Le problème posé par la pluralité des religions au sein des sociétés comme problème politique n'est-il pas, plutôt que celui des rapports entre pouvoirs religieux et politiques, celui du type d'unité qu'il convient de réaliser au sein de la société et de la manière de le réaliser politiquement? Une pensée éclaire d'un jour nouveau cette interrogation intempestive : celle de Stanislas Breton, prêtre de la congrégation des passionistes. Une pensée qui puise paradoxalement dans la lecture de Spinoza son idée régulatrice (...) : "l'essence éthique du théologique implique le politique, le politique comme pouvoir implique la détermination du théologique comme éthique". (shrink)

In three parts, this paper seeks 1) to provide a synopsis of Bernard Lonergan‟s proof for the existence of God as presented in chapter nineteen of Insight, 2) to explain how Lonergan later came to critique his approach in Insight 19 in light of subsequent philosophical developments, and 3) to assess the ongoing relevance of Lonergan‟s Insight 19 argument given that aforementioned critique.The issues discussed in this paper are important for a variety of reasons.First, Lonergan‟s argument for the existence (...) of God may in fact be a sound argument. Second, Lonergan prefaced his argument with the incredibly bold and enticing claim that while arguments for the existence of God are many, all such arguments are implicitly included in the general form of his own argument.And third, however one may assess the preceding claim, the second and third parts ofthis paper will raise fundamental questions regarding the function and existential significance of any philosophical proof for the existence of God, and by doing sowill contribute to contemporary discussions concerning the relevance of philosophical theology. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the dialectic of thought and existence implicit in the human person's task of self-constitution as both a knower and a chooser. By way of comparative interpretation and critical analysis of the thought of Soren Kierkegaard and Bernard Lonergan, it argues for the complementarity of cognitional and existential praxis and adumbrates the possibility of an intellectualist existentialism. ;The Kierkegaardian polarization of thought and existence is situated within the context of a polemic against Hegelian holism and its totalizing (...) aspirations. Not only does Hegelian speculation attempt to reduce Christianity to a mere philosophical theory, it also absentmindedly yet oppressively neglects the ethical and religious exigencies of the concretely existing individual. ;In Lonergan's account of the dynamism of conscious intentionality , there is found support for Kierkegaard's critique of speculative aestheticism. There occurs not only a clear differentiation between knowledge and decisiveness, but also an affirmation of the primacy of conscience. In the full expansion of this dynamism, the cognitional is sublated by the existential; immanent exigencies of intelligence are preserved, yet knowing is to be contextualized within a wider horizon of concern for actualizing the good. Hence Lonergan's intellectualism offers the possibility of re-integrating thought and existence; it is an alternative both to anti-intellectual existentialism and to anti-existential rationalism. ;The task of self-appropriation, which is the core of Lonergan's philosophy, is complementary to the Kierkegaardian retrieval of existential subjectivity. Full self-appropriation involves both self-knowledge and self-choice. Yet self-appropriation, unlike Kierkegaardian and later existentialism, also reveals how objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Lonergan avoids, as Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus does not, a denigration of objectivity and theoretical knowing. ;On grounds of performative self-contradiction, an objection is raised concerning existentialism's tendency to view objectivity in a merely pejorative manner. Theoretical knowing is more relevant to ethico-religious existence and to the actualization of personalist values than is commonly realized. A normative notion of objectivity is a necessary condition for the possibility of an ethics of historical authenticity. (shrink)

Nous nous proposons dans cet article un double but : parcourir la vaste pluralité des formes de l’amour, selon la nature de son sujet, de son objet, de ses modalités vécues, et clarifier les raisons qui justifient qu’on le considère, dans sa forme amoureuse, comme l’expérience humaine suprême. Cela nous amène devant une forme paradoxale de conscience d’absolu, la relation d’une conscience finie à un absolu singulier. Après avoir exploré les contradictions et la dialectique inféconde qui semblent inévitablement en (...) résulter, nous montrons, en surmontant les concepts antagonistes de manque (Platon) et de puissance (Spinoza), que l’amour est, indissociablement, création de monde et accès à l’idéalité. (shrink)

Bernard Lonergan has attempted to clarify a major theoretical transition from a classicist conception of culture, which was operative for over two millennia,to a contemporary notion of culture which is empirical, historicist, and pluralist. I argue that this transition has significant implications for apprehending boththe difficulty and the possibility of intercultural understanding. While the need for intercultural understanding is timely and obvious, its actual achievement hasproven elusive. One major impediment, I argue, has been the effective persistence of classicist assumptions (...) which undermine our best theoretical understandings of what a culture is. (shrink)

Bernard Lonergan has attempted to clarify a major theoretical transition from a classicist conception of culture, which was operative for over two millennia,to a contemporary notion of culture which is empirical, historicist, and pluralist. I argue that this transition has significant implications for apprehending boththe difficulty and the possibility of intercultural understanding. While the need for intercultural understanding is timely and obvious, its actual achievement hasproven elusive. One major impediment, I argue, has been the effective persistence of classicist assumptions (...) which undermine our best theoretical understandings of what a culture is. (shrink)

Le courant de pensée qui s’intitule Radical Orthodoxy propose une généalogie de ce qu’elle juge la dérive du subjectivisme moderne en faisant référence à son enracinement théologique, et notamment dans les modalités franciscaines et jésuites du volontarisme. Ce qui donne l’occasion de repenser ici non d’abord le symptôme d’une angoisse face à la croissance de la vérité pratique et spéculative dont certains cherchent à se préserver en vain, mais surtout la question du rapport à l’autorité dans le contexte d’une appréciation (...) nouvelle de la différence reçue entre autonomie et autosuffisance. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Dans un article sur le Banquet de Platon, ayant pour titre «L’amour sorcier», Luce Irigaray tente de retrouver les enseignements de Diotime de Mantinée sur Éros. Trouvant un contraste fort entre les deux parties du discours de Diotime, elle spécule sur le fait que la doctrine d’Éros contenue dans la première partie du discours pourrait représenter les enseignements de la Diotime historique auxquels viendrait se superposer la «métaphysique» platonicienne dans la deuxième partie du discours. Tout en trouvant beaucoup (...) à admirer dans le travail d’Irigaray, l’auteur suggère que les deux parties du discours peuvent être lues comme une unité, et que les idées développées par Irigaray peuvent être comprises au sein du platonisme. (shrink)

L’A. se propose un nouvel examen de l’unité du Phèdre, problème qui mobilise les commentateurs depuis l’Antiquité et a été récemment relancé dans les études françaises et anglo-américaines. De fait, Platon n’a pas explicité la charnière articulant le diptyque formé par le discours sur l’amour comme éros spiritualisé suivi de la réflexion sur la rhétorique du vrai. Au-delà de l’étrangeté formelle, l’enjeu est philosophique : la dualité même du dialogue signale la tentative platonicienne de maintenir à tout prix le (...) travail de la psychagogie, fondement de la recherche amoureuse de la vérité, sur le terrain de la parole politique, jusqu’à se heurter à l’éclatement mutuel des deux ordres. Reste alors, devant nos yeux, l’unité fracturée du métaphysique et du politique. (shrink)

L'homme des droits de l'homme eut une belle vie, pleine de bruit et de fureur, mais aujourd'hui, il n'est plus. En lieu et place a surgi un nouvel homme, égoïste, hédoniste, à la recherche de son seul plaisir ; sa préoccupation première, essentielle, c'est l'amour de soi, l'émerveillement de soi, la satisfaction de soi, et l'Etat est sommé d'y satisfaire. Car l'Etat n'est plus ce tyran féroce, avide de pouvoir, ce despote aux aguets qui attend l'occasion pour soumettre ces (...) sujets ; il ne fait plus vraiment peur ; il a été assagi, apprivoisé et sa fonction est de gérer un nouveau pacte social : non plus de faire respecter la liberté de tous mais celle de chacun ; non plus d'établir l'égalité pour tous mais pour chacun ; non plus de protéger un «moi commun», une nation, une collectivité, mais un moi individuel ; les hommes ne se sont pas réunis pour leur sécurité et leur conservation, mais pour mieux jouir les uns des autres. (shrink)

Que dire de l’art dans ses rapports avec l’esprit et le mystère à partir de la Bible, de la philosophie, de la poésie? Dans l’Écriture, la beauté se révèle comme indissociable de la bonté, l’amour. Dans la perspective d’une philosophie, comme d’une poésie, de l’esprit et de l’existence, la beauté nous arrache au règne de l’avoir, de l’intérêt, de la puissance, pour nous rapprocher du mystère de l’être. Si pour Nietzsche l’esthétique est étrangère à l’éthique comme à la vérité, (...) l’esthétique de Pascal apparaît indissociable d’une éthique de la charité et d’une recherche de la vérité. L’enjeu d’un art de l’esprit et du mystère se situe, par-delà l’agrément, dans l’ordre de la profondeur. (shrink)

Esprit, l’un des mots clés des Pensées, reçoit chez Pascal deux significations : la raison et le souffle intérieur. Si l’esprit en tant que mens rationalis appartient au deuxième ordre, l’esprit en tant que mens spiritualis relève du troisième ordre. Deux dualismes se croisent dans la distinction pascalienne des trois ordres : le premier de nature philosophique, cartésienne, oppose le premier ordre, voué au corps, et les deuxième et troisième ordres, voués à la mens ; le second, de nature éthico-religieuse, (...) oppose le premier et le deuxième ordres, ordres de la cupidité, au troisième ordre, celui de la charité. Au-dessus de l’esprit/raison se tient l’esprit/amour. Pascal tisse, au sein du troisième ordre, un lien entre l’esprit et le cœur. Dans la notion de spiritus cordialis, d’esprit cordial, se situe l’apport essentiel de l’auteur des Pensées.« Esprit », one of the key-words of Pascal’s Pensées, has two meanings according to Pascal : i.e. reason and interior creative inspiration. If esprit as mens rationalis belongs to the second order, esprit as mens spiritualis refers to the third order. Two dualisms cross themselves within the Pascalian distinction of three orders. The former – of a philosophical nature, i.e. Cartesian – opposes the first order, devoted to the body and the second and third order devoted to the mens ; the latter – of an ethico-religious nature – opposes both the first and second order, i.e. the orders of cupidity to the third order, i.e. that of charity. The esprit as love rests above the esprit as reason. Pascal weaves, amid the third order a link between the esprit and the heart. The major contribution of the author of the Pensées rests in the concept of spiritus cordialis. (shrink)

Dans la pensee du jeune Hegel, essentiellement theologico-politique, le moment francfortois est le moment critique conduisant a l'achevement de cette pensee qui, a Iena, reconciliera l'histoire, verite de la politique, et la philosophie, verite de la religion. La proposition finale d'un tel salut a l'homme moderne va clore positivement la negation severe que Hegel opere des solutions qu'il veut lire dans les abstractions opposees du judaisme et du christianisme. Le premier est condamne parce qu'il absolutise dans l'existence la difference (des (...) commandements) en rejetant l'identite; le second n'est pas absous parce que, inversement, il privilegie l'identite (de l'amour) en meprisant les differences. Hegel leur opposera l'identification, constitutive de la raison, de la difference et de l'identite, dont la future philosophie speculative construira le developpement dialectique. (shrink)

Rien n'a de valeur ni de signification inconditionnee, si ce n'est la vie: tel fut le principe au nom duquel Fichte libera le Moi d'abord de la puissance apparente de l'objet (la chose en soi), puis - par l'approfondissement de sa reflexion vivifiante - de ses propres limites, en decouvrant au coeur de lui-meme la presence agissante d'un Sujet infini. Mais la celebration de la maitrise morale de l'etre mondain ou de l'amour religieux de l'Etre divin se justifia toujours (...) dans le plus rigoureux et le plus scientifique des discours: c'est dans une absolue fidelite a lui-meme que le savoir philosophique fichteen se libere de lui-meme. Le present ouvrage expose les fondements, les etapes et les resultats d'une telle liberation philosophique. (shrink)

Le trait marquant de la position dite internaliste au sein du débat concernant la normativité pratique est le lien que ses adeptes établissent entre normativité et motivation. Dans cet article, je mets en avant l’originalité du geste philosophique de Harry Frankfurt. L’amour, érigé en source de la normativité, permet de distinguer la position du philosophe de celle de Bernard Williams, qui renvoie la motivation aux incitations du désir, et de celle de Christine Korsgaard, qui associe normativité et moralité. (...) Je montrerai également que le concept d’amour contribue à répondre à l’objection récurrente soulevée contre la conception frankfurtienne de l’autonomie personnelle selon laquelle celle-ci serait anhistorique. (shrink)

With a new foreword by Jonathan Lear 'Remarkably lively and enjoyable…It is a very rich book, containing excellent descriptions of a variety of moral theories, and innumerable and often witty observations on topics encountered on the way.' -_ Times Literary Supplement_ Bernard Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of his generation. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Drawing on (...) the ideas of the Greek philosophers, Williams reorients ethics away from a preoccupation with universal moral theories towards ‘truth, truthfulness and the meaning of an individual life’. He explores and reflects upon the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy and identifies new ideas about central issues such as relativism, objectivity and the possibility of ethical knowledge. This edition also includes a commentary on the text by A.W.Moore. At the time of his death in 2003, Bernard Williams was hailed by the Times as 'the outstanding moral philosopher of his age.' He taught at the Universities of Cambridge, Berkeley and Oxford and is the author of many influential books, including _Morality; Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry_ and _Truth and Truthfulness_. (shrink)

This essay asks why Aristotle, certainly no friend to unlimited democracy, seems so much more comfortable with unconstrained rhetoric in political deliberation than current defenders of deliberative democracy. It answers this question by reconstructing and defending a distinctly Aristotelian understanding of political deliberation, one that can be pieced together out of a series of separate arguments made in the Rhetoric, the Politics, and the Nicomachean Ethics.

This book is a philosophically sophisticated and scientifically well-informed discussion of the moral and social issues raised by genetically engineering animals, a powerful technology which has major implications for society. Unlike other books on this emotionally charged subject, the author attempts to inform, not inflame, the reader about the real problems society must address in order to manage this technology. Bernard Rollin is both a professor of philosophy, and physiology and biophysics, and writes from a uniquely well-informed perspective on (...) this topic. The style is non-technical and anecdotal and will ensure that the book can be used on a wide range of courses on bioethics, biotechnology, veterinary medicine and public policy. The book could also appeal to a general, non-academic reader with a serious interest in genetic engineering. (shrink)

Abstract The idea of a purely civic nationalism has attracted Western scholars, most of whom rightly disdain the myths that sustain ethnonationalist theories of political community. Civic nationalism is particularly attractive to many Americans, whose peculiar national heritage encourages the delusion that their mutual association is based solely on consciously chosen principles. But this idea misrepresents political reality as surely as the ethnonationalist myths it is designed to combat. And propagating a new political myth is an especially inappropriate way of (...) defending the legacy of Enlightenment liberalism from the dangers posed by the growth of nationalist political passions. (shrink)

J'ai choisi de travailler un portrait de Bachelard pour retrouver son humanité, sa qualité de coeur, d'âme, ce qui est trop souvent absent dans les ouvrages traitant de ses travaux, ses livres. Fils de cordonnier, le chant des outils, le parfum des cuirs, l'attitude de l'artisan appliqué à faire et à parfaire son travail : le quotidien resta vivant en sa mémoire. Il n'avait pas oublié d'où il venait, l'admiration vient de là. Son humanité porte aussi la mort prématurée de (...) son épouse, Jeanne, le 20 juin 1920. Marié le 8 juillet 1914, mobilisé le 2 août de la même année jusqu'au 16 mars 1919, il a vécu 38 mois dans les tranchées. De leur union est née une fille, Suzanne. On peut dire qu'en dépassant ses peines, son deuil, il est devenu un fin guetteur de la beauté de vivre et du monde. La poésie a été pour lui une matière lui donnant de vibrer et respirer l'Univers. "La sagesse, dit-on, a pour origine et pour creuset de savoir lutter". Au long de son oeuvre, Bachelard a plaidé pour "la liberté, les hautes valeurs morales". En écrivant "Le visage de Bachelard", peu à peu, s'est instauré un dialogue, s'est imposée une façon de maïeutique ouvrant à des réflexions sur la vie, l'amitié, l'amour, agressivité, égocentrisme, haine, racisme, "la mauvaise foi" selon Sartre, "l'illusion" selon Pascal. En outre, il ressort en rapprochant plusieurs de leurs pensées que Gaston Bachelard et Léonard de Vinci étaient et restent en parenté de génie. Benoît Aubierge. (shrink)

In Science and Ethics, Bernard Rollin examines the ideology that denies the relevance of ethics to science. Providing an introduction to basic ethical concepts, he discusses a variety of ethical issues that are relevant to science and how they are ignored, to the detriment of both science and society. These include research on human subjects, animal research, genetic engineering, biotechnology, cloning, xenotransplantation, and stem cell research. Rollin also explores the ideological agnosticism that scientists have displayed regarding subjective experience in (...) humans and animals, and its pernicious effect on pain management. Finally, he articulates the implications of the ideological denial of ethics for the practice of science itself in terms of fraud, plagiarism, and data falsification. In engaging prose and with philosophical sophistication, Rollin cogently argues in favor of making education in ethics part and parcel of scientific training. (shrink)

We tend to suppose that the ancient Greeks had primitive ideas of the self, of responsibility, freedom, and shame, and that now humanity has advanced from these to a more refined moral consciousness. Bernard Williams's original and radical book questions this picture of Western history. While we are in many ways different from the Greeks, Williams claims that the differences are not to be traced to a shift in these basic conceptions of ethical life. We are more like the (...) ancients than we are prepared to acknowledge, and only when this is understood can we properly grasp our most important differences from them, such as our rejection of slavery. The author is a philosopher, but much of his book is directed to writers such as Homer and the tragedians, whom he discusses as poets and not just as materials for philosophy. At the center of his study is the question of how we can understand Greek tragedy at all, when its world is so far from ours. Williams explains how it is that when the ancients speak, they do not merely tell us about themselves, but about ourselves. _Shame and Necessity_ gives a new account of our relations to the Greeks, and helps us to see what ethical ideas we need in order to live in the modern world. (shrink)

In 1944 Horkheimer and Adorno warned that industrial society turns reason into rationalization, and Polanyi warned of the dangers of the self-regulating market, but today, argues Stiegler, this regression of reason has led to societies dominated by unreason, stupidity and madness. However, philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century abandoned the critique of political economy, and poststructuralism left its heirs helpless and disarmed in face of the reign of stupidity and an economic crisis of global proportions. New theories (...) and concepts are required today to think through these issues. The thinkers of poststructuralism Lyotard, Deleuze, Derrida must be re-read, as must the sources of their thought, Hegel and Marx. But we must also take account of Naomi Klein’s critique of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School and her account of the ‘shock doctrine’. In fact, argues Stiegler, a permanent ‘state of shock’ has prevailed since the beginning of the industrial revolution, intensified by the creative destruction brought about by the consumerist model. The result has been a capitalism that destroys desire and reason and in which every institution is undermined, above all those institutions that are the products par excellence of the Enlightenment the education system and universities. Through a powerful critique of thinkers from Marx to Derrida, Stiegler develops new conceptual weapons to fight this destruction. He argues that schools and universities must themselves be transformed: new educational institutions must be developed both to take account of the dangers of digitization and the internet and to enable us to take advantage of the new opportunities they make available. (shrink)

The paper argues that in our usage of moral language we relate three concepts: guilt, forgiveness, and reconciliation. This assumes that we can distinguish between external actions and internal executions, because guilt as well as forgiveness and reconciliation are realities that first affect our inner humanity. When a relationship has been damaged by culpable actions (sometimes even by both sides), forgiveness is the precondition of reconciliation. As long as people accuse each other, there can be no talk of true reconciliation. (...) Although these are attitudes, that is, inner engagements, reconciliation also becomes outwardly recognizable as peace. However, these relationships can only be explained well in the connections of individual persons to each other. When political communities confront each other, our moral sense becomes fuzzy, because it is not so easy to say how such collectives (e.g., peoples) are to be determined in their inside and outside. Who can and may forgive, if other persons have become victims of culpable actions, but cannot forgive themselves? Here, then, the difficulty of individuality and collectivity is added. The essay pleads for maintaining the conceptual conjunction between individual and collective forgiveness. However, this should not be done at the price of a complete socio-ontological dissolution of collectives. Therefore, one must also be cautious about rash universalistic appropriation of the Other or the other group, because this is usually accompanied by a failure to recognize and endure the selfhood of the Other. Before it comes to a “false” reconciliation in this way, it is better to at least recognize each other – also in diversity. This should also be reflected in the rules of conflict, which must above all be oriented toward ensuring that conflicts are not carried out in such a way that the manner in which the conflict is carried out makes reconciliation impossible. But in both collective and individual reconciliation, the person does not have the outcome of the process entirely in his or her own hands. Reconciliation is not a technique, but a relational event that is carried out in an “open space.”. (shrink)

Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.

Tractatus, 5.62 famously says: ‘… what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language mean the limits of my world.’ The later part of this repeats what was said in summary at 5.6: ‘the limits of my language mean the limits of my world’. And the key to the problem ‘how much truth there is in solipsism’ has (...) been provided by the reflections of TLP, 5.61. (shrink)

Do people only act out of self-interest? Or is there a less pessimistic explanation for human behaviour? Maurer delves into early-Enlightenment debates on self-love from both famous and lesser known authors, including Lord Shaftesbury, Bernard Mandeville, Francis Hutcheson, Joseph Butler, Archibald Campbell, David Hume and Adam Smith.

How I became a philosopher -- To love, to love me, to love us.

Philosophy should not try to assimilate itself to the aims of the sciences. Scientism stems from the false assumption that a representation of the world minimally based on local perspectives is what best serves self-understanding. Philosophy must concern itself with the history of our conceptions, and we must overcome the need to think that this history should ideally be vindicatory. There is no basic conflict between arguing within the framework of our ideas, reflectively making better sense of them, and understanding (...) their highly contingent history. The third of these activities is an inescapable part of the second. (shrink)

In Nietzsche's Psychology of Ressentiment, Guy Elgat develops an interpretation of some of the central themes of Nietzsche's GM, which is one of his most systematic works and a pivotal part of his critique of the modern moral outlook that grew out of Christianity. Elgat's original approach is framed by two fundamental ideas: first, Nietzsche takes the concept of "moral justice" to be central to the morality he sets out to criticize; second, Nietzsche's suspicion toward moral justice is rooted in (...) its association with the affect of ressentiment. Thus, Elgat notes that ressentiment is frequently supposed either to express a sense of justice, or to... (shrink)