Much of the scholarship on Kant’s theory of concept formation has focused on the question of whether his theory suffers from circularity, i. e., whether it presupposes the very concepts whose origin it should explain. In this article, I defend Kant against a well-known objection raised by Hannah Ginsborg. Ginsborg, I argue, overlooks the relatively narrow aim of Kant’s theory of concept formation. Kant explicitly frames it as an account of a concept’s inherent generality, or form. However, Ginsborg’s objection is (...) not about a concept’s form; it concerns the concept’s content. Moreover, Kant addresses the issue that she raises in his theory of definitions, which explains how a concept’s content can be revised and perfected. Kant considered all empirical concepts to be incomplete and imprecise. For this reason, he denied that they can be properly defined. Kant also did not regard the content of empirical concepts as fixed or permanent. Indeed, he expected that we would continually expand and revise their content on the basis of experience. I argue that these facts, along with the narrow scope of Kant’s theory of concept formation, effectively defuse Ginsborg’s objection. (shrink)

This article has two aims. First, I offer a philological analysis of a key passage from Kant’s Logic: § 6. § 6 is widely regarded as the locus classicus for Kant’s theory of concept formation. However, I show that the part of this section that is most cited and discussed by scholars should not be attributed to Kant, as it is not corroborated by any of his Reflexionen. Second, I attempt to identify Jäsche’s source for this unsupported passage. Ultimately, I (...) conclude that the unsupported passage in § 6 was based on a set of student notes that was similar to the Wiener and Warschauer logic notebooks. However, I also argue that it would be a mistake to regard this passage as the final or definitive statement of Kant’s views about concept formation. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 105 Heft: 3 Seiten: 394-405.