopher cannot incorporate it lock, stock, and barrel.’ In short, we do not find a systematic theory of mathematics or its method described by Kant in the first Critique, nor do we find discussions of mathematics other than in contexts where philosophical positions are being developed. This holds for Kant’s other works, too. (shrink)

Konstantin Pollok offers the first book-length analysis of Kant's theory of normativity that covers foundational issues in theoretical and practical philosophy as well as aesthetics. Interpreting Kant's 'critical turn' as a normative turn, he argues that Kant's theory of normativity is both original and radical: it departs from the perfectionist ideal of early modern rationalism, and arrives at an unprecedented framework of synthetic a priori principles that determine the validity of our judgments. Pollok examines the (...) hylomorphism in Kant's theory of normativity and relates Kant's idea of our reason's self-legislation to the 'natural right' tradition, revealing Kant's debt to his predecessors as well as his relevance to contemporary debates on normativity. This book will appeal to academic researchers and advanced students of Kant, early modern philosophy and intellectual history. (shrink)

Much of the scholarship on Kant’s theory of concept formation has focused on the question of whether his theory suffers from circularity, i. e., whether it presupposes the very concepts whose origin it should explain. In this article, I defend Kant against a well-known objection raised by Hannah Ginsborg. Ginsborg, I argue, overlooks the relatively narrow aim of Kant’s theory of concept formation. Kant explicitly frames it as an account of a concept’s inherent generality, or form. However, (...) Ginsborg’s objection is not about a concept’s form; it concerns the concept’s content. Moreover, Kant addresses the issue that she raises in his theory of definitions, which explains how a concept’s content can be revised and perfected. Kant considered all empirical concepts to be incomplete and imprecise. For this reason, he denied that they can be properly defined. Kant also did not regard the content of empirical concepts as fixed or permanent. Indeed, he expected that we would continually expand and revise their content on the basis of experience. I argue that these facts, along with the narrow scope of Kant’s theory of concept formation, effectively defuse Ginsborg’s objection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 (2006) 559-575 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Kant's Critical Concepts of MotionKonstantin PollokThere are two significant places in Kant's Critical corpus where he discusses the concept of motion. The first is in the Critique of Pure Reason, where in the "Deduction of the Categories" Kant writes:Motion, as an act of the subject (not as a determination of an object†), and therefore (...) the synthesis of the manifold in space, first produces the concept of succession—if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act through which we determine the inner sense according to its form.In this passage Kant simply refers to the concept of motion, and the immediate context in which this reference occurs reveals little about what he means by it. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, motion plays a more significant role, and, concomitantly, it is in his writings on natural science that Kant most fully expresses his thoughts on the subject. For present purposes, the most relevant passage is paragraph 15 of the Preface of the Metaphysical Foundations, where Kant says that theconcept of matter had … to be carried through all four of the indicated functions of the concepts of the understanding (in four chapters), where in each a new determination of this concept was added. The basic determination of something that is [End Page 559] to be an object of the outer senses had to be motion, because only thereby can these senses be affected. The understanding traces back all other predicates of matter belonging to its nature to this, and natural science, therefore, is either a pure or applied doctrine of motion. The metaphysical foundations of natural science are therefore to be brought under four chapters. The first considers motion as a pure quantum in accordance with its composition, without any quality of the movable, and may be called phoronomy. The second takes into consideration motion as belonging to the quality of matter, under the name of an original moving force, and is therefore called dynamics. The third considers matter with this quality as in relation to another through its own inherent motion, and therefore appears under the name of mechanics. The fourth chapter, however, determines matter's motion or rest merely in relation to the mode of representation or modality, and thus as appearance of the outer senses, and is called phenomenology. 2The first passage from the first Critique (quoted above) reveals both that the concept of motion plays a central role in Kant's epistemology and that he distinguishes clearly between motion of the object, on the one hand, and action of the subject, on the other. The two concepts of motion are quite different—the former belonging to transcendental philosophy and geometry (to "pure science" in the Kantian sense), the latter to the metaphysical and empirical investigation of nature. By contrast, the second passage from the Metaphysical Foundations shows that the conceptual apparatus Kant developed in his transcendental philosophy is also relevant for understanding the empirical concept of motion. Since all empirical concepts are based on transcendental conditions for their possibility, this connection between elements of the Critical philosophy should come as no surprise. What remains unclear, however, is the sort of connection involved, and whether in the particular case of motion there might not be a more intimate relationship between the transcendental conditions and the empirical concept than one might at first suspect.Indeed, this is a possibility that has been entertained by a number of commentators. In his investigation of Kant's metaphysics of nature, Lothar Schäfer, for example, contends that "the original perspective on the unity of the sensibility in which nature reveals itself, and which belongs to the conception of nature, results in the original perspective on motion. Therefore, the laws of nature are laws of motion …." 3 Similarly, in her book on Kant's theory of natural science, Karen Gloy argues thatin the predicable 'motion' the connection of elements of the understanding with... (shrink)

This Element examines Kant's innovative account of labour in his political philosophy and develops an intersectional analysis of Kant. By demonstrating that Kant's analysis of slavery, citizenship, and sex developed in inter-linked ways over several decades, culminating in his development of a 'trichotomy' of Right, the author shows that Kant's normative account of independence is configured through his theory of labour, and is continuous with his anthropological accounts of race and gender, providing a systemic justification for (...) the dependency of women and non-whites embedded in his philosophy of right. By examining Kant's arguments about slavery as intertwined with his account of domestic labour, the author argues that his ultimate rejection of slavery may owe more to his changing conceptualization of labour than to his theory of race, and that his final arguments against slavery rehearse strategies for embedding intersectional patterns of domestic dependence in his account of the rightful state. (shrink)

To vindicate morality against skeptical doubts, Kant must show that agents can be moved to act independently of their sensible desires. Kant must therefore answer a motivational question: how does an agent get from the cognition that she ought to act morally to acting morally? Affectivist interpretations of Kant hold that agents are moved to act by feelings, while intellectualists appeal to cognition alone. To overcome the significant shortcomings of each view, I develop a hybrid theory of motivation. My (...) central interpretive claim is that Kant is a special kind of motivational internalist: on his view, agents are moved to act by a feeling of intellectual pleasure at the prospect of accomplishing a task they have set for themselves, a feeling that originates in free choice. The resulting theory is immune to the challenges facing intellectualism and affectivism, thus strengthening the prospects of Kant’s justification of morality. (shrink)

From Descartes to Hume, philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed a dialectic of radically conflicting claims about the nature of the self. In the Paralogisms of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant comes to terms with this dialectic, and with the character of theexperiencing self. Powell seeks to elucidate these difficult texts, in part by applying to the Paralogisms insights drawn from Kant's Transcendental Deduction. His reading shows that the structure of the Paralogisms provides an essential key (...) to understanding both Kant's critique of "rationalpsychology" and his theory of self-consciousness. As Kant realized, the ways in which we must represent ourselves to ourselves have import not only for epistemology, but for our view of persons and of our own immortality, and for moral philosophy as well. Kant's theory of self-consciousness is alsoshown to have implications for contemporary discussions of the problem of other minds, functionalism, and the problem of indexical self-reference. (shrink)

This paper is about Poincaré’s view of the foundations of geometry. According to the established view, which has been inherited from the logical positivists, Poincaré, like Hilbert, held that axioms in geometry are schemata that provide implicit definitions of geometric terms, a view he expresses by stating that the axioms of geometry are “definitions in disguise.” I argue that this view does not accord well with Poincaré’s core commitment in the philosophy of geometry: the view that (...) geometry is the study of groups of operations. In place of the established view I offer a revised view, according to which Poincaré held that axioms in geometry are in fact assertions about invariants of groups. Groups, as forms of the understanding, are prior in conception to the objects of geometry and afford the proper definition of those objects, according to Poincaré. Poincaré’s view therefore contrasts sharply with Kant’s foundation of geometry in a unique form of sensibility. According to my interpretation, axioms are not definitions in disguise because they themselves implicitly define their terms, but rather because they disguise the definitions which imply them. (shrink)

Compared to other aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy, Kant’s theory of conscience remains relatively unexplored in the secondary literature on his work. This is no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that in the Groundwork to a Metaphysics of Morals (henceforth: Groundwork) and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant's two most widely read works on ethics, conscience plays very little role. However, Kant has extended discussions of conscience in three of his lesser read works: On (...) the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Attempts in Theodicy (henceforth: Miscarriage), the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason (henceforth: Religion), and the Metaphysics of Morals. There are also many unpublished notes in which Kant discusses conscience, and it may be conjectured, on the basis of extant copies of students’ notes, that conscience was a frequent topic in Kant’s lectures. As commentators have begun to play closer attention to these lesser read works, the literature on Kant’s theory of conscience has begun to develop. It is thanks to this development that this Element is possible: there is an emerging consensus that Kant’s theory of conscience is important both in its own right and insofar as it can help to correct various misunderstandings that have become part of the standard view of Kant’s ethical thought. This Element is divided into two parts. The first focuses on exegesis of Kant’s ethics. One of the overarching theses of this first part of the Element is that, although many of Kant’s claims about conscience are prima facie inconsistent, a close examination of context generally can dissolve apparent contradictions. The second part of the Element focuses on philosophical issues in Kantian ethics. One of the overarching theses of this part of the Element is that many positions traditionally associated with Kantian ethics, including the denial of moral luck, the nonaccidental rightness condition, and the guise of the objectively good, are at variance with Kant’s ethics. (shrink)

This paper argues that kant's general epistemology incorporates a theory of algebra which entails a less constricted view of kant's philosophy of mathematics than is sometimes given. To extract a plausible theory of algebra from the "critique of pure reason", It is necessary to link kant's doctrine of mathematical construction to the idea of the "schematism". Mathematical construction can be understood to accommodate algebraic symbolism as well as the more familiar spatial configurations of geometry.

The key word in the title of this book is "essay," for Strawson has not written an introduction to Kant, nor a commentary on the Critique. It would be closer to truth to say that Strawson has attempted to extract and to translate into a contemporary idiom what he takes to be philosophically important in the Critique. Kant's major positive achievement, according to Strawson, is the partial carrying out of a certain program, viz., "that of determining the fundamental general (...) structure of any conception of experience such as we can make intelligible to ourselves." But this program can be dissociated from the Kantian motif that the structure of experience is "imposed by our capacities." Thus Strawson speaks of the "doctrinal fantasies of transcendental idealism." Given Strawson's concern with what he takes to be Kant's positive achievement, he doesn't hesitate to expose the weakness of some of Kant's arguments, to restate many of them in a more convincing way, or even to supply new arguments. But Strawson also exhibits a remarkable sensitivity to many recondite aspects of the Critique, e.g., the role of "pure intuition" in Kant's theory of geometry, and the status of "self-consciousness." The result of Strawson's essay is a philosophically exciting encounter where one can learn as much about Kant as he can about Strawson's own central concerns, and indeed about some of the most central issues of philosophy, both past and present.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Williamson explains, defends, and applies Kant's theory of emotion. Looking primarily to the Anthropology and the Metaphysics of Morals, she situates Kant's theory of affect within his theory of feeling and focuses on the importance of moral feelings and the moral evaluation of our emotions.

During the last twenty years, Kant's theory of biology has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars and developed into a field which is growing rapidly in importance within Kant studies. The volume presents fifteen interpretative essays written by experts working in the field, covering topics from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century biological theories, the development of the philosophy of biology in Kant's writings, the theory of organisms in Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment, and current perspectives (...) on the teleology of nature. (shrink)

It is occasionally claimed that the important work of philosophers, physicists, and mathematicians in the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries made Kant’s critical philosophy of geometry look somewhat unattractive. Indeed, from the wider perspective of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, the replacement of Newtonian physics with Einstein’s theories of relativity, and the rise of quantificational logic, Kant’s philosophy seems “quaint at best and silly at worst”.1 While there is no doubt that Kant’s transcendental project involves his own (...) conceptions of Newtonian physics, Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian logic, the issue at stake is whether the replacement of these conceptions collapses Kant’s philosophy into an unfortunate embarrassment.2 Thus, in evaluating the debate over the contemporary relevance of Kant’s philosophical project one is faced with the following two questions: (1) Are there any contradictions between the scientific developments of our era and Kant’s philosophy? (2) What is left from the Kantian legacy in light of our modern conceptions of logic, geometry and physics? Within this broad context, this paper aims to evaluate the Kantian project vis à vis the discovery and application of non-Euclidean geometries. Many important philosophers have evaluated Kant’s philosophy of geometry throughout the last century,3 but opinions with regard to the impact of non-Euclidean geometries on it diverge. In the beginning of the century there was a consensus that the Euclidean character of space should be considered as a consequence of the Kantian project, i.e., of the metaphysical view of space and of the synthetic a priori character of geometry. The impact of non-Euclidean geometries was then thought as undermining the Kantian project since it implied, according to positivists such.. (shrink)

Purpose: This work offers a caveat regarding the human propensity to error, even in situations of very meticulous and seemingly thorough philosophical investigations. Methodology: This paper is a critical, analytic and evaluative, in its exposition of Kant’s ontology. Findings: Kant already had a theory of the origin of concepts which reinforced his theory of the nature of judgments. Based on his acceptance of the Cartesian psychology of perception, he claimed that man thinks only thoughts and perceives only perceptions; (...) and that the mind is aware only of itself and its own states. The situation puts in relief what finally is an issue between a theory which is pinned to a belief in an absolute beyond history and behind experience, and one which is frankly experimental. Unique Contribution to theory, practice and policy (recommendation): In a manner that is both instructive and corrective, this work contributes to the extant repertoire of discussions on Kant’s ontology. It offers a significantly demanding ratiocinative interrogation of the foundations upon which Kant’s theory of human transcendence was premised or predicated. (shrink)

This article argues that Kant’s famous theory of ‘radical evil’, according to which there is a natural propensity for evil as well as good in all human beings, has precedent in the medieval Franciscan intellectual tradition. In the early thirteenth century, members of this tradition, inspired by its founder Alexander of Hales, developed a novel account of free will, according to which the will is capable of choosing between equally legitimate options of good and evil. In affirming this, early (...) Franciscans departed from the longstanding tradition of Augustine, for whom free will can only choose the good, since evil is merely a privation of the good that limits human freedom. By the same token, they anticipated the Kantian contention that freedom entails the ability to choose between good and evil maxims. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Kant’s notorious claim that psychology cannot become a science “properly so-called”. Contrary to widespread opinion, he does not hold any of the following three implausible views: psychological phenomena cannot be mathematized, they cannot be explained in by reference to mathematical causal laws, and they cannot be dealt with in causal terms at all. Instead of claiming something about psychological phenomena, Kant argues against a specific conception of psychology: the then popular introspective psychologies. Only this reading explains why (...) he is also concerned with the possibility of psychological experiments, and it does justice to how he himself treats phenomena of thinking, willing, and so on. (shrink)

본 논문의 목표는 칸트의 『이성의 한계 안에서의 종교』에 관한 선행 연구에서 덜 주목받았던 “자기애Selbstliebe” 개념을 중심으로 『종교』에 제시된 악의 이론을 명료하게 하는 것이다. 칸트의 악의 이론을 이해하기 위해 자기애 개념에 주목해야 할 이유는 다음과 같다. 『종교』에서 인간의 악은 “인간 본성 안에 있는 선으로의 근원적 소질”이 타락하여 “인간 본성 안에 있는 악으로의 성벽”이 발현됨으로써 생겨난다. 여기서 “선으로의 소질”과 “악으로의 성벽”에서 핵심을 이루는 것이 바로 자기애라는 개념이다. 자기애는 한편으로는 세 개의 “선으로의 소질” 중 두 개의 이름이자, 다른 한편으로는 “악으로의 성벽”의 원천이기 때문이다. (...) 본 논문은 칸트의 악론에서 자기애의 의미와 역할을 밝힘으로써, 특히 자기애가 어떻게 해서 “선으로의 소질”의 다른 이름이자 “악으로의 성벽”의 원천일 수 있는지를 밝힘으로써 칸트의 악의 이론을 명확히 할 것이다. (shrink)

Elvira Basevich, Martin Sticker, and Helga Varden offered generative criticism of my monograph, Kant’s Theory of Labour. In this response, I explore how the resources they offer for thinking about gender, labour, and the state’s responsibility to ensure the material conditions of freedom can deepen both our attentiveness to patterns of systemic injustice in Kant’s political philosophy, and the resources Kant offers for addressing contemporary patterns of intersectional and material injustice.

The main objective of my dissertation is twofold: (i) to investigate how the problem of moral motivation occurs in Kant’s texts, and (ii) to examine how Kant’s account of moral feeling serves as an appropriate solution to it. First, I argue that the problem of moral motivation occurs in Kant’s texts as a skeptical problem concerning the motivational efficacy of practical reason. My view that this problem is integral to Kant’s main ethical project goes against a scholarly trend that dismisses (...) the philosophical significance of motivational skepticism in Kant’s moral theory. Second, I argue that Kant develops a peculiar notion of moral feeling in his Critique of Practical Reason primarily to resolve the problem of motivational skepticism about pure practical reason. In doing so, I regard the notion of moral feeling as an essential component of both Kant’s moral motivational structure and his justification of the moral law. This inclusion of moral feeling makes my interpretation a better alternative not only to standard transcendental interpretations of Kant’s account of moral motivation, but also to other kinds of interpretations proposed in the recent literature. (shrink)

Very often, the rise of non-Euclidean geometry and Einstein's theory of relativity are seen as the decisive defeat of Kant's theoretical philosophy. Scientific progress seems to render Kant's philosophy obsolete. This view became dominant during the first decades of the twentieth century, when the movement of logical positivism arose. Despite extensive criticism of basic tenets of this movement later in the twentieth century, its view of Kant's philosophy is still common. Although it is not my (...) intention to defend Kant infinitely, I think that this view is rather unsatisfactory and even misleading.Let us consider the first factor: non-Euclidean geometry. If one reads the firstCritiquecarefully, it becomes clear that the claims of transcendental logic do not imply Euclidean geometry. Kant's notion of space, as explained in the aesthetics chapter, is rather limited: it does neither entail nor presuppose a specific form of geometry. None of his statements about the form of space is specific enough to imply or support Euclidean geometry. Although Kant uses several examples, Euclidean geometry does not play any systematic role; only the pure form of space is at issue in the aesthetics chapter. In my view, the same holds in the case of Newton's physics: it is neither presupposed nor entailed by Kant's transcendental logic. The justification of Newton's physics requires further specialisation and application of the transcendental framework to empirical concepts like matter and motion. Kant took this step in hisMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. (shrink)

In his new book the eminent Kant scholar Henry Allison provides an innovative and comprehensive interpretation of Kant's concept of freedom. The author analyzes the concept and discusses the role it plays in Kant's moral philosophy and psychology. He also considers in full detail the critical literature on the subject from Kant's own time to the present day. In the first part Professor Allison argues that at the centre of the Critique of Pure Reason there is the (...) foundation for a coherent general theory of rational agency. The second part employs this account of rational agency as a key to understanding Kant's concept of moral agency and associated moral psychology. The third part focuses on Kant's attempt to ground both moral law and freedom in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. This is a major contribution to the interpretation of Kant which will be of special interest to scholars and graduate students of Kant's moral theory. (shrink)

One thing to expect from a theory of absolute music is that it explains what makes it so significant to us. Kant rightly observes that the essence of absolute music is our affective response to it. Yet none of the standard 18 th century theories, arousal theory and aesthetic rationalism, can explain both the universality of a judgment of taste and its subjective emotional content. The paper argues that Kant’s own aesthetic theory of aesthetic ideas is on (...) the right path for explaining the emotive significance of music, but that Kant does not further pursue this route because his interest in a “theory of music” is only peripheral to his systematic interest as a transcendental philosopher. For both philosophical and historical reasons, Kant does not have a “theory of music.” Nevertheless, if we free Kant’s conception of aesthetic idea and its restriction to Geist from the background of its 18th century humanism, then Kant’s aesthetics of free play becomes a good theory to account for the broad variety of emotions in absolute music as a fine art proper. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Kant has a far more communitarian theory of aesthetic life than is usually acknowledged. I focus on two aspects of Kant’s theory that might otherwise be taken to support an individualist reading, namely, Kant’s emphasis on aesthetic autonomy and his characterization of judgments of taste as involving demands for agreement. I argue that the full expression of autonomy in fact requires being a member of an aesthetic community and that within such a (...) community, judgments of taste are issued as invitations to others to engage their faculties towards the goal of shared aesthetic appreciation. (shrink)

This book presents an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a priori psychologism. It groups Kant's philosophy together with those of the British empiricists--Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--in a single line of psychologistic succession and offers a clear explanation of how Kant's psychologism differs from psychology and idealism. The book reconciles Kant's philosophy with subsequent developments in science and mathematics, including post-Fregean mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, and both relativity and quantum theory. Finally, the (...) author reveals the ways in which Kant's philosophy dovetails with contemporary scientific theorizing about the natural phenomenon of consciousness and its place in nature. This book will be of interest to Kant scholars and historians of philosophy working on the British empiricists. (shrink)

Dans cet article, Tanabe reprend une question kantienne : quelle place la liberté, entendue comme « volonté auto-législatrice », peut-elle avoir dans un monde régi par les lois nécessaires de la causalité? Tanabe rappelle, avec Kant, que, comme noumène, ayant une cause spontanée, la liberté est « théoriquement possible », mais soutient que pour qu’elle soit concrètement réalisée, est nécessaire un dépassement de toutes les « limitations individuelles » à travers l’unification du sujet moral agissant avec la « valeur absolue (...) » qu’est. (shrink)

This volume presents an extended version of the contributions presented at the workshop "Kant's Concept of Law" held at the 26th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR) in 2013. It handles issues of applied legal philosophy in Kant's Doctrine of Right such as ownership, the alleged right of necessity, the right of resistance and the right of revolution. With each of these applied issues, the focus lies, on the one hand, (...) on the relationship between the principles a priori of law and of the duties of rights, as well as their normative requirements - for instance, the duty of independence from the coercion by others - and, on the other hand, empirical situations and their pressing demands. Thus, this volume illustrates how Kant concretely conceives of the doctrine of "first metaphysical of the doctrine of right" as supplying "the immutable principles for any giving of positive law". Each essay of this volume not only undertakes a careful and original interpretation of Kant's theses, but also offers a critical assessment. (shrink)

This seminal contribution to Kant studies, originally published in 1982, was the first to present a thorough survey and evaluation of Kant's theory of mind. Ameriks focuses on Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason, and examines how the themes raised there are treated in the rest of Kant's writings. Ameriks demonstrates that Kant developed a theory of mind that is much more rationalistic and defensible than most interpreters have allowed.

In the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the term object has an extensive and far-reaching significance, and it can therefore be understood as a theory of objects. This becomes particularly clear when it is observed that all of his guidelines can be traced to different concepts of objects and their combination. With his concept of the object of experience, he attempts to mediate incompatible aspects in this: in relation to the object of experience, we have apodictic claims but at (...) the same time our knowledge of the object develops and contains the possibility of historical progress. This theory of objects was elaborated by Kant with regard to natural science and the claim of its metaphysical foundation. For this reason, Kant’s concept of object is inherently linked with his concept of science. Astronomy is at the core of his investigation, because it represents a perfect example of a so-called proper and rational natural science. (shrink)

This book constitutes one of the most important contributions to recent Kant scholarship. In it, one of the pre-eminent interpreters of Kant, Henry Allison, offers a comprehensive, systematic, and philosophically astute account of all aspects of Kant's views on aesthetics. The first part of the book analyses Kant's conception of reflective judgment and its connections with both empirical knowledge and judgments of taste. The second and third parts treat two questions that Allison insists must be kept distinct: the (...) normativity of pure judgments of taste, and the moral and systematic significance of taste. The fourth part considers two important topics often neglected in the study of Kant's aesthetics: his conceptions of fine art, and the sublime. (shrink)

Anne Margaret Baxley offers a systematic interpretation of Kant's theory of virtue, whose most distinctive features have not been properly understood. She explores the rich moral psychology in Kant's later and less widely read works on ethics, and argues that the key to understanding his account of virtue is the concept of autocracy, a form of moral self-government in which reason rules over sensibility. Although certain aspects of Kant's theory bear comparison to more familiar Aristotelian (...) claims about virtue, Baxley contends that its most important aspects combine to produce something different - a distinctively modern, egalitarian conception of virtue which is an important and overlooked alternative to the more traditional Greek views which have dominated contemporary virtue ethics. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I argue that contemporary interpretive work on Kant's philosophy of geometry has failed to understand properly the diagrammatic aspects of Euclidean reasoning. Attention to these aspects is amply repaid, not only because it provides substantial insight into the role of intuition in Kant's philosophy of mathematics, but also because it brings out both the force and the limitations of Kant's philosophical account of geometry. ;Kant characterizes the predecessors with which he was engaged (...) as agreeing that mathematical judgments are analytic a priori. This is an inadequate account of geometrical judgments for Kant, because it cannot be reconciled with the evident success of the Euclidean practice in producing a priori knowledge of the nature of space. The ubiquitous presence of diagrams in Euclidean proofs suggests that, at least in Kant's time, any plausible account of the establishment of geometrical judgments must provide for the role of quasi-perceptual representations of individuals. Kant's claim that mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori reflects, in its positive aspect, his recognition of the importance of these 'intuitive' representations to Euclidean reasoning. Furthermore, Kant's doctrine that geometrical knowledge is established by the construction of concepts in intuition can be usefully understood as an attempt to accommodate the role of diagrams in the establishment of synthetic a priori geometrical judgments. ;Both Kant's rejection of the analytic a priori account of mathematics and his positive account of geometry depend on the plausibility of his appeals to Euclidean practice. Attention to the role of diagrams in Euclidean proof supports Kant's contention that intuitive representations are an essential component of Euclidean reasoning; however, the role of diagrams in both reductio proofs and in proofs by cases brings out tensions in Kant's positive account. The use of diagrams to represent impossible geometrical situations in reductio proofs indicates that Kant's notion of 'construction in intuition' can have a broader application than the construction of instances of geometrical concepts . Similarly, proofs by cases undermine Kant's attempts to explain the generality of judgments established through the consideration of individuals by appeal to the rules for the construction of those individuals. ;Contemporary interpretive debates about Kant's philosophy of geometry have centered on the philosophical role played by his appeal to intuition. This appeal cannot be primarily understood as an attempt to establish that the fundamental assumptions of Euclidean geometry are necessary truths about space. Nor can the role for intuition be regarded as merely licensing moves in geometrical proofs like an inference rule in modern logic. Instead, by understanding Kant's appeal to intuition as, at least in part, an attempt to accommodate the diagrammatic features of Euclidean reasoning, a much richer role for intuition is revealed. Intuition is required to play a logical role by expressing spatial relationships and establishing the existence of geometrical entities. In addition, it plays a quasi-perceptual role by supporting the truth of certain claims appealed to during the course of Euclidean proof. (shrink)

Hinging on a metaphysical examination of the concept of newness and Paul Guyer’s notion of the temporally extended self, this article analyzes what it means that we are a temporally extended being that is fashioned in time, which is none other than a transcendental object = newness, and argues that (fashioned) bodies can be things in themselves and mere phenomena simultaneously. Kant’s doctrine of self-positing assists us in decoding how the subject obtains an embodied experience while a thing in itself, (...) as well as how both a non-empirical affection and an empirical affection are at play, casually affecting the subject. By looking into how double affection is in operation, this article aims to broaden our understanding of Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. (shrink)

This book offers an account of Kant's theory of moral motivation that comprehends the most challenging and controversial aspects of Kant's theory of the will and human moral motivational psychology. It argues for a new approach to the question about the purity of the Kantian moral motive.

An Essay on Kant’s Theory of Evil shows the centrality of the doctrine of radical evil within Kant's critical philosophy. Combining textual accuracy with systematic ethical theory, it fills the gaps Kant left open in his own doctrine, and provides a non-mystifying account of human immorality, which shows the pertinence of the Kantian view to our moral concerns.

First published in 1962. Kant’s philosophical works, and especially the _Critique of Pure Reason_, have had some influence on recent British philosophy. But the complexities of Kant’s arguments, and the unfamiliarity of his vocabulary, inhibit understanding of his point of view. In _Kant’s Theory of Knowledge _an attempt is made to relate Kant’s arguments in the _Critique of Pure Reason _to contemporary issues by expressing them in a more modern idiom. The selection of issues discussed is intended to present (...) a continuous argument, of an epistemological kind, which runs centrally through the _Critique_. The argument deals with essentially with the problems, raised in the Transcendental Analytic, about the status of categories. It deals with certain preliminary assumptions made in setting these problems, and discusses the way in which the various sections of the Analytic contribute to their solution. It also deals with Kant’s criticisms of traditional metaphysics, and ends with an account of his effort in the Third Antinomy to resolve the conflict between freedom and causality, and so to effect a transition of knowledge to moral philosophy. (shrink)