Sympathy, Belief and Experience in David Hume

Ideas Y Valores 71 (180):173-195 (2022)
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Abstract

RESUMEN Aún no se ha explorado si el potencial comunicativo del principio humeano de simpatía se limita al intercambio de sentimientos y emociones o si permite también compartir creencias. Mostraremos que Hume considera esta última posibilidad tanto a partir de la universalidad de la naturaleza humana y del carácter inherentemente social del hombre, como de la existencia de una interconexión entre pensamientos y sentimientos. Contrariamente a la opinión de diversos autores, afirmamos además que la experiencia propia no es condición de posibilidad para poner en acto el principio de simpatía, sino que podemos recibir los sentimientos y creencias de los demás aunque no contemos con experiencia similar. ABSTRACT It has not yet been explored whether the communicational power of the Humean principle of sympathy is limited to conveying feelings and emotions or it also allows sharing beliefs. I will show that Hume considers the latter possibility both by means of the universality of human nature and the inherently social character of man, and the interconnection between thoughts and feelings. Contrary to the opinion of several authors, I will also argue that our personal experience is not a necessary condition to start up the principle of sympathy, but we can receive feelings and beliefs from other people even though we do not have previous similar experience.

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Author's Profile

Sofia Calvente
Universidad Nacional de La Plata

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References found in this work

A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise.Annette Baier - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Hume's Experimental Method.Tamás Demeter - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (3):577-599.
Has anything changed? Hume's theory of association and sympathy after the treatise.Remy Debes - 2007 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2):313 – 338.

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