_Thinking for Clinicians_ provides analysts of all orientations with the tools and context for working critically within psychoanalytic theory and practice. It does this through detailed chapters on some of the philosophers whose work is especially relevant for contemporary theory and clinical writing: Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Buber, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Orange presents the historical background for their ideas, along with clinical vignettes to help contextualize their theories, further grounding them in real-world experience. With a hermeneutic sensibility (...) firmly in mind, _Thinking for Clinicians_ rewards as it challenges and will be a valuable reference for clinicians who seek a better understanding of the philosophical bases of contemporary psychoanalytic theory. (shrink)

Secular and religious values of psychotherapists influence the process of psychotherapy. The psychologist Allen Bergin has pointed out several major antitheses between values of secular psychotherapists and their religiously oriented clients. The present essay is a response to Bergin's antitheses, on the one hand, and to humanistic psychology, on the other, from the point of view of a Christian humanism. Karl Rahner's theological anthropology is proposed as one possible foundation for an explicit articulation of the relationship between psychotherapy and (...) religion, and as a means to address apparently divergent values of psychotherapists and religious believers. (shrink)

This volume explores how conceptions of pragmatism set forth in American philosophy serve as orienting perspectives in psychotherapy. Drawing on the influential contributions of William James and John Dewey, the author demonstrates how realistic, comparative approaches to understanding strengthen everyday therapeutic practice. He also examines recent developments in neuroscience that shape training and practice in the broader field of psychotherapy, encompassing psychodynamic, behavioral, cognitive and humanistic traditions. By following a clinical pragmatism, psychotherapy can be viewed as an instrumental project (...) that is governed by _results_ rather than a commitment to particular theoretical perspectives, empirical findings, or technical strategies. Through a variety of case studies, this volume emphasizes the crucial role of experiential learning in change and growth, and the recognition of the person as an individual. (shrink)

The article presents a review of Robert Woolfork’s book, The Cure of Souls, which argues that psychotherapy shares the “humanistic dimension” of philosophy. According to Woolfork, the philosophical roots of psychotherapy may be uncovered from its theories, concepts, and practices. Therefore, he explores the scientific, ethical, and philosophical issues at the heart of modern psychotherapy, showing their congruence with the ancient therapeutic concept of philosophy. Since modern forms of psychotherapy are founded on a descriptive and evaluative view of human (...) experience, philosophers may embrace a calling as counselors who honor the heritage of the ancient philosophers within the context of modern scientific psychology. (shrink)

The point of psychotherapy has occasionally been associated with talk of ‘life’s meaning’. However, the literature on meaning in life written by contemporary philosophers has yet to be systematically applied to literature on the point of psychotherapy. My broad aim in this chapter is to indicate some plausible ways to merge these two tracks of material that have run in parallel up to now. More specifically, my hunch is that the connection between meaning as philosophers understand it and therapy as (...) psychotherapists ought to practice it is much closer than is suggested by the field of existential psychotherapy, which expressly addresses the topic of life’s meaning and appeals to ideas from classic philosophers such Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and the like. I instead proffer the claim that psychodynamic and humanistic therapy, clinical psychology, and counselling psychology as such, not a particular branch of them, are best understood as enterprises in search of meaning in life, in the way many present-day philosophers understand this phrase. In this chapter, I spell out what I mean by this bold hypothesis and provide some good reason to take it seriously. (shrink)

Humanism and radical behaviorism are two of today's most anxiety-provoking systems of thought. While they have challenged some of society's most comforting notions, each has long been viewed as opposed to the other's practice of psychology. In this adversarial climate of contemporary psychology, Bobby Newman's compelling assessment in The Reluctant Alliance effectively tears down many of the ideological walls separating these two powerful schools of thought. He carefully researches the positions of both camps to dispel the myths that behaviorists are (...) "manipulators" and humanistic psychologists are "armchair philosophers". After examining both systems, Newman outlines their shared philosophical and historical roots and explores such questions as: How should psychotherapy be conducted? How is moral behavior created and maintained? Is behaviorism inherently unethical? What forms of education are most effective at imparting information and improving self-concepts? As Newman points out, "It is my intention to demonstrate that the differences between the two systems are not as great as they are made to seem. More importantly, I will suggest that each system contains flaws that can be corrected by combining elements of the other". After reading The Reluctant Alliance humanists will come to appreciate that behaviorism is not destructive determinism, and behaviorists will learn that much of what they hold to be true is a natural outgrowth of humanistic thought. (shrink)

Time series analysis is a technique to describe the structure and forecast values of a particular variable based on a series of sequential observations. While commonly used in finance and engineering to understand structural changes across time, its applicability to humanistic processes like discourse is less clear. This article demonstrates the feasibility and complementary use of TSA with a case study of metaphor use in psychotherapy sessions. A conceptual sketch of how TSA components relate to discourse components is followed (...) by a step-by-step analysis of two therapist–client dyads. Each dyad is shown to be adequately described by a different model, and the key characteristics of the models are interpreted alongside prior qualitative analysis of the dyads, shedding new light on their structural properties and attendant implications. Limitations of the present analysis and future research directions are briefly discussed. (shrink)

Abstract. A possible consequence of the dialogue between science and religion is a revived religious humanism—a firmer grasp of the historical and phenomenological meanings of the great world religions correlated with the more accurate explanations of the rhythms of nature that natural science can provide. The first great expressions of religious humanism in the West emerged when Jewish, Christian, and Islamic scholars sat in the same libraries in Spain and Sicily, studying and translating the lost manuscripts of Aristotle in the (...) ninth and tenth centuries to understand his ethics, epistemology, and psychobiology. In our day, the science-religion dialogue—exemplified by interaction among psychology, spirituality, and psychotherapy—will best support such a revival if guided by the philosophical resources of critical hermeneutics (sometimes called hermeneutical realism) supplemented by William James's brand of phenomenology and pragmatism. Here, I develop primarily the contributions of Paul Ricoeur to hermeneutic realism and his unique ability to find a place for the natural sciences within hermeneutic phenomenology in his formula of understanding-explanation-understanding. (shrink)

Free will is discussed from a feminist/social constructionist perspective, especially in relationship to therapy. According to many psychological studies, women are perceived as less likely to exercise their free will and to suffer serious psychological consequences. Feminist critiques challenge this argument and the underlying liberal humanist image of the fully human being as an individual who is endowed with free will. It is stressed that within the binary construction of gender difference, the qualities associated with the free willed individual are (...) identical with those associated with men; women become the inferior other. An alternative construction of human ideal is advocated: relational selves. This repositioning dislocates other formulations, including free will, and changes the notion of therapy into a relational activity, suggesting that it may be as liberating to men as to women. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

"Annotated bibliography of Friedman's books": p. 289-304.

Reviews the book, The handbook of humanistic psychology: Leading edges in theory, research, and practice by Kirk J. Schneider, James F. T. Bugental, and J. Fraser Pierson . Over 30 years ago Abraham Maslow envisioned a 3rd force psychology that would bring about “a change of basic thinking along the total front of man’s endeavors, a potential change in every social institution, in every one of the ‘fields’ of intellectual endeavor, and in every one of the professions.” Schneider, Bugental, (...) and Pierson must have been guided by a similar vision as they edited the Handbook of humanistic psychology: Leading edges in theory, research, and practice. The breadth of the handbook is impressive with chapters addressing everything from psychotherapy, pedagogy, medicine, and spirituality to ecology, literature, social action and the workplace. The editors have successfully recruited authors from a variety of disciplines—including psychology, psychiatry, philosophy, education, and politics—who are well respected both inside and outside humanistic circles and who are exceptionally qualified to address their topics. Fortunately, despite this far-reaching breadth, the editors have not spread the handbook too thin. In fact, in areas where it seems especially needed there is a much welcome depth and detail that is far from typical of other handbooks. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Nourishing the Inner Life of Clinicians and Humanitarians: The Ethical Turn in Psychoanalysis, demonstrates the demanding, clinical and humanitarian work that psychotherapists often undertake with fragile and devastated people, those degraded by violence and discrimination. In spite of this, Donna M. Orange argues that there is more to human nature than a relentlessly negative view. Drawing on psychoanalytic and philosophical resources, as well as stories from history and literature, she explores ethical narratives that ground hope in human goodness and shows (...) how these voices, personal to each analyst, can become sources of courage, warning and support, of prophetic challenge and humility which can inform and guide their work. Over the course of a lifetime, the sources change, with new ones emerging into importance, others receding into the background. Donna Orange uses examples from ancient Rome, from twentieth century Europe, from South Africa, and from nineteenth century Russia. She shows how not only can their words and examples, like those of our personal mentors, inspire and warn us; but they also show us the daily discipline of spiritual self-care, although these examples rely heavily on the discipline of spiritual reading, other practitioners will find inspiration in music, visual arts, or elsewhere and replenish the resources regularly. Nourishing the Inner Life of Clinicians and Humanitarians will help psychoanalysts to develop a language with which to converse about ethics and the responsibility of the therapist/analyst. This is an exceptional contribution highly suitable for practitioners and students of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Donna M. Orange teaches, consults, and offers study groups for psychoanalysts and gestalt therapists. She seeks to integrate contemporary psychoanalysis with radically relational ethics. Recent books are _Thinking for Clinicians: Philosophical Resources for Contemporary Psychoanalysis and the Humanistic Psychotherapies _, and _The Suffering Stranger: Hermeneutics for Everyday Clinical Practice_, both from Routledge. (shrink)

_Therapy & the Counter-tradition: The Edge of Philosophy_ brings together leading exponents of contemporary psychotherapy, philosophers and writers, to explore how philosophical ideas may inform therapy work. Each author discusses a particular philosopher who has influenced their life and therapeutic practice, while questioning how counselling and psychotherapy can address human ‘wholeness’, despite the ascendancy of rationality, regulation and diagnosis. It also seeks to acknowledge the distinct lack of philosophical input and education in counselling and psychotherapy training. The chapters are rooted (...) in the Counter-Tradition, whose diverse manifestations include humanism, skepticism, fideism, as well as the opening of philosophy and psychology to poetry and the arts. This collection of thought-provoking essays will help open the discussion within the psychological therapies, by providing therapists with critical philosophical references, which will help broaden their knowledge and the scope of their practice. Therapy & the Counter-tradition: The Edge of Philosophy will be of interest to mental health professionals, practitioners, counselling and psychotherapy trainees and trainers, and academics tutoring or studying psychology. It will also appeal to those interested in psychology, meditation, personal development and philosophy. (shrink)

In the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, we created and implemented from November 2020 to February 2021 a monthly educational pilot program of philosophical management of stress based on Science, Humanism and Epicurean Pragmatism, which was offered to employees of 26 municipalities in the Prefecture of Attica, Greece. The program named “Philosophical Distress Management Operation System” (Philo.Di.M.O.S.) is novel and unique in its kind, as it combines a certain Greek philosophical tradition (Epicurean) that concurs with modern scientific knowledge. The (...) program was designed to be implemented in a period of crisis; therefore, it used a fast-paced, easy to learn and practice philosophical approach to stress management, based on cognitive psychotherapy. The philosophical approach to stress management has the advantage that it can be offered to most people, regardless of age and educational level. The pilot program was effective in achieving its objectives, shown by statistical comparisons of the trainees’ responses to anonymous questionnaires before and after the month-long training. The successful Philo.Di.M.O.S. program, thus, based on a solid scientific and philosophical basis, offers a paradigm of stress management during crises and could be useful in Greece and internationally. (shrink)

`Hans Cohn has given us a personal and valuable statement about the theoretical underpinnings of his work as a psychotherapist. These can be little doubt about his contribution to our thinking practice is invaluable. Students will find Cohn's easygoing exposition of complex ideas enormously helpful' - Professor Emmy van Deurzen, Existential Analysis `One of the most important books published this year. This long-awaited book by the foremost expert on the relationship between Heidegger and psychotherapy, manages to encapsulate the essence of (...) Heidegger's thinking and make of understandable and relevant to therapists without losing any of the original meaning' - Counsellingbooks.com Anyone interested in modern philosophy is familiar with the name of Martin Heidegger but there is a serious gap in even the most complete accounts of his life and thought. This is Heidegger's association with, and influence on, psychotherapy. Hans C Cohn explores the role of Heidegger's thought in providing an alternative basis for psychotherapeutic practice to the dominant psychodynamic, humanistic and cognitive approaches, also focusing strongly on the practical therapeutic relevance of Heidegger's ideas. This book will be essential reading for students and teachers of modern philosophy, as well as existential psychotherapists, and all practitioners interested in existential approaches to therapy. (shrink)

Info in English (book is in German): The book "Schöpferische Freiheit" ("Creative Freedom") is considered the third major work of Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Metzger (1899-1979) - along with his "Psychology" and the "Laws of Seeing". According to Michael Stadler and Wolfgang Crabus, Metzger's real achievement in the further development of Gestalt theory is expressed in this book: "Metzger develops here, on the basis of Köhler's natural philosophical ideas of 'physical Gestalten' (1920) and incorporating the teachings of Zen Buddhism ... a (...) theory of education for creative thought and action. ... This book perhaps most clearly expresses the ethic of free self-determination of human thought and action inherent in Gestalt theory." "Creative Freedom" has lost none of its relevance since its last edition in 1962. It can be considered a foundational work of a Gestalt theory of the living. Jürgen Kriz writes in his preface to the now new edition: "It is extremely gratifying that this central work not only of Gestalt psychology, but (at least from my point of view) also of humanistic psychology and psychotherapy is being reissued. It is currently available only in (all too few) libraries and single antiquarian copies. Yet the central messages and insights of Wolfgang Metzger's 'Creative Freedom' are more relevant than ever: as a necessary warning against the aberrations of an increasing functionalization, medicalization, and progress-believing optimization (for whatever purposes) of the human being in our time." The new edition is accompanied by comments on the topicality and relevance of the work for education and teaching (Marianne Soff) as well as for psychotherapy (Gerhard Stemberger). Buchinformation: Die „Schöpferische Freiheit“ gilt als das dritte Hauptwerk des Gestaltpsychologen Wolfgang Metzger (1899-1979) – neben seiner „Psychologie“ und den „Gesetzen des Sehens“. Nach Michael Stadler und Wolfgang Crabus kommt in diesem Buch Metzgers eigentliche Leistung der Weiterentwicklung der Gestalttheorie zum Ausdruck: „Metzger entwickelt hier auf der Grundlage von Köhlers naturphilosophischen Ideen der ‚physischen Gestalten‘ (1920) und unter Einbeziehung der Lehren des Zen-Buddhismus … eine Theorie der Erziehung zum schöpferischen Denken und Handeln. … Dieses Buch drückt vielleicht am deutlichsten die der Gestalttheorie inhärente Ethik der freien Selbstbestimmung menschlichen Denkens und Handelns aus.“. (shrink)

Summary This paper starts with a short review of recent developments in psychotherapy process research and analyzes that a medical, or better, technical approach in process research – using words such as ‘intervention’, ‘effect’ and ‘outcome’ – is gradually acknowledged as only one side of psychotherapy; the other, more human or ‘humanistic’ side, is ‘conversation’, described by prominent authors as ‘low technology’. Conversation analysis cannot study psychotherapy as a whole. Sessions are subdivided into ‘situations’. What are situations? I make (...) a proposal to answer this question by three components: open up, select and control options. Then, 11 transcribed extracts from psychoanalytical therapy sessions are used to describe three types of situations and the special kind of requirements they demand from a therapist. Obviously, such situations appear during a session, they can be handled if therapists are sensitized for certain difficulties to arise. Shift-of-situation and double meaning are new observations in this approach to define the situational gestalt and train ‘seeing’ it. (shrink)

Psychoanalysis, in its purist mainstream sense, tends to be considered as an isolationist discipline that steers clear of interdisciplinary connections with other psychotherapies. Its drive for purity does not open up to influences that cast as alien and a threat to its core principles. We refer to Hegelian dialectics in an attempt to offer an alternative approach to interdisciplinarity in clinical psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis entertains a complex dialectical relationship with the major theories it opposes. In this dynamic, psychoanalysis begins by negating (...) the non-psychoanalytic theory as a part of self-negation (Hegel calls this phase self-alienation). But in its own process of growth, it negates this negation and reabsorbs the alienated self part. Reabsorbing the negated component, psychoanalysis does not revert to its original identity but becomes sublated into a different, more complex idea. In this epistemological process, psychoanalysis deals with its own practical and theoretical anomalies and lacunas. The paper illustrates this process using three central developments in the history of psychoanalysis: empathy in self psychology (connection with Rogers' humanist psychology), short-term dynamic psychotherapy (connection with short, intensive therapies), and mentalization-based psychotherapy (connection with cognitive-behavioral therapies). In all of these cases, psychoanalysis integrates components it previously opposed and changes these components to their own, specific characteristics. We address the epistemological shifts in the scientific status of psychoanalysis and show their connection to dialectics. Finally, we conclude that dialectical development is what allows psychoanalysis to remain relevant and up to date, to be open to interdisciplinary influences without its identity and tradition coming under threat. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Abnormal PsychologyArticlesAggernaes, A. 1972. The expanded reality of hallucinations and other psychological phenomena. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 48: 220–238.Anonymous. 1991. Child sexual abuse and the limits of responsibility. Lancet 337: 890.Anonymous. 1993. Mental incapacity and medical treatment. Lancet 341: 1123–1124.Appelbaum, M. D., and A. Creer. 1993. Confidentiality in group therapy. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 44: 311–312.Beatson, J. A. 1993. (...) The psychiatrist and peer review—a psychodynamic review of the literature. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 27: 311–318.Berrios, G. E. 1987. Dementia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: a conceptual history. Psychological Medicine 17: 829–837.Blackburn, R. 1988. On moral judgments and personality disorders: the myth of psychopathic personality revisited. British Journal of Psychiatry 153: 505–512.Blackmon, W. D. 1993. Are psychoanalytic billing practices ethical? American Journal of Psychotherapy 47: 613–620.Blashfield, R. K., and J. G. Draguns. 1976. Evaluative criteria for psychiatric classification. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 85, no. 2: 140–150.Blashfield, R. K., J. Sprock, and A. K. Fuller. 1990. Suggested guidelines for including or excluding categories in the DSM-IV. Comprehensive Psychiatry 31, no. 1: 15–19.Blashfield, R. K., J. Sprock, D. Haymaker et al. 1989. The family resemblance hypothesis applied to psychiatric classification. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 177: 492–497.Borys, D. S. 1994. Maintaining therapeutic boundaries: the motive is therapeutic effectiveness not defensive practice. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 267–273.Brown, W. M. 1985. On defining disease. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10: 311–328.Bub, J. 1994a. Is cognitive neuropsychology possible? Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1: 417–427.Bub, J. 1994b. Testing models of cognition through the analysis of brain-damaged performance. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 45, no. 3: 837–855.Buck, C. 1989. Problems with the Popperian approach: A response to Pearce and Crawford-Brown. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 42: 185–187.Buck, R. 1994. The neuropsychology of communication: spontaneous and symbolic aspects. Journal of Pragmatics 22, no. 3-4: 265–278.Camp, N. M. 1993. The Vietnam war and the ethics of combat psychiatry. American Journal of Psychiatry 150: 1000–1009.Crockett, C. 1961. Ethics, metaphysics, and psychoanalysis. Inquiry 4: 37–52.Dalton, E., K. Hopper, and S. Reiner. 1976. Ethical issues in behavior control. Values and Ethics in Health Care 2: 1–40.Faust, D. 1993a. Use and then prove, or prove and then use? Some thoughts on the ethics of mental health professionals’ courtroom involvement. Ethics and Behavior 3, no. 3-4: 359–380.Fodor, J., and E. Lepore. 1994. What is the connection principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 4.Foss, L. 1994. Putting the mind back into the body: a successor scientific medical model. Theoretical Medicine 15, no. 3: 291–313.Galletly, C. A. 1993. Psychiatrist-patient sexual relationships: the ethical dilemmas. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 27: 133–139.Glymour, C. 1994. On the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 45, no. 3: 815–835.Gottlieb, M. C. 1994. Ethical decision making, boundaries, and treatment effectiveness: a reprise. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 287–293.Gutheil, T. G. 1994. Discussion of Lazarus’s “How certain boundaries and ethics diminish therapeutic effectiveness”. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 295–298.Helme, T. 1993. A special defence—a psychiatric approach to formalising euthanasia. British Journal of Psychiatry 163: 456–466.Kovel, J. 1976–77. Therapy in late capitalism. Telos 30: 73–92.Lazarus, A. A. 1994a. How certain boundaries and ethics diminish therapeutic effectiveness. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 255–261.Lazarus, A. A. 1994b. The illusion of the therapist’s power and the patient’s fragility: my rejoinder. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 299–306.Lehrman, N. S. 1980. Psychiatric power and responsibility: Abuse and abdication, a proposed corrective conference. The Humanist 40: 9–13.Lockhart, T. 1992. Professions, confidentiality, and moral uncertainty. Professional Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Journal 1, no. 3-4: 33–52.Margolin, S. G. 1964. The scientific status of psychoanalytic clinical evidence (II). Inquiry 7: 37... (shrink)

Taking as its starting-point the interest in archaeological metaphors evinced by Freud and by Jung, this paper considers the project of analytical psychology under the rubric of the recently discussed term, ‘philosophical archaeology’. Noting the shared methodological assumptions and procedures between these two areas, the paper goes on to examine the extent to which Jung’s project can legitimately be considered as an archaeological pursuit in respect of two key aspects: its humanism, and its hermeneutics. In this second case, the paper (...) concludes, we can learn much from Jung’s recently published Red Book, sections of which may be profitably read through the lens of his seminal paper, ‘The Aims of Psychotherapy’. What emerges from this discussion is a clearer appreciation of the role of the archaic in Jung’s thought, an insight into the analytic consulting-room (as a place of the archetypal) as a third instance of the site of philosophical archaeology in addition to the archive (as a place of statement or l’énoncé) and the museum (as a place of expression), and a confirmation of Heidegger’s assertion that ‘the authenticity and greatness of historical knowledge reside in an understanding of the mysterious character of the beginning’. (shrink)

This chapter evaluates the multiple roles of technology in psychiatry, drawing on philosophical resources and mindful of psychiatry's need to benefit from technology without reducing itself to nothing but a technology. It approaches the topic of technology and psychiatry from three perspectives. First, it addresses technology as a way of thinking-technical or instrumental reason-and how technical reason informs psychiatric theory and practice. For this analysis it invokes a philosophical tradition that stretches from Aristotle to Toulmin and Gadamer. Second, it takes (...) up technology as achievement, the most obvious example of which is psychotropic medications. For this dimension of technology in psychiatry it recruits philosopher Albert Borgmann, who has analyzed the tendency of technological products, analyzed as device paradigms, to transmute into commodities. Finally, the chapter takes up technology as instrument of investigation. Philosopher Don Ihde is the guide in this investigation into how the psychiatrically real can become what is revealed through the technological instrument. The final section addresses the overarching question of how to set the right balance between the technological and the non-technological in psychiatry-how psychiatry can make use of technology without losing its humanistic core. It notes that the binary of the technological and non-technology in psychiatry can be mapped onto other binaries: biology and psychology, mind and brain, medication and psychotherapy, diagnosis and patient, theory and instance, general and individual, technical and practical reason. These binaries are not precisely isomorphic with each other, but all contribute to evaluating the role of technology in psychiatry, both in the present and in the desired future. (shrink)

Praise for First Edition: `This book is highly recommended to a wide range of people as a clear and systematic introduction to phenomenological psychology... the book has set the stage for possible new colloquia between the phenomenological and other approaches in psychology' - Changes `As a trainee interested in matters existential, I have been put off in the past by the long-winded and confusing texts usually available in academic libraries. Thankfully, here is a text that remedies that situation... [it] provides (...) a readable and insightful account' - Clinical Psychology Forum 'Spinelli’s classic introduction to phenomenology should be essential reading on all person-centred, existential and humanistic trainings, and any other counselling or psychotherapy course which aims to help students develop an in-depth understanding of human lived-experience. This book is sure to remain a key text for many years to come' - Mick Cooper, Senior Lecturer in Counselling, University of Strathclyde 'This is by far the most monumental, erudite, comprehensive, authoritative case that Existentialism and Phenomenology (a) have a rightful place in the academy; (b) are tough-minded bodies of thought; (c) have rigorous scientific foundations; (d) bequeath a distinctive school of psychotherapy and counselling; and (e) are just as good as the more established systems of psychology' - Alvin R. Mahrer, Ph.D. University of Ottawa, Canada, Author of The Complete Guide To Experiential Psychotherapy 'This book’s rich insight into the lacunae of modern psychological thinking illustrates the contribution that existential phenomenology can make to founding a coherently mature Psychology that is both fully human(e) and responsibly ‘scientific’ in the best sense of that term' - Richard House, Ph.D., Magdalen Medical Practice, Norwich; Steiner Waldorf teacher. The Interpreted World, Second Edition, is a welcome introduction to phenomenological psychology, an area of psychology which has its roots in notoriously difficult philosophical literature. Writing in a highly accessible, jargon-free style, Ernesto Spinelli traces the philosophical origins of phenomenological theory and presents phenomenological perspectives on central topics in psychology - perception, social cognition and the self. He compares the phenomenological approach with other major contemporary psychological approaches, pointing up areas of divergence and convergence with these systems. He also examines implications of phenomenology for the precepts and process of psychotherapy. For the Second Edition, a new chapter on phenomenological research has been added in which the author focuses on the contribution of phenomenology in relation to contemporary scientific enquiry. He describes the methodology used in phenomenological research and illustrates the approach through an actual research study. The Interpreted World, Second Edition demystifies an exciting branch of psychology, making its insights available to all students of psychology, psychotherapy and counselling. (shrink)

A profile of Alexander Lowen between psychotherapy and philosophy This text is a revised version of a speech, given at a conference in Naples in memory of Alexander Lowen (1910-2008) on the tenth anniversary of his death. My remarks try to answer two simple questions, namely what philosophy learns from a system of psychology of personality and psychotherapy such as the one developed by Alexander Lowen, and – turning the perspective around – what a humanistic psychology such as bioenergetics (...) can learn from philosophy. I argue that bioenergetics encourages philosophy to rediscover vitality as a fundamental value and to look with new eyes at themes of its most ancient tradition such as the ethics of pleasure and happiness, which are Lowenian topics par excellence. On the other side, philosophy warns psychologists and psychotherapists against reductionism. Psychology and psychotherapy can learn from philosophy and humanistic culture to proceed in an “integrative” rather than reductionist way, and to stay open to the variety of possible experiences. (shrink)

In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, (...) presents the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology. (shrink)

RE-ISSUED WITH INDEX 'Therapy may be mad,' declares Rob Weatherill in this outspoken volume. Therapy here means particularly psychotherapy and counselling, but should be also taken to signify the universal logic of the post-modern therapeutic culture of well-being, happiness and enjoyment. More and more people want to believe in therapy who have lost belief in anything else. Counselling and therapy increasingly inform all human interaction. The dominant ethos is a holistic one. This book aims to refute, primarily through the prism (...) of modern psychoanalysis and key theorists like Baudrillard, Levinas, Lyotard, Paz, Steiner, Reiff as well as Žižek, the fashion for a return to a pre-Cartesian ideal of harmony and integration. On the contrary, there is something monstrous, something excessive, that Freud termed the death drive, at the heart of the Real upon which ordinary reality, so to speak, rests. Enlightenment thought, in which we in the West in particular are caught, is entirely incapable of going beyond the ideal humanist version of man – our last great illusion. (shrink)

The idea of the numinous is often raised in psychoanalytic and psychodynamic contexts, but it is rarely itself subjected to close scrutiny. This volume examines how the numinous has gained currency in the post-modern world, demonstrating how the numinous is no longer confined to religious discourses but is included in humanist, secular and scientific views of the world. Questions of soul and spirit are increasingly being raised in connection with the scientific exploration of the psyche, and especially in the context (...) of psychotherapy. The contributors to this volume are interested in exploring the numinous in the human psyche, in clinical work, world events, anthropology, sociology, philosophy and the humanities. They originate from multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural backgrounds, bringing a variety of approaches to subjects including: · Witchcraft: the numinous power of humans · Jung and Derrida: the numinous, deconstruction and myth · Accessing the numinous: Apolline and Dionysian pathways · The role of the numinous in the reception of Jung The Idea of the Numinous will fascinate all analytical psychologists, psychoanalysts, and psychotherapists interested in investigating the overlap between therapeutic and religious interests. (shrink)

Reviews the special issue of The Humanistic Psychologist, Psychotherapy for freedom: The daseinsanalytic way in psychology and psychotherapy edited by Erik Craig . The editor brings together a uniquely developed collection of essays, seminars, and interviews delving into foundational as well as clinically-oriented issues regarding the application of Martin Heidegger's philosophy to the fields of psychiatry and psychotherapy. Craig's edition exhibits a cohesiveness not often found in edited volumes, and it manages to be inspiring to the more advanced reader (...) while remaining accessible to the introductory student. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 29-31 [Access article in PDF] On the Border:Reflections on the Meaning of Self-Injury in Borderline Personality Disorder Robert L. Woolfolk Keywords borderline personality disorder, values, psychotherapy, diagnosis IT IS A PLEASURE to comment on Nancy Potter's elegantly written, provocative paper. Professor Potter raises important and intriguing issues that have not only clinical implications for practitioners, but also are of theoretical significance for those (...) who ponder the conceptual status of mental illnesses and their manifestations.Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is the mental health professional's bête noire. In the diagnostic context, borderline is an adjective that is evocative, albeit imprecise. Persons with BPD tend to the worst of multiple pathological worlds, to fall through the diagnostic cracks, to occupy the boundaries of decorum and safety. Even such intrepid and astute folk as Marsha Linnehan and Otto Kernberg, who have devoted careers to understanding and treating those with BPD, have acknowledged the limited state of current knowledge. Justice Stewart's theory of natural concepts seems to apply to patients to whom we give the label borderline personality disorder: we cannot define the disorder readily, but we know one when we see one. And when we see such a patient it is costly in time and stress and corrosive of one's sense of professional efficacy. So with these patients, any assistance in conceptualizing the problem or in modification of therapeutics is welcome.Professor Potter's phenomenological formulation of self-injury is cogent and helpful in a number of ways. Self-injurious behavior is, when conventionally interpreted, a prototype for irrationality and affliction. It is also dramatic, graphic, and often repugnant. Professor Potter's analysis brings us face to face with what most of us know but sometimes forget or fail to apply: Psychotherapy is a value-laden endeavor. Early on, both Max Weber and Carl Jung were eloquent on this point and we have been reminded often enough of it in the last four decades (Rieff 1966; Woolfolk 1998; Woolfolk and Murphy, in press). Usually it is the moral values residing in the underlying ideologies of treatment and diagnosis that are brought to our attention. The axiological underpinnings of psychotherapy, however, are aesthetic as well as ethical. Professor Potter successfully argues that, as therapists, we may be in the thrall of a parochial aesthetic that produces [End Page 29] a kind of tunnel vision inimical to therapeutic effectiveness and to the ethical treatment of the human beings who are our patients. She has impeccable advice for therapists on this topic: Although none of us can step outside of culture altogether, we can evaluate our attitudes, beliefs, and values from a second-order level (Taylor 1989; Frankfurt 1971). Complete objectivity is an unlikely ideal. But clinicians can, and should, think critically about ways in which prevailing norms and values may be influencing their understanding of the world and their ways of being in it. (Potter 2003, 11) Professor Potter also quite effectively persuades that a comprehensive understanding of disorders that occur mostly in women (e.g., somatization disorder) must effectively comprehend feminist scholarship and the sociocultural realities of gender. The concept of the commodification of the female body has been informative in both the epidemiology and treatment of yet another woman's disorder, anorexia nervosa. And although the linkages of somatic commodification to self-injurious behavior may not appear to be so straightforward, the paper points the way to deeper and possibly richer explanations of phenomena that seem at first glance to be inexplicable.The introduction of the concept of uptake into clinical contexts is also a valuable contribution. Those of us familiar with the traditions of psychotherapy recognize a concept both familiar and central. Uptake has family resemblance to the empathic attitude so extensively discussed by both Rogers and Kohut. Those with hermeneutic leanings will recognize affinities with Verstehen and the Gadamerian anticipation of completeness (Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit). Any truly humanistic approach to treatment or diagnosis must encompass the lived experience of the patient. This is not to... (shrink)

I want to begin by saying that the terms of reference of this series of lectures grated on me, in particular, the word ‘power’. One thing it conjured up was the criticism made by people who say we use our power over our patients to brainwash them, that the psychotherapeutic relationship is inescapably authoritarian, domineering, coercive. This was widely said in the sixties by leftist and feminists and others who sought a therapeutic relationship that was more equal, co-counselling, for example, (...) where the client and the therapist took turns exposing their problems. In my experience, most people who took up that position eventually saw the merits of relatively orthodox psychotherapy, and many have trained in conventional psychodynamic psychotherapy. I asked my partner, who is also a psychoanalytic psychotherapist, what the term power conjured up for her and got an uncharacteristically sharp response. She said, ‘I hate that word. It’s used by humanistic therapists who are afraid of authority, difference and knowledge and want us all to be the same. It’s like saying colour doesn’t matter. They confuse the abuse of power with the use of power. They assume that all exercise of power is abusive.’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3.2 (1996) 139-142 Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology Articles Abramowitz, S., C. Abramowitz, C. Jackson et al. 1973. The politics of clinical judgment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 41: 385-391.Audi, R. N. 1972. Psychoanalytic explanation and the concept of rational action. The Monist 56: 444- 464.Barondess, J. A. 1979. Disease and illness--a crucial distinction. American (...) Journal of Medicine 66: 375-376.Barrett, R. J. 1988. Interpretations of schizophrenia. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 12: 357-388.Bechtel, W. 1993. The case for connectionism. Philosophical Studies 7: 119-154.Belzen, J. A. 1995. The impact of phenomenology on classical psychiatry: Rümke's position between Jaspers and Kraepelin. History of Psychiatry 6: 349-385.Benda, C. E. 1967. Neuroses of conscience. Journal of Existentialism 7: 425-442.Binns, P. 1995. Commentary on "Contentless consciousness." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2: 61-63.Blankenburg, W. 1980. Phenomenology and psychopathology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 11: 50-78.Bloomfield, T. M. 1979. Psychoanalysis: A human science? Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 9: 271-287.Blumenfeld, D. 1972. Free action and unconscious motivation. The Monist 56: 426-443.Boudreaux, G. 1977. Freud on the nature of unconscious mental processes. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 7: 1-32.Bracken, P. J. 1995. Beyond liberation: Michael Foucault and the notion of a critical psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 1-13.Brazier, M. 1995. Commentary on "Who should be committable?." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 49-50.Bursztajn, J., and A. Brodsky. 1995. Authenticity and autonomy in the managed-care era: Forensic psychiatric perspectives. Journal of Clinical Ethics 5, no. 3: 237-242.Byrnes, J. F. 1979. Suggestions on writing the history of psychological data. History and Theory 16: 297-305.Campbell, E. J., J. G. Scadding, and R. J. Roberts. 1979. The concept of disease. British Medical Journal 2: 757-762.Carveth, D. 1988. In reply to Eagle's reply on "The epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18: 377-378.Chadwick, R. F. 1995. Commentary on "Karl Jaspers and Edmund Husserl." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 83-84.Christiansen, B. 1964. The scientific status of psychoanalytic clinical evidence (III). Inquiry 7: 47-79.Davis, M. 1987. Realistic utilitarianism and the social conditions of cognitive psychotherapy. Social Theory & Practice 13: 237-259.Dega, W., et al. 1978. Ethics and mental health: Discussion. Dialectics and Humanism 5: 219-235.Dingle, H. 1949. The logical status of psycho-analysis. Analysis 9: 63-66.Dupeau, J. 1977. Freud and degeneracy. Diogenes Spring: 43-64.Eagle, M. 1988. A reply to Carveth's "The epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18: 371-375.Elevitch, B. 1974-75. Reasons, motives and psychoanalysis. Philosophical Forum (Boston) 6: 143- 162.Elliot, P. 1995. Policies, identity, and social change: Contested grounds in psychoanalytic feminism. Hypatia 10: 41-55.Fabrega Jr, H. 1980. The position of psychiatric illness in biomedical theory: A cultural analysis. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 5: 145-168.Fisk, G. 1993. Accreditation of psychotherapists. British Journal of Hospital Medicine 50: 437-438.Flynn, B. G. 1985. Reading Habermas reading Freud. Human Studies 8: 57-76.Forrow, L., R. M. Arnold, and J. Frader. 1991. Teaching clinical ethics in the residency years--preparing competent professionals. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16: 93-112.Friedman, M. 1982. Philosophical anthropology and psychotherapy. Philosophical Context 12: 9-19.Galdston, I. 1969. The ontologic foundations of morality. Existential Psychiatry 7: 69-75.Gardner, S. 1995a. Commentary on "Irrationality and the dynamic unconscious." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 2: 175-176.Gardner, S. 1995b. Psychoanalysis, science, and commonsense. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 2: 93-113.Handelsman, M. M. et al. 1995. Does legally mandated consent to psychotherapy ensure ethical appropriateness? The Colorado experience. Ethics and Behavior 5, no. 2: 119-129.Hanlon, M. D. 1977. Commentary on Dunham's "Psychiatry, Sociology and Civil Liberties." Values and Ethics in Health Care 2: 275-278.Heaton, J. M. 1972. Insight in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eclecticism and Adolf Meyer’s Functional Understanding of Mental IllnessD. B. Double (bio)KeywordsAdolf Meyer, eclecticism, functionalism, biopsychosocial modelGhaemi’s Commentary and Meyer’s ‘Eclecticism’I am not against humanism. How could anyone be against the humanistic wisdom rooted in the worthy writings of Socrates, Hippocrates, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Osler, and the others listed by Nassir Ghaemi? Psychiatry should recognize the dignity and value of all people. The problem is that it may not (...) always do so, coming from a reductionist paradigm as it so often does.Ghaemi appreciates that Meyer’s compromising attitude meant that he was “unable to inoculate psychiatry from biological dogmatism.” My emphasis is on the challenge of Meyer’s psychobiology to biomedicine. In the same way, Engel’s biopsychosocial model acknowledged the need to neutralize the power of an impersonal and mechanical medicine. Doctors tend to overemphasize physical abnormalities at the expense of dealing with difficult personal issues.At the risk of oversimplification, I am juxtaposing biopsychosocial and biomedical models in psychiatry. Or in other terms, for our modern understanding, I am asserting a neo-Meyerian approach in contrast to neo-Kraepelinianism. Merely restating the Meyerian perspective will not do, because of Meyer’s ‘give and take,’ and his consequent failure to follow through the implication of his position. At least the ethical ramifications of his conceptual framework need to be acknowledged.Neo-Meyerianism also needs to be realized in the context of the reaction to anti-psychiatry. After anti-psychiatry’s attack, our modern understanding of mental illness has tended to be been subsumed into the binary opposition of ‘pro-psychiatry’ and ‘anti-psychiatry.’ But neo-Meyerianism is as much pro-psychiatric as biomedical psychiatry. It is in this sense that biopsychological approaches have been undermined by the biomedical reaction to anti-psychiatry. [End Page 355]I also agree with Ghaemi that there is a way in which the failures of the biopsychosocial model allowed the development of anti-psychiatry. For example, even though Laing quoted favorably from psychologically minded psychiatrists such as Manfred Bleuler, as far as I know he never made any reference to Meyer. There was never a systematic Meyerian theory to which Laing could refer. In fact, Laing wished to move beyond an interpretative understanding to abandon the metaphor of pathology (Double 2006). Perhaps if the biopsychosocial model had been more clearly defined, Laing would not have felt he needed to take this step. Or, at least in doing so, he would have been clearer about where he stood on this issue. When labeling Laing’s views as ‘anti-psychiatry,’ biomedical psychiatry would have had to state more precisely how Laing’s position was anti- rather than pro-psychiatric.My main disagreement with Ghaemi is his view of Meyer as eclectic. Meyer’s willingness to allow ‘anything goes’ in psychiatry meant that he did not oppose or challenge too much the views of those with whom he disagreed. Nonetheless, he did not combine together different sources to create an unintegrated philosophical and conceptual understanding. His theoretical position is internally consistent.Modern American psychiatry studied by participant observation is “of two minds,” in that there is a divided consciousness created between the practices of drug therapy and psychotherapy (Luhrmann 2000). In this sense, it is eclectic because there is no consistent theory that combines the two practice modes. True, psychiatry often claims that the foundation for this mixture is the biopsychosocial model. It asserts that everyday psychiatry is not as purely biomedical as is often maintained because it takes into account psychosocial factors that may precipitate mental disorders. It, therefore, says that it bring together the biological and psychosocial. This compromise avoids the adoption of any one model and was proposed to neutralize the dogmatism engendered by the anti-psychiatry debate (Clare 1980). I agree with Ghaemi that such eclecticism has outlived its usefulness.Where I think Ghaemi is mistaken is that he sees Meyer and Engel as the originators of this eclecticism. I regard the Meyerian approach as more genuinely pragmatic than Ghaemi suggests. Meyer’s dynamic psychology sought an integration of mind and brain as a way of dealing with the philosophical dilemma of the mind–body... (shrink)

This study investigated subjective experiences of nine men who had been psychiatrically hospitalized upon being assessed as "dangerous-to-others-due-to-a-mental-illness." Using a phenomenological interviewing approach, researchers helped subjects construct narratives of their pre-hospitalization experiences. The research illuminated aspects of life-contexts that were shared among all or nearly all subjects: feeling ostracized and alone; struggling with longstanding and pervasive feelings of inadequacy; experiencing a sense or a fear of having little or no control or options in life; and feeling emotionally depressed, misunderstood, and (...) uncared for. Situations immediately preceding hospitalization were characterized by subjects experiencing threats to their sense of self-esteem that were of heightened intensity. In five cases, subjects reported anxiety related to self-fragmentation or becoming "nothing." Perceived threats to self-worth and self-structure were accompanied by anger and aggressive acts or impulses. In all cases, aggressive impulses and threats, and violence appeared to be in the service of self-validation and self-empowerment. In cases of violent behavior, an apparent function of the subjects' behaviors was toward self-consolidation. Based on findings, the researchers discuss implications consistent with humanistic psychology and existential psychotherapy principles and practices. (shrink)

In the article is given to the analysis of the formation and development of the theory of client-centered therapy K. Rogers and detection of its humanistic content. The concept of k. Rogers provides an effective ìnstrementarìj that allows you to "collect the individual pieces together and garmonìzuvuati his relationship with those around the world. Based on the concepts of humanization. These methods of treatment of individual allow solving internal conflicts of man and give hope for the survival of the (...) human species. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:On Dialogue: An Essay in Free ThoughtMichael L. HallOn Dialogue: An Essay in Free Thought, by Robert Grudin; ix & 228 pp. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996, $23.95.In the fifth chapter of his recent book Robert Grudin touched on a question that had been vexing me since I began reading On Dialogue: An Essay in Free Thought. There, amongst his ruminations on the “Social Channels of Free (...) Thought,” Grudin recalls a luncheon celebration for his first trade book during [End Page 181] which one of the executives asked him: “Where in the bookstore would you display this book for sale?” In the four years it had taken him to write the book, Grudin had not given that question a moment’s thought. But it startled him into the realization that books are commodities that must be marketed; as a result he found himself confronting a powerful truth, “that money, like water, flows in channels, and that projects that ignore these channels are likely to come up dry.” More to the point: “These market channels give the American book industry, and hence current American literature, their overall shape. They largely dictate what will be written and read and what will not” (pp. 82–83).Grudin had not only anticipated my question, his response was a practical demonstration of the need for dialogic thinking, for a greater array of choices, questions and answers. I had been looking at On Dialogue from a kind of market perspective, or worse, an academic market perspective. Was it philosophy? Was it literature? Was it both, or neither? I was following the same familiar channels, but Grudin was telling me, quite explicitly, that my approach was unnecessarily limiting. Were I to employ, instead, the method of Renaissance copia that Grudin recommends as a propaedeutic to dialogic thinking, I would quickly discover that On Dialogue is certainly philosophy, and literary criticism, and that it partakes of the history of ideas, dabbles in personal memoir, and takes up theories of interpretation, and education, and creative writing, as well as various forms of psychotherapy, journalism, political theory, and economics.Grudin is obviously at home in the realm of literary criticism. His deft uses of Shakespeare’s Hamlet and of Henry James’s Daisy Miller advance his discussion of dialogic thinking, while at the same time offering focused interpretations of these works. And his examination of the Renaissance rhetorical practice of copia provides a stunning example of the way Grudin grounds his presentations in history and makes connections to other disciplines, thus extending the reach of his arguments. For instance, his reading of Plato’s Parmenides as a “Dialogue of the One and the Many” transforms Plato from an advocate of dialectic to a practitioner of dialogue: “The deep message of Plato’s Parmenides is that wholeness and fragmentation—the One and the Many—are valuable only as joint parameters. They cannot be objects of choice, because they are the nature of choice: they establish the playing field on which choices can be made” (p. 191).If all this makes On Dialogue sound like a congeries, in some respects it is, except that the force of Grudin’s discussion of “dialogic thinking” carries through the entire book and makes the whole cohere in a way that satisfies even when some of the parts occasionally begin to bewilder. His title may call to mind the 1980s literary critical trend spun off by the English translation of Mikhail Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination (1981), but Grudin’s notions about dialogue are grounded more in Plato, Martin Buber and Hans-Georg Gadamer than in Bakhtin. His sense of dialogue is personal and transformative as much [End Page 182] as it is critical and interpretive. In fact, Grudin’s subtitle is no throwaway. His dialogic demonstrations, as they find their literary form, are the offspring of Michel de Montaigne’s Essays, as well as being firmly grounded in the writing of other Renaissance humanists such as Erasmus and Rabelais. In a book as multifarious as this, there will be many interesting (and a few not so interesting) loose ends. Grudin acknowledges this in chapters that sometimes end with a... (shrink)

Otherness was at the center of the Levinese project, and in his ethics theory. In doing so, Levinas moved his project away from ontology, epistemology, and reason, to a point where the others are confronted in all its "nudes," to the point where it is recognizable that it cannot be reduced. In this article, I will examine the concepts of responsibility and the connection of the other person's humanism from his major books.

Major schools of thought in the 20th century agreed in repudiating metaphysical speculation, but the agreement was superficial, for what they repudiated as “metaphysical” was often one another. Whitehead’s defense of speculative philosophy as “productive of important knowledge” singled him out for scorn from all sides at the same time that it enabled him to move beyond dogmatic standoffs . Employing the same method of speculative generalization that led to the most celebrated theoretical discoveries of the 20th century, quantum theory (...) and special relativity, Whitehead sought to resolve the conflict between objectifying, causal explanations of the world and its inhabitants and the “folk” attitudes defended and elaborated by humanistic psychologies and philosophies. The result was his theory of the “dipolar actual occasion” as the fundamental unit of existence. Recent work by leading scientists continues this effort to elaborate a nonreductive monism that accounts for both meaning and causation. (shrink)

Major schools of thought in the 20th century agreed in repudiating metaphysical speculation, but the agreement was superficial, for what they repudiated as “metaphysical” was often one another. Whitehead’s defense of speculative philosophy as “productive of important knowledge” singled him out for scorn from all sides at the same time that it enabled him to move beyond dogmatic standoffs . Employing the same method of speculative generalization that led to the most celebrated theoretical discoveries of the 20th century, quantum theory (...) and special relativity, Whitehead sought to resolve the conflict between objectifying, causal explanations of the world and its inhabitants and the “folk” attitudes defended and elaborated by humanistic psychologies and philosophies. The result was his theory of the “dipolar actual occasion” as the fundamental unit of existence. Recent work by leading scientists continues this effort to elaborate a nonreductive monism that accounts for both meaning and causation. (shrink)

Ludwig Binswanger has been one of the first psychiatrists who used in his medical approach the Daseinsanalyse of Martin Heidegger in order to understand the mental disorders of his patients. However, as it is well-known, one of the most critical interlocutor of Binswanger was Heidegger himself. Rebuilding the controversial case of Ellen West and the relationship between Heidegger and Binswanger on the ground of analysis of human being, the aim of this paper is to verify if Heidegger’s approach can give (...) to psychoanalysis and psychiatry its most radical re-orientation by providing a new paradigm for understanding human being and the pathologies of existence. (shrink)

According to the origin of the word "humanism" and the concept of humanitas where the former comes from, management could be called humanistic when its outlook emphasizes common human needs and is oriented to the development of human virtue, in all its forms, to its fullest extent. A first approach to humanistic management, although quite incomplete, was developed mainly in the middle of the 20th century. It was centered on human motivations. A second approach to humanistic management (...) sprang up in the 80's and centered on organizational culture. This implied a wider approach to the human condition while taking into account the influence of culture on behaviors and decisionmaking, but it is incomplete, too. There is a third approach to humanistic management, which is still emerging, that considers a business enterprise as a real community of persons. That means promoting unity and favoring the acquisition of human virtues. This humanistic management approach is a real challenge in order to achieve a higher moral quality in management, human virtues among people and more efficient organizations. (shrink)

What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one (...) of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Spanning his career from his first publication to one of his last lectures, the book's previously unpublished or uncollected essays address metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, as well as the scope and limits of philosophy itself. The essays are unified by Williams's constant concern that philosophy maintain contact with the human problems that animate it in the first place. As the book's editor, A. W. Moore, writes in his introduction, the title essay is "a kind of manifesto for Williams's conception of his own life's work." It is where he most directly asks "what philosophy can and cannot contribute to the project of making sense of things"--answering that what philosophy can best help make sense of is "being human." Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline is one of three posthumous books by Williams to be published by Princeton University Press. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument was published in the fall of 2005. The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy is being published shortly after the present volume. (shrink)

Background: One of the main concerns in critical care units is the development of humanistic approaches. In this regard, recognizing the factors affecting humanistic nursing can contribute to humanizing nursing care in these units. Objective: The objective was to recognize the influential factors of humanistic nursing in critical care units. Research design: This qualitative study was carried out using a phenomenology method. Thirty-nine in-depth unstructured interviews were performed. The data were analyzed using the phenomenological nursology approach. To (...) guarantee trustworthiness, prolonged engagement, member check, triangulation of resources, and maximum variation sampling were used. Participants and research context: Purposeful sampling was employed to select 10 nurses, 8 patients, and 4 patient’s relatives from the intensive care unit and critical care unit departments. Ethical consideration: This study was approved by the ethics committee of Lorestan University of Medical Sciences with the code of LUMS.REC.1395.121. Finding: The participants’ experiences were reflected in the following three main concepts: moral, educational, and existential nature of the two humans involved in the interaction; maintenance of the nurses’ dignity; and interactions in the cultural and social context. Discussion: The nurse and patient, organizational environment, and society give rise to a set of intertwined characteristics which influence the realization of humanistic nursing. By affecting the nurses’ educational background and maintaining their dignity, the atmosphere of the hospital and cultural readiness of the society pave the way for delivering the humanistic care. (shrink)

In his 2015 Theoria article titled ‘A Rejection of Humanism in African Moral Tradition’, Motsamai Molefe argues that Kwasi Wiredu's humanistic interpretation of traditional Akan ethics cannot be the best account of African ethics because Wiredu overlooks the significant sentiment in traditional African thought that regards reality as a holistic totality of spiritual, social and environmental components. I point out that Molefe's rejection of Wiredu's humanism follows from the latter's de-emphasising of supernaturalism. I argue that Molefe overlooks the fact (...) that the displacement of God in this humanism is consistent with the limited God sentiment in traditional African thought, which confirms Wiredu's humanistic ethics as one rooted in traditional African worldviews. Adopting the method of philosophical exposition and analysis, I show how Wiredu's limited God framework motivates scepticism about the possibility of a supernaturalist ethics and renders a humanistic orientation a more attractive account of African moral tradition. (shrink)