This paper focuses on the links between Jakob von Uexküll’s theoretical biology and Adolf Portmann’s conception of organic life. Its main purpose is to show that Uexküll and Portmann not only share a view of the living being as an autonomous and holistically organized entity, but also base this view on the seminal idea of the subjectivity of the organism. In other words, the respective holistic principles securing the autonomy of the living being—the Bauplan, for Uexküll; the Innerlichkeit, for Portmann—share (...) an essentially subjective character. Such principles, indeed, express themselves in a centrally directed and formative way; moreover, in organisms endowed with a central nervous system, they also extend their influence on the overt behavioral sphere and on the organism’s capacity to give meaning to the surrounding reality. The conclusion of the article will show how, though starting from this common background, the two authors develop divergent positions on the issue of the anthropological difference. If Portmann emphasizes the special status of the relationship between the human animal and the world, Uexküll tends to see a substantial continuity in the biosemiotic processes through which human and non-human animals constitute their species-specific worlds of experience. (shrink)

The relationship of humans to other primates – both in terms of abilities and evolution - has been an age-old topic of dispute in science. In this paper the claim is made that the different views of authors are based not so much on differences in empirical evidence, but on the ontological stances of the authors and the underlying ground narratives that they use. For comparing and reconciling the views presented by the representatives of, inter alia, cognitive ethology, comparative psychology, (...) and zoosemiotics, an overarching approach of multi-constructivism is introduced. The paper proposes an analytic model that distinguishes four logical possibilities in representing anthropological difference: Gradualism, Transformativism, Unitarism, and Pluralism. Using this typology, the views of C. Darwin, F. de Waal, M. Tomasello, and T. A. Sebeok regarding the similarities and differences between human and animal capacities for cognition, culture and communication are analyzed. The results indicate systematic differences in the selected narratives by these authors that can be related to the types of underlying ontologies. (shrink)

The relationship of humans to other primates – both in terms of abilities and evolution - has been an age-old topic of dispute in science. In this paper the claim is made that the different views of authors are based not so much on differences in empirical evidence, but on the ontological stances of the authors and the underlying ground narratives that they use. For comparing and reconciling the views presented by the representatives of, inter alia, cognitive ethology, comparative psychology, (...) and zoosemiotics, an overarching approach of multi-constructivism is introduced. The paper proposes an analytic model that distinguishes four logical possibilities in representing anthropological difference: Gradualism, Transformativism, Unitarism, and Pluralism. Using this typology, the views of C. Darwin, F. de Waal, M. Tomasello, and T. A. Sebeok regarding the similarities and differences between human and animal capacities for cognition, culture and communication are analyzed. The results indicate systematic differences in the selected narratives by these authors that can be related to the types of underlying ontologies. (shrink)

The relationship of humans to other primates – both in terms of abilities and evolution - has been an age-old topic of dispute in science. In this paper the claim is made that the different views of authors are based not so much on differences in empirical evidence, but on the ontological stances of the authors and the underlying ground narratives that they use. For comparing and reconciling the views presented by the representatives of, inter alia, cognitive ethology, comparative psychology, (...) and zoosemiotics, an overarching approach of multi-constructivism is introduced. The paper proposes an analytic model that distinguishes four logical possibilities in representing anthropological difference: Gradualism, Transformativism, Unitarism, and Pluralism. Using this typology, the views of C. Darwin, F. de Waal, M. Tomasello, and T. A. Sebeok regarding the similarities and differences between human and animal capacities for cognition, culture and communication are analyzed. The results indicate systematic differences in the selected narratives by these authors that can be related to the types of underlying ontologies. (shrink)

This edited volume is the first specialized book in English about the Swiss zoologist and anthropologist Adolf Portmann. It provides a clarification and update of Portmann’s theoretical approach to the phenomenon of life, characterized by terms such as “inwardness” and “self-presentation.” Portmann’s concepts of secondary altriciality and the social uterus have become foundational in philosophical anthropology, providing a benchmark of the difference between humans and animals. In its content, this book brings together two approaches: historical and philosophical analysis of Portmann’s (...) studies in the life sciences and application of Portmann’s thought in the fields of biology, anthropology, and biosemiotics. Significant attention is also paid to the methodological implications of his intended reform of biology. Besides contributions from contemporary biologists, philosophers, and historians of science, this volume also includes a translation of an original essay by Portmann and a previously unpublished manuscript from his most remarkable English-speaking interpreter, philosopher Marjorie Grene. Portmann’s conception of life is unique in its focus on the phenomenal appearance of organisms. Confronted with the enormous amount of scientific knowledge being produced today, it is even clearer than it was during Portmann’s lifetime that although biologists employ physical and chemical methods, biology itself is not physics and chemistry. These exact methods must be applied according to what has meaning for living beings. If biology seeks to understand organisms as autonomous agents, it needs to take display and the interpretation of appearances as basic characteristics of life. The topic of this book is significantly relevant to the disciplines of theoretical biology, philosophy, philosophical anthropology, and biosemiotics. The recent epigenetic turn in biology, acknowledging the interconnections between organismal development, morphology and communication, presents an opportunity to revisit Portmann’s work and to reconsider and update his primary ideas in the contemporary context. (shrink)

Interaction between humans and cats in urban environments is subject to dynamic change. Based on the frequency and quality of relations with humans, we can distinguish several populations of domestic cats : pedigree, pet, semi-feral, feral, and pseudo-wild. Bringing together theoretical perspectives of the Tartu school of biosemiotics and ethological studies of animal societies, we distinguish two basic types of cat cultures: the culture of street cats and the humano-cat culture of pets. The difference between these cultures is documented on (...) the level of zoosemiotic interactions, ecological relations, and human representations. We introduce a threefold model of human-animal interactions in urban environments which steer a careful course between the Scylla of realistic ontology and the Charybdis of social constructivism. A case study on Estonian cat shelters illustrates the significance of cultural representations and institutionalized actions in human-cat cohabitation. (shrink)

This article focuses on the social structure of domestic cat colonies, and on the various ways these are represented in ethological literature. Our analysis begins with detailed accounts of different forms of cat societies from the works of Leyhausen, Tabor, and Alger and Alger, and then puts these descriptions into a broader epistemological perspective. The analysis is inspired by the bi-constructivist approach to ethological studies formulated by Lestel, which highlights the position of the ethologist in the constitution of particular animal (...) activities. We propose a third layer should be added to post hoc analyses of ethological enterprises: i.e., the ontological commitments shaping the conceptual framework of a given research. It is through these commitments we find a hierarchical structure in a caged colony of cats, different territorial patterns in the case of urban cats, and egalitarian friendly bonds within the society of a cat shelter. Our critical tri-constructivist approach can be utilized for contemporary biosemiotics as it is centered on a multi-level process of interpretation. (shrink)

The article aims to provide a general framework for assessing and categorizing the cognitive systems of human and non-human animals. Our approach stems from biosemiotic, ethological, and phenomenological investigations into the relations of organisms to one another and to their environment. Building on the analyses of Merleau-Ponty and Portmann, organismal bodies and surfaces are distinguished as the base for sign production and interpretation. Following the concept of modelling systems by Sebeok, we develop a concentric model of human and non-human animal (...) cognition that posits three intertwined spheres: corporeity, social communication, and culture. The model explicitly works with the pluralistic perspective that views the communication and cognition of humans as distinct, but not superior to those of non-human animals. Our position is substantiated by two case studies: the first one focuses on the acquisition and spread of nut-cracking technique among the chimpanzees in the Täi forest, the second one on the communication and cognition of deafblind persons. From an epistemological perspective, our paper is a contribution to contemporary attempts to link biosemiotics and ethology with phenomenological concepts of agency, living bodies, and lifeworld. (shrink)

The social cognition of domestic cats is a scarcely studied topic due to the reputation of the animal as individualistic. Nevertheless, cats are capable of cognitively demanding cooperative activities such as a communal nest-moving. The cognitive abilities of free-ranging cats are evaluated against the background of the shared intentionality hypothesis, proposed by a research group of Michael Tomasello. Although their comparative studies are carried out on chimpanzees, they are valuable as a source of conceptual work linking empirical cognitive studies with (...) the philosophical accounts of joint agency. We critically analyze theoretical cognitive concepts interpreting the triadic interactions of great apes and the collective hunting among chimpanzees. Contrary to the shared intentionality hypothesis, it is argued that cats have cognitive abilities to share attention, truly cooperate and constitute shared meanings. Finally, we introduce the concept of the natural interaction ritual by Randall Collins and outline its significance for our case study about cats as well as for a general biosemiotic theory of the development of symbols. (shrink)

Tato studie je inspirována knížkou Petra Urbana Jak rozumíme druhým? Studie o sociálním rozumění a sdílení světa nejen u člověka a věnuje se současným diskuzím o povaze sociálního rozumění, zejména v případě nelinguálních tvorů. Nejvýraznější pozice zastává na jedné straně skupina srovnávacích psychologů kolem M. Tomasella, která vychází z filosofů kolektivní intencionality, na straně druhé D. Leavens a K. Bardová, kteří mají blízko k interaktivistické interpretaci problému sociálního rozumění. Bude ukázáno, že rozdíly ve výsledcích empirických výzkumů mají základ v ontologických (...) závazcích jednotlivých výzkumných programů, přičemž důležitou roli hraje vymezení se vůči problému antropologické diference. Studie se táže, je-li možné prostředky filosofi e vědy mezi soupeřícími teoriemi rozhodnout. Na závěr je uvedena možnost biosémiotické reinterpretace mimo-lidského sociálního rozumění na pozadí teorie umweltu. (shrink)

Tzv. portmannismus je specifický, v biologii kořenící myšlenkový směr, jehož dosah je v současné době omezen převážně na české země. Řada knižních, časopiseckých a popularizačních prací dokazuje, že na platformě Portmannových myšlenek vznikla v Čechách specifická a originální myšlenková škola. Portmann uznával Darwinovu teorii, upozorňoval však na množství jevů, které si žádají interpretaci sahající za rámec známých darwinistických mechanismů. Mezi zastánci Portmannovy nauky a hlavním proudem darwinistů existuje napětí, které koření v různých pojetích vědy. Portmannismus je často považován za nauku (...) mířící mimo rámec vědy: snažíme se analyzovat oprávněnost takových poukazů a zasadit je do kontextu teorie vědy. Ukazuje se, že přes důležité rozdíly v cílech a užití metodologických prostředků není hranice mezi oběma přístupy ostře dána. Je připomenuta skutečnost, že od okamžiku přenesení Portmannových myšlenek do českých zemí došlo ke generační výměně jejich nositelů. Vychází najevo, že portmannismus lze do jisté míry smířit s hlavním proudem vědy, a to jak z hlediska teoretického a faktického, tak z hlediska sociálního. (shrink)

Článek představuje teorii původu lidské morálky od Franse de Waala a zhodnocuje přínos filozofických komentářů od Christine M. Korsgaardové a Mary Midgleyové z hlediska oboru evoluční etiky. Základní struktura de Waalova přístupu je v souladu se sentimentalistickou teorií morálky, která určuje soucítění jako bazální morální cit. V interpretaci vlivné neodarwinistické genocentrické školy dále hraje zásadní roli altruismus. Stoupenci tohoto směru nicméně obhajují rozdělení krutého světa přírody a etického světa lidské kultury; distinkce byla Fransem de Waalem nazvána „teorií pozlátka“, neboť vyvolává (...) obraz tenké vrstvy morálky nanesené na sobecké jádro lidské biologické přirozenosti. C. M. Korsgaardová využívá kantovskou etiku, aby ukázala, že zvířata nemohou být počítána za morální, neboť postrádají schopnost normativní autonomie. M. Midgleyová oponuje jak neodarwinistickému, tak kantovskému rozvrhu etiky a ukazuje, že soucítění patří k přirozenosti společensky žijících druhů a že reflektivní uvažování se vztahuje pouze k nejvyššímu patru evoluce morálky. Pozice M. Midgleyové je pro evoluční zkoumání morálky přínosnější než postup C. M. Korsgaardové. This article introduces Frans de Waal’s theory of the origins of human morality and evaluates the merits of the philosophical commentaries of Christine M. Korsgaard and Mary Midgley, and their application to the discipline of evolutionary ethics. The fundamental structure of de Wall’s approach is congruent with the sentimentalist theory of morality which determines sympathy as the most vital moral sentiment. A crucial role is also assigned to altruism in the view of morality in the influential genocentric neo-Darwinian school. However, proponents of this school advocate the separation of the cruel world of nature and the ethical world of humane culture; this is dubbed “Veneer Theory” by F. de Waal, since it invokes an image of a thin layer of morality applied to a selfish core of biological human nature. C. M. Korsgaard applies Kantian ethics to argue that animals cannot count as moral because they are not capable of normative self-government. M. Midgley opposes both neo-Darwinism and the Kantian tradition in ethics in arguing that sympathy is a part of any social species’ nature, and that reflective reasoning refers only to the highest peak of moral evolution. It is argued that the position of M. Midgley is ultimately a more fruitful approach to the evolutionary examination of ethics than that proposed by C. M. Korsgaard. (shrink)