Annette Baier's aim is to make sense of David Hume's Treatise as a whole. Hume's family motto, which appears on his bookplate, was True to the End. Baier argues that it is not until the end of the Treatise that we get his full story about truth and falsehood, reason and folly. By the end, we can see the cause to which Hume has been true throughout the work. Baier finds Hume's Treatise of Human Nature to be (...) a carefully crafted literary and philosophical work which itself displays a philosophical progress of sentiments. His starting place is an overly abstract intellectualism that deliberately thrusts passions and social concerns into the background. In the three interrelated books of the Treatise, his self-understander proceeds through partial successes and dramatic failures to emerge with new-found optimism, expecting that the exact knowledge the morally self-conscious anatomist of human nature can acquire will itself improve and correct our vision of morality. Baier describes how, by turning philosophy toward human nature instead of toward God and the universe, Hume initiated a new philosophy, a broader discipline of reflection that can embrace Charles Darwin and Michel Foucault as well as William James and Sigmund Freud. Hume belongs both to our present and to our past. (shrink)

We discuss the variety of sorts of sympathy Hume recognizes, the extent to which he thinks our sympathy with others’ feelings depends on inferences from the other’s expression, and from her perceived situation, and consider also whether he later changed his views about the nature and role of sympathy, in particular its role in morals.

In recent decades in North American social and moral philosophy, alongside the development and discussion of widely influential theories of justice, taken as Rawls takes it as the ‘first virtue of social institutions,’ there has been a counter-movement gathering strength, one coming from some interesting sources. For some of the most outspoken of the diverse group who have in a variety of ways been challenging the assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues are members of those sections (...) of society whom one might have expected to be especially aware of the supreme importance of justice, namely blacks and women. Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial correction of long-standing racist and sexist injustices to their race and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the presence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. Among these philosophers of the philosophical counterculture, as it were - but an increasingly large counterculture - I include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Stocker, Lawrence Blum, Michael Slote, Laurence Thomas, Claudia Card, Alison Jaggar, Susan Wolf and a whole group of men and women, myself included, who have been influenced by the writings of Harvard educational psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book In a Different Voice caused a considerable stir both in the popular press and, more slowly, in the philosophical journals. (shrink)

Kann es dabei bleiben, dass das Kontinuum und das Unendliche noch bis heute zwei ungeloste Ratsel sind? Denn immerhin ist nicht einmal geklart, ob sie tatsachlich zwei sind oder nicht vielmehr nur eins. Und das obwohl doch feststeht: Auftreten kann unsere Welt als Inbegriff des Endlichen nur im Kontinuum von Zeit und Raum als dem Unendlichen. Nur ist nicht klar, ob es auf seinem Grund denn in der Tat kontinuierlich ist und nicht vielmehr diskret, wozu man bisher neigt. Befragt man (...) es bisher doch nur reduktionistisch nach der blossen Vielheit seiner Elemente: philosophisch ebenso wie mathematisch. Notig fur die Ratsellosung aber konnte sein, dass man auch noch holistisch nach der inneren Einheit dieser Vielheit fragt, wie es nicht einmal Aristoteles und Kant tun. Schliesslich ist es fur uns bedeutsam, wenn als Grundgestalt der Welt, zu der wir, die Subjekte, mit hinzugehoren, das Kontinuum als das Unendliche auftritt. Womoglich ist es dadurch nicht nur mathematisch oder philosophisch, sondern auch noch theologisch von Bedeutung. All dem Ungeklarten gilt es jedenfalls noch weiter nachzugehen. (shrink)

This contribution is concerned with what Hume means by reflection and sentiment. Hume’s Treatise is devoted to an account of the extent to which the mind is able to bear its own reflexion or turn mental states on themselves. This theme is likely the “new scene of thought” that inspired Hume’s major concerns in the Treatise. Although Hume found that the understanding fails to understand itself, the passions do better in satisfying curiosity about curiosity, and, most importantly, moral sentiment is (...) able to approve of itself. The author contends that the whole task of the moral sentiment is to get us to fulfill our part to mankind and society, and that, according to Hume, the sentiments are the noble source of morality itself. (shrink)

Did Aristotle, with his categories, classify only expressions or also something extralinguistic? In the second case his classification seems to be not exclusive, at least if the usual universes of discourse are considered. However, if we use certain enlarged universes, which may have more than one individual for each individual of the usual universes, we may construct exclusive general classifications that approach the aristotelian categories. The latter ones should then be considered second order classes that classify classes of individuals. If (...) the individuals are taken from one of the indicated enlarged universes, we can obtain the exclusivity that we do not have for the usual universes. (shrink)

Beck, L.W. Können Kants synthetische Urteil in analystische umgewandelt werden?--Ebbinghaus, J. Kants Lehre von der Anschauung a priori.--Mittelstrass, J. Spontaneität.--Prauss, G. Zum Wahrheitsproblem bei Kant.--Henrich, D. Die Beweisstruktur von Kants transzendentaler Deduktion.--Kaulbach, F. Schema, Bild und Modell nach den Voraussetzungen des Kantischen Denkens.--Frede, M. und Krüger, L. Über die Zuordnung der Quantitäten des Urteils und der Kategorien der Grösse bei Kant.--Weizsäcker, C.F. von. Kants "Erste Analogie der Erfahrung" und die Erhaltungssätze der Physik.--Beck, L.W. Die Zweite Analogie und das Prinzip der (...) Unberstimmtheit.--Tuschling, B. Kants "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft" und das Opus postumum.--Hilbner, K. Leib und Erfahrung in Kants Opus postumum.--Patzig, G. Die logischen Formen praktischer Sätze in Kants Ethik.--Henrich, D. Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft.--Schwemmer, O. Vernunft und Moral.--Ebbinghaus, J. Die Formeln des kategorischen Imperativs und die Ableitung inhaltlich bestimmter Pflichten. (shrink)

'The Rational and the Moral Order' is a significant book providing a comprehensive theory of morality. The opening chapter is simply marvellous. Baier provides a cogent response to Hume's conundrums on practical reasoning: logical entailment, he argues, is not the correct model of the relation between reasons and that for which they are reasons. Indeed, the giving of reasons is, in part, a social enterprise, and there is no necessary connection between rationality and self-interest. Just as the giving of (...) reasons is a social enterprise taught to succeeding generations, so too is the moral enterprise, for a moral order is a social order of some sort. It is a social order that encourages a critical stance toward, and permits the correction of, its mores. Moral precepts can be sound or unsound, and yet can be relative to a moral order. In the concluding chapter Baier shows how his theoretical framework can be used to confront some of the moral problems people face, problems which have also exercised contemporary philosophers. Though there are many philosophers who believe that killing is worse than letting anyone die, there are few that defend the view other than by raw intuition. Baier deploys the resources of his theory of morality in support of this widely shared but poorly defended viewpoints. "Along the way, Baier deals with virtually all the problems that have taxed moral philosophers for a very long time -- rationality, responsibility, morality's relation to law, the good life, prisoner's dilemma, moral motivation, and others. The Rational and the Moral Order is careful, insightful, and convincing." --Theodore M. Benditt, University of Alabama. (shrink)

David Hume's essay Of Moral Prejudices offers a spirited defense of "all the most endearing sentiments of the hearts, all the most useful biases and instincts, ...

In two experiments, we tested whether fearful facial expressions capture attention in an awareness-independent fashion. In Experiment 1, participants searched for a visible neutral face presented at one of two positions. Prior to the target, a backward-masked and, thus, invisible emotional or neutral face was presented as a cue, either at target position or away from the target position. If negative emotional faces capture attention in a stimulus-driven way, we would have expected a cueing effect: better performance where fearful or (...) disgusted facial cues were presented at target position than away from the target. However, no evidence of capture of attention was found, neither in behavior, nor in event-related lateralizations. In Experiment 2, we went one step further and used fearful faces as visible targets, too. Thereby, we sought to boost awareness-independent capture of attention by fearful faces. However, still, we found no significant attention-capture effect. Our results show that fearful facial expressions do not capture attention in an awareness-independent way. Results are discussed in light of existing theories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 32, Number 1, April 2006, pp. 113-117 How Wide Is Hume's Circle? (A question raised by the exchange between Erin I. Kelly and Louis E. Loeb, Hume Studies, November 2004) ANNETTE C. BAIER Hume's version, in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, section 9,2 of the viewpoint from which moral assessments are made, and from which traits are recognized as virtues or vices, is (...) that it is one which activates a "universal principle of the human frame," the "principle of humanity." It displays "the force of many sympathies," and depends upon our possession of "some propensity to the good of mankind" (EPM 5.39; SBN 226). Does this represent a revision, on Hume's part, of his Treatise claim that sympathy with a person's "narrow circle" is what enables us to judge that person's moral goodness? A humanity-wide circle is scarcely "narrow," even if it is not wide enough for those who see our treatment of animals as relevant to our moral merit or demerit. The claim about sympathy with the narrow circle is made in the Treatise section "Of goodness and benevolence."3 It has recently been assuming the status of a definition of the Humean moral point of view, in some commentators' writings.4 If it had been so intended, then there would indeed be a revision in EPM, where there is no mention of narrow circles, merely two footnotes, 22 and 25, to the section "Why utility pleases," concerning the wisdom of confining our efforts to do good to those close to us, lest our efforts be "dissipated or lost for want of a properly limited object." But in fact Hume never claimed that sympathy with a Annette Baier formerly taught in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and is now retired. Email: [email protected]. 114 Annette C. Baier person's narrow circle was enough to enable us to recognize her bravery, her proper pride, her prudence, her good judgement, her wit, her integrity, her "justice" or her allegiance to lawful magistrates. It is needed only to judge her "goodness and benevolence. " (I take it that the title, "Of goodness and benevolence," is pleonastic, that the varieties of benevolence exhaust "goodness.") Just as benevolence is not the whole of virtue, for Hume, nor is "goodness." The section in which he uses the phrase, "narrow circle," begins with an explicit limitation of what is there to be discussed: "Having thus explained that praise and approbation for everything we call great in human affections, we now proceed to give an account of their goodness..." (T 3.3.3.1; SBN 602). "Good" is not, for Hume, the most general term of moral approbation. Just as we can judge some to be "too intrepid" (an ingredient in "greatness of mind"), so we can judge some to be "too good" (EPM 7.22; SBN 259). Hume's most general terms of approbation are "meritorious" and "estimable." He uses "good" in a restricted sense, for a person's possession of the group of virtues that come under "benevolence." In the Treatise 3.3.3.15 (SBN 581-82), he speaks not of one moral point of view, but of "steady and generalpoinrs of view" (my emphasis), and it is possible, indeed plausible, that sympathy with circles of different widths will be needed to recognize different virtues and groups of virtues. For some, such as justice, "extensive sympathy" (T 3.3.1.23; SBN 586) is needed. For others, such as affability, and other aspects of "goodness," we sympathize with the effects of the person's character on a less extensive circle. A good person is affable, generous, and kind, does well as friend, as parent, as neighbor, as colleague, as employer. She does considerate and helpful things to those she encounters, both those close to her, friends, family, and work-mates, and also to those to whom she is not so close, such as the needy in her own community, to whom she may give employment, or charity. Hume uses other phrases in Treatise 3.3 which are sometimes taken to refer to the same... (shrink)

The series, founded in 1970, publishes works which either combine studies in the history of philosophy with a systematic approach or bring together systematic studies with reconstructions from the history of philosophy. Monographs are published in English as well as in German. The founding editors are Erhard Scheibe (editor until 1991), Günther Patzig (until 1999) and Wolfgang Wieland (until 2003). From 1990 to 2007, the series had been co-edited by Jürgen Mittelstraß.

In the seventeenth century, the Jewish mystical tradition which is known as Kabbalah was integrated into the curriculum of studying the Hebrew Bible and the Talmud. Kabbalah became popular in these times in the wake of the dissemination of Isaac Luria’s teachings, in particular within the Jewish communities in Prague and Amsterdam, where members of the Horowitz family took a leading role. Kabbalistic psychology was applied to the whole Jewish lifestyle then, and to the understanding of Jewish tradition. Kabbalistic intentions (...) of prayer intensified the expectation of redemption, and during the messianic movement initiated by Shabtai Zvi, the kabbalistic meaning of repentance was also adapted in prayer books composed for so-called Conversos, who had to familiarize themselves with Jewish tradition. The article exemplifies this process by a Spanish anthology of prayers, Libro entitulado ensenha à pecadores, and shows the historical impact of Kabbalah in the field of Jewish education. (shrink)

In recent decades in North American social and moral philosophy, alongside the development and discussion of widely influential theories of justice, taken as Rawls takes it as the ‘first virtue of social institutions,’ there has been a counter-movement gathering strength, one coming from some interesting sources. For some of the most outspoken of the diverse group who have in a variety of ways been challenging the assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues are members of those sections (...) of society whom one might have expected to be especially aware of the supreme importance of justice, namely blacks and women. Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial correction of long-standing racist and sexist injustices to their race and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the presence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. Among these philosophers of the philosophical counterculture, as it were - but an increasingly large counterculture - I include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Stocker, Lawrence Blum, Michael Slote, Laurence Thomas, Claudia Card, Alison Jaggar, Susan Wolf and a whole group of men and women, myself included, who have been influenced by the writings of Harvard educational psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book In a Different Voice caused a considerable stir both in the popular press and, more slowly, in the philosophical journals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 32, Number 1, April 2006, pp. 113-117 How Wide Is Hume's Circle? (A question raised by the exchange between Erin I. Kelly and Louis E. Loeb, Hume Studies, November 2004) ANNETTE C. BAIER Hume's version, in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, section 9,2 of the viewpoint from which moral assessments are made, and from which traits are recognized as virtues or vices, is (...) that it is one which activates a "universal principle of the human frame," the "principle of humanity." It displays "the force of many sympathies," and depends upon our possession of "some propensity to the good of mankind" (EPM 5.39; SBN 226). Does this represent a revision, on Hume's part, of his Treatise claim that sympathy with a person's "narrow circle" is what enables us to judge that person's moral goodness? A humanity-wide circle is scarcely "narrow," even if it is not wide enough for those who see our treatment of animals as relevant to our moral merit or demerit. The claim about sympathy with the narrow circle is made in the Treatise section "Of goodness and benevolence."3 It has recently been assuming the status of a definition of the Humean moral point of view, in some commentators' writings.4 If it had been so intended, then there would indeed be a revision in EPM, where there is no mention of narrow circles, merely two footnotes, 22 and 25, to the section "Why utility pleases," concerning the wisdom of confining our efforts to do good to those close to us, lest our efforts be "dissipated or lost for want of a properly limited object." But in fact Hume never claimed that sympathy with a Annette Baier formerly taught in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and is now retired. Email: [email protected]. 114 Annette C. Baier person's narrow circle was enough to enable us to recognize her bravery, her proper pride, her prudence, her good judgement, her wit, her integrity, her "justice" or her allegiance to lawful magistrates. It is needed only to judge her "goodness and benevolence. " (I take it that the title, "Of goodness and benevolence," is pleonastic, that the varieties of benevolence exhaust "goodness.") Just as benevolence is not the whole of virtue, for Hume, nor is "goodness." The section in which he uses the phrase, "narrow circle," begins with an explicit limitation of what is there to be discussed: "Having thus explained that praise and approbation for everything we call great in human affections, we now proceed to give an account of their goodness..." (T 3.3.3.1; SBN 602). "Good" is not, for Hume, the most general term of moral approbation. Just as we can judge some to be "too intrepid" (an ingredient in "greatness of mind"), so we can judge some to be "too good" (EPM 7.22; SBN 259). Hume's most general terms of approbation are "meritorious" and "estimable." He uses "good" in a restricted sense, for a person's possession of the group of virtues that come under "benevolence." In the Treatise 3.3.3.15 (SBN 581-82), he speaks not of one moral point of view, but of "steady and generalpoinrs of view" (my emphasis), and it is possible, indeed plausible, that sympathy with circles of different widths will be needed to recognize different virtues and groups of virtues. For some, such as justice, "extensive sympathy" (T 3.3.1.23; SBN 586) is needed. For others, such as affability, and other aspects of "goodness," we sympathize with the effects of the person's character on a less extensive circle. A good person is affable, generous, and kind, does well as friend, as parent, as neighbor, as colleague, as employer. She does considerate and helpful things to those she encounters, both those close to her, friends, family, and work-mates, and also to those to whom she is not so close, such as the needy in her own community, to whom she may give employment, or charity. Hume uses other phrases in Treatise 3.3 which are sometimes taken to refer to the same... (shrink)

David Hume has been invoked by those who want to found morality on human nature as well as by their critics. He is credited with showing us the fallacy of moving from premises about what is the case to conclusions about what ought to be the case; and yet, just a few pages after the famous is-ought remarks in A Treatise of Human Nature, he embarks on his equally famous derivation of the obligations of justice from facts about the cooperative (...) schemes accepted in human communities. Is he ambivalent on the relationship between facts about human nature and human evaluations? Does he contradict himself – and, if so, which part of his whole position is most valuable? Between the famous is-ought passage and the famous account of convention and the obligations arising from established cooperative schemes once they are morally endorsed, Hume discusses the various meanings of the term “natural.” “Shou'd it be ask'd, Whether we ought to search for these principles [upon which all our notions of morals are founded] in nature or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou'd reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal.” The natural can be opposed to the miraculous, the unusual, or the artificial. It is the last contrast that Hume wants, for his contrast between the “artificial” culturally variant, convention-dependent obligations of justice and the more invariant “natural virtues,” and what he says about that contrast in this preparation for his account of the “artificial” virtues, makes it clear why he can later refer to justice as “natural” and to the general content of the rules of justice – that is, of basic human conventions of cooperation – as “Laws of Nature”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

This chapter contains section titled: The Appendices The Analysis of Personal Merit The True Origin of Morals What Pleased the Author Final Note References Further Reading.

We investigate how the selection of assurance topics and the format of their communication influence the credibility perception of sustainability report readers. This is important because misleading communication may discredit ethical sustainability assurance practices. Based on signaling theory and using an experimental approach, we are the first to examine false credibility signals in the context of sustainability assurance. We find that two variables related to sustainability assurance, reference explicitness and assurance depth, jointly influence the assurance signal and the perceived credibility (...) of a sustainability report. Our findings indicate that readers are not at risk of false signaling but can make incorrect interpretations of the assurance signal and might respond negatively to well-intentioned signals. The main implications of our findings are that firms should refrain from increasing reference explicitness and should select only the most material topics. Taken together, our results provide new insights on the unethical practice of false signaling and provide an example of an incorrect signal interpretation by readers. (shrink)

Kann Spaltung oder Abgrund zwischen Subjekt und Objekt das letzte Wort sein? Nicht, wenn beides doch von dieser Welt ist als der einen. Und auch nicht, wenn jene Sachen selbst, mit denen Kant gerungen hatte, wie mit Zeit und Raum oder Bewusstsein, immer ratselhafter werden, auch fur Mathematiker und Physiker: Warum denn ausgerechnet solche zwei wie Zeit und Raum der einen Welt? Warum nicht mehr, doch auch nicht weniger? Warum der Raum als Ausdehnung denn ausgerechnet drei-, die Zeit jedoch anscheinend (...) eindimensional? Warum nicht mehr, doch auch nicht weniger? Sind Zeit und Raum als Ausdehnung auf ihrem Grund diskret oder kontinuierlich? Geht es an, sie kurzerhand zur Punktmenge diskret zu machen, nur um ihre Ausdehnung durch Zahlen berechenbar zu machen? Kann verwundern, dass Mathematik und mathematische Physik mit dem Kontinuum von Ausdehnung in Schwierigkeiten kommen, wenn sie demgemass punktmengentheoretisch mit ihm umgehen mussen? Steht laut Quantentheorie nicht langst schon fest, auf seinem Grund gehorche unser Kosmos nicht der Mengentheorie? In welchem Grundverhaltnis stehen Punkt und das Kontinuum von Ausdehnung ursprunglich zueinander? Und was ist denn Zeit- und Raum-Bewusstsein, wenn Objekte von Subjekten als Bewusstsein abhangig sind, wie nach Kant und nach der Quantentheorie? Ist es vielleicht verfehlt, wenn Mathematiker und Physiker, doch auch so manche Philosophen die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft verabschieden, weil sie als solche angeblich etwas Unmogliches wie Ursprungs- oder Erste Philosophie sei? Zumindest gilt es, allen diesen ratselhaften Sachen selbst mit Kant noch einmal auf den Grund zu gehen. (shrink)