The nature of unconscious information processing is a heavily debated issue in cognitive science, and neuroscience. Traditionally, it has been thought that unconscious cognitive processing is restricted to knowledge that is strongly prepared by conscious processes. In three experiments, we show that the task that is performed consciously can also be applied unconsciously to items outside the current task set. We found that a same–different judgment of two target stimuli was also performed on two subliminally presented prime stimuli. This was (...) true for target and prime stimuli from entirely different categories, as well as for prime and target stimuli at different levels of abstraction. These results reveal that unconscious processing can generalize more widely than previously accepted. (shrink)

An important approach to understand how the brain gives rise to consciousness is to probe the depth of unconscious processing, thus to define the key features that cause conscious awareness. Here, we investigate the possibility for subliminal stimuli to shape the context for unconscious processing. Context effects have generally been assumed to require consciousness. In the present experiment, unconscious context processing was investigated by looking at the impact of the context on the response activation elicited by a subliminal prime. We (...) compared the effects of the same subliminal prime on target processing when the prime was embedded in different unconscious contexts. Results showed that the same prime can evoke opposite responses depending on the unconscious context in which it is presented. Taken together, the results of this study show that context effects can be unconscious. (shrink)

The nature of unconscious information processing is a heavily debated issue in cognitive science , and neuroscience . Traditionally, it has been thought that unconscious cognitive processing is restricted to knowledge that is strongly prepared by conscious processes . In three experiments, we show that the task that is performed consciously can also be applied unconsciously to items outside the current task set. We found that a same–different judgment of two target stimuli was also performed on two subliminally presented prime (...) stimuli. This was true for target and prime stimuli from entirely different categories, as well as for prime and target stimuli at different levels of abstraction. These results reveal that unconscious processing can generalize more widely than previously accepted. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed an enormous increase in behavioral and neuroimaging studies of numerical cognition. Particular interest has been devoted toward unraveling properties of the representational medium on which numbers are thought to be represented. We have argued that a correct inference concerning these properties requires distinguishing between different input modalities and different decision/output structures. To back up this claim, we have trained computational models with either symbolic or nonsymbolic input and with different task requirements, and showed that this allowed (...) for an integration of the existing data in a consistent manner. In later studies, predictions from the models were derived and tested with behavioral and neuroimaging methods. Here we present an integrative review of this work. (shrink)

Routine action sequences critically rely on neural mechanisms maintaining contextual and temporal information to disambiguate similar tasks (e.g. making coffee or tea). In this study we show the involvement of areas in temporal and lateral prefrontal cortices in maintaining temporal and contextual information for the execution of hierarchically‐organized action sequences.

Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik [Cohen Kadosh, R., Tzelgov, J., and Henik, A. (2008). A synesthetic walk on the number line: The size effect. Cognition, 106, 548-557] present a new paradigm to probe properties of the mental number line. They describe two experiments which they argue to be inconsistent with the exact small number model proposed by Verguts, Fias, and Stevens [Verguts, T., Fias, W., Stevens, M. (2005). A model of exact small-number representation. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 12, 66-80]. We (...) discuss the data, assumptions, and conclusions of Cohen Kadosh et al.'s paper in relation to existing models of numerical cognition. (shrink)

Rips et al.'s arguments for rejecting basic number representations as a precursor of the natural number system are exclusively based on analog number coding. We argue that these arguments do not apply to place coding, a type of basic number representation that is not considered by Rips et al.

A central controversy in cognitive science concerns the roles of rules versus similarity. To gain some leverage on this problem, we propose that rule‐ versus similarity‐based processes can be characterized as extremes in a multidimensional space that is composed of at least two dimensions: the number of features (Pothos, 2005) and the physical presence of features. The transition of similarity‐ to rule‐based processing is conceptualized as a transition in this space. To illustrate this, we show how a neural network model (...) uses input features (and in this sense produces similarity‐based responses) when it has a low learning rate or in the early phases of training, but it switches to using self‐generated, more abstract features (and in this sense produces rule‐based responses) when it has a higher learning rate or is in the later phases of training. Relations with categorization and the psychology of learning are pointed out. (shrink)

Comments on an article by Feigenson et. al.(see record 2004-18473-007). Reviewing behavioral and neural data in children, humans and animals, Feigenson and colleagues distinguish two core systems for number representation. One system represents number in an exact way but has a fixed upper limit; the other system has no size limit but represents number only approximately. Both systems are claimed to have a phylogenetic origin and to constitute the basis for ontogenetic development. As such, each system's representational principles are reflected (...) in adult human performance: subitizing is ascribed to the exact system whereas symbolic number processing is based on a mapping to the approximate system. This last assumption is motivated by the robust finding that symbolic numbers are more difficult to discriminate with increasing size (the 'size effect'). However, it remains to be shown how this mapping can reconcile the inherently exact nature of a symbolic system with signatures of approximate processing such as the size effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

We challenge the arguments of Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) on two grounds. First, interactions between number form (e.g., notation, format, modality) and an experimental factor do not show that the notations/formats/modalities are processed separately. Second, we discuss evidence that numbers are coded abstractly, also when not required by task demands and processed unintentionally, thus challenging the authors' dual-code account.

Comments on an article by Feigenson et. al.(see record 2004-18473-007). Reviewing behavioral and neural data in children, humans and animals, Feigenson and colleagues distinguish two core systems for number representation. One system represents number in an exact way but has a fixed upper limit; the other system has no size limit but represents number only approximately. Both systems are claimed to have a phylogenetic origin and to constitute the basis for ontogenetic development. As such, each system's representational principles are reflected (...) in adult human performance: subitizing is ascribed to the exact system whereas symbolic number processing is based on a mapping to the approximate system. This last assumption is motivated by the robust finding that symbolic numbers are more difficult to discriminate with increasing size (the 'size effect'). However, it remains to be shown how this mapping can reconcile the inherently exact nature of a symbolic system with signatures of approximate processing such as the size effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Why can’t we keep as many items as we want in working memory? It has long been debated whether this resource limitation is a bug or instead a feature. We propose that the resource limitation is a consequence of a useful feature. Specifically, we propose that flexible cognition requires time-based binding, and time-based binding necessarily limits the number of memoranda that can be stored simultaneously. Time-based binding is most naturally instantiated via neural oscillations, for which there exists ample experimental evidence. (...) We report simulations that illustrate this theory and that relate it to empirical data. We also compare the theory to several other resource theories. (shrink)