Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism

Ancient Philosophy 26 (1):141-160 (2006)
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Abstract

In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.

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Filip Grgic
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb

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