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  1. Singular Reference Without Singular Thought.Filipe Martone - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (1):33-60.
    In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only (...)
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    Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on Gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”.Filipe Martone - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (4):49-58.
    In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.
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  3.  43
    Demonstratives and cognitive significance revisited.Filipe Martone - 2022 - Analysis 83 (1):61-69.
    The issue of whether a theory of demonstratives should be able to handle Frege’s Puzzle seems rather old hat, but it was not so much resolved as left hanging. This paper tries to remedy that. I argue that a major problem not previously noticed affects any theory of demonstratives that aims at dealing with Frege’s Puzzle. This problem shows itself in cases in which the cognitive significance of a single demonstrative identity – such as ‘that is that’ – differs for (...)
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  4. Character, proper names, and Frege's Puzzle.Filipe Martone - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (1):75-80.
    Kaplan’s solution to the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the character of linguistic expressions has been greatly influential and much discussed. Many philosophers regard it as being correct, or at least as being on the right track. However, little has been said about how character is supposed to apply to proper names, and how it could account for the name version of the Puzzle. In this paper I want to fill this gap. I sketch some solutions to (...)
     
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    Donnellan, nomes millianos E o contingente a priori.Filipe Martone - 2017 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 58 (138):539-556.
    Neste artigo, primeiramente, apresento tese de Kripke sobre a possibilidade de se adquirir conhecimento de verdades contingentes a priori e a crítica de Keith Donnellan a essa tese. Depois, exploro a distinção que Donnellan faz entre (a) saber que uma sentença é verdadeira e (b) conhecer a verdade que essa sentença expressa. Argumento que essa distinção não é relevante apenas no contexto de sua crítica ao contingente a priori, mas sim para nossa prática com nomes próprios de modo geral. Tento (...)
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    Some remarks on Perry’s reflexive content and cognitive significance.Filipe Martone - 2017 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 22 (1):67-83.
    Neste artigo, apresento e discuto a solução oferecida por John Perry para o Problema de Frege em termos do conteúdo reflexivo de elocuções. Em primeiro lugar, discuto sua solução para a versão indexical do Problema de Frege, e argumento que o conteúdo reflexivo não pode explicar a trivialidade de certas e locuções. Se isso está correto, então o conteúdo reflexivo não é o tipo de coisa que explica adequadamente o valor cognitivo. Depois, discuto a solução de Perry para o Problema (...)
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    Book review: ALMOG, J. Referential Mechanics: Direct Reference and the Foundations of Semantics (Oxford University Press, 2014). [REVIEW]Filipe Martone - forthcoming - Manuscrito 39 (2):133-140.
    In this review I discuss Joseph Almog's book "Referential Mechanics". The book discusses direct reference as conceived by three of its founding fathers, Kripke, Kaplan and Donnellan, and introduces Almog's ambitious project of providing a referential semantics to all subject-phrases. I offer a brief overview of its four chapters and point out some of their virtues and shortcomings.
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    Book review: De ponte, Maria & Korta, Kepa . Reference and representation in thought and language. [REVIEW]Filipe Martone - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (2):123-136.
    ABSTRACT In this review, I try to present and discuss the main elements of each chapter of the book as briefly and instructively as possible. The first group of chapters deals with various issues about language, and the second group focuses on thought.
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    Book review: Ludlow, P., interperspectival content. [REVIEW]Filipe Martone - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (3):149-161.
    In this review, I present and discuss the main aspects of Peter Ludlow's theory of interperspectival contents.
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