We only regard a system or a process as being “scientific” if it displays the three predominant characteristics of the natural sciences: predictability, repeatability and quantifiability. This by definition precludes intuition, subjective judgement, tacit knowledge, heuristics, dreams, etc. in other words, those attributes which are peculiarly human. Furthermore, this is resulting in a shift from judgment to calculation giving rise, in some cases, to an abject dependency on the machine and an inability to disagree with the outcome or (...) even question it. To tolerate such a situation could be seen as an abdication of professional responsibility. In complex technological and scientific environments, it is sometimes said that those who make best use of computers already know what the answer is (in ball park terms) before the calculation. (shrink)

This paper is about the opposite of judgement and calculation. This opposition has been a traditional anchor of critiques concerned with the rise of AI decision making over human judgement. Contrary to these approaches, it is argued that human judgement is not and cannot be replaced by calculation, but that it is human judgement that contextualises computational structures and gives them meaning and purpose. The article focuses on the epistemic structure of algorithms and artificial neural networks to find (...) that they always depend on human judgement to be related to real life objects or purposes. By introducing the philosophical concept of judgement, it becomes clear that the property of judgement to provide meaning and purposiveness is based on the temporality of human life and the ambiguity of language, which quantitative processes lack. A juxtaposition shows that calculations and clustering can be used and referred to in more or less prejudiced and reflecting as well as opaque and transparent ways, but thereby always depend on human judgement. The paper clearly asserts that the transparency of AI is necessary for their autonomous use. This transparency requires the explicitness of the judgements that constitute these computational structures, thereby creating an awareness of the conditionality of such epistemic entities. (shrink)

Recent research on moral decision-making has suggested that many common moral judgments are based on immediate intuitions. However, some individuals arrive at highly counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions about when it is permissible to harm other individuals. Such utilitarian judgments have been attributed to effortful reasoning that has overcome our natural emotional aversion to harming others. Recent studies, however, suggest that such utilitarian judgments might also result from a decreased aversion to harming others, due to a deficit in empathic concern and social (...) emotion. The present study investigated the neural basis of such indifference to harming using functional neuroimaging during engagement in moral dilemmas. A tendency to counterintuitive utilitarian judgment was associated both with ‘psychoticism’, a trait associated with a lack of empathic concern and antisocial tendencies, and with ‘need for cognition’, a trait reflecting preference for effortful cognition. Importantly, only psychoticism was also negatively correlated with activation in the subgenual cingulate cortex (SCC), a brain area implicated in empathic concern and social emotions such as guilt, during counterintuitive utilitarian judgments. Our findings suggest that when individuals reach highly counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions, this need not reflect greater engagement in explicit moral deliberation. It may rather reflect a lack of empathic concern, and diminished aversion to harming others. (shrink)

What does it mean to ‘calculate’—today? The pause introduced by the dash in this question marks the inescapable necessity of historicizing the problem of calculation. In his provocative essay, ‘Toward a Critique of the Ineffectual: Heidegger’s Reading of Aristotle and the Construction of an Action without Ends’, Dimitris Vardoulakis proposes a philosophical and political programme in order to counter the negative effects of ‘Heidegger’s mistake’ (the conflation of causality and instrumentality through a mistranslation of Aristotle) that has led to (...) the theoretical fetishization of the ‘ineffectual’ (action without ends) in continental philosophy. In his conclusion, Vardoulakis advocates for a return to a politics and ethics of practical judgment that avoids the twin pitfalls of asserting either the impossibility or the absolute possibility of calculation. As he puts it, we need to acknowledge today ‘the exigency to calculate in the face of the provisional ends of instrumentality, or to perform the judgment that the Greeks called phronesis’ [2022: 244]. This is why we should keep in mind that Heidegger’s critique of technology in the 1950s was articulated in the context of the early Cold War, atomic warfare, and the rise of cybernetics. But, as many have recently argued, in the age of so-called ‘Big Data’, neoliberal rationality has increasingly replaced the epistemology of ‘causality’ with epistemologies of ‘correlation’: the algorithmic calculation of probabilistic relations between clusters of variables (based on information harvested by digital technologies designed for the total surveillance of human life). As Chris Anderson notoriously announced in his 2008 editorial, ‘The End of Theory’, ‘correlation supersedes causation, and science can advance even without coherent models, unified theories, or really any mechanistic explanation at all’. He calls this epistemology ‘dimensionally agnostic statistics’ (the amount of data available can no longer be visualized in its totality). This worldview, however, functions as a basic attack on one of the fundamental (and still often repeated) ground-truths of modern science: correlation is not causation. As Anderson puts it: ‘There is now a better way. Petabytes allow us to say: “Correlation is enough”’. In other words, the stakes of Vardoulakis’s argument must be tested against the rise of this neoliberal elimination of causality from corporate epistemologies that has led to an inversion of the terms of the Heideggerian critique of technology: as it turns out, technology has produced an ideology of pure instrumentality without causation. Today, there are only ends without causes. (shrink)

This paper explores how calculative cultures shape perceptions of models and practices of model use in the financial industry. A calculative culture comprises a specific set of practices and norms concerning data and model use in an organizational setting. Drawing on interviews with model users working in algorithmic securities trading, I argue that the introduction of complex machine-learning models changes the dynamics in calculative cultures, which leads to a displacement of human judgment in quantitative finance. In this paper, I (...) distinguish between three calculative cultures: an idealistic culture of undivided trust in models, a pragmatic culture of skepticism toward model accuracy, and a pragmatic idealist culture of early stage skepticism and implementation and production-phase idealism. Based on the empirical material, the analysis engages with examples of each of the three calculative cultures. The study contributes to the social studies of finance and science and technology studies more broadly by showing how perceptions of models shape and are shaped through model work in data-intensive, computerized finance. (shrink)

A traditional idea is that moral judgment involves more than calculating the consequences of actions; it also requires an assessment of the agent's intentions, the act's nature, and whether the agent uses another person as a means to her ends. I survey experimental developments suggesting that ordinary people often tacitly reason in terms of such deontological rules. It's now unclear whether we should posit a traditional form of the doctrine of double effect. However, further research suggests that a range (...) of non-consequentialist factors influence moral judgment, including intentions, commissions, personal harm, and agent-centered commitments. Many, if not all, such factors appear to affect how involved the agent is in bringing about an outcome. (shrink)

In this article, two separate aspects of Mises’ famous economic calculation argument are identified. The first concerns the fact that the profit-and-loss calculations that drive economic decisions regarding factors of production under capitalism cannot, by definition, take place under socialism since there cannot be any prices on which to base such calculations. The second concerns that idea that, owing to the nature of value, there is no alternative means of allocation, such as a calculus in terms of value. Although (...) both of these points are well-known and frequently invoked to pass a decisive judgment against socialism, they are in fact separate arguments which have thus far been inadequately distinguished in the Austrian literature. The objective of this paper is to highlight this distinction. I further illustrate the point by emphasizing the role of monetary calculation, which nonetheless plays a real role in capitalist economies. (shrink)

How do people come to opposite causal judgments about societal problems, such as whether a public health policy reduced COVID‐19 cases? The current research tests an understudied cognitive mechanism in which people may agree about what actually happened (e.g., that a public health policy was implemented and COVID‐19 cases declined), but can be made to disagree about the counterfactual, or what would have happened otherwise (e.g., whether COVID‐19 cases would have declined naturally without intervention) via comparison cases. Across two preregistered (...) studies (total N = 480), participants reasoned about the implementation of a public policy that was followed by an immediate decline in novel virus cases. Study 1 shows that people's judgments about the causal impact of the policy could be pushed in opposite directions by emphasizing comparison cases that imply different counterfactual outcomes. Study 2 finds that people recognize they can use such information to influence others. Specifically, in service of persuading others to support or reject a public health policy, people systematically showed comparison cases implying the counterfactual outcome that aligned with their position. These findings were robust across samples of U.S. college students and politically and socioeconomically diverse U.S. adults. Together, these studies suggest that implied counterfactuals are a powerful tool that individuals can use to manufacture others’ causal judgments and warrant further investigation as a mechanism contributing to belief polarization. (shrink)

Will existing forms of artificial intelligence (AI) lead to genuine intelligence? How is AI changing our society and politics? This essay examines the answers to these questions in Brian Cantwell Smith's The Promise of Artificial Intelligence and Mark Coeckelbergh's The Political Philosophy of AI with a focus on their central concern with judgment—whether AI can possess judgment and how developments in AI are affecting human judgment. First, I argue that the existentialist conception of judgment that Smith (...) defends is highly idealized. While it may be an appropriate standard for intelligence, its implications for when and how AI should be deployed are not as clear as Smith suggests. Second, I point out that the concern with the displacement of judgment in favor of “reckoning” (or calculation) predates the rise of AI. The meaning and implications of this trend will become clearer if we move beyond ontology and metaphysics and into political philosophy, situating technological changes in their social context. Finally, I suggest that Coeckelbergh's distinctly political conception of judgment might offer a solution to the important boundary-drawing problem between tasks requiring judgment and those requiring reckoning, thus filling a gap in Smith's argument and clarifying its political stakes. (shrink)

Consumers are prone to cognitive biases in decision-making due to the impact of time restrictions, specific environment, and project inducements in the process of experience. Compared with traditional marketing scenarios, it is easy to bias decision makers due to the existence of anchor information. Research on anchoring effect focuses on psychology, economics, law, and medicine instead of the price judgment of consumers. This article uses experimental research to explore the existence and influencing factors of anchoring effect when consumers judge (...) and estimate the price of a product in experiencing scenes. In this article, the hypothesis is that anchoring effect exists and is influenced by factors including anchor value, gender, emotion, personality, knowledge and skill, time pressure, early warning indication, cognitive need, and self-confidence level under external and internal anchor conditions. Subjects judged and estimated different prices after product experience through the design of different decision-making scenarios of external and internal anchors, and finally, the anchoring index and the mean skew index were used to calculate the anchoring effect. The experimental results showed that consumers were affected by anchoring effect when making price judgment in experiencing scenes. In addition to the factors of time pressure and self-confidence level, gender, personality, knowledge, and skill all had a significant influence on anchoring effect under external anchor conditions. Finally, this article provides advice for enterprise marketing planners including setting reasonable anchor values, highlighting the design of experiencing scenes, and developing differentiation strategies. (shrink)

ArgumentTalk of “reason” and “rationality” has been perennial in the philosophy and sciences of the European, Latin tradition since antiquity. But the use of these terms in the early-modern period has left especial marks on the specialties and disciplines that emerged as components of “science” in the modern world. By examining discussions by seventeenth-century philosophers, including natural philosophers such as Descartes, Pascal, and Hobbes, the practical meanings of, specifically, inferential reasoning can be seen as reducing, for most, to intellectual processes (...) deriving from foundations that required intuitional insight that was owing to God. Mechanical reasoning, or artificial intelligence, was a contradiction in terms for such as Pascal, whose views of his own arithmetical machine illustrate the issue well. Hobbes’ analysis of reason, however, replaced the ineffable authority of God with the authority of the civil power, to reveal the social reality of “reason” as nothing other than authorized judgment. (shrink)

This paper interprets Knight’s views of the firm from the standpoint of his theory of human agency. Focusing on the coordination perspective, this paper argues that Knightian firms are institutions which deal with intersubjective uncertainty. The fundamental principle underlying an organized activity is the reduction of the uncertainty inherent in judgements and decisions by grouping the decisions of a particular individual and estimating the proportion of successes and failures. Coordinating activities by the use of the firm, shift focus and interest (...) from errors in human agents’ opinions of things to errors in their opinions of other people. By routinizing some judgements in the form of wage payments, firms allow the coordination of the interests of various parties and thus reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, entrepreneurs conduct economic calculation and bet their judgements on the value of the factors of production they employ. Correct entrepreneurial judgement is the ultimate source of profit. This paper calls for a research agenda on the theory of the firm to incorporate Knight’s insights.Cet article interprète la vision knightienne de la firme du point de vue de sa théorie de l’agent humain. En s’intéressant principalement à l’enjeu de la coordination, cet article soutient que les entreprises sont, selon Knight, des institutions qui “agissent” en incertitude intersubjective. Le principe fondamental qui sous-tend une activité organisée est la réduction de l’incertitude inhérent aux jugements et décisions par le regroupement des décisions d’un individu et l’estimation des proportions de succès et d’échecs. Les activités de coordination par le biais de l’entreprise, déplacent le sujet d’étude et l’intérêt des erreurs dans les opinions qu’ont les agents humains à propos des choses vers leurs erreurs d’opinion sur les autres personnes. En rendant routiniers les jugements par la pratique de paiements de salaires, les firmes permettent la coordination des intérêts de parties variées et réduisent ainsi l’incertitude. De plus, les entrepreneurs procèdent à des calculs économiques et fondent leurs jugements sur la valeur des facteurs de production qu’ils emploient. Le jugement entrepreneurial correct est l’ultime source de profit. Cet article plaide en faveur d’un programme de recherche en théorie de l’entreprise qui incorpore les perspectives ouvertes par Knight. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the interpretation of quantity expressions in Yudja, an indigenous language spoken in the Amazonian basin, showing that while the language allows reference to exact cardinalities, it does not generally allow reference to exact measure values. It does, however, allow non-exact comparison along continuous dimensions. We use this data to argue that the grammar of exact measurement is distinct from a grammar allowing the expression of exact cardinalities, and that the grammar of counting and the grammar (...) of measurement may use numerals with different, though related interpretations. As Yudja shows, the language of measurement is not automatically acquired along with the knowledge of exact numeral expressions. We show that the ‘gap’ between prelinguistic intuitions about quantity in terms of numerosity and counting, which is bridged by the learning of language expressing exact cardinality, is paralleled by a similar gap between prelinguistic intuitions about quantity on a continuous dimension and measuring: this gap too must be bridged by language which expresses exact measure values. Our results suggest that the enculturation process by which we develop skills to perform abstract operations in the domain of measurement is (1) language dependent and (2) distinct from the process by which we learn to perform abstract calculations in the cardinal domain. (shrink)

As a response to Le Fils, a film directed by the Dardenne brothers (), we explore the idea of speaking as an invitation and juxtapose it against ideas of speaking as a transactional, calculative, calibrated, activity. Speaking tends to be understood as a relatively straightforward matter: as a means of communication structured by such values as the reciprocal balancing of rights and obligations, of clear communication of information, of the gaining of insight into what is happening. Speaking, then, is a (...) means by which we explain, prove or pass judgement on something. Understood this way, it is easily associated with ideas of empowerment or of the mediation of information: one directs or commits oneself to a (shared) orientation—for example to what Jürgen Habermas refers to as ‘communicative reason’. It presupposes a particular attitude of the subject; speaking that addresses the listener and the speaker herself in the name of an orientation or particular expertise to which access is claimed. In this article, by contrast, we would like to explore a different avenue of thought whereby speaking appears rather as an abandoning or exposing of oneself. It is less an activity than a passivity or passion, through which one becomes present in the present, which is at once also a kind of invitation. In exploring this form of speaking, we take up some ideas of Martin Buber. Our discussion relates speaking to being inspiring and being inspired, revealing in the process the way that to be inspiring is at the same time to be inspired. Speaking as invitation, we conclude, is what education is about. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) technology has brought new opportunities and challenges to the judicial field, which dramatically improves judicial efficiency and may even change the judiciary's way. The concept of judicial justice in the information age has a natural affinity with artificial intelligence. As artificial intelligence continues to make breakthroughs in judicial data sorting and deep learning knowledge, judicial artificial intelligence has gradually become a reality. Artificial intelligence can conduct legal argumentation, interpret calculation results, human–computer collaboration, and judicial judgment. (...) At the same time, the development of artificial intelligence technology also has potential risks, such as algorithm black boxes, algorithm discrimination, etc., to help judges achieve judicial justice, the value of judicial justice should be pursued to the limit of its judicial application. Therefore, artificial intelligence justice should be constrained by social relations, legal rationality, and code operation. (shrink)

Publishers love titles that begin How or Why. Better still, How and Why, combining edification with utility. The target group is that overlap between the self-help audience and the idly curious—which is to say, most of us. And since emotions are very much about self-help and self-harm, they offer rich pickings in a burgeoning market. Flanagan's How to Do things with Emotions is a philosopher's take on moral emotions, the allusion to J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words (...) chiming with the self-help milieu. Reviewing cases, Flanagan points out that most scientific work in this field derives from experiments on psychology students, about as unrepresentative a slice of humanity as you could find. For Flanagan, they are too WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) to tell us much about the non-weird majority. To learn to “do emotions better,” he argues, we have to look farther afield. Although the emotional lives of cultural others are surely different from those taking Psychology 101, at some functional level they might be similar. Work out the conceptual logic and practical rationale of culturally elaborated emotions—Minangkabau “shame,” Ifaluk “righteous anger,” American “road rage”—and there is scope for comparison. Indeed, anthropology has shown as much, and it is from anthropology that Flanagan takes his cues. To mention two famous cases, what can we learn about anger management from Utku igloo-dwellers and Ilongot headhunters? Mutually dependent for survival in their snowy isolation, the Utku cannot risk getting angry. (They mercilessly tease their children into learning the futility of anger.) In the jungles of Luzon, Ilongot youths cast away their anger in externally directed violence: headhunting as cathartic sport. We can think of parallels closer to home.Flanagan's vigorously argued book, a tour de force of its kind, is both an anatomizing of anger and shame—two moral emotions we tend to “do badly”—and a proposal to “change how we do these emotions.” Indignation is fine, but anger that is vengeful or “pain-passing,” rather than righteous, is irrational and socially harmful. Shame can be incapacitating and cruel (the undeserved burn of a Twitter pile-on). What we need is reflective anger directed at injustice and a “mature sense of shame” that reminds us of the social contract and stops us misbehaving.In its How-and-Why format, the book combines theory and practice, metaethics with moralism. Here is how a prof should do self-help. But if the diagnosis is well made, the remedy is hard to imagine. As Flanagan recognizes, moral sentiments and practices are embedded in intricate forms of life and not readily detachable. Anger Utku-style is not a transferable skill, nor are educative routines forged in social ecologies remote from our own. Lacking serviceable models, Flanagan falls back on the anthropological justification that knowledge of cultural diversity expands our sense of human possibility, of other roads taken. In a globalizing world, difference is its own reward. For me, an anthropologist, that maxim is enough. Yet difference bedevils comparison, jinxing the units, warping criteria. Most languages lack a word for emotion or an equivalent umbrella concept; nor do emotion words translate well across languages. Emotion may be an incoherent notion, or at best a heuristic.Flanagan's use of the WEIRD tag makes things a bit too easy. Does it cover farmhands and factory workers? Are we so democratic, anyway? More damagingly, a typological approach blurs the circumstances of family, community, and biography that define an emotional episode and shape its phenomenology, the way it is felt and experienced—what a violent outburst or fearful exit means in the context of a life. Take Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim, who flees a scene of failure and derails his life. It requires a long narrative to unravel the implications of his jumping ship and the paralyzing shame he experiences before the judgment of society. Or consider the scene in Anna Karenina in which the dignified and self-important Karenin, apprised of Anna's adulterous liaison, agonizes over the threat to his existence. To call his response jealousy would not scratch the surface. Characteristically for Tolstoy, the emotions go unnamed. Instead, we witness Karenin's fervid deliberations (emotions involve thoughts), vacillations (emotions have action tendencies), anguished calculations of impending scandal (emotions are appraisals), and bodily changes (emotions are cognized feelings). We shudder at the brutal metaphors through which he grasps his predicament and its cure: like rooting out a bad tooth, he decides. That welter of particularities escapes the theorist who needs clear-cut, comparable units, formulaic instances of jealousy or anger. But what are you left with if you omit the details? What would remain of Karenin's existential crisis?The novelist's privileged access to subjectivity is, of course, unavailable to the scientist, but the larger context of plot and character—a history of relations that gives emotional episodes their shape and power—has its analog in the ethnographic domain. Emotions are public as well as private events, their meanings and effects depending on a fit with social reality, a clash of perspectives. In thought and feeling, we are never really alone. All of which suggests that narrative, fictional or nonfictional, can capture the ongoing moment in a way that eludes other methods. If what we are after is living emotion, it is the movie, not the snapshot, that surely matters. No point in comparing “emotions” no one ever really experienced outside of an experiment.But there's the rub. In generalization—the goal of emotion theory—an emotion's social meaning, personal significance, pragmatic function, and narrative context get stripped out. All that makes it what it is! Even in doggedly empirical anthropology, detailed emotional episodes are rare (Jean Briggs's Utku ethnography Never in Anger, published in 1970, is still unsurpassed). Instead we get recollections and summary examples, lacking the constitutive detail, real-time evolutions, and consequences of the real thing. Yet these must serve for comparison, fodder for countless theoretical speculations. Are we at risk of analyzing faux emotions and building theories on cardboard constructions?An empty Arctic stage, a handful of characters, life simplified to survival: Briggs is a hard act to follow. Bare life does not make for basic emotions. On the white set, emotions prove hard to parse. That gruff hesitation, that flashing glint—are they tokens of anger? Empathy will not suffice. As Briggs shows, narrative context is all. And in our more cluttered emotional worlds, the value of backstory, interwoven biographies, and emotional plots is all the greater. Flanagan is right; we must do emotions better. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:To Bear Man's Greatness:On the Moral-Theological Message of a Recent Document of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Samaritanus Bonus1Andrzej KucinskiBackground and ObjectiveWhen, in 1582, Camillus de Lellis, the later-canonized founder of the Order of Camillians, the "servants of the sick," had the inspiration to found a society of men who would serve the sick for religious motives,2 the revolutionary nature of such a decision was clear. (...) An unprecedented hope broke into the world of the hopelessly marginalized, who did not have sufficient means to be cared for at home, and therefore had to go to hospitals, where they were often assisted only by untrained caregivers, who did so under obligation because they were either criminals or compelled by economic need to perform such menial service. This hope consisted in the message that the love of God urges the voluntary and sacrificial service of dedication to the sick, and especially to those who will not recover from their illness. However, this service should be holistic, because the welfare of the needy encompasses all the dimensions of the human person: the body and the soul, but also the spirit.The letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) Samaritanus Bonus, dated July 14, 2020—the liturgical day of commemoration of Camillus of Lellis—on the care of persons in the critical and [End Page 753] terminal phases of life, seeks to promote the same concern for comprehensive service to the sick out of respect for the divinely anchored dignity of the human person. The letter suggests that it is this dignity, and therefore the incomparable greatness of each human being, that makes it necessary, contrary to any logic of efficiency and a cost–benefit calculation, to persevere at the side of the (terminally) ill until their natural death.This article aims to highlight some (in the author's opinion) central elements of this letter, and to comment on them specifically against the background of the magisterial positions underlying the document. For this purpose, I will often quote Robert Spaemann, the German philosopher who died in 2018 and whose ethical views appear in parts as well suited to illuminate from the ethical point of view the foundations of thought of the universal Church magisterium with regard to the relevant topics and to prepare these foundations for a scientific discussion. However, it is explicitly not the aim here to engage in such a discussion or to analyze the already existing relevant contributions. Rather, it is to deepen the current Church teaching in certain aspects on the basis of this new document. In this sense, contributions from the press conference on its presentation on September 22, 2020, will also be drawn upon. After the exploration of what one could understand as "core" of the letter according to a certain reading of the document, some concretizations follow under the guiding perspective of the "Catholic" approach to the terminally ill.The Core of the DocumentThe structure of Samaritanus Bonus will be briefly described: An introduction, in which above all the need for magisterial intervention is justified, is followed by chapter 1, on the comprehensive character of the care which is always possible for persons in critical states, according to the principle that "the judgement that an illness is incurable cannot mean that care has come at an end" (8).3 Chapter 2 then further explicates the grounds of Christian hope in the face of approaching death, starting from the mystery of the Crucified, with special reference to those who stay around him at the moment of the Passion. Chapter 3 recalls the positive meaning of human life as an expression of inalienable human dignity and as the source of certain imperatives in dealing with it. A clear reference to the proclamation [End Page 754] of Pope Francis is made in chapter 4, which explains some "cultural obstacles" to the recognition of the "sacred value of every human life." Finally, chapter 5 (the longest) addresses individual bioethical, medical-ethical, legal, pastoral, and educational issues related to care at critical stages of life.In substance, the doctrine set forth in the new document... (shrink)

Several influential organisations have attempted to quantify the costs and benefits of expanding access to interventions-like contraceptives-that are expected to decrease the number of pregnancies. Such health economic evaluations can be invaluable to those making decisions about how to allocate scarce resources for health. Yet how the benefits should be measured depends on controversial value judgments. One such value judgment is found in recent analyses from the Disease Control Priority Network (DCPN) and the Study Group for the Global Investment (...) Framework for Women's and Children's Health. Noting the decrease in the number of pregnancies expected to result from providing access to family planning, DCPN and the Study Group claim that a substantial benefit of such interventions is averting the stillbirths and child deaths that would have resulted from those pregnancies. We argue that health economic analyses should not count such averted deaths as benefits in the same way as saved lives. First, by counting averted stillbirths and child deaths as a benefit but not counting as a cost the lives of babies who survive, DCPN and the Study Group implicitly commit themselves to antinatalism. Second, this method for calculating the benefits of family planning interventions implies that infertility treatments are harmful. Determining how potential people should be treated in health economic analyses will require grappling with population ethics. (shrink)

Several influential organisations have attempted to quantify the costs and benefits of expanding access to interventions—like contraceptives—that are expected to decrease the number of pregnancies. Such health economic evaluations can be invaluable to those making decisions about how to allocate scarce resources for health. Yet how the benefits should be measured depends on controversial value judgments. One such value judgment is found in recent analyses from the Disease Control Priority Network (DCPN) and the Study Group for the Global Investment (...) Framework for Women’s and Children’s Health. Noting the decrease in the number of pregnancies expected to result from providing access to family planning, DCPN and the Study Group claim that a substantial benefit of such interventions is averting the stillbirths and child deaths that would have resulted from those pregnancies. We argue that health economic analyses should not count such averted deaths as benefits in the same way as saved lives. First, by counting averted stillbirths and child deaths as a benefit but not counting as a cost the lives of babies who survive, DCPN and the Study Group implicitly commit themselves to antinatalism. Second, this method for calculating the benefits of family planning interventions implies that infertility treatments are harmful. Determining how potential people should be treated in health economic analyses will require grappling with population ethics. (shrink)

Every artificial-intelligence research project needs a working definition of "intelligence", on which the deepest goals and assumptions of the research are based. In the project described in the following chapters, "intelligence" is defined as the capacity to adapt under insufficient knowledge and resources. Concretely, an intelligent system should be finite and open, and should work in real time. ;If these criteria are used in the design of a reasoning system, the result is NARS, a non-axiomatic reasoning system. ;NARS uses a (...) term-oriented formal language, characterized by the use of subject-predicate sentences. The language has an experience-grounded semantics, according to which the truth value of a judgment is determined by previous experience, and the meaning of a term is determined by its relations with other terms. Several different types of uncertainty, such as randomness, fuzziness, and ignorance, can be represented in the language in a single way. ;The inference rules of NARS are based on three inheritance relations between terms. With different combinations of premises, revision, deduction, induction, abduction, exemplification, comparison, and analogy can all be carried out in a uniform format, the major difference between these types of inference being that different functions are used to calculate the truth value of the conclusion from the truth values of the premises. ;Since it has insufficient space-time resources, the system needs to distribute them among its tasks very carefully, and to dynamically adjust the distribution as the situation changes. This leads to a "controlled concurrency" control mechanism, and a "bag-based" memory organization. ;A recent implementation of the NARS model, with examples, is discussed. The system has many interesting properties that are shared by human cognition, but are absent from conventional computational models of reasoning. ;This research sheds light on several notions in artificial intelligence and cognitive science, including symbol-grounding, induction, categorization, logic, and computation. These are discussed to show the implications of the new theory of intelligence. ;Finally, the major results of the research are summarized, a preliminary evaluation of the working definition of intelligence is given, and the limitations and future extensions of the research are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to question the Joshua Greene’s neuroethical thesis about the essentially emotional character of so-called “deontological moral judgments”. Frist, I focus on the dual process theory of moral judgment and I criticize that they are considered only and mainly intuitive and non reflective. Se condly, I question that the “utilitarian judgment” is linked to mathematical calculation and the deontological judgment is exclusively reduced to non-reflective factor of emotion. The main objection to Greene’s (...) naturalism raised by me is trying to eliminate the philosophical justification about the moral validity defended by Kant’s deontologism; meanwhile Greene reduces “deontological moral judgment” to exclusively psychological and neurophysiological factors associated with emotion. (shrink)

We will flip a fair coin infinitely many times. Al calls the first flip, claiming it will land heads. Betty calls every odd numbered flip, claiming they will all land heads. Carl calls every flip bar none, claiming they will all land heads. Pre-theoretically, it seems that Al's claim is infinitely more likely than Betty's, and that Betty's claim is infinitely more likely than Carl's. But standard, real-valued probability theory says that, while Al's claim is infinitely more likely than Betty's, (...) Betty's claim is exactly as likely as Carl's. I use John Conway's surreal numbers to capture these pre-theoretic judgements about the relative probabilities of Al's, Betty's, and Carl's claims. Surreal-valued probabilities also allow us to calculate precise numerical values for those claims. For instance, we will see that Betty's claim has a probability equal to the reciprocal of the product of the square root of cardinality of the continuum and the fourth root of 2. The article provides a 'user's guide' to surreal-valued probabilities and raises questions for further research. (shrink)

Arguably, emotions figure prominently in contemporary philosophy, not only in the fields of aesthetics and philosophy of religion, but also in the study of morality and cognition. Expressions like “emotional intelligence” are now commonly used and there is even talk of an affective turn in the cognitive sciences. Twentieth-century philosophers paved the way with conceptual creations like “poietic thinking” (dichtende Denken), “sentient intelligence” (inteligencia sentiente) or “poetic reason” (razón poética). It is also widely acknowledged that our apparently rational thoughts, calculations (...) and decisions are inextricably intertwined with our emotions, which even alter our mental judgement without making us aware of it. Thus, the clear contrast between reason and feelings―as separate and mutually exclusive―that runs through much of Western philosophical thought seems to be fading away. We could ask ourselves whether this has been the case in other philosophical traditions, or whether, far from it, this contrast has led them to privilege the rational over the affective. Moreover, in valuing these other traditions as philosophical, it is also worth considering the extent to which this opposition remains valid, perhaps behind the scenes. (shrink)

Quantum cognition is a new theoretical framework for constructing cognitive models based on the mathematical principles of quantum theory. Due to its increasing empirical success, one wonders what it tells us about the underlying process of cognition. Does it imply that we have quantum minds and there is some sort of quantum structure in the brain? In this paper, I address this important issue by using a new result in the research of quantum foundations. Based on the PBR theorem about (...) the reality of the wave function, I show, given certain assumptions, that the wave function assigned to a cognitive system such as our brain, which is used to calculate probabilities of thoughts/judgment outcomes in quantum cognition, is a real representation of the cognitive state of the system, not a mere representation of incomplete knowledge about the state of the system. This result supports a realist interpretation of quantum cognition, according to which the cognitive state of our brain and its dynamics are not classical but quantum in quantum cognition. In short, quantum cognition implies quantum minds. However, this result does not mean that we have quantum minds and our brain is a quantum computer, since quantum cognition by its standard formulation has not been fully confirmed by experiments. The hope is that more crucial experiments can be done in the near future to determine whether or not quantum cognition is real. (shrink)

This article integrates the history of military theory – and the practical history of military campaigns and battles – within the broader history of knowledge. Challenging ideas that the new natural philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the so-called Scientific Revolution) fostered attempts to make warfare mathematically calculated, it builds on work showing that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural philosophy was itself much more subjective than previously thought. It uses the figure of King Frederick II of Prussia (reigned 1740–1786) to (...) link theoretical with practical military knowledge, placing the military treatises read and written by the king alongside the practical example of the Prussian army’s campaign against the Russians in summer 1758 at the height of the Seven Years War (1756–1763), which culminated in the battle of Zorndorf. This article shows that both the theory and practice of war – like other branches of knowledge in the long eighteenth century – were fundamentally shaped by the contemporary search for intellectual order. The inability to achieve this in practice led to a reliance on subjective judgment and individual, local knowledge. Whereas historians have noted attempts in the eighteenth century to calculate probabilities mathematically, this article shows that war continued to be conceived as the domain of fortune, subject to incalculable chance. Answering Steven Shapin’s call to define concretely “the subjective element in knowledge-making,” the examples of Frederick and his subordinate, Lieutenant General Count Christoph zu Dohna, reveal sharply different contemporary ideas about how to respond to uncertainty in war. Whereas Dohna sought to be ready for chance events and react to them, Frederick actively embraced uncertainty and risk-taking, making chance both a rhetorical argument and a positive choice guiding strategy and tactics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Fitness, Fatness, and Aesthetic Judgments of the Female Body:What the AMA Decision to Medicalize Obesity means for other Non–Normal Female BodiesSara R. Jordan“I’ll be happy to refer you to our dietician to get you on a program to help you get your weight under control before it becomes a problem”.As my new physician spun around out of the examination room door, my head spun faster. I had heard the (...) phrase “get your weight under control” twice that morning, but the contexts in which the phrase was uttered could not have been more different.At 7:30 a.m., my fitness trainer was imploring me to get my weights under control as I struggled under a bar, laden with slightly less than my body weight, to do a final set of front squats. At 11:15 a.m., my new general practitioner was imploring me to get my weight under control, by which he meant to learn how to reduce my body mass index (BMI) to match the chart prominently displayed on his office wall. The exhortation to get my weight under control meant such radically different things in these two contexts that it was difficult to comprehend the meaning of the phrase.I am 5’4” and 158 pounds. This gives me a BMI of 27.3, which means that I am considered overweight; right in the middle of the category of overweight. Or, according to the definition of the BMI found on the calculator pinned to the National Heart Lung and Blood Institutes (NHLBI) webpage, I am over fat. If the BMI is, “a measure of body fat based on height and weight that applies to adult men and women” then I carry a health–threatening percentage of body fat. If my fitness trainer, with his 12 point skin–fold caliper test is correct, my body fat percentage of 17% is within the limits expected of female (non–endurance) athletes. In terms of health, then, I am a paradox: according to one standard, I am healthy and fit, according to another, I am unhealthy and fat.As this new physician picked apart my weight, suggesting I should lose between 15 and 20 pounds to bring myself to “full health”, I found myself quite annoyed. He was a small, rail thin, man with greying hair, tired eyes, unpressed khakis, and a beaten pair of black–ish grey “Crocs” on his feet. He looked disheveled and as if he had not seen the inside of a weights room in his life. As I listened to him address my history, current vitals, and how being overweight in my 30s could lead to being [End Page 101] “fat and 40”, I looked him over and made a snap judgment of “I could bench (press) you [right out this window]”. While I was angry with his delivery, I tried to remind myself that he was an overworked physician in a multi–lingual office, trying to operate under a new paradigm in healthcare policy, practice, and diagnostic categories. Specifically, prompted by the medicalization of the condition of obesity by the American Medical Association, my physician was reflecting the professional wisdom that I suffer from a condition needing preventive treatment. He was trying to be a good practitioner to recommend preventive treatment, but to me, he was being a terrible physician.The AMA Declares Obesity a DiseaseThe declaration by the American Medical Association in 2013 that the condition of being obese is one that requires medical treatment is one that I, on the face of it, support. By inviting the medicalization of the condition, the AMA opens the door for individuals who wage a deeply personal battle with their weight to find support in their physicians’ offices and from their insurance companies. Yet, the blunt tools that are used to assess these conditions raise my ire, emotionally and intellectually.Intellectually, the use of the BMI calculator for snap diagnosis of all individuals makes easy sense. It is an easily comprehended tool and, for a normally distributed population, such a simple tool is an excellent choice. But, it stands to treat outliers like me poorly. Outliers, such as particularly fit... (shrink)

This paper is devoted to showing that a safety priority should be accorded the highest priority in decision-making and that such a prioritisation is an ethical responsibility. The connection between a safety-first priority and ethics is that an ultimate concern for safety is an integral feature of respect for human life. This paper exposes the illogic behind the misleading phrase "risky technology" and the fallacies which underlie the seemingly morally neutral phrase "risk assessment". It is argued that human beings ultimately (...) possess the responsibility of the choice to employ one technological system as over another and hence the decision to employ unsafe technology is a case of "risky assessment" rather than "risky technology". The phrase "risky technology" implies that the risk factor is inherent to the technology when the risk factor is inherent to the choice of which technology to employ. Risk assessment has been portrayed as amoral numerical calculation without clarifying the basis of the assessment. It is argued here that risk assessment must include the basis of its figures and that, to be epistemologically sound, the basis should be past engineering performance and not "subjective engineering judgement". To be ethically sound, risk assessment must take into account not only probabilities of occurrence but consequences of occurrence, such as life or death risks to risk takers and all those on whom the risk taken will ultimately make an impact. It is argued that risk takers possess a right to know of the specific risks to which they are exposing themselves and that risk makers possess the corresponding duty to inform risk takers. The Challenger case is utilised as a lesson in unsound and unethical risk assessment. It is also utilised as a case in which the right of the astronauts and civilian passengers to know of the risk they were taking was not respected and the ethical duty to inform the astronauts and civilian passengers of the risk they were taking was not observed. Distinctions are drawn between general and unknown risks of space travel and the specifically foreknown risks of a design deficient O-ring which malfunctioned below specific temperature readings. The belief that progress requires risk taking is exposed as an oversimplification since progress can be made as in the case of the development of commercial air travel without taking reckless risks. Passenger aircraft must meet certain criteria of safety to be operable but this is not an obstacle to progress. The observance of the right to know and the duty to inform is an asset to business. In the case of Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines, the decision to notify the public of bomb threats may have given business a boost since passengers have deduced in absence of such a threat that their flight was a safe one as they trusted these airlines. (shrink)

In Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patiens in is emergency room if it provides for a “screening examination reasonably calculated to identify critical medical conditions” that may be afflicting symptomatic patients and if it “provides that level of screening uniformly to all those who present substantially similar complaints.” The First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment to (...) the hospital in a claim raised under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.Maria del Carmen Guadalupe brought her husband, Narciso Figueroa, to the Hospital Interamericano De Medicina Avanzada, Inc., on October 3, 1998, with symptoms of urinary retention, edema in the legs, high blood pressure, pain, increased respiratory difficulty, a dry cough, fever, and drowsiness. (shrink)

In Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patiens in is emergency room if it provides for a “screening examination reasonably calculated to identify critical medical conditions” that may be afflicting symptomatic patients and if it “provides that level of screening uniformly to all those who present substantially similar complaints.” The First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment to (...) the hospital in a claim raised under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.Maria del Carmen Guadalupe brought her husband, Narciso Figueroa, to the Hospital Interamericano De Medicina Avanzada, Inc., on October 3, 1998, with symptoms of urinary retention, edema in the legs, high blood pressure, pain, increased respiratory difficulty, a dry cough, fever, and drowsiness. (shrink)

Summary The question of rationality and irrationality — conceived as characteristics of human behaviour — can be discussed either in empirical or in transcendental terms. In empirical terms political behaviour is called “irrational” when it is predictably counterproductive, i.e. when the agents are able, but fail to calculate the outcome of their actions. This is a “Machiavellian” concept of rationality and it involves no moral judgement. In transcendental terms rationality or irrationality are measured by standards of the “rational human nature” (...) as defined in Platonic, Kantian or Husserlian manner. These two perspectives are mutually exclusive and irreducible, as they involve philosophical options.RésuméRationalité ou irrationalité — considérées comme des caractéristiques du comportement humain — peuvent ětre discutées soit en termes empiriques, soit en termes transcendentaux. En termes empiriques, une conduite politique est qualifiée d'irrationnelle lorsqu'on peut prévoir qu'elle n'atteindra pas ses buts, c'est‐à‐dire lorsque les agents pourraient calculer l'effet de leurs actions, mais omettent de le faire. Il s'agit là d'un concept “machiavellien” de rationalité, qui n'implique pas de jugement moral. En termes transcendentaux, la rationalité ou l'irrationalité sont mesurées à l'aune de la “nature humaine rationnelle” telle qu'elle a été définie à la manière de Platon, de Kant ou de Husserl. Ces deux perspectives s'excluent mutuellement et sont irréductibles l'une à l'autre, car elles reposent sur des options philosophiques.ZusammenfassungDie Frage der Rationalität und Irrationalität — betrachtet als charakteristische Züge des menschlichen Verhaltens — kann auf entweder empirische oder transzendentale Art diskutiert werden. Empirisch wird politisches Verhalten »irrational« genannt, wenn es voraussagbar unzweckmässig ist, d.h. wenn die Handelnden zwar fähig sind, die Folgen ihrer Handlungen zu berechnen, es aber unterlassen. Das ist ein Machiavellischer Begriff von Rationalität, der kein moralisches Urteil involviert. Im transzendentalen Sinne werden Rationalität oder Irrationalität am Massstab »der rationalen menschlichen Natur« gemessen, wie dieser etwa durch Platon, Kant oder Husserl bestimmt worden ist. Diese zwei Perspektiven schliessen sich gegenseitig aus, da sie auf verschiedenen philosophischen Standpunkten beruhen. (shrink)

Recently, Bonnie Steinbock has argued that there is still not a convincing case to support the legalisation of doctor-assisted suicide.1 The argument is framed in consequentialist terms: rather than contend that there is something intrinsically wrong with mercy killing itself, caution is recommended because of the risk that a system may be open to sufficient abuse to warrant its non-implementation. A welcome criticism is made of partisanship that obstructs useful progress in the debate, which she suggests should be based on (...) objective, empirical evidence on both the need for, and the risks associated with, legalised doctor-assisted suicide.1 The main presumption underlying Professor Steinbock’s argument is that a proportionately large number of people would become vulnerable to great and unacceptable harm under a regime that was not strictly regulated. She asserts certain values, which, on a consequentialist calculation, support her conclusion that currently the case for legalisation is not made.Here I would like to question how useful objective, empirical data can be. Although data that show some assertions to be objectively right or wrong may be obtained and are doubtless valuable, I will show that the debate on assisted suicide is unavoidably partisan and that the protagonists will therefore receive data differently, necessarily because of their moral and philosophical convictions. Steinbock would like the question of legalisation to “turn on objective, empirical evidence about both the need for PAS [physician-assisted suicide] and the risk of mistake and abuse.”1 But to be understood, the concepts of “need” and “abuse” require pre-existing value judgements. Furthermore, even if the values of these concepts are quantifiable, they are probably parts of distinct metrics, so offsetting one against the other will become a matter of qualitative assessment. This does not entirely disvalue the use of objective data, but it means that the …. (shrink)

We explore a computational algebraic approach to grammar via pregroups, that is, partially ordered monoids in which each element has both a left and a right adjoint. Grammatical judgements are formed with the help of calculations on types. These are elements of the free pregroup generated by a partially ordered set of basic types, which are assigned to words, here of English. We concentrate on the object pronoun who(m).

The question of rationality and of its role in human agency has been at the core of pragmatist concerns since the beginning of this movement. While Peirce framed the horizon of a new understanding of human reason through the idea of inquiry as aiming at belief-fixation and James stressed the individualistic drives that move individuals to action, it is in Dewey’s writing that we find the deepest understanding of the naturalistic and normative traits of rationality considered as the qualifying attribute (...) of human agency. Recent developments in moral and political philosophy as well as in general pragmatist scholarship have shown a renewal of interest in the role of human reason in agency, both with respect to control of conduct (decisions about how to act) and with respect to normative attitudes (considerations of what is good and right). In this article I will examine some features of Dewey’s epistemology which are particularly promising for the elaboration of a theory of practical rationality based on pragmatist sources. In particular, I will focus on Dewey’s notion of “judgment of practice” in order to frame a distinctively Deweyan approach to practical rationality. In order to point out the specificity of Dewey’s epistemological framework, I will refer to it as an “epistemology of practice”i. The aim of this article is to clarify the epistemological meaning of the concepts of articulation and transformation, that Dewey places at the heart of his theory of inquiry. Part of my argument consists in showing that through these notions Dewey aimed at broadening the conception of rationality, bringing it beyond the reach of the standard notions of analysis and synthesis and of induction, deduction, and abduction. Once the specificity of Dewey’s conception of rationality will have been demonstrated, I will proceed to show some of its implications in the explanation of the rationality of human agency with reference to practical reasoning and value assessment. I will then conclude the article by drawing some implications of Dewey’s theory of judgment for a broader epistemology based upon the acknowledgment of the primacy of practice. (shrink)

We present a model for studying communities of epistemically interacting agents who update their belief states by averaging the belief states of other agents in the community. The agents in our model have a rich belief state, involving multiple independent issues which are interrelated in such a way that they form a theory of the world. Our main goal is to calculate the probability for an agent to end up in an inconsistent belief state due to updating. To that end, (...) an analytical expression is given and evaluated numerically, both exactly and using statistical sampling. It is shown that, under the assumptions of our model, an agent always has a probability of less than 2% of ending up in an inconsistent belief state. Moreover, this probability can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of independent issues the agents have to judge or by increasing the group size. A real-world situation to which this model applies is a group of experts participating in a Delphi-study. (shrink)

If calculation and judgment are to answer the question Which way?, perfectionist thinking is a response to the way’s being lost.In his thought-provoking exploration of Cavellian perfectionism—which he sees as identical with what Cavell himself prefers to call Emersonian perfectionism—Paul Guyer quotes the following passage from Cities of Words:Emerson’s writing, in demonstrating our lack of given means of making ourselves intelligible (to ourselves, to others), details the difficulties in the way of possessing those means, and demonstrates that they (...) are at hand. This thought, implying our need of invention and transformation, expresses two dominating themes of perfectionism.1Guyer makes the following comment:This.. (shrink)

The judgement of human ability is ubiquitous, from school admissions to job performance reviews. The exact make-up of ability traits, however, is often narrowly defined and lacks a comprehensive basis. We attempt to simplify the spectrum of human ability, similar to how five personality traits are widely believed to describe most personalities. Finding such a basis for human ability would be invaluable since neuropsychiatric disease diagnoses and symptom severity are commonly related to such differences in performance. Here, we identified four (...) underlying ability traits within the National Institutes of Health Toolbox normative data (n= 1, 369): (1) Motor-endurance, (2) Emotional processing, (3) Executive and cognitive function, and (4) Social interaction. We used the Human Connectome Project young adult dataset (n= 778) to show that Motor-endurance and Executive and cognitive function were reliably associated with specific brain functional networks (r2= 0.305 ± 0.021), and the biological nature of these ability traits was also shown by calculating their heritability (31 and 49%, respectively) from twin data. (shrink)

The long-periodic/infinite discrete Gabor transform is more effective than the periodic/finite one in many applications. In this paper, a fast and effective approach is presented to efficiently compute the Gabor analysis window for arbitrary given synthesis window in DGT of long-periodic/infinite sequences, in which the new orthogonality constraint between analysis window and synthesis window in DGT for long-periodic/infinite sequences is derived and proved to be equivalent to the completeness condition of the long-periodic/infinite DGT. By using the property of delta function, (...) the original orthogonality can be expressed as a certain number of linear equation sets in both the critical sampling case and the oversampling case, which can be fast and efficiently calculated by fast discrete Fourier transform. The computational complexity of the proposed approach is analyzed and compared with that of the existing canonical algorithms. The numerical results indicate that the proposed approach is efficient and fast for computing Gabor analysis window in both the critical sampling case and the oversampling case in comparison to existing algorithms. (shrink)

The British Government has recently agreed proposals for a National Numeracy Strategy which claims to be based on evidence concerning 'what works'. This article reviews the literature in each key area in which recommendations are made, and makes a judgement of whether the claim is justified. In some areas (e.g. calculators) the recommendations run counter to the evidence.

The relevance of Kant to Plessner’s work was long all but ignored and there is hardly any mention of Plessner in the Kant literature. The Plessner renaissance beginning in the 1990s, however, has brought with it a stronger focus on the methodological construction of his theory, so that the Kant connection has at least been acknowledged, but the particular relevance of Kant’s Critique of Judgement has not been systematically explicated. In this essay, I investigate the connection between Kant’s notion of (...) reflective—specifically teleological—judgment and Plessner’s theory. I begin by setting out the characteristics of teleological judgment, with two points being of particular importance: the temporal structure of the final cause and Kant’s reference to an understanding other than the human, that is, to an ordering power other than the human. In a second step, I work out Plessner’s conceptualization of the spatiotemporal appearance of organisms and the way he understands the other of human understanding as nature’s—or history’s—historically evolved and mutable capacity for self-order. He arrives at these conclusions by way of a methodologically controlled process of questioning derived from Kant, which he calls the “principle of the open question.”. (shrink)

Most parents want to improve the lot of their children. Providing a safe environment, a healthful diet, a good education, exposure to diverse experiences are some of the more conventional means of enhancing the health and opportunities of children. Increasingly, parents or would‐be parents are being offered genetic means for enhancing their children's lives. To whichever means parents turn, the road to enhancement is paved with some deadly and not‐so‐deadly sins that all parents and social stewards ought to learn to (...) avoid. They are calculativeness, overbearingness, shortsightedness, hasty judgment, and pessimism. (shrink)

It has been shown in Spirtes(1995) that X and Y are d-separated given Z in a directed graph associated with a recursive or non-recursive linear model without correlated errors if and only if the model entails that ρXY.Z = 0. This result cannot be directly applied to a linear model with correlated errors, however, because the standard graphical representation of a linear model with correlated errors is not a directed graph. The main result of this paper is to show how (...) to associate a directed graph with a linear model L with correlated errors, and then use d-separation in the associated directed graph to determine whether L entails that a particular partial correlation is zero. (shrink)

We have developed a knowledge base of words as a tool to measure the semantic similarity between words. In this paper, we evaluate the knowledge base of words comparing with thesauruses, which are commonly used for measuring similarity. Thesauruses of NIHONGO-GOI-TAIKEI and Japan Electronic Dictionary are selected for the evaluation. For similarity calculation methods using thesauruses, we adopt a newly proposed method, in which each word is represented with vector using the structural feature of thesauruses and the degree of (...) similarity between words is calculated by the inner product of their vectors, in addition to traditional methods based on the path length between categories or the depth of the subsumer. Evaluation is carried out through the two methods, that is, a traditional method based on human rating and the method we have already proposed, feasible for evaluating automatically without human judgment. Evaluation result shows that the knowledge base of word is superior to the both thesauruses as measurement tools, and the proposed calculation method outperforms the traditional ones. The result also shows that our evaluation method is a practical one, by investigating the correlation of both methods. (shrink)

Vitruvius has something interesting to say at De architectura 2.8.8: Non enim quae sunt e molli caemento subtili facie venustatis, non eae possunt esse in vetustate non ruinosae. itaque cum arbitrio communium parietum sumuntur, non aestimant eos quanti facti fuerint, sed cum ex tabulis inveniunt eorum locationes, pretia praeteritorum annorum singulorum deducunt octogesimas et ita – ex reliqua summa parte reddi pro his parietibus – sententiam pronuntiant eos non posse plus quam annos LXXX durare.Those structures made of soft rubble, for (...) all their subtle attractiveness, are not the ones that will resist ruin as time passes. And thus when assessors are appointed to evaluate party walls, they never assess soft rubble walls according to their initial cost, but rather, when they look at the price recorded in the original contracts, they deduct 1/80th of that sum for each subsequent year, and the remaining amount is fixed as the current value of the walls. They have rendered judgement, in effect, that such walls cannot last more than 80 years.By contrast, mud-brick walls were not depreciated at all if they were standing when assessed. The calculation performed for concrete walls demonstrates clear understanding of what we call ‘depreciation’ or ‘amortization’ in ancient Roman thought. It appears to have been overlooked to date. (shrink)

The nature of moral action versus moral judgment has been extensively debated in numerous disciplines. We introduce Virtual Reality (VR) moral paradigms examining the action individuals take in a high emotionally arousing, direct action-focused, moral scenario. In two studies involving qualitatively different populations, we found a greater endorsement of utilitarian responses–killing one in order to save many others–when action was required in moral virtual dilemmas compared to their judgment counterparts. Heart rate in virtual moral dilemmas was significantly increased (...) when compared to both judgment counterparts and control virtual tasks. Our research suggests that moral action may be viewed as an independent construct to moral judgment, with VR methods delivering new prospects for investigating and assessing moral behaviour. (shrink)

Recommender systems are recently developed computer-assisted tools that support social and informational needs of various communities and help users exploit huge amounts of data for making optimal decisions. In this study, we present a new recommender system for assessment and risk prediction in child welfare institutions in Israel. The system exploits a large diachronic repository of manually completed questionnaires on functioning of welfare institutions and proposes two different rule-based computational models. The system accepts users’ requests via a simple graphical interface, (...) calculates the institutions’ profiles according to user preferences, and presents assessment scores, trends and comparative analyses of the corresponding data using assorted visual aids. Based on the analysis, the system offers three different strategies for objective assessment of the institutions’ functioning and risks. Qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the system’s effectiveness and accuracy demonstrates that it substantially improves the assessment process of a welfare institution. Moreover, it provides an effective tool for objective large-scale analysis of the institution’s overall state and trends, which were previously based primarily on the institution supervisors’ subjective judgment and intuition. In addition, the proposed recommender system has great practical and social impact as it may help identify and avert potential problems, malfunctions, flaws, risks and even tragic incidents in child welfare institutions, as well as increase their overall functioning levels. As a result, as a long-term social implication, the system may also help reduce inequality and social gaps in the Israeli society. (shrink)

Increased globalisation has also seen increased scrutiny of corporate behaviour by the communities. Clearly managers are under increased pressure from stakeholders not only to outperform their competitors, but also are expected to do so in an ethical manner. In order to act ethically an individual is expected to have a well-developed moral imagination and moral reasoning. Literature on ethical reasoning research indicates a positive relationship between higher levels of moral reasoning and ethical behaviour. This paper presents the findings of a (...) study of the moral reasoning/moral development of managers working in large manufacturing enterprises situated in the state of Punjab in India. Kohlberg’s theory of Cognitive Moral Development forms the basis of the study. Moral Judgement Interview (MIG) developed by Weber, on the basis of Kohlberg’s theory was used for the study. Moral Reasoning Scores were calculated using Abbreviated Scoring Guide. More than half of the managers scored at post-conventional level of reasoning while assessing the moral dilemmas. The reasoning scores varied for the three dilemmas. (shrink)