A teaching method may not work for all students. Therefore, attention should be paid to the type of students entering the learning environment in order to explain how they perceive the learning environment and achieve. This study investigates students? perceptions and achievement in four learning environments that differed in the degree to which case-based and lecture-based learning were implemented (either separately or combined), hereby making use of students? motivational and learning profiles. Participants were 1098 first-year student teachers who took a (...) course on child development. Results showed that autonomously motivated deep-strategic learners were significantly more positive about each type of learning environment than little motivated and less pronounced deep-strategic learners. However, with regard to achievement, student profiles did not differ. Instead, the learning environment proved to be of significant influence: students in a gradually implemented case-based setting and a completely lecture-based setting scored significantly higher than students in a completely case-based setting. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to gain insight into the relationships between hands?on experiences with formative assessment, students? assessment preferences and their approaches to learning. The sample consisted of 108 university first?year Bachelor?s students studying criminology. Data were obtained using the Revised two?factor study process questionnaire (R?SPQ?2F) and the Assessment preferences inventory (API). The study shows that differences in assessment preferences are correlated with differences in approach to learning. Students? preferences for assessment methods with higher?order thinking tasks are significantly (...) lower after actual experience with a formative assessment. Moreover, students also changed their approaches to learning after hands?on experience with a formative mode of assessment. Surprisingly, this change evinced a more ?surface approach? to learning. Nevertheless, this is in line with other recent research findings. The paper ends with some possible explanations, and new directions for research are proposed. (shrink)

This communication presents a very simple model for the global growth of the human population. It is shown that the solution of the simple equation.

I propose a theory aimed at advancing scholarly research in social entrepreneurship. By highlighting the key trade-off between value creation and value capture and explaining when situations of simultaneous market and government failure may arise, I suggest that social entrepreneurship is the pursuit of sustainable solutions to neglected problems with positive externalities. I further discuss the situations in which problems with externalities are likely to be neglected and derive the central goal and logic of action of social entrepreneurs, in contrast (...) to commercial entrepreneurs. Overall, this article provides a conceptual framework that allows understanding the growing phenomena of social entrepreneurship and its role in the functioning of modern society. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only (...) perception will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price. (shrink)

Because philosophical reflections on touch usually start from our ability to perceive properties of objects, they tend to overlook features of touch that are crucial to correct understanding of tactual perception. This paper brings out these features and uses them to develop a general reconception of the sense of touch. I start by taking a fresh look at our ability to feel, in order to reveal its vital role. This sheds a different light on the skin's perceptual potential. While it (...) is commonly observed that tactile experiences have two intentional objects, an external object and one's own body, I will advance a more accurate alternative: in tactile experiences, one becomes aware of what one's body undergoes. This alternative not only fits better with tactility's vital role; it is also key to explaining how active touching provides for a unique contribution to our perceptual relation to material objects. By thus connecting tactility's vital role to the way we rely on touch while manipulating objects, this essay offers a cross-sectional survey of our tactile powers that reveals the interplay between sensing and touching. (shrink)

The paper offers a conceptual and phenomenological analysis of the language of depersonalization. The depersonalization syndrome or disorder has no known common pathogenesis and shows no characteristic behavioral manifestations. A conceptual analysis of the key terms in the subjective complaints would therefore have consequences for clinical research into the phenomenon of depersonalization.

Fibring is a meta-logical constructor that applied to two logics produces a new logic whose formulas allow the mixing of symbols. Homogeneous fibring assumes that the original logics are presented in the same way . Heterogeneous fibring, allowing the original logics to have different presentations , has been an open problem. Herein, consequence systems are shown to be a good solution for heterogeneous fibring when one of the logics is presented in a semantic way and the other by a calculus (...) and also a solution for the heterogeneous fibring of calculi. The new notion of abstract proof system is shown to provide a better solution to heterogeneous fibring of calculi namely because derivations in the fibring keep the constructive nature of derivations in the original logics. Preservation of compactness and semi-decidability is investigated. (shrink)

While talking about sports (and games) we use such expressions as ?random victory?, ?winning by accident?, ?skill against luck?, ?chance (fortune) favours the better player?, etc. Unfortunately, chance-related notions that occur in these expressions are not well defined?their meaning is vague and it is not clear whether they refer to one or many different phenomena. Because such phenomena play an important role in sport, from the viewpoint of the philosophy of sport it is necessary to give a systematic account of (...) this topic. Although the works of De Wachter, Simon, Dixon, Breivik and Loland contain many important insights, there is still a room for further research in this field. The author tries to establish a typology of phenomena that could generally be called ?chance-phenomena?, which however, should be precisely distinguished. As such the primary task is to present an analysis of several different kinds of chance in sports. In constructing this typology the author uses both the distinction between different kinds of games (performative vs. kinetic) as well as analysis of structure of a game (four constitutive elements: players, constitutive rules, material substrate of the game and the world of the game). The most important method used is phenomenological analysis, especially Ingarden-style analysis. These kinds of ?chance-phenomena? are: aleatoriness, chaos, irregularity, imprecision and arbitrariness. The paradigm cases of each kind of chance are discussed. The genesis and functions of the respective phenomena in sports and games are also shown, as well as their position in the structure of the game. Such analytic work should precede any solutions of the chance vs. skill problem, or other problems concerning chance in sport. As a test of usefulness of the provided distinctions, the author considers the veracity of the judgements expressed in such sentences as ?Fortune favours the better player? (shrink)

In this article I shall investigate Alexander Nehamas’s classic interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche in relation to the idea of self-fashioning. My aim is to dispel certain misconceptions about Nehamas’s Nietzsche and to explore what his vision of life actually involves. First, I shall expose some basic presuppositions about self-fashioning, that have to do with the nature of the self. Then I shall examine the concept of style, which is related to the concept of the self, and what it means to (...) give style to oneself. This endeavour will further expand on the prominently literary model of life espoused by Nehamas’s Nietzsche. We will see that Nietzsche’s (in)famous idea of the eternal return plays a pivotal role within this framework. Afterwards, it will be argued that realizing the idea of self-fashioning is a pluralistic affair, unique to each person. Subsequently, the temporal structure of self-fashioning will be addressed in greater detail, by focusing on two aspects: coming to terms with the past and being open to the future. Finally, the processual nature of this project will be further revealed with the analysis of its slogan ‘become who you are.’. (shrink)

Background: Mental fatigue can impact physical demands and tactical behavior in sport-related contexts. Small-sided games are often used to develop a specific sport-related context. However, the effects of mental fatigue on physical demands and tactical behaviors during soccer SSGs have not been aggregated for systematical assessment.Objective: This systematic review was conducted to compare the effects of mental fatigue vs. control conditions in terms of the total running distance and tactical behavior of soccer players during SSGs.Methods: The data sources utilized were (...) PubMed, PsycINFO, Scielo, Scopus, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science. The study eligibility criteria were established based on PICOS: Population: healthy youth and young adult men soccer players with regular training practice and belonging to teams with regular competitions; Intervention: exposed to mental fatigue-induced protocols only before SSGs; Comparator: control conditions before SSGs; Outcomes: physical demands and tactical behavior ; Study design: counterbalanced cross-over design; and only full-text and original articles written in English.Results: The database search initially identified 111 titles. From those, six articles were eligible for the systematic review and meta-analysis. Results showed no significant effect of fatigue on total running distance and tactical behavior.Conclusions: A non-significant effect of mental fatigue on total running distance and tactical behaviors performed by soccer players during SSGs was found in this systematic review. (shrink)

The relationship of humans to other primates – both in terms of abilities and evolution - has been an age-old topic of dispute in science. In this paper the claim is made that the different views of authors are based not so much on differences in empirical evidence, but on the ontological stances of the authors and the underlying ground narratives that they use. For comparing and reconciling the views presented by the representatives of, inter alia, cognitive ethology, comparative psychology, (...) and zoosemiotics, an overarching approach of multi-constructivism is introduced. The paper proposes an analytic model that distinguishes four logical possibilities in representing anthropological difference: Gradualism, Transformativism, Unitarism, and Pluralism. Using this typology, the views of C. Darwin, F. de Waal, M. Tomasello, and T. A. Sebeok regarding the similarities and differences between human and animal capacities for cognition, culture and communication are analyzed. The results indicate systematic differences in the selected narratives by these authors that can be related to the types of underlying ontologies. (shrink)

I argue that the adjective δαιμόνιος (‘daemonic’) and the substantivized adjective τὸ δαιμόνιον (‘the daemonic’) that occur in Aristotle’s dream treatises basically mean ‘divine-like,’ denoting an illusory appearance of divine intervention, typically in the form of an alleged god-sent prophetic dream. Yet the appearances to which the terms refer are, in fact, neither divine nor supernatural at all, but involve merely coincidental correlations between the dream and the fulfilling event. It is shown that Aristotle’s use of ‘daemonic’ is traditional and (...) reflects the endoxon that prophetic dreams are closely related to the divine. The paper also examines a set of earlier readings of the daemonic in De divinatione in relation to the proposed interpretation. (shrink)

Student dorminatory and institutions such as dormitories in the social welfare system represent the educational contexts in which certain groups of young people find themselves. In the education crisis of the modern society, it is necessary to empower young people to be autonomous and participative members of the society. The research question of this paper is: What are the pedagogical aspects of empowerment and how are they manifested in the context of the education taking place in dormitories? The objective of (...) this work is to determine the markers of education and empowerment of young people by observing their common characteristics and to emphasize the importance of educational work in the dormitory environment. The results of the research indicate that empowerment is an important and indispensable process in the upbringing of young people, especially within different forms of dormitory environment, with the aim of developing their further autonomy and participation in the community. (shrink)

My analysis of the mind-body problem suggests that the mind-body problem is a "problem" because: There are discrepancies in use between scientific notions like "physical" and philosophical notions like "phenomenal character". Phenomenological conceptions of the mind are primarily used as contrast-terms in arguments against metaphysical physicalism. "Qualia" and similar terms - properly analysed - reveal that they do not, as often claimed, have a "folk-psychological" origin. Rather these terms should be described as highly sophisticated technical terms and should not be (...) confused with non-philosophical notions expressing experiential content. Dualists are obliged to offer us a positive, thus substantive, account of what they mean by "subjective experience" and similar idioms. This is, as I shall point out, a very hard task, mainly due to the strong contrast-mode in which these terms are used. When disconnected from the paradigmatic contrast-context these terms appear more or less out of place. But when faced with a hard-core reductionism the appeal to "phenomenal qualities" seems very appropriate. In my analysis, terms like "what it is like" and "experiential character" are concept that, as such, make perfect sense, but only in a limited context. The strong contrast mode in which these terms are used, I think, also explains why it is so hard to give a satisfactory semantic account for these terms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.3 (2002) 287-288 [Access article in PDF] Investigating Depersonalization Filip Radovic and Susanna Radovic The comments offered by Morris and Modigh in this issue give us an opportunity to clarify some of the views and topics discussed in our paper.One of Morris' objections is that we on some occasions characterize depersonalization complaints in a way that indicate delusion. Although one of the criteria of (...) depersonalization syndrome is intact reality testing (APA 2000), it is nevertheless the case that patients with depersonalization complaints may at the same time be delusional, a fact that Modigh also points out: "The border between unreality feelings with largely intact reality-testing ability and psychotic disorders with grossly disturbed reality-testing is, however, not absolute and patients with psychotic disorders may of course experience feelings of unreality or depersonalization."Morris is also critical of the idea that feelings of unreality in the quasi-sensory sense (or in sense [a3]) may tempt patients to doubt the reality of the items experienced as unreal. We suggest that the experience of the self or the world as unreal may actually give rise to an impulse to believe that the self or the world does not exist. This, however, need not imply that a person who has such a belief is delusional. For example, consider the following cases, which include patients with intense unreality feelings but who exhibit largely intact reality testing. One of Sierra and Berrios' (2000) patients says: "I have to touch myself to make sure that I have a body and a real existence." Lindqvist (1966, p. 171) describes two cases of the "mirror syndrome," which he recognizes as a typical behavior seen in cases of severe depersonalization. The patients want to confirm that they are real by looking in a mirror. Such cases strongly indicate that a person with otherwise intact reality testing can be so overwhelmed by feelings of unreality that he or she can come to doubt his or her own existence. The reason we do not want to call this state delusional is that the patient constantly tries to compare the experience of reality with some other mark of reality (e.g., by using a mirror), thus indicating that, on a higher cognitive level, he or she still understands that his or her belief may be incorrect. The image in the mirror works as an assurance that the fear of not existing is, after all, just a fear.Merleau-Ponty's (1962) description of Stratton's inverting spectacles experiment is indeed relevant to our analysis. The experiment seems to indicate that the feeling of unreality corresponds to the degree of unfamiliarity with seeing the world upside down. Stratton's subjects report that after a couple of days objects still appear inverted but less unreal than they did before. This seems to suggest that unreal in this circumstance approximates not normal. An inverted world is after some time accepted as normal. (See also note 3 in our paper.)Let us conclude with a few comments on an important methodological issue. Our methodological [End Page 287] approach is not equivalent with a classical ordinary language approach because our main concern is language use in psychiatric contexts. A classical ordinary language analysis aims to explicate how terms actually are used in everyday language; our primary concern is to try to understand the phenomenology underlying descriptions of felt unreality given by patients suffering from depersonalization. However, we do start by looking at the terms from an everyday angle, but this only gives us a coarse approximation of what the depersonalization patient may mean by such expressions. The strange and unpleasant phenomenology of the condition in combination with the variety of characteristic expressions make it likely that the role of unreal in connection with depersonalization complaints is quite different from its use in everyday language. When a person undergoes a depersonalization episode for the first time, he or she encounters a quite new and perhaps unexpected phenomenological reality. When the person attempts to describe these perplexing feelings he or she, naturally, uses terms found in everyday language, but the changed... (shrink)

ABSTRACT By turning his focus to individuals – the profile of billionaires as the people they are – Peter Hägel offers in his book Billionaires in World Politics an interesting move towards agency, showing that their power, even if situated in a complex economic structure, also consists in bending, changing, or setting the rules of how the game is played. After having followed the move of the pendulum from structure to agency with Hägel, in this paper I suggest that moving (...) back to structural analyses could again provide new insights. I argue that in order to have a more complete picture of the billionaires-and-politics puzzle, it is required to not only look at agency as a kind of reflexive phenomenon, but also to provide a more historically informed genealogy of the conditions under which billionaires’ passions have been shaped. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of institutions as clusters of stable solutions to recurrent coordination problems can illuminate and explain some unresolved difficulties and problems adhering to institutional definitions of art initiated by George Dickie and Arthur Danto. Their account of what confers upon objects their institutional character does not fit well with current work on institutions and social ontology. The claim that “the artworld” confers the status of “art” onto objects remains utterly mysterious. The “artworld” is a generic notion that designates a (...) sphere of human activity that involves practices that create goals that have led to the emergence of formal and informal institutions. But those institutions, rather than magically “creating” objects subjected to esthetic appreciation, merely solve familiar and ubiquitous coordination problems created by artistic activity in ways other institutions in other areas solve similar and/or analogous coordination problems. (shrink)

The nature of unconscious information processing is a heavily debated issue in cognitive science, and neuroscience. Traditionally, it has been thought that unconscious cognitive processing is restricted to knowledge that is strongly prepared by conscious processes. In three experiments, we show that the task that is performed consciously can also be applied unconsciously to items outside the current task set. We found that a same–different judgment of two target stimuli was also performed on two subliminally presented prime stimuli. This was (...) true for target and prime stimuli from entirely different categories, as well as for prime and target stimuli at different levels of abstraction. These results reveal that unconscious processing can generalize more widely than previously accepted. (shrink)

In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.

This paper briefly presents an account, partially based upon Ryle’s approach, of the functions of intentional psychological terms as they are used in ordinary language. According to this account, intentional psychological terms describe known patterns of behavior that are determined by selective mechanisms of causation. That is, these terms describe relations between certain responses, selected on the basis of the consequences they produce in the environment, and contexts of their occurrence, to which they become associated. Intentional psychological terms do not (...) point to inner causes of a given behavior, but can explain it only in the sense of stating that it could be expected to occur, if we can identify its behavior pattern and the context in which it occurs. We proceed then to examine three main objections that have been raised against Ryle’s position, namely: (a) Davidson’s challenge to the non-causal accounts of reason-explanations; (b) Armstrong’s worries about “leaving the counterfactuals hanging in the air”; and (c) the holistic objection to the (wrongly) presumed Ryle’s atomism. We aim at showing that none of these objections pose serious problems to the proposed account. (shrink)

Hayek’s social theory of evolution suggests that market liberal morality is adaptive for social groups. He justified the evolutionary superiority of market liberalism by asserting that groups operating under a market liberal morality would have a higher capacity to expand and reproduce than groups with alternative tribal moralities. Thus, market liberal groups would be favoured through cultural and genetic group selection. But in fact, market liberal morality reveals maladaptive tendencies and remains insufficiently powerful to create adaptive social groups. Hayek’s dismissal (...) of moral tribalism in favour of market liberal morality is found to underestimate the importance of tribal goals in the evolutionary system. (shrink)

Almost 250 years after the publication of the taxonomy-founding work Systema Naturae, by Carl Linnaeus, the inventory and catalogue of the planet's biodiversity is still far from complete: only ca 1.5 to 1.8 million of an estimated 10+ million species are so far described. Notwithstanding the remarkable merits of the Linnean system, the task is too vast ever to be completed using current conventional approaches. Such a staggering reality, and the customary difficulty that the scientific community and society in general (...) experience to access taxonomic knowledge, has prompted the search for novel tools or approaches for species identification. Such a tool has been recently proposed in the form of a standardised short DNA sequence from an agreedupon region of the genome, which is expected to ultimately provide a means of fast and robust identification of any species on the planet: the DNA barcode. Received with as much enthusiasm by some as skepticism by others, this novel tool was set in motion on a worldwide scale by means of an international consortium of organisations (the Consortium for the Barcoding of Life), thus becoming a large-scale horizontal genomics project. While anchored within the knowledge and principles of taxonomy, DNA barcoding possesses unique characteristics which anticipate a diverse scope of new applications and benefits for society. Notably, it places the completion of the biodiversity catalogue within the reach of a single generation, with the promise to assist greatly in the discovery of new species. Alongside long-term, ultimate goals, such as democratisation of access to taxonomic knowledge and assistance in writing the encyclopaedia of life, there are several more prosaic applications that may also impact society, not only in certain scientific fields, but also in a range of social and economic activities. Here, we will use DNA barcoding of fish as an example to illustrate foreseen applications, and as a basis to stimulate reflection on potential societal impacts of this horizontal genomics project. (shrink)

If we take into account all chronologically relevant data, the book must have been written in 404, perhaps in 403 or in the winter of 405. A passage of Calv. enc. implies that Synesius was married when composing the essay as, in fact, he had been since 402 or 403. This terminus post quem is corroborated by the identification of Synesius’ Epistle 74 as accompanying letter for the Praise of Baldness which was sent after the author’s return to Cyrene in (...) 401. Also, Calv. enc. shows a connection to Synesius’ Dion from 404. As for the terminus ante quem, it is set clearly by the war that broke out in 405, since Synesius would not have been able to write this hilarious literary piece under the conditions of war and most likely not even later in his lifetime. (shrink)

The semantic analysis of conditional sentences does not entirely align with their morphosyntactic structure. I substantiate this hypothesis with instances from both Czech and English that extend beyond conventional textbook examples. I also highlight that logicians and philosophers often make terminological errors when they disregard the insights from linguistic disciplines. Despite the early analytic philosophy’s emphasis on terminological precision, the practical application falls significantly short of this ideal. I firmly believe that a proper understanding of the morphosyntax and semantics of (...) conditional sentences is a prerequisite for their classification and analysis. In our pursuit of a comprehensive exploration of conditional clauses, we must also grapple with methodological challenges that delve into the very core of the philosophy of language. The primary issue revolves around the fact that two out of the three a priori methods in philosophy rely heavily on the analysis of conditional sentences: thought experiments and modal metaphysics. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the philosophy of sport, an opinion that chess is in fact not sports because it lacks physical skills is a standard position. I call the argument that leads to this conclusion a mind sport syllogism. Its analysis enables me to explicate four possible positions concerning the sport-status of chess. Apart from the standard position, which excludes chess from the sport family, I also present analysis of other possible positions, which – for various reasons – do not deny that chess (...) is a sport. A position that postulates including chess into the family of sport by broadening the definition of sport turns out to be particularly interesting from the philosophical viewpoint. Having confronted this position with the standard, i.e. ‘conservative’, position, I come to the conclusion that the conceptual revision consisting in the broadening of the concept of sport is a rational option and is a probable direction of the evolution of the concept of sport. (shrink)

In recent philosophy of mind, a series of challenging ideas have appeared about the relation between the body and the sense of touch. In certain respects, these ideas have a striking affinity with Husserl’s theory of the constitution of the body. Nevertheless, these two approaches lead to very different understandings of the role of the body in perception. Either the body is characterized as a perceptual “organ,” or the body is said to function as a “template.” Despite its focus on (...) the sense of touch, the latter conception, I will argue, nevertheless orients its understanding of tactual perception toward visual objects. This produces a distorted conception of touch. In this paper, I will formulate an alternative account, which is more faithful to what it is like to feel. (shrink)

How should we use intellectual history to inform our thinking about freedom in the advent of digital technologies? Quentin Skinner argues that prevalent liberal idiom is unable to address the political challenges in the world of big tech. While liberals consider these challenges in terms of invasion of individual privacy, in Skinner's neo-Roman – and once widely accepted – perspective, the growing datafication of contemporary societies should be considered an affront to liberty. By invoking the figure of ‘paths not taken’, (...) the author of Liberty before liberalism shows, how we may learn from the past without abandoning commitments to contextual accuracy of historical investigation. The interview will be published in Polish in ‘Przegląd Polityczny’ [Political Review]. (shrink)

This thesis is about the problem of how sensory qualities relate to neural states or processes. I shall try to present an account of why dualism appears to be an attractive and intuitive position, but also point out why dualistic intuitions may be misleading. A relatively common view in philosophy of mind is that accounts of how sensory qualities relate to neural states and processes involve an explanatory anomaly i.e. the so-called explanatory gap. The alleged gap makes it hard to (...) comprehend how a system, which basically involves electro-chemical processes, can create feels of whatever kind. However, the felt profoundness of the problem may be an exaggeration. One of the major points in this essay is to show that we do not yet know whether it is a deep mysterious philosophical puzzle or if it is a technical engineering problem, i.e. how to bring about sensory qualities by means of an underlying neural mechanism. A theme throughout this essay is to demystify the nature of sensory qualities as natural items that only under certain descriptions appear as mysterious or miraculous. For all we know, phenomenal consciousness may be plain sentience – not some fancy or unfathomable kind of consciousness, although complicated to account for due to lack of empirical knowledge about how the brain works. The argument tries to establish that it is the wiring and function of sensory observational systems that make sensory qualities appear spectacular and immaterial. It is argued that the notion of there being an explanatory gap emerges out of a misunderstanding of how sensory observation is wired and how it works. Some basic facts about sensory observation explain why “experiential concepts” and “physical concepts” reflect two logically distinct conceptual vocabularies. Given a proper description of the observational process the gap does not manifest itself as a gap but as an illusion of there being a gap. In sum, the mind-body problem is man-made and is in a profound sense a cognitive artifact. (shrink)

Myšlenkové experimenty jsou populárním argumentačním nástrojem ve vědě i filosofii. Jejich kritika ze strany naturalistických a experimentálních filosofů vedla k vytvoření deflačních a minimalistických koncepcí, které oslabují epistemickou sílu myšlenkových experimentů a smiřují je s empirismem. Cílem článku je ukázat, že tyto pokusy nepřekonávají hlavní problémy, se kterými se myšlenkové experimenty ve filosofii střetávají. Omezená lidská racionalita a představivost znemožňují experimentátorům řešit nereálné scénáře spolehlivým způsobem. Myšlenkové experimenty se ve filosofii používají jinak než ve vědě, protože ty pravé jsou obvykle (...) neuskutečnitelné a uzavřené vůči možnosti empirické falsifikace. Navíc jsou založeny na vadných analogiích a neoprávněně přenášejí důkazní břemeno. Persvazivní úspěšnost myšlenkových experimentů je velmi nízká, a proto nedokáží přispět k řešení filosofických problémů. Závěrem článku je, že nejběžnější druhy myšlenkových experimentů by měly být odstraněny ze souboru filosofických metod. (shrink)