24 found
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  1.  98
    Action understanding as inverse planning.Chris L. Baker, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2009 - Cognition 113 (3):329-349.
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  2.  36
    Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments.Liane Young, Joan Albert Camprodon, Marc Hauser, Alvaro Pascual-Leone & Rebecca Saxe - 2010 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
    When we judge an action as morally right or wrong, we rely on our capacity to infer the actor's mental states. Here, we test the hypothesis that the right temporoparietal junction, an area involved in mental state reasoning, is necessary for making moral judgments. In two experiments, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt neural activity in the RTPJ transiently before moral judgment and during moral judgment. In both experiments, TMS to the RTPJ led participants to rely less on the (...)
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  3. The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment.Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Rebecca Saxe - 2007 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (20):8235-8240.
     
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  4. When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains.Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe - 2011 - Cognition 120 (2):202-214.
  5.  22
    Learning a commonsense moral theory.Max Kleiman-Weiner, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2017 - Cognition 167 (C):107-123.
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  6.  52
    Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences.Elizabeth Baraff Bonawitz, Darlene Ferranti, Rebecca Saxe, Alison Gopnik, Andrew N. Meltzoff, James Woodward & Laura E. Schulz - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):104-117.
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  7.  16
    Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": the use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts.Liane Young, Jonathan Scholz & Rebecca Saxe - 2011 - Social Neuroscience 6 (3):302-315.
    Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind, reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants (...)
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  8.  12
    Preferences for redistribution are sensitive to perceived luck, social homogeneity, war and scarcity.Daniel Nettle & Rebecca Saxe - 2020 - Cognition 198 (C):104234.
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  9.  21
    There’s more to “sparkle” than meets the eye: Knowledge of vision and light verbs among congenitally blind and sighted individuals.Marina Bedny, Jorie Koster-Hale, Giulia Elli, Lindsay Yazzolino & Rebecca Saxe - 2019 - Cognition 189 (C):105-115.
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  10.  77
    The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents.Anna Jenkins, David Dodell-Feder, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua Knobe - 2014 - PLoS ONE 9.
    In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 (...)
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  11. Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference.James Dungan & Rebecca Saxe - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (6):1148-1156.
    Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child’s theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference (...)
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  12.  23
    Divide and conquer: a defense of functional localizers.Rebecca Saxe, Matthew Brett & Nancy Kanwisher - 2010 - In Stephen Hanson & Martin Bunzl (eds.), Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping. MIT Press. pp. 25--42.
    This chapter presents the advantages of the use of functional regions of interest along with its specific concerns, and provides a reference to Karl J. Friston related to the subject. Functionally defined ROI help to test hypotheses about the cognitive functions of particular regions of the brain. fROI are useful for specifying brain locations and investigating separable components of the mind. The chapter provides an overview of the common and uncommon misconceptions about fROI related to assumptions of homogeneity, factorial designs (...)
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  13.  42
    Thinking about seeing: Perceptual sources of knowledge are encoded in the theory of mind brain regions of sighted and blind adults.Jorie Koster-Hale, Marina Bedny & Rebecca Saxe - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):65-78.
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  14.  63
    Moral Universals and Individual Differences.Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):323-324.
    Contemporary moral psychology has focused on the notion of a universal moral sense, robust to individual and cultural differences. Yet recent evidence has revealed individual differences in the psychological processes for moral judgment: controlled cognition, mental-state reasoning, and emotional responding. We discuss this evidence and its relation to cross-cultural diversity in morality.
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  15.  42
    Functional neuroimaging of theory of mind.Jorie Koster-Hale & Rebecca Saxe - 2013 - In Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 132.
  16. Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know. [REVIEW]Liane Young, Shaun Nichols & Rebecca Saxe - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):333-349.
    Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t (...)
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  17.  42
    Interaction versus observation: A finer look at this distinction and its importance to autism.Elizabeth Redcay, Katherine Rice & Rebecca Saxe - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):435 - 435.
    Although a second-person neuroscience has high ecological validity, the extent to which a second- versus third-person neuroscience approach fundamentally alters neural patterns of activation requires more careful investigation. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that this new avenue will prove fruitful in significantly advancing our understanding of typical and atypical social cognition.
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  18.  17
    Habituation Reflects Optimal Exploration Over Noisy Perceptual Samples.Anjie Cao, Gal Raz, Rebecca Saxe & Michael C. Frank - 2023 - Topics in Cognitive Science 15 (2):290-302.
    This paper presents the Rational Action, Noisy Choice for Habituation (RANCH) model. The model was evaluated with adult looking time collected from a paradigm analogous to the infant habituation paradigm. And the model captured key patterns of looking time documented in developmental research: habituation and dishabituation.
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  19. Discovering the conceptual primitives.Lisa Aziz-Zadeh, Daniel Casasanto, Jerome Feldman, Rebecca Saxe & Leonard Talmy - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
     
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  20.  6
    Advantages and limitations of representing groups in terms of recursive utilities.Setayesh Radkani, Ashley J. Thomas & Rebecca Saxe - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45.
    Group representations based on recursive utilities can be used to derive the same predictions as Pietraszewski in conflict situations. Additionally, these representations generalize to non-conflict situations, asymmetric relationships, and represent the stakes in a conflict. However, both proposals fail to represent asymmetries of power and responsibility and to account for generalizations from specific observed individuals to collections of non-observed individuals.
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  21.  17
    Mirror neurones and false beliefs.Rebecca Saxe - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-179.
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  22.  8
    Rationalization: Why, when, and what for?Rebecca Saxe & Daniel Nettle - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    In this commentary, we ask when rationalization is most likely to occur and to not occur, and about where to expect, and how to measure, its benefits.
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  23. The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is. [REVIEW]Rebecca Saxe - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):447 - 456.
    Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I (...)
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  24. It’s Not Just What You Do, but What’s on Your Mind: A Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “Experiments in Ethics”. [REVIEW]Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (3):201-207.
    What is the impact of science on philosophy? In “Experiments in Ethics”, Kwame Anthony Appiah addresses this question for morality and ethics. Appiah suggests that scientific results may undermine moral intuitions by undermining our confidence in the actual sources of our intuitions, or by invalidating our factual assumptions about the causes of human behavior. Appiah worries that scientific results showing situational causes on human behavior force us to abandon the intuition, formalized in virtue ethics, that what matters is “who you (...)
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