La philosophie de David Hume entend rompre avec une théorie classique des facultés, redessinant la place que l'imagination joue dans notre vie psychique et déployant ainsi une géographie mentale inédite. Instrument privilégié de son scepticisme philosophique, cette théorie de l'imagination pose cependant autant de questions qu'elle n'en résout, du fait même qu'associant imagination et conception, elle se voit chargée de rendre compte de tendances contradictoires au sein de l'esprit humain. Une clarification terminologique et conceptuelle permet alors, faute de résoudre ces (...) tensions, d'éclairer les nouveaux enjeux proposés par une telle approche. (shrink)

Cet article consiste en une analyse critique de la notion de sympathie dansles deuxièmes et troisièmes tomes du *Traité de la Nature Humaine* de DavidHume. Il s’agit plus particulièrement de l’étude du passage de la sympathierestreinte à la sympathie étendue comme concept clé dans la philosophiepolitique de Hume. La lecture deleuzienne de Hume, telle qu’elle se donnedans *Empirisme et Subjectivité* est particulièrement mobilisée pour montreren quoi ce passage est représentatif des difficultés d’une philosophiepolitique qui, se voulant demeurer *empiriste*, doit passer (...) par une théoriede la croyance et des fictions. C’est-à-dire que l’effort théorique de Hume,consistant à ne pas sortir du donné, doit donner droit de cité àl’imaginaire dans ce donné. La philosophie politique de Hume est ainsicomprise comme une des premières de l’histoire de la philosophie à ne pasinvoquer la raison comme gestionnaire du passionnel. Au contraire, ellefonde l’institution politique sur une *extension* du mode même decirculation des passions : une extension de la sympathie. La sympathie estdonc à comprendre non seulement comme le mécanisme d’échange des passions, àla fois interne au sujet et intersubjectif, mais comme principed’universalisation de la croyance en un vivre-ensemble. L’institutionpolitique est donc une fiction, qui doit être l’objet de croyance pour êtreeffective, et ainsi recevoir l’investissement affectif de la multitude de lamême manière que s’il s’agissait d’une sympathie de proximité naturelle. Lesmoyens d’une extension de la sympathie communément restreinte àl’environnement immédiat, vers l’institution politique représentantl’intérêt commun, constituent ainsi la trame de l’étude. (shrink)

Cette monumentale etude d'Olivier Brunet reste assurement la reference majeure concernant la philosophie esthetique de David Hume (1711-1776). Les questions et les problemes relatifs au "beau", au "jugement de gout" ne se presentent pas, dans l'oeuvre du penseur ecossais, de maniere detachee, isolee du reste de sa philosophie. C'est l'un des merites d'Olivier Brunet d'avoir montre que les reflexions de Hume sur l'esthetique sont inseparables de ses concepts essentiels. Ainsi, lorsque l'on recherche les racines conceptuelles de la definition du "jugement (...) de gout" chez Hume, on retrouve les memes jalons qui structurent son ethique. En morale comme en esthetique, les "passions" jouent un role central et sont liees - chacune a leur facon - a l'"utile"; celui-ci participe a la cause du "plaisir esthetique" qui est lui-meme etroitement lie a la fameuse "sympathie", sentiment desinteresse reglant le comportement moral tel que definit par Hume. La boucle est-elle bouclee? Loin de la, car l'esthetique humienne serait encore impossible a saisir, sans y considerer l'usage que le fondateur de l'empirisme moderne fait de ses concepts-phares : la croyance, le scepticisme, l'experience, l'habitude. Olivier Brunet, enfin, ne borne pas son etude a la philosophie esthetique de Hume. De tres belles pages sont consacrees a la relation personnelle que ce dernier entretenait avec l'art, ainsi qu'aux vertus sociales, psychologiques et morales que l'auteur du Traite de la nature humaine deduisait de la contemplation du Beau. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to make clear in what sense Hume's actually very radical scepticism can nevertheless be called moderate, and not only leaves intact the praxis in daily life but is even compatible with a — modest and experimental — form of science. The first part stresses the theoretical profoundness of Hume's scepticism, and more specifically the arguments concerning the validity of reason and those concerning some typically 'metaphysical' objects. The former culminate in the impossibility of determining (...) a criterion of correctness and consequently in the degenerating of all knowledge into probability. The latter exceed the information of the senses, are therefore 'groundless' and yet in a way ineradicable, not as explanatory principles of reason but as factual constituents of human nature. The result is an overwhelming amount of contradictions and fictions within human imagination, mainly due to the inevitable presence of two contradictory beliefs, none of which are justifiable. In the second part it is shown how Hume succeeds in conquering scepticism without actually rebutting or revoking it. He is able to do so because his scepticism had, in fact, from the very beginning been elaborated as a form of naturalism, gradually minimizing the strength as well as the importance of reason as a theory, while at the same time stressing the deeply rooted and ultimately reliable character of reason as a praxis. The achievement of this naturalistic doctrine of 'belief is threefold : first, it is a critical weapon against metaphysical fictions, second, it gives man, and even the rational philosopher, an ineradicable peace of mind, and finally, it is the foundation of a special sort of science — the critical, experimentally rooted, modest and fundamentally doubtful science of human nature. (shrink)

Avec Hume, l'empirisme ne se définit plus essentiellement par l'origine sensible des idées. Il développe trois problèmes, les relations, les cas, les illusions. D'une part, les relations sont toujours extérieures à leurs termes, et dépendent de principes d'association qui en déterminent l'établissement et l'exercice (croyance). D'autre part, ces principes d'association n'agissent qu'en fonction des passions, pour indiquer des "cas" dans un monde de la culture ou du droit : c'est tout l'associationnisme qui est au service d'une pratique du droit, de (...) la politique et de l'économie (suffit-il, pour devenir propriétaire d'une cité abandonnée, de lancer un javelot sur la porte, ou faut-il toucher la porte du doigt?). Enfin, de telles règles de légitimité des relations peuvent-elles être séparées des fictions, des croyances illégitimes qui les accompagnent ou les doublent? Si bien que la philosophie est moins critique des erreurs que dénonciation des illusions inévitables. Dans tous ces domaines, l'empirisme opère la substitution de la croyance pratique au savoir, dans une entreprise athée qui consiste à naturaliser la croyance. (shrink)

Cet article montre qu'il est faux de considérer le scepticisme mitigé que présente Hume dans la section 12 de l' Enquête sur l'entendement humain comme un scepticisme modéré. Afin d'établir ce point, l'argument principal est qu'il existe un rapport de causalité par lequel l'affect que laissent derrière eux les doutes pyrrhoniens est en grande partie responsable de la production du scepticisme mitigé. Cet affect n'est pas la mélancolie paralysante dont parle le Traité de la nature humaine , mais ce qui (...) motive le sceptique à être prudent parce qu'il est sensible à la fragilité des facultés qu'il a radicalement éprouvée dans l'exercice des doutes outrés. Le scepticisme mitigé n'est pas un oubli, mais, au contraire, une mémoire du scepticisme excessif. (shrink)

Les stratégies de Bayle et de Hume devant la question de l’athéisme sont bien plus proches qu'on ne le croit généralement. Cet accord découle de l’influence constante que Bayle exerça sur Hume. Pour Bayle et pour Hume, l’athéisme et le scepticisme sont très étroitement liés – celui-là n’est qu’une forme du celui-ci. La force des Dialogues sur la religion naturelle de Hume ressort précisément de cette alliance entre athéisme et scepticisme qui, puisant la plupart de ses arguments chez Bayle, aboutit (...) à une critique de la théologie fondée sur une analyse sans concession des fondements épistémologiques de la croyance, tout en se gardant, comme le Straton de Bayle, de réduire l’athéisme à un dogmatisme métaphysique abstrait. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Contra Spinoza? Wim Klever In Book 1 ofthe TreatiseofHumanNature1 Spinoza enjoys thehonour ofbeing the only figure from the history of philosophy and science to be explicitly and extensively discussed by Hume. This honour is, however, a dubious one as the treatment he gets is not so friendly. The passage (T 232-51) is full of insults and denunciations: Spinoza is referred to as "that famous atheist" (T 241), and (...) characterized as "universally infamous" (T 240). His doctrine contains "a true atheism" (T 240). His theory about the thinking substance is an "hideous hypothesis" (T 241); Hume does not want to enter "farther into these gloomy and obscure regions" (T 241), although he spends ten pages on the subject. Richard Popkin2 suggests on account ofthis not too well studied section: "In introducing Spinoza into the discussion of the immateriality ofthe soul, Hume follows what was common practice in his day." This statement, if true, raises the question whether Hume was sincere in writing these 'satanicverses'. Does he, after all, hide the backside of his tongue? This would bring him pretty well in line with two of his English forerunners; with Hobbes about whom Aubrey recorded: "He toldme he [Spinoza]had outthrown him [Hobbes] a bar's length, for he [Hobbes] durst not write so boldly," and with Locke, who possessedinhis privatelibraryall Spinoza's worksbutnonetheless, for one reason or another, refused to assess the theories of "those decried names," saying "I am not so well read in Hobbes or Spinoza as to be able to say what were their opinions in this matter" (namely the pre-existence ofthe soul).4 One commentator, named Gilbert Boss, wrote a two volume dissertation in order to argue for the fundamental opposition between the philosophical systems of both thinkers. In this paper I wish to propose another view and to defend their overall agreement. I will not do so with regard to their thought on religion (as this is already done byPopkin), but I shall more specificallyfocuson the theoretical (mainly epistemological) part oftheir work. Coming to Hume's text the reader of Spinoza's work who is, moreover, convinced by his geometrical demonstration of the propositions, does feel himself quite well at home chez Hume. Hume's is not another world for him. Apart from the question who is the real first modern thinker, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza or Hume, there is much common in their treatises on man and world, not only methodologically. Hume's rejection of "the antient philosophy," in Volume XVI Number 2 89 WIM KLEVER which he criticizes the "fictions... concerning substances, and substantial forms, and accidents, and occult qualities" (T 219), "sympathies, antipathies, and horrors ofa vacuum" (T 224) could have been written by the three other candidates as well. In fact every one of thoseitems maybe tracedoutin Spinoza's work; compare, for instance, JSp 136 ("doctrinam illam puerilem et nugatoriam de formis substantialibus, qualitatibus etc.") or 2 PPC 8s ("Quare omnia ilia figmenta de sympathie et antipathie ut falsa sunt reicienda... Nunquam dicendum erit, quod corpus aliquod movetur, ne detur vacuum; sed tantum ex alterius impulsu"). But let us go to the main theme in Book 1 ofthe Treatise, already present in Part 1, Section 1, "Ofthe Origin ofour Ideas." All our ideas result from impressions, themselves also being ideas or perceptions, though withmoreforce andliveliness. The original perceptions aresaid to be "the causes of our ideas" (T 5). We find the impressions in our mind and their effects, our ideas. Hume does not explain the cognitive status ofthe impressions by reducing them to non-cognitive processes. The "universe of the imagination" (T 68) is a world apart, irreducible to matter; we can't step out ofit, "since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind" (T 67). Ideas, whatever their character (about external existences or not), can only be explained by other ideas. Hume carefully avoids the category mistake of transcending the border from mental to material things and keeps consequently, at least methodologically, to the absolute caesura between mind and body. The Spinozistic reader must necessarily feel sympathy for this position. The attributes of... (shrink)

Dans les Dialogues sur la religion naturelle de Hume, ce sont en réalité deux formes de l’argument du dessein que le sceptique Philon affronte successivement. D’une part, l’argument du dessein entendu comme un raisonnement causal de nature analogique. D’autre part, la « croyance naturelle » de l’homme en un dessein, liée à cet évident ajustement des causes finales que mettait notamment en avant le Newtonien Colin Maclaurin. Après une réfutation implacable de l’argument expérimental du dessein, Philon finit par admettre l’efficace (...) de la religion naturelle sur certains esprits : par cette restriction, Hume montre que l’évidence du dessein n’a rien d’une croyance instinctive. (shrink)

Avec Hume, l'empirisme ne se définit plus essentiellement par l'origine sensible des idées. Il développe trois problèmes, les relations, les cas, les illusions. D'une part, les relations sont toujours extérieures à leurs termes, et dépendent de principes d'association qui en déterminent l'établissement et l'exercice (croyance). D'autre part, ces principes d'association n'agissent qu'en fonction des passions, pour indiquer des "cas" dans un monde de la culture ou du droit : c'est tout l'associationnisme qui est au service d'une pratique du droit, de (...) la politique et de l'économie (suffit-il, pour devenir propriétaire d'une cité abandonnée, de lancer un javelot sur la porte, ou faut-il toucher la porte du doigt?). Enfin, de telles règles de légitimité des relations peuvent-elles être séparées des fictions, des croyances illégitimes qui les accompagnent ou les doublent? Si bien que la philosophie est moins critique des erreurs que dénonciation des illusions inévitables. Dans tous ces domaines, l'empirisme opère la substitution de la croyance pratique au savoir, dans une entreprise athée qui consiste à naturaliser la croyance. (shrink)

Des la parution du Traite de la nature humaine, Hume avait ete accuse d'entretenir des paradoxes sceptiques. A cette accusation, l'Enquete sur l'entendement humain repond d'une triple facon: 1) sur le mode discret d'une incontestable autocensure; 2) sur le mode positif d'une science sceptique et positive de la nature humaine; 3) enfin, par la definition d'une regle de bonne conduite: le scepticisme-mitige.

Hume’s view that the object of moral feeling is a natural passion, motivating action, causes problems for justice. There is apparently no appropriate natural motive, whilst, if there were, its “partiality” would unfit it to ground the requisite impartial approval. We offer a critique of such solutions as that the missing non-moral motive is enlightened self-interest, or that it is feigned, or that it consists in a just disposition. We reject Cohon’s postulation of a moral motive for just acts, and (...) also Harris’s attempt to dispense with motive as the source of their merit, by invoking extensive sympathy, and citing their beneficial societal consequences. These solutions assume that, if Hume remains a virtue ethicist, the natural virtues supply the paradigm. Taylor claims that a revolution in motivational psychology follows the inauguration of the artificial convention of justice, remoulding the natural virtues. This solution founders, we argue, upon unresolved contradictions besetting even these virtues. (shrink)

La philosophie moderne tente souvent de faire du scepticisme un simple instrument ou moment provisoire de la recherche d ’ une certitude. Au travers surtout de l ’ étude du Traité de la nature humaine (I, IV), on montrera ici qu ’ à l ’ inverse le scepticisme de Hume est un scepticisme consistant, puisqu ’ il ne contredit pas le « naturalisme » et n ’ est pas non plus un simple moyen qui lui serait subordonné. Étant en relation (...) avec lui non seulement de l ’ extérieur mais par essence, le scepticisme mitigé se maintient au travers de nos croyances mêmes, de sorte que se limitant lui-même il devient la condition de leur réflexion et de leur modération. Il apparaît ainsi à la fois comme une doctrine philosophique consistante et comme une manière de vivre philosophique, modérée et responsable. (shrink)

David Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, first published in 1779, is one of the most influential works in the philosophy of religion and the most artful instance of philosophical dialogue since the dialogues of Plato. It presents a fictional conversation between a sceptic, an orthodox Christian, and a Newtonian theist concerning evidence for the existence of an intelligent cause of nature based on observable features of the world. This new edition presents it together with several of Hume's other, shorter writings (...) about religion, and with brief selections from the work of Pierre Bayle, who influenced both Hume's views on religion and the dialectical style of the Dialogues. The volume is completed by an introduction which sets the Dialogues in its philosophical and historical contexts. (shrink)

Epistemological issues are usually taken to be David Hume's central preoccupation. Attending to the role of sympathy in Hume's thought reveals, however, that his primary aim is to secure the conditions for social peace and prosperity in 18th-century Scotland and beyond, a peace particularly threatened by religious conflict. This perspective not only discloses the unity of Hume's ethical, political, aesthetic, and historical writings, it also suggests that the driving forces in the development of modern ethical and religious thought are ethical (...) and social rather than epistemological. ;The first two chapters discuss the background to Hume's use of sympathy and explore its application in the Treatise. In Hume's secularized account of moral approbation, sympathy fills the place Hutcheson reserved for Providence; it assures an intelligible connection between moral judgments and human flourishing in society. Hume at first makes use of a passive notion of sympathy developed by Latitudinarian divines to counter Hobbesian accounts of self-interested human nature. But this passive form of sympathy is limited and variable, threatening to reinforce, rather than alleviate, religious zeal and sectarian conflict. Hume introduces a new form of corrected, 'extensive' sympathy which involves an active effort to overcome prior affinities and cross factional boundaries. ;Appreciating the role of sympathy in morals also illuminates malfunctions of judgment among religious believers. Chapter 3 interprets Hume's essay on the pleasures of tragedy as an unmasking of Scottish Evangelical condemnation of theater. Evangelical opposition reflects pathologies of belief which grow out of a rejection of worldly existence and eventually distort sympathetic capacities. In "Of the Standard of Taste," discussed in Chapter 4, Hume grapples with disagreement in taste and judgment and argues that sympathy cannot be extended to those who live "artificial" religious lives, deducing practical consequences from speculative theories. ;Where poetry fails, however, history may succeed, since history is for Hume the paradigm of sympathetic understanding. As the final chapter argues, it is in the History of England that sympathy reaches its mature expression and Hume's delineation of the links among religious irrationality, zeal, and faction, attains its most concrete and persuasive form. (shrink)

Hume’s understanding of sympathy in section 2.1.11 of the Treatise—that it is a mental mechanism by means of which one sentient being can come to share the psychological states of another—has a particularly interesting implication. What the sympathizer receives, according to this definition, is the passing psychological “affection” that the object of his sympathy was experiencing at the moment of observation. Thus the psychological connection produced by Humean sympathy is not between the sympathizer and the “other” as a “whole person” (...) existing through time, but between the sympathizer and the other’s current mental state, detached from his or her diachronic psychological life. Some commentators profess themselves dissatisfied with the impersonality of this “limited sympathy”. John Bricke, for example, argues that the Humean sympathizer sympathizes with “atomistically rendered desires of some individual who is, thus far, of no further concern,” while Philip Mercer writes more bluntly that Hume’s definition omits the “practical concern for the other” that is the essence of sympathy’s contribution to moral psychology. (shrink)

"Une expérience qui réussit dans l'air ne réussit pas toujours dans le vide. C'est ainsi que s'achève le dialogue qui clôt l'Enquête sur les principes de la morale (1751). Dans cette oeuvre que Hume jugeait être le meilleur de tous ses écrits, le philosophe écossais. fidèle à sa méthode empirique et à son "scepticisme mitigé", part en quête des indices susceptibles de révéler L'origine de la morale. N'agissons-nous que par intérêt? L'approbation morale peut-elle faire abstraction de nos préférences? À suivre (...) les hommes dans leurs choix pour en dégager la constance, on ne peut qu'être frappé par la diversité des moeurs et des coutumes. La conclusion alors révèle la subtilité du détective: la morale de Hume joint l'utile à l'agréable et l'Enquête ne se fait pas faute de rappeler, dans sa forme même, que l'exercice philosophique doit lui aussi être un plaisir. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This essay presents a critical examination and development of an exchange between Adam Smith and David Hume on the nature of sympathy. I identify four objections to Smith's account in a letter from Hume and then argue that Smith's system has the resources to reply to all of them. As such, this essay shows that Smith's system provides a more robust foundation for a sentiment-based system of ethics than has been traditionally recognized.

Tous ceux qui depuis Descartes prenaient part aux sciences par leurs recherches ou leurs etudes, etaient certains d'avance que la verite et la methode de ces sciences possedaient en soi le sceau de la validite definitive et qu'elles etaient exemplaires. Et voici que le scepticisme empiriste de Hume faisait venir au jour ce qui se trouvait deja en germe dans la meditation cartesienne fondamentale, a savoir le fait que l'ensemble de la connaissance du monde, qu'elle soit pre-scientifique ou scientifique, constitue (...) un effroyable enigme. Husserl, la crise des sciences europeennes, p.103. (shrink)

English summary: The reason for this text's success lies in the variety of the book: there is a refutation of skepticism, a defense of common sense, a doctrine on the five senses, the major themes of sensation, attention, perception and belief, long essays on optics, and a chapter devoted entirely to non-Euclidean geometry. French text. French description: Les Recherches sur l'entendement humain paraissent en 1764 et sont traduites en francais des 1768, signe d'un rapide succes a l'echelle de l'Europe. La (...) raison de ce succes tient a la richesse de l'ouvrage puisqu'on y trouve une refutation du scepticisme, une defense du sens commun, une doctrine elaboree des cinq sens, l'amorce des themes majeurs de la sensation, de l'attention, de la perception et de la croyance, themes qui seront repris et proprement construits dans les Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man de 1785, de longs developpements sur l'optique et un chapitre consacre entierement a la geometrie non euclidienne des visible; mais aussi de fines analyses sur l'art de la peinture, sur le langage et sur l'histoire de la philosophie. Or cette richesse a une unique source: la critique du systeme des idees, systeme ne avec la philosophie de Descartes et trouvant son terme dans le scepticisme radical de Hume, et selon lequel l'esprit n'aurait pas affaire aux choses memes mais aux representations des choses. Cette seule critique suffit a justifier la place de Reid dans l'histoire de la philosophie et permet de mieux comprendre comment ses analyses ont pu nourrir plusieurs debats contemporains sur la connaissance et la croyance. (shrink)

Met en scène le débat entre le théisme expérimental, le dogmatisme et le scepticisme, au sujet de la religion naturelle confrontée aux limites de la raison.

David Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception (...) of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments. (shrink)

Two longstanding questions about Hume's later moral theory have preoccupied scholars of his work: First, what does Hume mean by "humanity" in the second Enquiry, and what are we to make of its seeming replacement of "extensive sympathy" as the source of our moral sentiments? Second, what happened to the associationist account of sympathy emphasized so keenly in the Treatise? My primary task in this paper will be to answer the first of these two questions. To do this, I conduct (...) a careful analysis of Hume’s notion of humanity with heavy emphasis on the text of the second Enquiry. This is not to say I will skip over sympathy. On the contrary, if I am right that humanity is dependent on sympathy (or at a minimum, the process of sympathizing), then we must also take a close look at the Enquiry account of sympathy. -/- However, I do not directly discuss the mysterious disappearance of the associationist account of sympathy from the Enquiry in this paper. Instead, I address that part of the puzzle in a second, related article (published in the subsequent issue of BJHP in the same year). What we find in that related analysis, however, is that the associationist explanation of sympathy never really disappeared from the Enquiry . Taken together, then, the arguments of the two papers goes some distance towards confirming that there is no real inconsistency between Hume’s position in the Enquiry and the Treatise regarding humanity, sympathy, and the source of our moral sentiments. (shrink)

La philosophie moderne tente souvent de faire du scepticisme un simple instrument ou moment provisoire de la recherche d ’ une certitude. Au travers surtout de l ’ étude du Traité de la nature humaine (I, IV), on montrera ici qu ’ à l ’ inverse le scepticisme de Hume est un scepticisme consistant, puisqu ’ il ne contredit pas le « naturalisme » et n ’ est pas non plus un simple moyen qui lui serait subordonné. Étant en relation (...) avec lui non seulement de l ’ extérieur mais par essence, le scepticisme mitigé se maintient au travers de nos croyances mêmes, de sorte que se limitant lui-même il devient la condition de leur réflexion et de leur modération. Il apparaît ainsi à la fois comme une doctrine philosophique consistante et comme une manière de vivre philosophique, modérée et responsable. (shrink)

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. (...) We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory. (shrink)

Hume says that sympathy is the source of our moral feeling of approval for useful qualities. But does Hume give the same psychological explanation of our approval of immediately agreeable qualities as he does to our approval of useful qualities? Does he trace our moral approbation of immediately agreeable qualities to sympathy? Some commentators, including Rachel Cohon and Don Garrett, argue that he does not. Let us call this view the ‘narrow view’ of sympathy in contrast to the ‘wide view’ (...) of sympathy, which holds that sympathy is required for every moral sentiment. There is indeed some apparent textual evidence in Hume’s work that seems to support the narrow view. My aim in this paper is to examine that evidence and show how it is merely apparent, in particular by showing how a number of passages can be and are misread. I thus want to argue indirectly for the wide view. (shrink)

In the “Appendix” to the Treatise, Hume claims that he has discovered a “very considerable” mistake in his earlier discussion of the self. Hume's expression of the problem is notoriously opaque, leading to a vast scholarly debate as to exactly what problem he identified in his earlier account of the self. I propose a new solution to this interpretive puzzle. I argue that a tension generated by Hume's conceptual skepticism about real “principles of union” and his account of fictions (...) of the imagination is the defect identified in the “Appendix.”. (shrink)

(1) Alors que Hume distingue plusieurs sortes de propositions, nous expliquons pourquoi il se focalise sur l’inférence causale lorsqu’il examine la nature de la croyance. (2) Après avoir considéré les réponses qu’il écarte concernant la nature de la croyance, nous étudions sa solution. (3) Nous dégageons les implications de sa position, dirigée entre autres contre la théorie cartésienne du jugement. (4) Une interprétation du rôle asymétrique de la croyance par rapport aux passions et à l’action est proposée. (5) La position (...) de Hume au sujet de la nature de la croyance, pensons-nous, rencontre une difficulté : elle est peu apte à rendre compte de la nature de la croyance existentielle négative. (shrink)

Cet article commente une lettre de jeunesse d’un Hume qui traverse une grave dépression nerveuse. Cet épisode pourtant n’a rien d’anecdotique, parce que Hume y théorise déjà le rapport entre la mélancolie, diagnostiquée à l’époque comme la maladie des lettrés, et sa manière de philosopher.

Schon seit langem ist bekannt, daß Humes "theory of the passions" sowohl für seine politische als auch für seine Moralphilosophie grundlegend gewesen ist. Vor allem in den Diskussionen über Humes "account of sympathy", also seiner Darstellung der Sympathie, ist dies längst zum Gemeinplatz geworden. Doch wird das gleichermaßen wichtige "principle of comparison" oft übersehen. Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Merkmale von Humes Darstellung des Mitgefühls und des "principle of comparison" und geht auf die Bedeutung dieser Prinzipien für (...) die Entstehung spezifisch moralischer Gefühle wie Mißgunst, Mitleid und Neid ein.Das "Selbst" ist unerlässlich sowohl für die Entstehung von Sympathie als auch für das Funktionieren des Prinzips des Vergleichens. Allerdings spielt es in beiden Fällen eine je unterschiedliche Rolle. Um den Unterschied zu erklären, muß man Humes Bindung an das "referencing principle" beachten. Eine Konsequenz dieses Prinzips ist, daß Selbstbewußtsein von den Meinungen, Einstellungen und Emotionen derer abhängt, die einem nahestehen. Schon seit langem ist bekannt, daß Humes "theory of the passions" sowohl für seine politische als auch für seine Moralphilosophie grundlegend gewesen ist. Vor allem in den Diskussionen über Humes "account of sympathy", also seiner Darstellung der Sympathie, ist dies längst zum Gemeinplatz geworden. Doch wird das gleichermaßen wichtige "principle of comparison" oft übersehen. Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Merkmale von Humes Darstellung des Mitgefühls und des "principle of comparison" und geht auf die Bedeutung dieser Prinzipien für die Entstehung spezifisch moralischer Gefühle wie Mißgunst, Mitleid und Neid ein.Das "Selbst" ist unerlässlich sowohl für die Entstehung von Sympathie als auch für das Funktionieren des Prinzips des Vergleichens. Allerdings spielt es in beiden Fällen eine je unterschiedliche Rolle. Um den Unterschied zu erklären, muß man Humes Bindung an das "referencing principle" beachten. Eine Konsequenz dieses Prinzips ist, daß Selbstbewußtsein von den Meinungen, Einstellungen und Emotionen derer abhängt, die einem nahestehen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to Gauthier Annette C. Baier Gauthier's splendidly dialectical paper1 first sets out Hume's official Treatise account ofhow each personhas a self-interested motive to curb her natural but socially troublesome self-interest, by agreeing to the adoption ofthe artifices ofprivate property rights, transfer by consent, and promise (provided others are also agreeing to adopt them), andhow the sympathy-dependent moral sentiment approves of (...) such a redirection of"the interested passion." Enlightened self-interest gives us the natural obligation tojustice; the fact that it is morally approved turns it into a moral obligation. Self-hatred for any breaches of the moral obligation may come in to bolster the self-interested motivation, and this will be helped along by the extra artifices employed by educators and politicians. So far so good. But now enters the sensible knave, who queries the initial assumption that each will in fact gain more by strict conformity to the rules of the Humean social artifices than by occasional carefully calculated and undetected breaches of them. If the knave is right, then the Treatise story ofhow reasonable self-interested people can get themselves to conscientiously respect property rights (including rights ofbarter), and to keep promises, is in trouble. Only by an erroneous calculation of their interest could they end with the motivation which Hume attributes to them, and finds to be morally approvable.Gauthier argues that there are indications even in the Treatise that Hume is aware ofthe flawed nature ofhis official account, since he attributes "sophistry" to some attempted justifications of honest behaviour, and attributes "feigned acts" of impossible willing to some conscientious promise-keepers. Gauthier finds Hume to have, in the Treatise, a second, less official story ofwhat it takes to be motivated to be just—that it takes error, and letting oneself be taken in by feignings and sophistry. In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals this submerged account surfaces in the sensible knave's challenge and Hume's admission that his own answer will not be satisfactory to the knave. The charms of official Humeanjustice, Gauthierconcludes, are spurious, sincethe "anatomy" of the account of the rational motivation to be just is known to be unsound. "The sensible knave's message is thathuman society... lacks any moral foundation." Volume XVIII Number 2 429 ANNETTE C. BAIER This is a sombre tale. One of its unwelcome implications is that Hume himself, really believing that the knave is right, but unwilling tobe seen tohave the bad grace to "dehver a theory, however true which... leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious," is simply trying to "sink" the knave's truth in oblivion by creating a smoke-screen of insincere rhetoric about the greater delights of consciousness of integrity over the knave's satisfaction in his ill-gotten gains. So there really are two sombre tales—one, attributed to Hume, about justice, and one about Hume's dupUcity (or is it mere cynical frivolity?): Gauthier crafts both stories beautifully, directing our attention to bits ofHume's text injust the right order for his dramatic purposes. But is he giving us truth or fiction? I completely agree with Gauthier's version of Hume's official Treatise story, that the moral obligation to justice supervenes on the "natural obligation" for which Hume believes the natural motivation to be collectively redirected self- (or family) interest.2 1 agree that there are one or two passages, especially in the Treatise section, "Of the obUgation of promises," that seem to jar with this account, and which much somehow be explained. I agree that Hume believes that his reply to the knave is, from the knave's point ofview, unsatisfactory. Now for some disagreements. First, about Hume's reply to the knave.3From the viewpointofthevirtuous dues-payingmemberof"the party of humankind," Hume's is a perfectly satisfactory reply. It will be plain truth, for a person with the other Humean virtues (including equity, which is listed as a natural virtue),4 that justice will bring as great or greater good than would judicious injustice. Even if it would be "simply preposterous" to believe that the social order is dangerously threatened by any... (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Humean Moral Sentiments as Responsibility Conferring Exclusion and Humean Moral Disapproval A Spectator's Standard of Virtue Looking Forward References Further Reading.

David Hume argues that the prevalence of human sympathizing justifies our attributing to humans a certain degree of benevolence. This move from sympathy to having a concern for others has been challenged by recent critics. A more fine-grained look at Hume’s concept of sympathy may reveal the reasons why he thought that experiencing sympathy implied having a benevolent attitude. Two arguments from the Treatise are analyzed and found wanting. It is suggested that Hume’s confusion may derive from ambiguities surrounding the (...) term “sympathy” and a lack of attention given to the intentional aspects of sympathizing. (shrink)

The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the (...) construction of a moral point of view, acknowledged by both writers, as my primary platform. My contention is that Humean sympathy is too mechanistic to actually deliver an impartial adjudicatory perspective, and that Smithian sympathy, with its evaluative, imaginative components, succeeds where Hume's account falls short. The paper is comprised of six sections: (i) introductory remarks, (ii) a discussion of Humean sympathy, (iii) a discussion of Smithian sympathy and its distinctness, (iv) a critical analysis of Hume's attempt to correct for sympathetic partiality in the construction of the judicial spectator's general point of view, (v) a critical discussion of sympathetic partiality in Smithian sympathy & (vi) a critical analysis of Smith's construction of the impartial spectator perspective as a moral point of view. (shrink)

Hume’s account of sympathy has often been taken to describe what the discovery of so-called mirror neurons has suggested, namely, that we are able to understand one another’s emotions and beliefs through experiences that require no mediating thoughts and exactly resemble the experiences of the observed person. I will oppose this interpretation by arguing that, on Hume’s standard account, sympathy is a mechanism that produces ideas and beliefs prior to the emergence of shared feelings. To stress this aspect of Humean (...) sympathy is to show that the experiences, which mirror neurons apparently cause us to have, may well count as inferentially derived emotion-laden beliefs, thus undermining the opposition between experience-grounded and inference-based accounts of mind-reading. (shrink)

Many prominent scholars of Hume's philosophy have suggested that Hume eventually abandoned his associationist account of sympathy, which he made so much of in the Treatise, by the time he came to write the second Enquiry. In this paper I reconsider the seeming disappearance of the associationist account of sympathy, but with the ultimate aim of defending a no-change hypothesis. That is, I’ll argue that careful analysis reveals that Hume not only retained the associationist theory of sympathy in his later (...) work, he made no substantive changes to this theory, including in particular, in EPM. (shrink)

More than two hundred years after its publication, David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is still widely regarded as either a footnote to the more philosophically interesting third book of the Treatise, or an abbreviated, more stylish, version of that earlier work. These standard interpretations are rather difficult to square with Hume's own assessment of the second Enquiry. Are we to think that Hume called the EPM “incomparably the best” of all his writings only because he preferred that (...) later style of exposition? Or worse, should we take his preference for the second Enquiry as a sign of aging literary vanity? Does Hume's stated preference for the EPM in no way speak to its philosophical content? (shrink)

David Hume's sympathetic principle applies to physical equals. In his account, we sympathize with those like us. By contrast, Adam Smith's sympathetic principle induces equality. We consider Hume's “other rational species” problem to see whether Smith's wider sympathetic principle would alter Hume's conclusion that “superior” beings will enslave “inferior” beings. We show that Smith introduces the notion of “generosity,” which functions as if it were Hume's justice even when there is no possibility of contract.

David Hume argues that the prevalence of human sympathizing justifies our attributing to humans a certain degree of benevolence. This move from sympathy to having a concern for others has been challenged by recent critics. A more fine-grained look at Hume’s concept of sympathy may reveal the reasons why he thought that experiencing sympathy implied having a benevolent attitude. Two arguments from the Treatise are analyzed and found wanting. It is suggested that Hume’s confusion may derive from ambiguities surrounding the (...) term “sympathy” and a lack of attention given to the intentional aspects of sympathizing. (shrink)

During the second half of the eighteenth century, the most powerful literary work in Britain was nonfictional: philosophy, history, biography, and political controversy. Leo Damrosch argues that this tendency is no accident; at the beginning of the modern age, writers were consciously aware of the role of cultural fictions, and they sought to ground those fictions in a real world beyond the text. Their political conservatism (often neglected by modern scholars) was an extensively thought out response to a (...) world in which meaning was inseparable from consensus, and in which consensus was increasingly under attack. Damrosch finds strong affinities between writers who are usually described as antagonists. The first chapter places Hume and Johnson in dialogue, showing that their responses to the challenge of their age have deep similarities, and that their thinking points forward in significant ways to twentieth-century pragmatism. Subsequent chapters explore the interrelationship of the fictive and the "real" in a wide range of works by Boswell, Gibbon, White, Burke, and Godwin. In its combination of literary, philosophical, and cultural criticism, this book will appeal to scholars in many fields as well as to nonacademic readers interested in intellectual history. (shrink)

RESUMEN Aún no se ha explorado si el potencial comunicativo del principio humeano de simpatía se limita al intercambio de sentimientos y emociones o si permite también compartir creencias. Mostraremos que Hume considera esta última posibilidad tanto a partir de la universalidad de la naturaleza humana y del carácter inherentemente social del hombre, como de la existencia de una interconexión entre pensamientos y sentimientos. Contrariamente a la opinión de diversos autores, afirmamos además que la experiencia propia no es condición de (...) posibilidad para poner en acto el principio de simpatía, sino que podemos recibir los sentimientos y creencias de los demás aunque no contemos con experiencia similar. ABSTRACT It has not yet been explored whether the communicational power of the Humean principle of sympathy is limited to conveying feelings and emotions or it also allows sharing beliefs. I will show that Hume considers the latter possibility both by means of the universality of human nature and the inherently social character of man, and the interconnection between thoughts and feelings. Contrary to the opinion of several authors, I will also argue that our personal experience is not a necessary condition to start up the principle of sympathy, but we can receive feelings and beliefs from other people even though we do not have previous similar experience. (shrink)

With his theory of sympathy in the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume has been interpreted as anticipating later hermeneutic theories of understanding. It is argued in the present article that Hume has good reasons to consider a hermeneutic theory of empathetic understanding, that such a theory avoids a serious difficulty in Hume’s “official,” positivist theory of sympathy, that it is compatible with the complex and subtle form of positivism, or naturalism, developed in Book 1 of the Treatise, and that his (...) analysis of sympathy provides valuable methodological rules for empathetic interpreters. Against the interpretation of James Farr in “Hume, Hermeneutics, and History,” it is maintained that Hume’s theory does not support a hermeneutics of nonempathetic Verstehen. (shrink)

The paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, by examining a conflict regarding the vivacity of the self in his writings about sympathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy supposes that self is the liveliest perception of thought, when we consider sympathy through the perspective of the ‘desire of company’, we find that self lacks vivacity and, without alterity, it would be in reality nothing. Our objective is to present the conflict and show that, far (...) from being a contradiction in Hume's thinking, it is consistent with how the philosopher conceives personal identity as a product of imagination, that is, a perception that, like any other, exists within the flow of perceptions. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Philosophical Background Arguments against Moral Rationalism The Moral Sentiments and Sympathy References Further Reading.

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy is substantially unchanged from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. I show that Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ to refer to three different mental phenomena (a psychological mechanism or principle, a sentiment, and a conversion process) and that he consistently refers to sympathy as a cause of benevolent motivation. I attempt to resolve an apparent difficulty regarding sympathy and humanity by explaining how each is an ‘original principle’ in Hume’s sense. (...) I conclude by suggesting how my interpretation might make a contemporary evaluation of Hume’s account of benevolent motivation possible. (shrink)