Abstract
Arguably, emotions figure prominently in contemporary philosophy, not only in the fields of aesthetics and philosophy of religion, but also in the study of morality and cognition. Expressions like “emotional intelligence” are now commonly used and there is even talk of an affective turn in the cognitive sciences. Twentieth-century philosophers paved the way with conceptual creations like “poietic thinking” (dichtende Denken), “sentient intelligence” (inteligencia sentiente) or “poetic reason” (razón poética). It is also widely acknowledged that our apparently rational thoughts, calculations and decisions are inextricably intertwined with our emotions, which even alter our mental judgement without making us aware of it. Thus, the clear contrast between reason and feelings―as separate and mutually exclusive―that runs through much of Western philosophical thought seems to be fading away. We could ask ourselves whether this has been the case in other philosophical traditions, or whether, far from it, this contrast has led them to privilege the rational over the affective. Moreover, in valuing these other traditions as philosophical, it is also worth considering the extent to which this opposition remains valid, perhaps behind the scenes.