The present study examines the development of complex sentences with non-finite clause combining with particular focus on clause chaining, in narratives of 40 Turkish-speaking 4- to 11-year-olds and six adults elicited by a wordless picture book. Results show a gradual increase by age in the variety of clauses combined, the length of the complex sentences and their frequency of use. Clause chains formed with converbal clauses are the earliest and most frequent type of clause combinations, already present in 4-year-olds’ complex (...) sentences with 1-non-finite clause. Older children’s and adults’ 2- or 3-non-finite clause complex sentences consist of some combinations of adverbial, complement, relative and converbal clauses. Developmentally, clause chains establish first, aspectual-temporal continuity, then temporal-causal continuity. Sentence-internal and cross-sentence-boundary referential continuities are present early, from age 4 onwards. These findings are discussed in terms of the demands of narrative organization as well as the syntactic and semantic complexity of the clause combination devices in Turkish. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Riding Out of the Cave Discipline and Diet Toughing It Out Surprises Down the Road From Tribulation to Wisdom Notes.

Kit Fine’s book is a study of abstraction in a quite precise sense which derives from Frege. In his Grundlagen, Frege contemplates defining the concept of number by means of what has come to be called Hume’s principle—the principle that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs. Frege’s discussion is largely conducted in terms of another, similar but in some respects simpler, (...) proposal—to define the concept of direction by laying down the principle that the direction of a line a is the same as that of line b if and only if lines a and b are parallel. Such principles have come to be known as abstraction principles. More generally, abstraction principles are ones of the shape: ∀α∀β ↔ α ≈ β), where ≈ is an equivalence relation on entities of the type over which α and β vary and, if the principle is acceptable, § is a function from entities of that type to objects. Since ‘the direction of’ is intended to stand for a function from objects of a certain sort to other objects, the Direction Equivalence is a first-order, or in Fine’s terminology objectual, abstraction; since ‘the number of’ is intended to stand for a function from concepts to objects, Hume’s principle is a higher-order, or as Fine says conceptual, abstraction. As is well-known, Frege himself abandoned the idea of defining number implicitly or contextually by means of Hume’s principle—adopting instead an explicit definition of the number of Fs as the extension of the concept concept equinumerous to the concept F— because he thought that an adequate definition should settle the question whether Julius Caesar, for example, is or is not the number of some concept, but that the proposed implicit definition cannot do so. But interest in abstraction principles has revived in the last couple of decades, largely as a result of Crispin Wright’s attempt to show that in spite of the many difficulties confronting it—including the notorious Julius Caesar problem— Hume’s principle can after all serve as a foundation for arithmetic. (shrink)

In the passage from the Enneads devoted to discussing and defining the nature of time, it is written that first one must experience eternity, which, as everyone knows, is the model and archetype of time. This initial warning, which is especially serious because we trust in its sincerity, appears to wipe out all hope of finding common ground with its author.Jorge Luis Borges, History of EternitySo let us leave the Platonists to wander off down a blind alley. Poor simpletons, they (...) think they will find the secret of discourse about time in the link with eternity. Whereas I, who am powerless in the face of eternity, would prefer to ask: what link can be retained, in discourse about time, between past, present, and future? If there is some link, can the three kinds of time break free of their mutual bonds? Can predicting the future, a time that will be but has never existed before, be disconnected from what determines the future as a product of what already exists and what has already existed? Can the past be what it once was or will it always be what each age decides it should have been? (shrink)

In the History of Philosophy, the atomistic physics of Epicurus and of Democritus have been considered as very similar.1 Con trary to the more conventional view, Marx considers this similarity.

This volume provides a survey of contemporary philosophy of language. As well as providing a synoptic view of the key issues, figures, concepts and debates, each essay makes new and original contributions to ongoing debate.

I argue that Monique Wittig's view that lesbians are not women neglects the complexities involved in the composition of the category "woman." I develop an articulation of the concept "woman" in the contemporary United States, with thirteen distinct defining characteristics, none of which are necessary nor sufficient. I argue that Wittig's emphasis on the material production of "woman" through the political regime of heterosexuality, however, is enormously fruitful for feminist and queer strategizing.

This book is a collection of essays written by Bob Hale (three co-authored), with a critical introduction from Kit Fine. They comprise Hale’s final years of work, adding to and extending beyond his landmark monograph Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them (OUP, 2013, 2nd edition 2015). The essays develop and consolidate several key themes in Hale’s work, most notably the notion of definition, especially as it extends beyond definition of a word (...) to definition of a thing more generally, and its relations to essence and existence; how the recently influential notion of truthmaking relates to and illuminates some of these issues; and ontological questions connected with Hale’s metaphysical commitments on the one hand, and his commitments in the foundations of mathematics on the other. Several of the essays engage with and respond to work by Kit Fine, and contributions to Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale (OUP 2018). As such, these essays also demonstrate a rich and fruitful philosophical dialogue between Hale and his critics and friends. (shrink)

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

This article presents Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutic of the productive imagination as a methodological tool for understanding the innovative social function of texts that in exceeding their semantic meaning, iconically augment reality. Through the reasoning of Rastafari elder Mortimo Planno’s unpublished text, Rastafarian: The Earth’s Most Strangest Man, and the religious and biblical signification from the music of his most famous postulate, Bob Marley, this article applies Paul Ricœur’s schema of the religious productive imagination to conceptualize the metaphoric transfer from text (...) to life of verbal and iconic images of Rastafari’s hermeneutic of word, sound and power. This transformation is accomplished through what Ricœur terms the phenomenology of the iconic augmentation of reality. Understanding this semantic innovation is critical to understanding the capacity of the religious imagination to transform reality as a proclamation of hope in the midst of despair. (shrink)

Based on a series of interviews with blue-collar women and their husbands in Istanbul, Turkey, this article examines the negotiation of family work in households in which the wives are major providers. The relationships between provider status, women's expectations, and the actual configuration of family work are complexly mediated by cultural constructions, perception of women as providers, marital dynamics, and extended family relationships. Three different discourses characterize family work. Woman's evaluation of her husband as “responsible” or “irresponsible” informs the construction (...) of the male role in the household. Conflict is heightened when men default on both domestic and economic grounds. This study makes a contribution toward a comparative understanding of negotiation of family work by providing an analysis of how structural conditions and cultural ideology interact to construct a gendered division of family work in the household in the context of continuities and discontinuities in sociocultural patterns. (shrink)

In this paper, we present an argument strengthening the view of Norman Daniels, Bruce Kennedy and Ichiro Kawachi that justice is good for one's health. We argue that the pathways through which social factors produce inequalities in sleep more strongly imply a unidirectional and non-voluntary causality than with most other public health issues. Specifically, we argue against the 'voluntarism objection' – an objection that suggests that adverse public health outcomes can be traced back to the free and voluntary choices of (...) individual actors. Our argument proceeds along two lines: an empirical line and a conceptual line. We first show that much of the empirical research on sleep supports the view that those with fewer opportunities are those who have poorer sleep habits. We then argue that sleep-related decisions are not of the same nature as most other lifestyle choices, and therefore are not as easily susceptible to the voluntarism objection. (shrink)

With the advent of the digital age and new mediums of communication, it is becoming increasingly important for those interested in the interpretation of religious text to look beyond traditional ideas of text and textuality to find the sacred in unlikely places. Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological reorientation of classical hermeneutics from romanticized notions of authorial intent and psychological divinations to a serious engagement with the “science of the text” is a hermeneutical tool that opens up an important dialogue between the interpreter, (...) the world of the text, and the contemporary world in front of the text. This article examines three significant insights that Paul Ricoeur contributes to our expanding understanding of text. First under scrutiny will be Ricoeur’s de-regionalization of classic hermeneutics culminating in his understanding of Dasein (Being) as “being-in-the-world,” allowing mean-ing to transcend the physical boundaries of the text. Next, Ricoeur’s three-fold under-standing of traditionality/Traditions/tradition as the “chain of interpretations” through which religious language transcends the tem-poral boundary of historicity will be explored. The final section will focus on Ricoeur’s understanding of the productive imagination and metaphoric truth as the under-appreciated yet key insight around which Ricoeur’s philosophical investigation into the metaphoric transfer from text to life revolves. (shrink)

L’objet de cet article est double: 1) montrer que la Science de la logique de Hegel est incapable de rendre compte de la nature de la relation de causalité. Hegel explique plutôt la relation de causalité en la réduisant à une relation de conditionnalité. 2) Soutenir ensuite que cet échec n’est pas le propre de l’hégélianisme mais qu’il est le résultat inévitable de tout effort intellectuel pour comprendre la relation de causalité, quand on ne prend pas en compte la contribution (...) de la perception sensible à la connaissance. L’analyse philosophique peut alors conclure que la causalité, bien qu’elle soit perceptible par les sens, n’est pas compréhensible, tandis que la conditionnalité qui s’y substitue est compréhensible bien qu’elle ne soit pas perceptible. (shrink)

The history of the idea of biological progress shows that it is not a selfexplanatory category, so a clear definition is required. Biological progress exists if: “more progressive” is defined as “more complex” – in that case evolution is synonymous with progress, i.e. development from simple to complex, from homogeneous to heterogeneous; we perceive the expression “more progressive” as more successful in relation to the environment, in these terms some groups in the history of life were more progressive because/so that (...) they survived, while others were retrogressive or less progressive because/so that they died out; on the other hand, within their ecological niches, certain forms of life are perfectly adapted to their environment as long as it is stable ; we take the span or reach of a potential adaptation of populations as a measure. However, there is no active, innovative problem solving in relation to the environment either with plants or animals – only the variability mechanism / selection is in place, automatism, instinct. In the light of the above-mentioned biological criteria, man is the most complex living creature by his constitution, he is the least dependent on the environment and can be innovative in relation to the environment. Man is the only living creature capable of establishing an active relationship with the environment through his special tool – culture. Considering the level of organization and quantity of information, the mammal genome is more progressive than the bacterium genome, while the human genome comprises most information which makes man the most progressive living thing. We can talk about biological progress if we define progressiveness as advancement toward complexity of organisation, but sometimes the simplification of structure enables survival. It seems that we can talk about progressivenessin biology only if we accept the anthropic principle – that is why only cultural progress is possible. Information is the link between biological and cultural-anthropological successfulness. Biological information is a “complete” piece of information to an animal. To a human being, it is only a condicio sine qua non for the reality of human spirit which receives, keeps and generates information. Progress can be measured according to the capability of establishing an active and innovative relationship with the environment, but only within some sort of anthropocentric outlook which is a criterion of value. It is not possible to talk about progressiveness of life if man is not the measure of all things. (shrink)

The history of the idea of biological progress shows that it is not a selfexplanatory category, so a clear definition is required. Biological progress exists if: “more progressive” is defined as “more complex” – in that case evolution is synonymous with progress, i.e. development from simple to complex, from homogeneous to heterogeneous; we perceive the expression “more progressive” as more successful in relation to the environment, in these terms some groups in the history of life were more progressive because/so that (...) they survived, while others were retrogressive or less progressive because/so that they died out; on the other hand, within their ecological niches, certain forms of life are perfectly adapted to their environment as long as it is stable ; we take the span or reach of a potential adaptation of populations as a measure . However, there is no active, innovative problem solving in relation to the environment either with plants or animals – only the variability mechanism / selection is in place, automatism, instinct. In the light of the above-mentioned biological criteria, man is the most complex living creature by his constitution , he is the least dependent on the environment and can be innovative in relation to the environment. Man is the only living creature capable of establishing an active relationship with the environment through his special tool – culture. Considering the level of organization and quantity of information, the mammal genome is more progressive than the bacterium genome, while the human genome comprises most information which makes man the most progressive living thing. We can talk about biological progress if we define progressiveness as advancement toward complexity of organisation, but sometimes thesimplification of structure enables survival. It seems that we can talk about progressivenessin biology only if we accept the anthropic principle – that is why only cultural progress is possible. Information is the link between biological and cultural-anthropological successfulness . Biological information is a “complete” piece of information to an animal . To a human being, it is only a condicio sine qua non for the reality of human spirit which receives, keeps and generates information. Progress can be measured according to the capability ofestablishing an active and innovative relationship with the environment, but only within some sort of anthropocentric outlook which is a criterion of value. It is not possible to talk about progressiveness of life if man is not the measure of all things.Povijest ideje biološkog napretka pokazuje kako to nije samorazumljiva kategorija, pa se traži jasna definicija. Biološki progres postoji ukoliko: “naprednije” definiramo kao “složenije” – evolucija je tada sinonim napretka, tj. prelaženja iz jednostavnijeg u složenije, iz homogenog u heterogeno; “naprednije” shvatimo kao “uspješnije” s obzirom na okoliš; u tom smislu neke skupine u povijesti života bile su naprednije jer/pa su opstale, dok su druge bile nazadnije ili manje napredne pa/jer su izumrle; s druge strane unutar svojih ekoloških niša pojedini oblici života savršeno su prilagođeni svojem okolišu dokle god je on stabilan ; kao mjerilo uzmemo raspon ili širinu moguće prilagodbe populacija jer tada postoje razlike; ipak ni u biljaka ni u životinja tu nema aktivnog inovatorskog rješavanja problema okoliša, nego djeluje samo mehanizam varijabilnost/selekcija, automatizam, nagon. U svjetlu gore navedenih bioloških mjerila čovjek je svojim ustrojstvom najsloženije biće , najmanje je ovisan u odnosu na okolinu, može se novativno nositi spram okoline. Čovjek je jedini kadar za pravi aktivni odnos prema svom okolišu putem specifičnog oruđa kulture. S obzirom na stupanj organizacije i količinu informacija, genom sisavca je napredniji od genoma bakterije, a genom čovjeka raspolažes najviše informacija, pa je on po tome najprogresivnije biće u prirodi. O biološkom progresu možemo govoriti ako progresivnost definiramo kao porast složenosti organizacije, no ponekad pojednostavljenje građe omogućava preživljavanje. Čini se da o progresivnosti u biologiji možemo govoriti samo usvajajući princip antropičnosti, zato je u svijetu moguć samo kulturni progres. Posjedovanje informacije je veza između biološke i kulturno-antropološke uspješnosti . Posjedovanje biologijske informacije za životinju je “potpuna informacija” , dok je za Čovjeka samo condicio sine qua non za zbiljnost ljudskog duha koji dobiva, posjeduje i stvara informaciju. Progres je moguće mjeriti prema sposobnosti aktivnog i inovativnog odnosa spram okoliša jedino u nekoj vrsti antropocentričnog obzora koji u središtu ima mjerilo vrijednosti. Nemoguće je govoriti o progresivnosti života ako svemu nije mjera sam čovjek. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Nietzsche's Useful Fictions The Commercial Origins of Christmas Santa Claus and the Social Compact The Spirit of Giving and the True Meaning of Christmas.

Bentham argues that Nature has placed mankind under the governance of pain and pleasure. They determine what we ought to do, as well as what we shall do. Bentham tries to answer two different questions. The first is whether people are actually looking for pleasure. It is a cognitive question about human nature, formulated at a meta-ethical level. The second is whether people ought to look for pleasure. The question is formulated on the ethical level and Bentham asserts that people (...) ought to look for pleasure. In the first case, Bentham is a partner in a non-normative meta-ethical discussion about the character of human values. In the second case, he is not a partner and he is not making statements about facts. Is Bentham aware that the answer to one question does not necessarily imply the answer to the other? (shrink)

HEGEL says that "when enquiry is made as to the kind of predicate belonging to [a] subject, the act of judgement necessarily implies an underlying concept [Begriff]; but this concept is expressed only by the predicate." According to this, some concept of the subject must precede predication. This circularity can be formulated as follows: If the statement is the "factory" in which concepts are produced, how is it that the concepts precede the statement and are not merely produced within it (...) in their function as subjects? And, on the other hand, if the subject is not, prior to predication, a concept--if it has by itself no meaning--how can a predicate be matched to it? There would, in fact, be nothing to match. We are caught in a circular thesis that requires for its elucidation a fresh analysis of the relationship between concept and statement. (shrink)

The ArgumentEugenics, in whatever form it may be articulated, is based on the idea that phenotypic characteristics of particular individuals can be predicted in advance. This paper argues that biology's capacity to predict many of the characteristics exhibited by an individual, especially behavioral or cognitive attributes, will always be very limited. This stems from intrinsic limitations to the methodology for relating genotypes to phenotypes, and from the nature of developmental processes which intervene between genotypes and phenotypes. While genetic studies may (...) generate valid population predictions for conditions which impact human health, neither genetics nor developmental biology are likely to generate useful individual predictions about variation in non-disease-related human behavioral and cognitive phenotypes in the foreseeable future. (shrink)

This paper seeks to exhibit and explain, by way of comparison, two ideal kinds of knowledge: knowledge based on classifications according to genera and species, as in Aristotelianism and common sense, and scientific knowledge based on the application of laws of nature. I will proceed by attempting (1) to determine the role that presuppositions play in knowledge in general by means of the distinction between content and form; (2) to describe and explain the main features of both ideal forms of (...) knowledge; and, finally, (3) to analyze the relation between these two forms of knowledge as it is presented in Eddington's celebrated discussion of the “two tables”. I will be critical of the widespread view that modern science is the correct form of knowledge, and that common sense is merely an illusion. (shrink)