In this paper I will discuss Aristotle's phenomenology of giving. I try to point out the relations between virtues such as liberality, magnificence and magnanimity. These virtues deal with different domains, i.e. with the right flow of money, with expenditure and finally with political and spiritual greatness. I argue, however, that they share a common structure, the friendship with oneself. Aristotle's concept of friendship with oneself means a personal integration, an achieved harmony of individual faculties, which represents the core of (...) the different virtues. It can be recognized in its most accomplished form in the case of magnanimity, a secondlevel virtue that is not primarily about economic goods and deals rather with self-knowledge and self-realization. Friendship with oneself is actually the result of a long process of maturation, made possible by practice, imitation of good models, teachings and personal reflection. During this process the natural individuality, with its attachments and cravings, is regenerated and adjusted to higher goals: the ethical and political life. Accordingly, I try to make clear that both the liberal and the magnificent man have gone through this long and challenging path. Both the liberal and the magnificent citizen can give to others in the right way as they do not rob themselves of the good they deserve. The consequence of Aristotle's theory of virtuous giving is intriguing: one can give to other people in a virtuous way only if one is friend of himself and recognizes himself the right to the goods he is truly worth of. (shrink)

Im folgenden Beitrag möchte ich einige Überlegungen zu einer hermeneutischen Vorgehensweise in der Anthropologie anstellen, die das Paradigma der “klassischen” philosophischen Anthropologie in der Perspektive der Postmoderne überdenken. Ich plädiere für ein anthropologisches Projekt, das die Tradition der Lebensphilosophie fortsetzt, insbesondere den Anspruch von Otto Friedrich Bollnow auf eine bildlose Anthropologie. Ich versuche, plausibel zu machen, dass die Anthropologie nicht die Natur des Menschen und seine Stellung im Kosmos untersuchen, sondern Identitäten im praktischen Sinn beschreiben sollte. Einen hermeneutische Anthropologie hat (...) dann eine doppelte Aufgabe: Sie arbeitet an den Bildlichkeiten, die Identitäten bilden, sowohl auf der sozialen als auch auf der persönlichen Ebene; zur gleichen Zeit spielt sie eine praktische Rolle, indem sie an Verantwortung für die Lebensgestaltung appelliert. Die mythologische Gestalt des Hermes, der Seelenführer und Beschützer der Übergänge, passt dann perfekt zu dieser Doppelrolle einer hermeneutischen Anthropologie, die nicht nur Theorie macht, sondern auch Bewusstsein und neue Möglichkeiten des menschlichen Fortschritts schafft. (shrink)

In this paper, I will compare the Aristotelian and the Middle-Stoic concepts of liberality as stated by Cicero in the De Officiis, which refers to Panaetius. For both concepts, liberality is a principal virtue of socio-political life, but they start from different premises: the individual life in case of Aristotle, and social bonds in the case of Middle-Stoicism. I will try to point out that Aristotle, led by the dualism of reason and passions, is bound to think of liberality as (...) an individual character virtue that prevails over the natural attachment to wealth and assets. Because of his dualism, Aristotle must exclude non-economic beneficence from the domain of liberality. In comparison, the Middle-Stoic approach is mainly based on the idea of sociability. This model does not undervalue goods, but it states that virtues mature from the balanced development of natural impulses, based on the combination of sociability and self-preservation, rather than from an ascetic effort. More particularly, the virtue of liberality originates from the social dimension of moral good. The liberal citizen can make virtuous use of money in certain cases, but he does not necessarily need it. The social sense is crucial, and it leads to the personal support of others, thereby creating and strengthening social bonds. (shrink)

This essay interprets O. F. Bollnow′s hermeneutic of life from an intercultural point of view. It points out that Bollnow was unsatisfied with the eurocentrism involved in the classical idealistic concept of reason and developed a hermeneutical approach, which came very close to the tradition of Zen Buddhism. It has the form of a “meditative” philosophy based on the concept of “Gelassenheit” as a door to a new and productive relationship with the Being in both practical and theoretical life.

In the following paper, I would like to reconsider the paradigm of “classical” philosophical anthropology in the perspective of postmodernity. I plead in favor of an anthropological project continuing the tradition of Lebensphilosophie, especially Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s claim for an anthropology without images. In fact, I present here a few considerations about a hermeneutic approach to anthropology. I try to make plausible that anthropology should not investigate the nature of the human being and his place in the cosmos, but rather (...) describe identities in a practical sense. Its task is dual: it has to give a critical understanding of the unconscious images that form identities, both at a social and personal level; at the same time, it has to make appeal to a sense of responsibility for others and for the shaping of one’s personal way of life. The mythological figure of Hermes, guide of souls and protector of transitions, is perfectly suited to this dual role of a hermeneutic anthropology, which not only makes theory, but also creates awareness and new opportunities for human advancement. (shrink)

This article criticizes the classical paradigm of philosophical anthropology, which not only tried a scientifically based determination of human identity, but it also contained practical postulates and an implicit teleology. In my paper I argue that the anthropology in our liquid post-modernity should not idealize its status as “first philosophy”. Rather it should remain descriptive and critical. It is therefore urged a transition from a comparative theory of human identity – based on the animal or computer comparison – to a (...) non-idealistic theory of identity. In this respect, the paper offers a contribution to an anthropology of Far Eastern Arts. It focuses mainly on two phenomena: the seated body in Zen Buddhism and the moving body in Taoism. These arts, I argue, have an educational value because they make discover a bodily and mental self-reference, which also means a reference to the other, a self-withdrawal. Through such an identification with the body, an awareness-based identity takes shape; an identity which is broader than Descartes’ concept of consciousness. (shrink)

A profile of Alexander Lowen between psychotherapy and philosophy This text is a revised version of a speech, given at a conference in Naples in memory of Alexander Lowen (1910-2008) on the tenth anniversary of his death. My remarks try to answer two simple questions, namely what philosophy learns from a system of psychology of personality and psychotherapy such as the one developed by Alexander Lowen, and – turning the perspective around – what a humanistic psychology such as bioenergetics can (...) learn from philosophy. I argue that bioenergetics encourages philosophy to rediscover vitality as a fundamental value and to look with new eyes at themes of its most ancient tradition such as the ethics of pleasure and happiness, which are Lowenian topics par excellence. On the other side, philosophy warns psychologists and psychotherapists against reductionism. Psychology and psychotherapy can learn from philosophy and humanistic culture to proceed in an “integrative” rather than reductionist way, and to stay open to the variety of possible experiences. (shrink)