Abstract Viroli is right to draw a distinction between republican patriotism and nationalism. But in arguing that the former can correct the problems associated with the latter, he places too much trust in the descriptions of patriotism offered by republican theorists. In practice, republican patriotism has been almost as fierce and hostile to outsiders as nationalism. Patriotism might make us better citizens, but it will not make the world a more peaceful or generous place.

ABSTRACT National identities have tended to be established by elites who universalize deep cultural conformity to key cultural artefacts such as language and religion. But this approach can provoke intergroup conflict when the official national identity clashes with other social identifications (e.g., religious, ethnic, or regional ones). Research based on the Social Identity Theory of Henri Tajfel and John Turner indicates that collective identities can be easily induced, through ?minimal? cues of group membership, suggesting a strong and innate need to (...) identify with larger groups and to share in and contribute to their achievements. Instead of insisting on deep conformity, therefore, national identification might be achieved through the use of simple cultural cues, banal national symbolism, and mass political participation. (shrink)

Associative duties—duties inherent to some of our relationships—are most commonly discussed in terms of intimate associations such as of families, friends, or lovers. In this essay I ask whether impersonal associations such as state or nation can also give rise to genuinely associative duties, i.e., duties of patriotism or nationalism. I distinguish between the two in terms of their objects: the object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share (...) a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together. I explore three arguments for the thesis that a special concern for one’s polity and fellow-citizens, or one’s nation and co-nationals, is an associative duty: from reciprocity, from collective self-determination, and from the well-being of compatriots or co-nationals. I argue that the relationship among compatriots is a more plausible contender for generating associative duties than the relationship among co-nationals, although even in this case there are questions whether these are genuinely associative duties, or simply special duties. Although the relationship among co-nationals is a less plausible contender for associative duties, the well-being argument does apply to the relationship among both co-nationals and compatriots. I also suggest that there is a certain privileging of the status quo in the way that associative duties arguments work, because they tend to operate from existing relations and associations. (shrink)

Questions of political identity and citizenship, raised by thecreation of the `new Europe', pose new questions that politicaltheorists need to consider. Reflection upon the circumstances ofthe new Europe could help them in their task of delineatingconceptual structures and investigating the character ofpolitical argument.Does it make sense to use concepts as `citizenship' and`identity' beyond the borders of the nation-state? What does itmean when we speak about `European Citizenship' and `EuropeanIdentity'?

Questions of political identity and citizenship, raised by thecreation of the `new Europe', pose new questions that politicaltheorists need to consider. Reflection upon the circumstances ofthe new Europe could help them in their task of delineatingconceptual structures and investigating the character ofpolitical argument.Does it make sense to use concepts as `citizenship' and`identity' beyond the borders of the nation-state? What does itmean when we speak about `European Citizenship' and `EuropeanIdentity'?It is argued that the pluralism that has led theorists tooffer a conception (...) of citizenship based upon principles of right,rather that the common good, applies even more strongly at thelevel of the European political order. Developing a contractariantheory of federation, an account of the basis of a Europeancitizenship will be offered in which federalism emerges out of anoverlapping consensus of European citizens on the terms of theirpolitical association.`European Citizenship' and `European Identity' are discussedin the context of the so-called `European Union', and not in thewider context of Europe `as a whole', or for that matter on aneven broader `cosmopolitan' scale. However, the gist of the articleis that arguments for concepts of `citizenship' and `identity'that go beyond borders of nation-states and that are applied tothe `European Union', could have implications for an even widerapplication.Finally, and in conclusion, the (empirical) context will beelaborated in which the normative concept of shared liberalcitizenship identity should be realized on a pan-national,European level. (shrink)

The article represents a contribution to the discussions about the basis, motives, and goals of European integration, which were stimulated by the recent “normative turn” in EU studies. My aim in this the article is threefold: By addressing the issue of internal legitimacy of EU decision-making, I wish to show that the European Union is in need of a public “story” of European integration; however, a closer analysis suggests that there is much normative disagreement on values and principles that are (...) supposed to define such “Europeanness”. This is also relevant for the role of Europe on the scene of international or global politics, where the EU aspires to become a leading actor, or is supposed to do so by cosmopolitan-minded authors. Lastly, the text defends the usefulness of the traditional conceptual apparatus of political theory, which which has – in relation to the European integration – in recent times come under attack. (shrink)

The paper compares opposite approaches to the study of spatial order in contemporary societies. On the one hand, theories of globalization and world society argue that states and their borders are not relevant anymore. Globalization means world without borders, therefore contemporary global cities, being located within state borders, do not belong to their territories. In a global city, there is no room for common solidarity among citizens—those who go beyond state borders cannot become integrated to world society. On the other (...) hand, there is much empirical evidence that states do not disappear. They still play a significant role. The state border deliniates a part of space which people can feel emotional attachment with. The states can use legitimate violence against those who reside within its borders as well as enforce feelings of solidarity with those who live on this territory. This logic brings two notions of nation and nationalism. In a more traditional understanding of these notions based on kinship, culture and language, the state is defined as a tool for the constitution of nation, which needs territory with clear borders for survival. In contrast, the civic understanding of nation suggests flexibility of any identities, including the national one. Those who follow the second definition usually do not recognize its implications. On the one hand, a territorially located group can demand statehood to assert and guarantee its identity. On the other hand, a group, which has freely chosen its identity, also can demand spatial borders and, in the same vein, a state. These demands are connected with each other. Spatial definition of any group, which can proclaim itself as a nation and demand a state, contradicts contemporary organization of global cities. In this respect, sociology may be interested in how these two modes of space intersect, i.e. how the world society with its fluids and networks interacts with new states, being constituted within new borders. (shrink)

The rise of constitutional self-government in early modern Europe, I argue, owes much to a nationalist liberation narrative pioneered by French Huguenot François Hotman in Francogallia (1573). In response to appeals by absolutist thinkers to Ro- man law, which put the power of the king beyond legal or constitutional restraint, Hotman wove together tales of the heroism of ancient Gauls and Franks wresting their native liberties back from the Romans with a theory of constitutionally limited government grounded in the common (...) law of France. This type of narrative was adapted by Dutch and English thinkers who sought to defend constitutionalism in their respective countries. Through this examination of early modern liberation narratives, I argue we can gain insight on the relationship between nationalism and resistance to autocratic governments and the formation of regimes consistent with the principles of constitutional self-government. (shrink)

The emphasis in contemporary democratic theory and in the history of political thought on the peculiarly abstract theory of popular sovereignty of Locke and his twentieth-century intellectual descendants obscures a crucial relationship between constitutional self-government and nationalism. Through a Hobbesian and Filmerian critique of Locke and an examination of the political writings of George Lawson , the article shows the necessary connections between popular sovereignty, constitutionalism and a form of national consciousness that renders concrete the otherwise abstract and airy notion (...) of the pre-political community to which government is to be held accountable, and, through amyth of national origin, memories of native traditions of self-government, and stories of heroic ancestors who successfully defended those traditions against usurpers and tyrants, gives substance to theories of constitutional government. (shrink)