ABSTRACTIn the philosophy of sport, an opinion that chess is in fact not sports because it lacks physical skills is a standard position. I call the argument that leads to this conclusion a mind sport syllogism. Its analysis enables me to explicate four possible positions concerning the sport-status of chess. Apart from the standard position, which excludes chess from the sport family, I also present analysis of other possible positions, which – for various reasons – do not deny that chess (...) is a sport. A position that postulates including chess into the family of sport by broadening the definition of sport turns out to be particularly interesting from the philosophical viewpoint. Having confronted this position with the standard, i.e. ‘conservative’, position, I come to the conclusion that the conceptual revision consisting in the broadening of the concept of sport is a rational option and is a probable direction of the evolution of the concept of sport. (shrink)
ABSTRACTIn this article, we contextualize and introduce the papers that comprise the special issue, “Bernard Suits’ Legacy: New Inspirations and Interpretations.” The articles discuss the work of S...
The article presents an ontological analysis of games. In every game one could distinct four constitutive elements: players, game rules, material substratum of the game and intentional world of the game. The last element correspond with make-believe quality of games. These are two kinds of acts of playing (creating the world of the game): performative and kinetic. The article presents an analysis of these two kinds of acts of playing and present the division of games (performative-based/kinetic-based) which is ontologically fundamental (...) and sets two radically different groups of games. Kinetic games are based on physical, kinetic aspect of the player’s bodies and material tools they use in the game. Performative games are based on transmission some pieces of information. This division enable us to indicate some non-trivial facts about games, like implicit presence of laws of physics in kinetic games or double character or rules in performative games. Interesting fact is that although these two groups of games are very different in the terms of kinds of acts of playing (and also kinds of effort connected with these acts) there is at least one performative-kinetic hybrid game – chessboxing. (shrink)
W filozofii czasu Ingardena szczególną rolę odgrywa charakterystyka ontologiczna teraźniejszości. Należy do niej m.in. szczelinowość. Okazuje się, że pojęcie to można powiązać z koncepcją tzw. teraźniejszości pozornej (specious present). Opierając się ponadto na pewnych rozważaniach S. Lema oraz B. Ogrodnika wiążę różne wartości szczelinowości (trwania kwantu teraźniejszości), ze złożonością formalną budowy przedmiotów. Uogólnienie tych wyników umożliwia dopełnienie rozważań Ingardena nad szczelinowością – sformułowanie zarysu ontologicznej teorii względności trwania teraźniejszości.
While talking about sports (and games) we use such expressions as ?random victory?, ?winning by accident?, ?skill against luck?, ?chance (fortune) favours the better player?, etc. Unfortunately, chance-related notions that occur in these expressions are not well defined?their meaning is vague and it is not clear whether they refer to one or many different phenomena. Because such phenomena play an important role in sport, from the viewpoint of the philosophy of sport it is necessary to give a systematic account of (...) this topic. Although the works of De Wachter, Simon, Dixon, Breivik and Loland contain many important insights, there is still a room for further research in this field. The author tries to establish a typology of phenomena that could generally be called ?chance-phenomena?, which however, should be precisely distinguished. As such the primary task is to present an analysis of several different kinds of chance in sports. In constructing this typology the author uses both the distinction between different kinds of games (performative vs. kinetic) as well as analysis of structure of a game (four constitutive elements: players, constitutive rules, material substrate of the game and the world of the game). The most important method used is phenomenological analysis, especially Ingarden-style analysis. These kinds of ?chance-phenomena? are: aleatoriness, chaos, irregularity, imprecision and arbitrariness. The paradigm cases of each kind of chance are discussed. The genesis and functions of the respective phenomena in sports and games are also shown, as well as their position in the structure of the game. Such analytic work should precede any solutions of the chance vs. skill problem, or other problems concerning chance in sport. As a test of usefulness of the provided distinctions, the author considers the veracity of the judgements expressed in such sentences as ?Fortune favours the better player? (shrink)
Although the very existence and need for an exact definition of sport is still debatable, there is common agreement that competitive sport events on elite level are, among others, goal directed, rule-governed and institutionalized activities. These three facts will guide us in an analysis of the complex issue concerning the idea of goal in games. The first of these facts - that games are goal-oriented activities – is reflected in the very basic notion of prelusory goal. The fact that achieving (...) the prelusory goal in games is rule-governed is reflected in the notion of a lusory goal. Finally, the institutionalized aspect of games is reflected in the notion of, nomen omen, an institutional goal. The paper is thus devoted to detailed analysis of the notion of goal in games. It is argued that Suits' analysis which provides a distinction between prelusory goal and lusory goal is insufficient, and thus introduction of a third kind of goal is necessary. I suggest to call this third kind of goal institutional goal. The paper discusses the definition of this kind of goal as well as its relations to other kinds of goals in games and other elements of game-playing. These three goals create the goal triad, a conceptual map of all possible goal-related situations. Both Venn diagrams and Euler diagrams are used to represent this triad. Various fields of these diagrams, which represent a spectrum of specific situations that occur in games, are illustrated by case-studies, taken mainly from the history of association football. These examples are meant to test the usefulness of distinctions provided in the analytical part of the paper. (shrink)
ABSTRACTThe article presents the story of the Polish translation of Bernard Suits’s The Grasshopper. It was prepared by Filip Kobiela, a philosopher and researcher of Suits’s legacy, and published in 2016. Some remarks concerning the difficulties of the translation and its peculiarities particularly related to the Polish ludic terminology have been added as well as an explanation of the translator’s attitude towards the translation as a type of game in Suits’s sense of the term. The article concludes with information concerning (...) the reception of the translation of Suits’s magnumopus in Poland and its possible impact on future research. (shrink)
Artykuł zawiera prezentację niektórych wątków Kantowskiej filozofii przedkrytycznej, w dziedzinie filozofii przyrody zawierającej wiele oryginalnych hipotez i argumentów często niewykorzystanych w krytycznej filozofii Kanta i przez to mniej znanych. Przedstawiona jest nowatorska hipoteza wiążąca trójwymiarowość przestrzeni z prawem grawitacji pochodząca z pierwszej rozprawy Kanta Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurteilung der Beweise z 1747 roku. Omówiona została praca Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels zawierająca słynną hipotezę Kanta dotyczącą genezy układu planetarnego. Przedstawiono też tzw. argument z (...) ręki (pochodzący z pracy Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume) wraz z jego krótka dyskusją. (shrink)
The paper addresses the family of questions that arose from the field of interactions between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. On the one hand, apparently partial coextensivity of research domain of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences sets the goal of their cooperation and mutual inspiration. On the other hand, there are some obstacles on the path to achieve this goal: phenomenology and the cognitive sciences have different traditions, they speak different languages, they have adopted different methodological approaches, and last but (...) not least, their prominent exponents exhibits different styles of thinking. In order to clarify this complicated area of tensions, the paper presents the results of philosophical reflections of such topics as: 1) philosophical presuppositions and postulates of the cognitive sciences 2) abstraction of some phenomena during idealisation and the dialectical model of science's development 3) argumentation based on prediction of future development of the cognitive sciences. This finally leads to the formulation of a phenomenology-based postulate for adequate model of mind and the discussion of humanistic dimension of cognitive sciences. (shrink)
