Editor's Note: This paper was found in galley proof form from the journal Mind in the C.I. Lewis Archives in the Special Collections Department of the Stanford University Libraries, call number M174, Box 18, Folder 1. There are two copies of the proofs in this folder, one includes Lewis's corrections. The version that appears here incorporates all of Lewis's corrections. Where these corrections are substantive, the original wording is give in a footnote. The paperwas withdrawn from publication by Lewis early (...) in 1935. The proofs were found with Lewis's other papers in his house in Menlo Park after his death in 1964. (shrink)

In his lucid paper “The Objectivity of History” Professor Pass more poses the problem of history's objectivity and seeks to find out in what the objectivity of history might consist. In this note I wish only to criticize his presentation of Popper's views . I think Pass more's failure to report Popper's views correctly causes him to overlook the striking similarity between Popper's conclusion and his own.

The fourth of Herodas is entitled in the papyrus —a title which very well describes the beginning and end of the poem, but disregards the middle, the most important part. The poem divides naturally into sections as follows: 1–20a; 20b–38, 39–563, 56b–78; 79–95. In we hear one of the women of the title carrying out the offering to the god. This section has been examined in detail by R. Wünsch, ‘Ein Dankopfer an Asklepios’, Arch. Rel. Wiss. vii , 95 ff., (...) who shows that it corresponds closely to the form of prayer used in real life, starting with the invocatio of the god, comprising greeting () and mention of his dwelling-places , family (parents, Koronis and Apollo. (shrink)

In the sixth mime of Herodas is described a visit by a woman called Metro to her friend Coritto. After an introduction largely taken up with abuse of Coritto's slave, Metro comes to the point: she asks, . Coritto is furious that knowledge of this precious possession has spread so far, and without answering the question asks where Coritto saw it: the reply is, . Coritto laments the faithlessness of those she thought her friends, but is consoled by Metro, who (...) repeats her question. Coritto now reveals that the craftsman was Cerdon, and describes him and his works: and she was prevented from this last only by the presence of a neighbour's slave. Metro now asks how Coritto got to know Cerdon, and on hearing that it was through Artemeis, she declares her intention of going to see her, to learn more of Cerdon, and departs . The poem ends with Coritto giving orders for the door to be closed and the hens counted. (shrink)

Leuridan (2011) questions whether mechanisms can really replace laws at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters a long-standing discussion about the relationship between the mech-anistic structures evident in the theories of contemporary biology and the laws of nature privileged especially in traditional empiricist traditions of the philosophy of science (see e.g. Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bogen 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan 1996; MDC 2000; Schaffner 1993; Tabery 2003; Weber 2005). In our view, Leuridan (...) misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive claim that mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but uninteresting. His stronger claim, that all causal claims require laws, is unsupported by his arguments. Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan’s arguments, our greater purpose is to embellish his arguments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms enriches and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, explanation and control. (shrink)

A popular book on semantics, illustrating and commenting on uses of symbols in the social and physical sciences. The author writes best when he deals with subtle uses of language in practical affairs and in politics, but in clarifying notions central to semantics he is too often imprecise and obscure. His selection of quotations and references suggests, furthermore, that he is unacquainted with much of the best recent work in semantics.--I. C. L.

A speculative work of the widest range, systematically dealing with the issues that are fundamental in every philosophical study. There are, Mr. Weiss argues, four irreducible modes of being. Actuality, Existence, Possibility and God are independent realities, yet each needs the other in order fully to be. Together they are all that is, and all that could, must and should be. Only by acknowledging each separately and all of them together, Mr. Weiss claims, can we, without paradox, deal with the (...) things, natures, actions, and values there are. The book divides into critically constructive accounts of each of the modes of being, an investigation of attempts to deny their reality, and an explanation of their unity. Lucid, fast-paced throughout, the exposition of the general theory is supported by pertinent, revealing examples. Modes of Being is a work of first importance. On its assertions, a reader is forced to test and form his philosophical convictions.--I. C. L. (shrink)

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking (...) or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking. (shrink)

This volume sets Berkeley's philosophy in its historical context by providing selections from: firstly, works that deeply influenced Berkeley as he formed his main doctrines; secondly, works that illuminate the philosophical climate in which those doctrines were formed; and thirdly, works that display Berkeley's subsequent philosophical influence. The first category is represented by selections from Descartes, Malebranche, Bayle, and Locke; the second category includes extracts from such thinkers as Regius, Lanion, Arnauld, Lee, and Norris; while reactions to Berkeley, both positive (...) and negative, are drawn from a wide range of thinkers - Leibniz, Baxter, Hume, Diderot, Voltaire, Reid, Kant, Herder, and Mill. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The editors of this volume - Jarvie and D'Agostino - encountered John Watkins at such different times in his career that they have never ...

Abstract This paper examines the kind of epistemic circularity which, according to Ernest Sosa, is unavoidably entailed whenever one has what he calls ?reflective? knowledge (that is, knowledge that p such that the knower reflectively endorses the reliability of the epistemic sources by which she came to her belief that p). I begin by describing the relevant kind of circularity and its role in Sosa's epistemology, en route presenting and resisting Sosa's arguments that this kind of circularity is not vicious. (...) Then I consider the somewhat complex relationship between Sosa's views on epistemic circularity and his response to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, arguing that (on one interpretation of Sosa, at least) a complete solution to that problem cannot be extracted from Sosa's work unless the aforementioned epistemic circularity can be proved non-vicious. (shrink)

Joseph Beuys was one of the most significant artists of the 20th century. He was a gunner and radio operator in the German Air Force during World War II, and was severely injured several times. In March 1943 he had a life-changing experience after the dive bomber he was assigned to crashed in the Crimean peninsula. This trauma influenced Beuys' entire artistic career, and is known in art history as the ’Tartar Legend’ or ’Tartar Myth’. Profoundly affected by the crash, (...) the severe trauma, the near-death experience and his rescue, which he perceived as a “rebirth”, Beuys no longer saw himself, other people or society as a whole in the same way as previously. With his new consciousness, he ignored boundaries and created visions whereby all mankind could experience the healing he had undergone. Beuys did not bring society far enough for the turning point towards “the healing of the world” to be visible, yet today it is important to keep his work alive as a record of his extraordinary strength, which arose from trauma and severe injury, and was carried by a passionate commitment to mankind and to life itself. (shrink)

Karshish, the picker-up of learning's crumbs, The not-incurious in God's handiwork (This man's flesh He hath admirably made, Blown like a bubble, kneaded like a paste, To coop up and keep down on earth a space, That puff of vapour from His mouth, man's soul). Browning.

Although Sibawayh dealt with it in a scattered manner under different headings there have been different views on na't (adjective), which is gene-rally included in the tawabi group in Arabic syntax, and there have been debates around these views. Na't, which is categorized as a proper adjective and qualifies the meaning of man'ut (mawsuf), has different characteristics from the sentence elements that indicate the subject. Nahiv scholars have mostly divided na't into two parts: real and causal na't, and they have (...) formulated certain rules for these two parts in accordance with the structure of the Arabic language. Since na't and man'ut are accepted as nouns, the i'rab of na't is subject to men'ut. However, some examples in the Qur'an and some expressions used by the Arabs caused objections to the i'rab of na't being the same as men'ut. It is observed that these objected examples are the cases where men'ut is known and the exceptional cases of madih, zam and jarri jivar. It is also obligatory for the na't to conform to the man'ut in terms of ma'rifiyyah, nekiriyyah, custom and gender. While Sibawayh (d. 180/796) considered it qabh (ugly) for non-propositional words to be na't, scholars such as Ibn Hisham (d. 218/833), Ibn al-Ḥajib (d. 646/1249), and Abd ar-Rahman Jami (d. 898/1492) accepted that na't could be either propositional or non-propositional and cited many examples of na't in the case of non-propositional words. Scholars such as Ibn Jinni (d. 392/1002) and Ibn al-Hajib gave an explanation of the causative na't without naming it, scholars such as Ebu’l-Bekā al-Ukbari (d. 616/1219) analyzed the subject under the title of causative adjective or causative na't, and Halid b. Abdullah al-Azhari discussed it under the title of al-wasf al-majazi. The subject of our study is to examine the handling of na't, which is one of the sentence elements in the Arabic language, in the works written on the field, its parts, the dimension that affects the meaning and the controversial aspects. The aim of the research is to examine the rules that Sibawayh deals with in his al-Kitâb on na'ta and the objections of later Arab linguists to these rules, and to contribute to the field by revealing different views on the subject. (shrink)

In these articles, I describe Cantor’s power-class theorem, as well as a number of logical and philosophical paradoxes that stem from it, many of which were discovered or considered (implicitly or explicitly) in Bertrand Russell’s work. These include Russell’s paradox of the class of all classes not members of themselves, as well as others involving properties, propositions, descriptive senses, class-intensions, and equivalence classes of coextensional properties. Part I focuses on Cantor’s theorem, its proof, how it can be used to manufacture (...) paradoxes, Frege’s diagnosis of the core difficulty, and several broad categories of strategies for offering solutions to these paradoxes. (shrink)

I. C. Jarvie interprets Popper's philosophy of science as a theory of the institution of science, explains how the social aspect of his theory developed, and suggests that an updated version of Popper's social theory should be used to study both scientific and nonscientific societies today. Although (1) Jarvie's description of the emergence of Popper's theory suffers because he takes no account Popper's research conducted before Logik der Forschung (1994), (2) his portrayal of Popper's framework overlooks important problems, and (3) (...) his program is by no means new, his essay throws light on the relation between Popper's philosophy of science, his social theory, and his social studies of science. (shrink)

On study and teaching of aesthetics in Vietnam.

Do we love for reasons? Most romantics would insist not. In fact, we love despite good reasons not to love. I argue that love necessarily involves reasons. I discuss the problem of loving someone for his or her looks and what I call Plato's Problem, loving only the properties of a person. I end by discussing some dubious and perverse reasons for love.

Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: to show how Descartes gets from intuitions to propositional knowledge, and to show how his solution to this problem structures his thinking on the main issues in Cartesian epistemology. I maintain that the solution to is to be found in the principle if we perceive the presence of an attribute A, there must be (...) an actually existing substance to which A is attributed. This principle gets its clearest expression in the Principles of Philosophy but also appears in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and in the Meditations where, I argue, it appears in the form of the Rule of Truth. I show how this principle is derived from the cogito, understood both as inference and as intuition, how this principle plays a role in Descartes theory of consciousness and self‐knowledge, in the case for substance dualism, and in the theory of clear and distinct ideas. (shrink)

The leading idea of this chapter is that, for Descartes, intellectual ideas make it obvious what metaphysical category the properties they disclose to the mind fall into but not whether they are actually exemplified; sensations make it obvious whether the properties they disclose to the mind are exemplified but not what their metaphysical category is. This idea is worked out through a discussion of three stages in the development of Descartes's doctrine of the material falsity of sensory ideas, the core (...) concept of his error explanation of the senses. Material falsity is a set of three defects that sensations have in comparison with intellectual ideas, ideas that fully discharge the role, which Descartes assigns to ideas in his philosophical system. The first stage, reflected in Meditation III, identifies material falsity with two defects: nonrepresentation and misrepresentation ; the second stage, reflected in the Reply to Arnauld, identifies material falsity with obscure ideas ; the third stage, reflected in the Principles of Philosophy I, sees the terminology of material falsity disappear and the terminology of clear but not distinct ideas appear. Other topics discussed include a special application of the rule of truth and skepticism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: American Pragmatism: An Introduction by Albert R. Spencer. Polity Press, 2020. Reviewed by: Lee A. McBride III -/- American Pragmatism: An Introduction is a judicious and stimulating read, comprising an introduction and five numbered chapters. The introduction orients the book, offering various ways of conceiving American Philosophy and American pragmatism. Spencer explains that it is difficult to discern the national and cultural variables that make a philosophy an (...) American philosophy. Not all philosophers who practice philosophy in the United States claim the descriptor "American Philosophy." And, within the group that embraces the descriptor, some take American pragmatism to be, in essence, a theory of truth (or a method by which we can make our ideas clear); others take pragmatism to be a method of experience, a pluralistic approach to knowledge creation and social amelioration (2). It is a complicated picture, and Spencer affords ample care and attention to the disparate camps of pragmatism. Chapter 1: "Fallibilism and the Classical Pragmatists" is largely devoted to Charles S. Peirce and William James. Peirce and James, as fallibilists, are contrasted against Descartes and Hume, respectively. Peirce and James diverge in regard to style and their commitments to (scholastic) realism. Spencer discusses Josiah Royce briefly at the closing of the chapter, noting how Royce's work can serve as a foil for both Peircean and Jamesian pragmatisms. Chapter 2: "Meliorism and the Chicago Pragmatists" highlights the pragmatist philosophical contributions of Jane Addams and John Dewey. In this chapter, Spencer emphasizes sympathetic knowledge, cooperative intelligence, the pattern of experimental inquiry, and social amelioration. Spencer deserves kudos for introducing Addams's pragmatist contributions first, then explaining the ways in which her work in community-building and social amelioration influenced Dewey. Chapter 3: "Pluralism and the Harvard Pragmatists" highlights the work of a motley crew: George Santayana, W. E. B. Du Bois, Horace Kallen, and Alain Locke. This chapter draws attention to the pluralism one can detect in Santayana's detached cosmopolitanism, Du Bois's double consciousness, Kallen's cultural pluralism, and Locke's democratic pluralism. We are introduced to a Spaniard, two African American men, and a Jewish man, all of whom had spent time abroad. Each offers a critical perspective that falls outside the conventional view of the purported democratic culture of the United States. Chapter 4: "Verification and the Analytic Pragmatists" turns to the philosophers of the logico-linguistic turn, [End Page 108] featuring C. I. Lewis, W. V. O. Quine, and Richard Rorty. Here, we see a pronouncedly analytic approach to the analysis of propositions, inference, and semantic content—a heightened attention to shoring up defensible conceptions of truth and the real. The goal is to articulate a coherent conceptual pragmatic position that evades both scientistic reductionism and Fregean transcendental presuppositions, all the while offering a feasible conception of truth. Chapter 5: "Hope and the Contemporary Pragmatists" surveys how pragmatists have engaged with various traditions in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to potentially bolster their positions and find hope. Spencer highlights three promising strands. The first strand is that of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas arose out of Frankfurt School critical theory but appropriated pragmatist insights from Peirce, Dewey, and Mead to formulate his conceptions of communicative action and communitive rationality (208). Habermas reconstructed the reductive dialectical materialism of the Frankfurt School, developing a sophisticated theory of democracy as public discourse. Spencer asserts that "ultimately Habermas is the best demonstration of pragmatism's potential when compared with critical theory during the Cold War" (208). Spencer also finds the work of Huw Price promising. Price, in an effort to defuse the tension between neopragmatism's antirealism and scientific realism, offers a tenable theory of truth: truth as a (postulated) practical norm, or "truth as a convenient fiction" (217). Truth, as a practical norm, gives normative structure and impetus to various forms of inquiry. And, to close this chapter on hope and contemporary pragmatism, Spencer delineates a third promising strand. He writes that "perhaps the most promising development among pragmatists results from their increasing engagement with American Indian philosophy and other philosophical traditions throughout the Americas" (219). American pragmatists, following Scott L. Pratt and Bruce Wilshire, are increasingly recognizing... (shrink)

Summary Watters questions the universality of mental illness and warns of the harms that accompany the exportation of Western typologies to non-Western cultures. He is particularly concerned that these effects will be exacerbated by the upcoming revisions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V). Building on his examination of non-Western practices, Watters exposes the historical instability of mental health classifications in North America to question the validity of current DSM categories. Although Watters' warnings about the dangers of (...) the globalisation of the DSM are persuasive, they may be overreaching as our examination of the successful incorporation of Western created autism services, information, and interventions in the developing world suggests. (shrink)

Okasha claims at the outset of his book "Evolution and the Levels of Selection" that the Price equation lays bare the fundamentals underlying all selection phenomena. However, the thoroughness of his subsequent analysis of multi-level selection theories leads him to abandon his fundamentalist commitments. At critical points he invokes cost benefit analyses that sometimes favors the Price approach and sometimes the contextual approach, sometimes favors MLS1 and sometimes MLS2. And although he doesn’t acknowledge it, even the Price approach breaks down (...) into a family of alternative equations that parse the causes in different ways, none of which is uniquely correct and none of which achieves the ultimate isolation of effects due to what Okasha believes are the fundamental causes. I argue that his book provides good reason to re-conceive our understanding of evolutionary theorizing in terms of a toolbox view and to stop subjecting the analyses of evolutionary concepts to a universalist standard. (shrink)

Among the works of Aelius Aristides is preserved an address to an unnamed ‘king’. The prevailing view in this century has been that it is addressed to a third-century emperor, and was attributed to Aristides in error. In an article published in 1972 , 134–52), I argued that the speech was genuine, and was delivered by Aristides in 144 before Antoninus Pius. In a recent article in this journal , 172–97), Stephen A. Stertz has undertaken to rebut this view, and (...) advances a novel one: the speech is a school exercise written in the third or perhaps the fourth century, and does not refer to any particular ‘king’, not even necessarily a Roman emperor. Rather than attempt to answer all of Stertz's arguments, I have selected as samples one each from several diverse fields. Manuscript tradition. In his first paragraph, Stertz suggests that the manuscript tradition of the Eis basilea itself impugns its authenticity. ‘The oration is entitled єς βασιλέα in three manuscripts and єς τόν ατοκρτορα in another. It has been pointed out that in the former group of manuscripts the title is not preceded by the words ριστεδου λόγος, thus casting doubt on Aristidean authorship' . The accompanying footnote refers to Keil's apparatus ad loc, and the reader might infer that this argument is borrowed from Aristides’ foremost editor. What Keil said was: ‘Titulus ες βασιλα STC : єς τòν ατοκρτορα U et in indice D m recentiss.’. (shrink)

Sequel to Part I. In these articles, I describe Cantor’s power-class theorem, as well as a number of logical and philosophical paradoxes that stem from it, many of which were discovered or considered (implicitly or explicitly) in Bertrand Russell’s work. These include Russell’s paradox of the class of all classes not members of themselves, as well as others involving properties, propositions, descriptive senses, class-intensions and equivalence classes of coextensional properties. Part II addresses Russell’s own various attempts to solve these paradoxes, (...) including strategies that he considered and rejected (limitation of size, the zigzag theory, etc.), as well as his own final views whereupon many purported entities that, if reified, lead to these contradictions, must not be genuine entities, but ‘logical fictions’ or ‘logical constructions’ instead. (shrink)

I. The Antiope.—The papyrus fragments of theAntiope, written in a small and crabbed hand of the third century B.C., were first published by Mahaffy in vol. 1 of the Petrie papyri in 1891, a time when the study of writing on papyrus was in its early days and there was not the abundance of other literary texts to provide practice and comparison that there is to-day. An advance in the study of the text was made by Blass in 1892, whose (...) readings were based on first-hand knowledge of the manuscript; he was followed by von Arnim, who in his text in the Supplementum Euripideum introduced several startling alterations, based on the autotypes alone and very rarely justified by the papyrus. A landmark in the history of the text was reached when Hans Schaal published his dissertation De Euripidis Antiopa; not only had he studied the papyrus closely in London, but he was able to make use of several readings of Wilamowitz. Though he left some of the major problems unattacked, perhaps too readily, his text represents a great advance on that of his predecessors, and I have found his readings in the majority of cases where he differs from Mahaffy or von Arnim confirmed by the papyrus, and consequently I have taken his text as the basis of my collation. That there was still a little more to be deciphered was suggested to me by the late Dr. Hunt, and I am indebted to him as the instigator of these notes if there is anything of value in them. (shrink)

In The Great Endarkenment, Elijah Millgram argues that the hyper-specialization of expert domains has led to an intellectual crisis. Each field of human knowledge has its own specialized jargon, knowledge, and form of reasoning, and each is mutually incomprehensible to the next. Furthermore, says Millgram, modern scientific practical arguments are draped across many fields. Thus, there is no person in a position to assess the success of such a practical argument for themselves. This arrangement virtually guarantees that mistakes will accrue (...) whenever we engage in cross-field practical reasoning. Furthermore, Millgram argues, hyper-specialization makes intellectual autonomy extremely difficult. Our only hope is to provide better translations between the fields, in order to achieve intellectual transparency. I argue against Millgram’s pessimistic conclusion about intellectual autonomy, and against his suggested solution of translation. Instead, I take his analysis to reveal that there are actually several very distinct forms intellectual autonomy that are significantly in tension. One familiar kind is direct autonomy, where we seek to understand arguments and reasons for ourselves. Another kind is delegational autonomy, where we seek to find others to invest with our intellectual trust when we cannot understand. A third is management autonomy, where we seek to encapsulate fields, in order to manage their overall structure and connectivity. Intellectual transparency will help us achieve direct autonomy, but many intellectual circumstances require that we exercise delegational and management autonomy. However, these latter forms of autonomy require us to give up on transparency. (shrink)

Postmodern dönemde tüketim ilişkilerindeki rasyonel bağın koptuğu görülmektedir. Ürünlerin tüketilmesinde kullanım değerlerinin yerine, örgütler tarafından oluşturulan simgeler, semboller ve “anlamlar” geçmiştir. Örgütler tarafından halkla ilişkiler, reklam ve pazarlama aracılığıyla oluşturulan “anlamlar”, bireylerin tüketim kararlarını etkilemektedir. Birey ürünle birlikte, ürüne yüklenen anlamları da satın almaktadır. Hikaye anlatımı, bu anlamların oluşturulması için önemli bir araç olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Hikâyeler duyguları yaymakta ve insanların birbiriyle bağ kurmasını sağlamaktadır. Makalenin amacı, hikaye anlatımının yeni bir yolu olan “manifesto hikayeciliğinin” yeni tüketim anlayışı içinde nasıl bir (...) işleve sahip olduğunu tartışmaktır. Bu bağlamda, Dove’un “Gerçek Güzellik”, Diesel’in “Aptal Ol”, Axe’ın “Erkekler de Ağlar” ve Nike’ın “Sınırsız Ol” kampanyaları çoklu vaka analizi çerçevesinde, betimsel analiz yoluyla incelenmiştir. “Manifesto hikayeciliği”nin yeni tüketim anlayışı içinde örgütler tarafından “bir amacın parçası olma” duygusunu yaratmak ve tüketiciyle duygusal bağ kurmak için bir araç olarak kullandıkları sonucuna varılmıştır. (shrink)

While for many years Locke was viewed almost universally as the prophet of liberalism, today a successive reading of C.B. Macpherson's Possessive Individualism, John Dunn's The Political Thought of John Locke and Richard Ashcraft's Revolutionary Politics and Locke's �Two Treatises of Government�, might produce a schizophrenic vision of Locke as simultaneously an accumulative bourgeois villain, an irrelevant Calvinist moralist and a radical egalitarian revolutionary hero. This essay addresses an issue examined to a greater or lesser extent by these and other (...) interpreters: John Locke's thoughts on the conduct of everyday political life. Consideration of this topic can serve to moderate one's impression of Locke, just as currently Ashcraft holds Locke to be less radical and Dunn finds Locke less irrelevant than they did before. The essay seeks to identify the group of persons Locke presumed would govern in a well-ordered nation, to examine the qualities required of these governors in order for them to perform their calling, and to illuminate Locke's personal efforts to promote these qualities in the governors of the next generation. In particular, I will examine the concept of trust, which John Dunn in recent years has found to be of continuing political relevance. In the first section, I will review the use of the word �trust� in Locke's Second Treatise to display the fact that trustworthiness in governors is constituted by possession of the qualities of virtue and prudence in the second section, I will argue that Locke's educational writings ought to be viewed as attempts to encourage the formation of the qualities necessary for good governors. In the following two sections, I will examine the meaning Locke ascribes to both �prudence� and �virtue� in his various political, philosophical, and educational writings. Finally, I will endeavour to show that an understanding of these qualities, along with the importance of status and breeding, are instrumental to an understanding of Locke's conception of the conduct of everday political life. (shrink)

Translation and interpretation of selected Hadith on Islamic ethics and coduct.

This paper, which gives continuity to another article, analyzes the content of I Dialogus V, 14-22 and, in an appendix, presents our Portuguese translation of this excerpt. In these chapters, the Inceptor Venerabilis discusses whether St. Peter and the Roman Church possess primacy over all other apostles and churches; andwhether this primacy is granted by God himself. Ockham first presents, not ad litteram, the opinion of those who refute the thesis that Christ did not give primacy to Peter and the (...) Roman Church. Then, because this thesis fully deflates papal power, he proposes a contrary thesis based on five proofs. We conclude that Ockham’s unnamed opponent is Marsilius of Padua, whose opinions are in his Defensor Pacis. (shrink)

Ethical leadership research has primarily relied on social learning and social exchange theories. Although these theories have been generative, additional theoretical perspectives hold the potential to broaden scholars’ understanding of ethical leadership’s effects. In this paper, we examine moral typecasting theory and its unique implications for followers’ leader-directed citizenship behavior. Across two studies employing both survey-based and experimental methods, we offer support for three key predictions consistent with this theory. First, the effect of ethical leadership on leader-directed citizenship behavior is (...) curvilinear, with followers helping highly ethical and highly unethical leaders the least. Second, this effect only emerges in morally intense contexts. Third, this effect is mediated by the follower’s belief in the potential for prosocial impact. Our findings suggest that a follower’s belief that his or her leader is ethical has meaningful, often counterintuitive effects that are not predicted by dominant theories of ethical leadership. These results highlight the potential importance of moral typecasting theory to better understand the dynamics of ethical leadership. (shrink)

Among the works of Aelius Aristides is preserved an address to an unnamed ‘king’. The prevailing view in this century has been that it is addressed to a third-century emperor, and was attributed to Aristides in error. In an article published in 1972, 134–52), I argued that the speech was genuine, and was delivered by Aristides in 144 before Antoninus Pius. In a recent article in this journal, 172–97), Stephen A. Stertz has undertaken to rebut this view, and advances a (...) novel one: the speech is a school exercise written in the third or perhaps the fourth century, and does not refer to any particular ‘king’, not even necessarily a Roman emperor. Rather than attempt to answer all of Stertz's arguments, I have selected as samples one each from several diverse fields. Manuscript tradition. In his first paragraph, Stertz suggests that the manuscript tradition of the Eis basilea itself impugns its authenticity. ‘The oration is entitled єς βασιλέα in three manuscripts and єς τόν ατοκρτορα in another. It has been pointed out that in the former group of manuscripts the title is not preceded by the words ριστεδου λόγος, thus casting doubt on Aristidean authorship'. The accompanying footnote refers to Keil's apparatus ad loc, and the reader might infer that this argument is borrowed from Aristides’ foremost editor. What Keil said was: ‘Titulus ες βασιλα STC : єς τòν ατοκρτορα U et in indice D m recentiss.’. (shrink)

In Lowe (1995), instead of endorsing a Stalnaker/Lewis-style account of counterfactuals, E. J. Lowe claims that a variation of C. I. Lewis’s strict implication alone captures the essence of everyday conditionals and avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. However, Lowe’s approach fails to account for the validity of simple and straightforward arguments such as ‘if 2=3 then 2+1=3+1’, and Heylen & Horsten (2006) even claims that no variation of strict implication can successfully describe the logical behavior of natural language conditionals. (...) By incorporating the German logician O. Becker’s modal intuition with the insight of Ramsey’s Test, we show that there does exist a unified, strict-conditional based account of everyday conditionals, which withstands all attacks previously raised against truth-conditional accounts of conditionals. Furthermore, a subtle distinction between autistic and realistic readings of the indexical ‘I’ involved in a conditional helps us resolve a recent debate concerning the Thomason conditionals. (shrink)

The Malayalam poet, Kunjunni, is known for his short and simple poems. Some of his poems are filled with rich philosophical insights, and a few such poems are gathered in this paper with a view to unravel the philosophical view point embedded in them. By explicating the poet’s views about space, time, the world and the other, the paper contends that the philosophical vision that unfolds in these poems is a form of solipsism, the doctrine that the self alone exits. (...) It is shown how the poet considers the other minds including God, and the spatiotemporal universe as various manifestations of his self and refuses to grant them independent ontological status as people generally tend to do. The paper concludes by noting also certain sceptical tendencies in the poet. (shrink)

C. Thi Nguyen – the author whose new book, Games: Agency as Art, is the main provocation for co-editor John Russell and I putting together this special issue of the Journal of the Philosophy of Spo...

I do not think it would be fair for me to reply to Professor Spiegelberg’s rejoinder without giving him the chance to reply in turn to my reply. The first speaker in a symposium should always, I believe, have the last word. But by that principle I am entitled to a reply to Professor Chisholm, for whom, in his original paper, I was a primary target.

This contribution to the debate over Marx's theory of value gives an account of his concept of ?abstract labour?. Contrary to Stanley Moore {Inquiry, Vol. 14 [1971]), Marx never abandons his early critique of the Hegelian ?Concept'; for he gives a material basis to the conception of social labour as concretely universal. If, in analysing the commodity form of the product of labour, Marx characterizes the labour that forms the substance of value as ?abstractly universal labour?, the priority of the (...) abstract over the concrete at this point is not due to the influence of Hegel's Logic on Marx's work, but reflects the material process of abstraction occurring in commodity exchange. We show that Marx takes up a critical stance to this reality. (shrink)

That there is a personal, or private, dimension to religious and moral experience is obvious enough. On the face of things we may feel driven even to attach a sense which is essentially personal to the content of propositions relating to those areas of experience. ‘I know what I mean by what he says’, one might say. Or, it might be felt that there is a sense in which each man has a God who is uniquely his own. Just how (...) far can we push this idea of the irreducibly personal meaning, the necessarily individual content to such a moral or religious concept? Can we, in the end, give it an acceptable and unequivocal logical form? (shrink)

Şiir, masal ve destan yazarı olan Feqîyê Teyran, tasavvuf edebiyatının önemli şairlerinden biridir. Yaşantısı üzerinde derli toplu bilginin bulunmadığı müellifin şiirlerinin derlendiği Divan adlı eserinde en uzun manzume olan Şéx Sen’anî, dikkat çekici ve oldukça öğretici bir hikâyedir. Hikâyenin Fars, Türk ve Kürt edebiyatında tasavvuf meşrepli şairler tarafından sıkça kullanıldığı görülmektedir. Hikâyede; Hristiyan kızın sevgisine ulaşmak için elindeki maddî-mânevî makamları terk eden, içki içen, Hıristiyan olan, zünnar bağlayan şeyhin yolculuğu üzerinden Feqîyé Teyran, mecâzi aşktan ilâhi aşka seyr-i sülûku anlatmaktadır. Bu (...) aşk; Muhaddis, mutasavvıf ve adı kaynaklarda Abdürrezzâk olarak bilinen şeyhin ibretlik kıssasında, vahdet-i vücût anlayışı içerisinde değerlendirilmektedir. İlâhi nûrun mazharını sevdiğinde gören Şéxin hikâyesinde Feqî, ilâhî isim ve sıfatların hüküm ve eserlerinin zuhûrunun insanda gerçekleştiğini anlatmaktadır. Vahdet-i vücûd ilkesi ile alakalı vahdet-kesret, tecellî, cezbe, hayret, cemâl, yakîn, aşk gibi tasavvufî kavramların eserinde geçiyor olması, varlığın birliğini ispatlamak için geçerli, sağlam ve ikna edici hususlar olarak öne çıkmaktadır. (shrink)

In his Works of Pindar, Vol. II, p. xxiii, Dr. L. R. Farnell discusses the admission of metrical licences into Pindar's text, and pronounces that ‘the “Responsion-law” should not be pressed with over-strained severity.’ In general he agrees with Wilamowitz and Schroeder and disagrees with the stricter school of P. Maas. But none of these scholars have formulated the principles by which long syllables may be equated with short in Pindar's text, or even those by which two short syllables may (...) take the place of one long and vice versa. Such attempts were made by great scholars of the past, notably by Erasmus Schmid, Hermann and Boeckh, but recent developments in metric and textual criticism have created a new attitude towards metrical problems and provided a new vocabulary. It is time that Pindar's practice was re-examined. Only from it can we deduce what his rules of composition were and find out what licences he allowed and what not. The question is important both for the textual critic and for the student of Greek metric. If we can discover the principles on which Pindar used such metrical licences, we shall be more qualified to consider emendations which involve them and to understand the rules which he set before himself when composing an ode. (shrink)

In this article I assess Georges Canguilhem's historical epistemology with both theoretical and historical questions in mind. From a theoretical point of view, I am concerned with the relation between history and philosophy, and in particular with the philosophical assumptions and external norms that are involved in history writing. Moreover, I am concerned with the role that history can play in the understanding and evaluation of philosophical concepts. From a historical point of view, I regard historical epistemology, as developed by (...) Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, as a conception and practice which came out of the project, elaborated in France from the 1920s to the 1940s, of combining history of science and philosophy. I analyse in particular Canguilhem's epistemology in his theory and practice of history of science. What he called 'normative history' is the focus of my analysis. I evaluate the question of the nature and provenience of the norm employed in normative history, and I compare it with the norm as discussed by Canguilhem in Le normal et le pathologique. While I am critical of Canguilhem's treatment of history, I conclude that his philosophical suggestion to analyse the formation of scientific concepts 'from below' represents a useful model for history and philosophy of science, and that it can be very profitably extended to philosophical concepts. (shrink)

The ‘beautiful axiom’ to which Dickens refers is a central feature of Thomas Hobbes' thinking but its precise role in his moral philosophy remains unclear. I shall here attempt both to dispel the unclarity and to evaluate the adequacy of the position that emerges. Given the high level of contemporary interest in Hobbes' thought, both within and beyond philosophical circles, this is an enterprise of considerable importance. None the less, my interest is not merely interpretative, since the assessment of Hobbes' (...) attitude to ‘the beautiful axiom’ raises important and difficult questions about what might be termed the preconditions of morality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Robert C. Solomon IN DEFENSE OF SENTIMENTALITY "A sentimentalist is simply one who desires to have the luxury of an emotion without paying for it." —Oscar Wilde, De Profundis. 66TA That's Wrong with Sentimentality?"1 That tide of Mark JefV V ferson's 1983 Mindessay already indicates a great deal notonly about the gist of his article but about a century-old prejudice that has been devastating to ethics and literature alike. (...) According to that prejudice, it goes without saying that there is something wrong with it, even if it is difficult to put one's finger on it. To be called "sentimental" is to be ridiculed, or dismissed. Sentimentality is a weakness, it suggests hypocrisy. Or, perhaps it is the fact that sentimental people are so... so embarrassing. (How awkward it is talking or sitting next to someone weeping or gushing, when one is dry-eyed and somber.) Or, perhaps it is the well-confirmed fact that sentimentalists have such poor taste, and sentimental literature is, above all, literature that is cheap, superficial, and manipulative—in other words, verbal kitsch. Such mawkish literature jerks tears from otherwise sensible readers, and sentimentalists are those who actually enjoy that humiliating experience. Perhaps that is why Oscar Wilde thought that sentimentalists were really cynics ("Sentimentality is merely the bank holiday of cynicism").2 Or, perhaps what bothers us is what bothered Michael Tanner, that sentimental people indulge themselves in their feelings instead of doing what should be done.3 It is often said that the problem is that sentimentality and sentimental literature alike give us a false view of the world, distort our thinking and substitute a "saccharine" portrait of the world in place ofwhat we all know to be the horrible realities. Moreover, as Jefferson more than merely suggests, the "simple-minded sympathies " ofsentimentality might actually promote fascism and racism. Mary Midgley similarly suggests that sentimentality leads to brutality.4 But Philosophy and Literature, © 1990, 14: 304-323 Robert C. Solomon305 even where sentimentality is a harmless diversion—a Daphne du Maurier novel on a sad Saturday afternoon—it seems to be all but agreed that sentimentality is no virtue even ifit is not, like cruelty and hypocrisy, intrinsically vicious. Something is wrong with sentimentality; the only question is, what is it that is wrong? In this essay, I will argue that there is nothing wrong with sentimentality. Of course, like any quasi-ethical category, it admits of unwarranted excesses and hypocritical abuses, and is prone to various pathological distortions. But the prejudice against sentimentality, I want to argue, is ill-founded and in fact is an extension ofthat all-too-familiar contempt for the passions in Western literature and philosophy. Our disdain for sentimentality is the rationalist's discomfort with any display of emotion, warranted as well as unwarranted, appropriate as well as inappropriate. It is as ifthe very word, "sentimentality," has been loaded with the connotations of "too much"—too much feeling and too litde common sense and rationality, as if these were opposed instead of mutually supportive. It is as if sentimentality and its sentiments are never warranted and always inappropriate. The word has come to be used as the name of a deficiency or a weakness if not, as some critics have written, a malaise. But I take sentimentality to be nothing more nor less than the "appeal to tender feelings," and though one can manipulate and abuse such feelings (including one's own), and though they can on occasion be misdirected or excessive, there is nothing wrong with them as such and hence nothing (in that respect) wrong with literature that provokes us, that "moves" us, to abstract affection or weeping. Sentimentality implies no deficiency in one's rational faculties and does not imply any inappropriateness, unwillingness, or lack of readiness to act. Sentimentality does not involve any distortion of the world and it does not impede but rather prepares and motivates us to react in "the real world." It is not an escape from reality or responsibility, but, quite to the contrary, provides the precondition for ethical engagement rather than an obstacle to it. Historically, I want to trace the fate of sentimentality to... (shrink)