This paper seeks to contribute to the field of transitional justice by adding new insights about the role that trials of victimizers can play within democratization processes. The main argument is that criminal proceedings affirming the value of equal respect and concern for both victims and abusers can contribute to the socialization of citizens’ politically relevant emotions. More precisely, using law constructively to engage public resentment and indignation can be successful to the extent that legality is not sacrificed. In order (...) to locate this argument within the rich literature on the pedagogical functions of transitional trials this paper enters a dialogue with three emblematic texts. Lawrence Douglas’s narrative jurisprudence approach, Judith Shklar’s critique of the limits of legalism, and Marc Osiel’s interest in ‘discursive solidarity’ represent starting points for a more complex conceptualization of the relationship between democracy, law and emotional education within transformational periods. (shrink)

The present study investigates how laughter features in the everyday lives of 3-5-year old children in Swedish preschools. It examines and discusses typical laughter patterns and their functions with a particular focus on children’s and intergenerational (child-adult/educator) laughter in early education context. The research questions concern: who laughs with whom; how do adults respond to children’s laughter, and what characterizes the social situations in which laughter is used and reciprocated. Theoretically, the study answers the call for sociocultural approaches that contextualize (...) children’s everyday social interaction, e.g., in different institutions or homes, to study the diverse conditions society forms for learning, sociality and socialization and development of shared norms. Methodologically, the study makes use of mixed methods: it uses descriptive statistics that identify prevalent patterns in laughter practices and, on the basis of these results, examines social-interactional situations of children’s laughter in detail. It was found that children’s laughter tended to be directed to children and adults’ laughter tended to be directed to adults. 87% of children’s laughter was directed to other children, and adults directed their laughter to other adults 2,7 times as often as to children. The qualitative interaction analysis shows that children and adults exhibited different patterns of laughter. Children primarily sought and received affiliation through laughter in the peer group, and the adults were often focused on the institutional and educational goals of the preschool. Overall, the study shows that intergenerational reciprocal laughter was a rare occurrence and suggests that laughter between generations is interesting in that it can be seen as indicative of how children and adults handle alterity in their everyday life. By deploying multiple methods, the present study points to the importance of viewing emotion and norm sharedness in social interaction not just as a matter of communicating an emotion from one person to another, but as an intricate process of inviting the others into or negotiating the common emotional and experiential ground. (shrink)

This study examined whether parents’ attribution of their child’s emotions (internalizing, externalizing) to dispositional causes is associated with children’s problem behaviour (internalizing, externalizing). The mediating roles of parents’ emotion-dismissing and -coaching reactions and the moderating role of child’s gender was also examined. Participants were 241 US parents with a child (43% girls) between the ages of 5 and 7. Parents were presented with vignettes in which a gender-neutral child displayed internalizing and externalizing emotions and were asked to imagine their (...) own child in the vignettes. Subsequently, parents indicated whether they attributed the child’s emotion to dispositional causes and the likelihood of reacting in an emotion-dismissing and -coaching way in each situation. Child problem behaviour was measured using the CBCL. Results show that parental dispositional attributions were associated with child internalizing and externalizing problems, and this association was consistently mediated by emotion-dismissing reactions. The association between parental dispositional attributions and emotion-dismissing, as well as its indirect effect on child internalizing problems, was stronger for boys than for girls, whereas the indirect effect via emotion-coaching was stronger for girls than for boys. Thus, the parental attribution process seems to be different for boys and girls. (shrink)

Drawing on recent cognitive theories of the emotions, this article develops an account of critical reflection as requiring emotional flexibility and involving the ability to envisage alternative reasons for action. The focus on the role of emotions in critical reflection, and in agents' resistance to reflection, suggests the need to move beyond an introspective to a more social and relational conception of the process of reflection. It also casts new light on the intractable problem of explaining how oppressive socialisation (...) impairs the capacity for autonomy. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Language and Emotion offers a variety of critical theoretical and methodological perspectives that interrogate the ways in which ideas about and experiences of emotion are shaped by linguistic encounters, and vice versa. Taking an interdisciplinary approach which incorporates disciplines such as linguistic anthropology, sociolinguistics, applied linguistics, psychology, communication studies, education, sociology, folklore, religious studies, and literature, this book: explores and illustrates the relationship between language and emotion in the five key areas of language (...) socialisation; culture, translation and transformation; poetry, pragmatics and power; the affective body-self; and emotion communities; situates our present-day thinking about language and emotion by providing a historical and cultural overview of distinctions and moral values that have traditionally dominated Western thought relating to emotions and their management; provides a unique insight into the multiple ways in which language incites emotion, and vice versa, especially in the context of culture. With contributions from an international range of leading and emerging scholars in their fields, The Routledge Handbook of Language and Emotion is an indispensable resource for students and researchers who are interested in incorporating interdisciplinary perspectives on language and emotion into their work. (shrink)

Although cognitively oriented theories of emotion are now dominant in the psychological study of emotion, there remain issues upon which these theories do not agree. Central among these are questions regarding the minimal cognitive processes necessary to have an emotion. A potentially productive approach to such questions is the study of the relation of cognitive development and the development of emotions in infants. Such an approach was featured in ancient philosophical and psychological treatises, some of which formed (...) the very foundations of later cognitive theories. However, the recent literature has been nearly indifferent to just these foundations. Ancient commentators, especially Aristotle and the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers, understood emotions as fundamentally sociomoral constructs. Owing to a lack of socialisation and moral understanding, infants are not fully capable of experiencing emotions as they are typically understood. Contemporary work in the area of emotion, including that of Michael Lewis, as well as work in other emotion-related areas, is shown to address only inadequately the sociomoral components of emotion and thus to address only inadequately the emotion-cognition relationship. (shrink)

The paper seeks to contribute to the transitional justice literature by overcoming the Democracy v. Justice debate. This debate is normatively implausible and prudentially self-defeating. Normatively, transitional justice will be conceptualised as an imperative of democratic equal concern. Prudentially, it can prevent further violence and provide an opportunity for initiating processes of democratic emotional socialisation. The resentment and indignation animating transitions should be acknowledged as markers of a sense of justice. As such, they can help the reproduction of democracy. (...) However, their public expression must be institutionally filtered through democratic norms. The consistent institutional instantiation of equal respect can educate and recuperate negative emotions for democracy. (shrink)

Les réseaux sociaux numériques ont connu en Chine un engouement massif, et cela dès leur introduction en 2007. On compte aujourd’hui 210 millions d’utilisateurs de « ites d’échanges sociaux », soit exactement la moitié des 420 millions d’internautes chinois, et les autorités chinoises soulignent désormais que ce développement des réseaux sociaux numériques est « irrésistible ». Comme souvent pour la Chine, la tyrannie des nombres n’a d’égale que l’originalité des usages. C’est cette originalité bornant à la singularité des « caractéristiques (...) chinoises » − étroitesse des liens entre réseaux sociaux numériques de socialisation et de navigation, domination des plateformes nationales, « harmonisation » des contenus, prévalence des liens forts, etc. − que nous nous efforçons de mettre au jour en nous intéressant successivement aux utilisateurs, aux plateformes et au rôle particulier joué par l’État-parti chinois dans les structures sociales. Une fois encore, l’héritage communiste s’affiche comme une subtile synthèse entre contrôle des pratiques et mobilisation des individus et des organisations sociales, tout en tolérant les vertus cathartiques et correctives des émois populaires liés aux sentiments d’injustice.Social networking sites have spread like wildfire in China, ever since the first sites appeared there in 2007. There are now some 210 million people using “social exchange sites”, which is exactly half of all Internet users in China, and the Chinese authorities are saying that the development of social networking sites is “irresistible”. As is often the case in China, the weight of numbers is equalled only by the distinctiveness of their Internet uses. It is this distinctiveness, which borders on the singular − very close links between online socialisation and navigation networks, predominance of national sites, content “harmonisation”, prevalence of strong links, etc. − that we attempt to bring out here, by successively investigating users, sites and the particular role played by China’s one-party State in the country’s social structures. The legacy of Communism once again stands out as a subtle mix between control over practices and the mobilisation of individuals and social organisations and a tolerance of the cathartic and corrective virtues of popular emotion aroused by feelings of injustice. (shrink)

Hegelian philosophical treatise beginning with analysis of Reversal Theory and restructuring into Resurrexit Theory, a structured phenomenology centred around Spirit (first three articles: Hegelian Analysis of Reversal Theory, Structural Reformation of Reversal Theory, & Resurrexit Theory - The Dualist Expansion of Structural Phenomenology). This is followed by a theory of mind and consciousness based in complex universality (Dialectic Mind). Naturally, this leads into how particularity can best align with universality, to thereby generate Good. Such a discussion begs the question of (...) virtues and sins. Sins are defined in materialistic terms, while virtues are given definition as aspects and moments of Reason through skill interactions and pathology, which is to say the experiences in emotions that instigate self-understanding and inform purpose (Structural Virtues Theory - The Dozen Skills in Reason). The series of articles then dives into evolutionary concepts of personality development and evidenced-based psychological theories. Spirit is identified with personality, and then personality is associated with mind module evolution and mate selection, especially within religious organisation (Spiritual Material - Evolutionary Theory of Spiritual Mate Selection and Personality Development). Finally, the author's dissertation is used to suggest an alteration of attachment theory for the greater contribution of fathers in the role of early socialisation (First Other Theory - The Paternity of Civilisation - Evolutionary Roots of Attachment and the Paternal Role in Formation of Civilisation). (shrink)

Social networking technologies have become a ubiquitous framework for social interaction, serving to organise much of the individual’s social life. Such technological structuring affects not merely the individual’s psyche (as a psychotechnics), it also affects broader aspects of society (as a socio-technics). While social networking technologies may serve to transform society in positive ways, such technologies also have the potential to significantly encroach upon and (re) construct individual and cultural meaning in ways that must be investigated. Erich Fromm, who psychoanalytically (...) describes humans as a product of their society and the economic systems within that society, may provide insight into the influence of social networking technologies in contemporary society. He sees the relationship between the individual and society as being in a constant state of dynamic change. Utilising Fromm’s psycho-societal insight, social networking technologies are shown to conflate and confuse the relation between Thanatos and Eros – the Thanatos of a lifeless and consumerist agenda-filled mechanisation, and the Eros associated with social engagement. Thanatos and Eros are tied together via social networking technologies. This results in, firstly, social networking technologies functioning predominantly to further capitalist agendas through the monetisation of these technologies – particularly in terms of linking commodity fetishism and the foundational social drive of the individual. Secondly, social networking technologies mechanise human action according to predictable behavioural paths through the use of these technologies, especially in terms of how socialisation is possible via these technologies (shaping how platonic and romantic relationships may take place in the contemporary world). Such a mechanisation of interpersonal engagement contrasts with Erich Fromm’s assertion that interpersonal relations (vis-à-vis love) are not “mere emotion”, but rather represent an interpersonal creative capacity and interplay. Fromm’s psycho-societal insights will show how contemporary individuals may take independent and responsible rational action to establish accountable and psychologically beneficial ways of engaging with others through social networking technologies. (shrink)

Background: Empathy and moral courage are important virtues in nursing and nursing ethics. Hence, it is of great importance that nursing students and nurses develop their ability to empathize and their willingness to demonstrate moral courage. Research aim: The aim of this article is to explore third-year undergraduate nursing students’ perceptions and experiences in developing empathy and moral courage. Research design: This study employed a longitudinal qualitative design based on individual interviews. Participants and research context: Seven undergraduate nursing students were (...) interviewed during or immediately following their final clinical placement. Ethical considerations: The Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) approved the study. Participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and were assured confidentiality. They were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time, without providing reasons. Findings: Affective empathy seemed to be strong among third-year undergraduate nursing students. However, they tried to handle the situations in a ‘professional’ way, and to balance their emotions. At the same time, they expressed how difficult it can be to show moral courage when confronted with poor patient care. In addition, they spoke about a lack of role models during clinical practice and supervision. Conclusions: Undergraduate nursing students are in a vulnerable position throughout their journey to become professional and to develop empathy and moral courage. The professional socialisation and forming of professional empathy and moral courage among nursing students, may be seen as a complex interaction of formal and hidden curriculum, where role models play an important role. We argue that the main theme ‘Vulnerable students – a journey towards professional empathy and moral courage’ may cover the longitudinal project as a whole. This vulnerability is something both teachers and supervisors should be aware of when following up with students in their clinical placements. (shrink)

Values‐based practice is deemed essential for healthcare provision worldwide. In England, values‐based recruitment methods, such as multiple mini interviews (MMIs), are employed to ensure that healthcare students’ personal values align with the values of the National Health Service (NHS), which focus on compassion and patient‐centeredness. However, values cannot be seen as static constructs. They can be positively and negatively influenced by learning and socialisation. We have conceptualised students’ perceptions of their values over the duration of their education programme as (...) a ‘values journey’. The aim of this hermeneutic longitudinal focus group study was to explore the ‘values journey’ of student nurses and midwives, recruited through MMIs, across the 3 years of their education programme. The study commenced in 2016, with 42 nursing and midwifery students, originally recruited onto their programmes through multiple mini interviews. At the third and final point of data collection, 25 participants remained. Findings indicate that students' confidence, courage and sense of accountability increased over the 3 years. However, their values were also shaped by time constraints, emotional experiences and racial discrimination. We argue that adequate psychological support is necessary as healthcare students embark on and progress through their values journey, and propose a framework for this. (shrink)

This paper aims at a conceptual clarification of some of the mechanisms that are involved when human selves are made in interactions with each other. Four such broad mechanisms are distinguished: socialisation, classification of self and others, the deference-emotion system, and the attribution and manipulation of the status of the responsible agent. The first two mechanisms are modelled with simple mechanical machines like clocks and signalling devices. Regarding the status of the responsible agent, the paper offers a proposal (...) as to why we have conflicting intuitions about freedom of the will. (shrink)

Julien Claparède-Petitpierre Cet article aborde la question du bien-être à partir du problème sociologique et psychologique de la socialisation. Deux types de théories distinctes de la socialisation sont ici cernés qui posent de façon différente la question du rapport entre émotions et bien-être. En premier lieu, les théories de la répression (Freud) et des sentiments moraux (Elster) font du processus de socialisation une expérience d’émotions négatives puissantes suscitées par l’intériorisation du jugement moral d’autrui dans la psyché individuelle. (...) Qu’elle soit naturalisante (Freud) ou culturaliste (Benedict, Elster), cette approche repose sur l’idée d’une contradiction entre les aspirations pulsionnelles de l’individu et les réquisits moraux du groupe. Cette contradiction, qui induit une violence affective (angoisse du rejet, honte) et un renoncement systématique aux satisfactions du désir, montre la socialisation comme un processus conflictuel générant inévitablement du mal-être. En second lieu, les théories de l’apprentissage font de la socialisation un processus générateur de bien-être dans la mesure où la découverte cognitive des règles qui structurent le champ social permet à l’individu de devenir un acteur social compétent et à l’aise dans les interactions quotidiennes. Ces théories distinguent l’affectivité de haute intensité, générée par l’angoisse ressentie par l’acteur social incompétent et désorienté, de l’affectivité de basse intensité reposant sur le sentiment de confiance affectant l’acteur social compétent (Quéré). Cette seconde approche illustre l’intérêt que porte l’individu à la maîtrise des règles sociales. Quoique distinctes, ces deux positions ne s’opposent pas, voire semblent pouvoir être articulées à profit. (shrink)

Guilt- and shame-prone responding were examined in a sample of 146, 18-month-old toddlers and their older siblings (M = 49.5 months, SD = 10.4) during mishap tasks which were used to differentiate both toddlers and their older siblings into Amenders (low avoidance) and Avoiders (high avoidance). Toddlers and older siblings classified as Amenders expressed more concern and were less distressed by the mishap than Avoiders. Children were divided into four groups: Amender-Amender (older sibling-toddler), Amender-Avoider, Avoider-Avoider, and Avoider-Amender to examine differences (...) in sibling interaction and moral development. Older siblings in the Avoider-Avoider group were significantly more aggressive and less empathic toward toddlers than older siblings in the Avoider-Amender group. Toddlers in the Amender-Amender, Amender-Avoider, and Avoider-Amender groups showed significant gains in moral regulation from 18 to 24 months whereas toddlers in the Avoider-Avoider group did not. In contrast, while older siblings were generally high on moral regulation when toddlers were 18 months, this was not the case for older siblings in the Avoider-Avoider group, who had lower moral regulation scores that significantly increased over time. Findings are discussed with respect to the significance of sibling socialisation for toddlers’ developing moral sensibility. (shrink)

How should we go about developing emotion taxonomies suitable for a science of emotion? Scientific categories are supposed to be “projectable”: They must support generalizations required for the scientific practices of induction and explanation. Attempts to provide projectable emotion categories typically classify emotions in terms of a limited set of modules, but such taxonomies have had limited uptake because they arguably misrepresent the diversity of our emotional repertoire. However, more inclusive, non-modular, taxonomies also prove problematic, for they (...) struggle to meet the projectability constraint. In this paper, I explain how a developmental approach to emotion, one that utilizes the notion of progressive modularization, can help us approach emotion categorization in a more inclusive and projectable manner. (shrink)

Linguistic anthropologists have studied emotion in societies around the world for several decades. This article defines the discipline, introduces its general relevance to emotion theory, then presents five of the most important contributions linguistic anthropology has made to the study of emotion.

A Defence of the Perceptual Account of Emotion Against the Alleged Problem of Ambivalent Emotion: Expanding on Tappolet Tappolet (2005) has defended the perceptual account of emotion against a problem which some have raised against it, stemming from the phenomenon of ambivalent emotions. According to Tappolet, we can explain cases of ambivalent emotions unproblematically. To persuade us of this, she draws our attention to circumstances in which it seems entirely appropriate to have conflicting emotions with respect to (...) the same situation. On her perceptual account of emotions, in such situations our emotions disclose two values, e.g., danger and attractiveness, at the same time. My aim here is to defend Tappolet by expanding on the considerations she adduces. In order to do this, I utilize Prinz's notion of "valence". Using this terminology, I shall show that the undeniable co-instantiation of emotions that are our intuitions classifies as "contrary", for example, fear and attraction does not actually constitute a contradiction. (shrink)

In this chapter, we start by spelling out three important features that distinguish expressives—utterances that express emotions and other affects—from descriptives, including those that describe emotions (Section 1). Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of emotion and value (2), we show how these three features derive from the nature of affects, concentrating on emotions (3). We then spell out how theories of non-natural meaning and communication in the philosophy of language allow claims that expressives inherit their meaning from (...) specificities of emotions—namely, from being felt, evaluative attitudes toward propositional or non-propositional contents (4). (shrink)

In Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre highlights how emotions can transform our perspective on the world in ways that might make our situations more bearable when we cannot see an easy or happy way out. The point of this chapter is to spell out and discuss Sartre’s theory of emotion as presented in the Sketch with two aims in mind. The first is to show that although emotions have the power to transform our perspectives on the (...) world in ways described by Sartre, Sartre is mistaken to think emotions comprise the cognitive transformations in question. The second aim is to show why on one plausible way of thinking about the relationship holding between emotions and the cognitive transformations they help to bring about, emotions turn out to be the very sort of things that Sartre claims at the outset they are not, namely types of bodily feelings or sensations, a view of emotion that can be accredited to William James. (shrink)

Although some still advance reductive accounts of emotions—according to which they fall under a more familiar type of mental state—contemporary philosophers tend to agree that emotions probably constitute their own kind of mental state. Agreeing with this claim, however, is compatible with attempting to find commonalities between emotions and better understood things. According to the advocates of the so-called ‘perceptual analogy’, thinking of emotion in terms of perception can fruitfully advance our understanding even though emotion may not be (...) reducible to ordinary perception. In this paper, I spell out and motivate a different analogy—that between emotion and action—an analogy which I think can do some important theoretical work. In particular, it constitutes a theoretically fruitful way to think about core aspects of emotions and might in fact be employed to provide a better account of certain aspects of emotions than the one based on the perceptual analogy. Emotions might not be a matter of seeing the world a certain way, but a matter of behaving internally in response to it. In a slogan form: Emotion is the inward counterpart of bodily movement. (shrink)

This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses modulate ongoing attention generates what I call the puzzle of emotional attention, which turns on recognising that distinct emotions (e.g., fear, happiness, disgust, admiration etc.) have different attentional profiles. The puzzle concerns why this is the case, such that a solution consists in explaining why distinct emotions have the distinct attentional profiles they do. It then provides an account of the functional roles of different emotions, as (...) tied to their evaluative themes, which explains and further elucidates the distinctive attentional profiles of different emotions, so solving the puzzle of emotional attention. Following that, it outlines how such attentional profiles are reflected in the character of emotional experience and its attentional phenomenology. The resulting picture is a more detailed account of the connections between emotion and attention than is currently on offer in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

Decision making is an area of profound importance to a wide range of specialities - for psychologists, economists, lawyers, clinicians, managers, and of course philosophers. Only relatively recently, though, have we begun to really understand how decision making processes are implemented in the brain, and how they might interact with our emotions. 'Emotion and Reason' presents a groundbreaking new approach to understanding decision making processes and their neural bases. The book presents a sweeping survey of the science of decision (...) making. It examines the brain mechanisms involved in making decisions, and controversially proposes that many of our perceptual actions are essentially decision making processes. Whether looking, listening, hearing, or moving, we choose to attend to certain stimuli, at the expense of others. In some psychiatric disorders the inability to respond selectively to certain stimuli can be harmful - such pathologies of decision making are additionally considered. Berthoz also considers how many decision making processes involve an internal dialogue with our other self, and how this dialogue with our "doppelganger" might be represented in the brain. He considers the important implications that a neuroscience of decision making can have for the judiciary - how we apportion blame and responsibility; for economics - with discussion of the growing field of neuroeconomics; and for theories of management. Lastly he examines decision making and creativity - if perception relies in part on decision making processes, how might this alter our view of the artistic process. Written by a neuroscientist of international fame and accessible for both scientists and non-scientists, this book is the most exhaustive examination of the science of decision making yet. (shrink)

What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary folk treat it as an emotion. This chapter argues the category of emotion is inadequate to account for romantic love. It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. (...) It assesses the roles of culture and evolution in shaping the romantic love phenomenon and evaluates the ways in which the norms of rationality that are applied to standard emotions fail to apply to love. It considers the category of sentiments and argue that despite coming close, it does not adequately capture the nature of romantic love. Finally, the chapter makes a case for love being best characterized as a syndrome. (shrink)

Victims of oppression are often called to let go of their anger in order to facilitate better discussion to bring about the end of their oppression. According to Amia Srinivasan, this constitutes an affective injustice. In this paper, we use research on emotion regulation to shed light on the nature of affective injustice. By drawing on the literature on emotion regulation, we illustrate specifically what kind of work is put upon people who are experiencing affective injustice and why (...) it is damaging. We begin by explaining affective injustice and how it can amount to a call for emotion regulation. Then we explain the various techniques that can be used to regulate emotions and explain how each might be harmful here. In the penultimate section of the paper, we explain how the upshot of this is that victims of affective injustice are left with a dilemma. Either they try to regulate their anger in a way that involves ignoring the fact of their oppression or they regulate it in a way that is likely to be harmful for them. Finally, we consider whether there are any good solutions to this dilemma, and how this issue opens up the possibility for further research into emotion regulation and moral philosophy. (shrink)

While the influence of emotion on individuals'' ethical decisions has been identified by numerous researchers, little is known about how emotions influence individuals'' ethical decision process. Thus, it is not clear whether different emotions promote and/or discourage ethical decision-making in the workplace. To address this gap, this paper develops a model that illustrates how emotion affects the components of individuals'' ethical decision-making process. The model is developed by integrating research findings that consider the two dimensions of emotion, (...) arousal and feeling state, into an applied cognitive-developmental perspective on the process of ethical decision-making. The model demonstrates that certain emotional states influence the individual''s propensity to identify ethical dilemmas, facilitate the formation of the individual''s prescriptive judgments at sophisticated levels of moral development, lead to ethical decision choices that are consistent with the individual''s prescriptive judgements, and promote the individual''s compliance with his or her ethical decision choices. In particular, the model suggests that individuals experiencing arousal and positive affect resolve ethical dilemmas in a manner consistent with more sophisticated cognitive moral structures. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. (shrink)

According to the judgment theory of emotion, emotions necessarily involve evaluative judgments. Despite a number of attractions, this theory is almost universally held to be dead, for a very simple reason: it is overly intellectualistic. On behalf of the judgment theorist, I defend a simple strategy, namely, to claim that her view is restricted to a special class of emotions, a strategy that is rooted in a plausible distinction between two broad classes of emotion. It turns out that, (...) if the judgment theory is to be rejected, such rejection cannot be based on the charge that it overintellectualizes emotions. (shrink)

The long debate -- Aesthetics and ethics : basic concepts -- A conceptual map -- Autonomism -- Artistic and critical practices -- Questions of character -- The cognitive argument : the epistemic claim -- The cognitive argument : the aesthetic claim -- Emotion and imagination -- The merited response argument.

ABSTRACTWhich emotion regulation strategy one uses in a given context can have profound affective, cognitive, and social consequences. It is therefore important to understand the determinants of emotion regulation choice. Many prior studies have examined person-specific, internal determinants of emotion regulation choice. Recently, it has become clear that external variables that are properties of the stimulus can also influence emotion regulation choice. In the present research, we consider whether reappraisal affordances, defined as the opportunities for re-interpretation (...) of a stimulus that are inherent in that stimulus, can shape individuals’ emotion regulation choices. We show that reappraisal affordances have stability across people and across time, and are confounded with emotional intensity for a standardised set of picture stimuli. Since emotional intensity has been shown to drive emotion regulation choice, we construct a context in which emotional intensity is separable from r... (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 261-264, October 2022. According to Jean Moritz Müller's The world-directedness of emotional feeling, the reason why emotions do not apprehend or disclose value is that one cannot apprehend what one has already apprehended: the value in question, he claims, is apprehended prior to the emotional feeling. Emotions, then, should not be conceived as apprehending value since they already presuppose awareness of it. I can be acquainted with a fact without feeling aware of (...) the meaning it holds. Yet I argue that only an emotional reaction actually registers value or disvalue. My value-responsive concept of emotion is one that Müller rejects. Yet I contend that to recognize the loss of a beloved person, for instance, just is to feel the emotion of grief. (shrink)

This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a "thick affective concept" A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful, where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert (...) that the intentional object of the emotion falls under the thick affective concept distinctive of the emotion. I argue that the most basic kind of moral judgment is is this category. It has the form "That is A" (pitiful, contemptible, rude, etc.). Such judgments combine the features of cognitivism and motivational judgment internalism, an advantage that explains why we find moral weakness problematic in spite of its ubiquity. I then outline a process I call "thinning" the judgment, which explains how moral strength, weakness, and apathy arise. I argue that this process is necessary for moral reasoning and communication, in spite of its disadvantage in disengaging the agent's motivating emotion from the judgment. (shrink)

In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.

A recent skeptical challenge denies deliberation is essential to virtuous agency: what looks like genuine deliberation is just a post hoc rationalization of a decision already made by automatic mechanisms (Haidt 2001; Doris 2015). Annas’s account of virtue seems well-equipped to respond: by modeling virtue on skills, she can agree that virtuous actions are deliberation-free while insisting that their development requires significant thought. But Annas’s proposal is flawed: it over-intellectualizes deliberation’s developmental role and under-intellectualizes its significance once virtue is acquired. (...) Doing better requires paying attention to a distinctive form of anxiety—one that functions to engage deliberation in the face of decisions that automatic mechanisms alone cannot resolve. (shrink)

One solution to the problem of moral knowledge is to claim that we can acquire it a posteriori through moral experience. But what is a moral experience? When we examine the most compelling putative cases, we find features which, I argue, are best explained by the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. To preempt an objection, I argue that putative cases of emotionless moral experience can be explained away. Finally, I allay the worry that emotions are an unsuitable basis for (...) moral knowledge. I conclude that those who believe in moral experience should hold that it consists of emotion. (shrink)

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete (...) emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories. (shrink)

Originally a keynote address at the International Society for Research on Emotion (ISRE) 2013 convention, this article surveys many nonobvious ways that emotion phenomena show up in natural language. One conclusion is that no classical Aristotelian definition of “emotion” in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is possible. The brain naturally creates radial, not classical categories. As a result, “emotion” is a contested concept. There is no one correct, classical definition of “emotion.” There are real (...) emotion phenomena that can be precisely studied, and language is an important area to look at for such phenomena. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFacial stimuli are widely used in behavioural and brain science research to investigate emotional facial processing. However, some studies have demonstrated that dynamic expressions elicit stronger emotional responses compared to static images. To address the need for more ecologically valid and powerful facial emotional stimuli, we created Dynamic FACES, a database of morphed videos from younger, middle-aged, and older adults displaying naturalistic emotional facial expressions. To assess adult age differences in emotion identification of dynamic stimuli and to provide normative (...) ratings for this modified set of stimuli, healthy adults categorised for each video the emotional expression displayed, rated the expression distinctiveness, estimated the age of the face model, and rated the naturalness of the expression. We found few age differences in emotion identification when using dynamic stimuli. On... (shrink)

Humans typically combine linguistic and nonlinguistic information to comprehend emotions. We adopted an emotion identification Stroop task to investigate how different channels interact in emotion communication. In experiment 1, synonyms of “happy” and “sad” were spoken with happy and sad prosody. Participants had more difficulty ignoring prosody than ignoring verbal content. In experiment 2, synonyms of “happy” and “sad” were spoken with happy and sad prosody, while happy or sad faces were displayed. Accuracy was lower when two channels (...) expressed an emotion that was incongruent with the channel participants had to focus on, compared with the cross-channel congruence condition. When participants were required to focus on verbal content, accuracy was significantly lower also when prosody was incongruent with verbal content and face. This suggests that prosody biases emotional verbal content processing, even when conflicting with verbal content and face simultaneously. Implications for multimodal communication and language evolution studies are discussed. (shrink)

Among the many striking features of the philosophy of the Zhuāngzǐ is that it advocates a life unperturbed by emotions, including even pleasurable, positive emotions such as joy or delight. Many of us see emotions as an ineluctable part of life, and some would argue they are a crucial component of a well-developed moral sensitivity and a good life. The Zhuangist approach to emotion challenges such commonsense views so radically that it amounts to a test case for the fundamental (...) plausibility of the Daoist ethical orientation: If the Zhuangist stance on emotion is untenable, then other aspects of Daoist ethics may founder as well. In this essay, I explore what I call a Zhuangist ‘Virtuoso View’ of emotion and its connections with human agency, attempting to show that at least one version of a Zhuangist approach to emotion passes the ‘basic plausibility’ test. I begin by describing the Virtuoso View and sketching its theoretical foundation, which involves claims about human agency, the self, psychophysical hygiene, the good life, epistemology, and metaphysics. Next, I defend the Virtuoso View against three objections, namely that it abandons intentionality, that it interferes with a good life, and that it yields a schizophrenic conception of agency. I argue for three major theses. First, the Virtuoso View is easily intelligible and largely defensible. Second, it reflects a crucial insight into a fundamental dichotomy at the core of human agency: the unavoidable conflict within a self-aware human agent between an internal, engaged perspective and an external, detached one. Third, I suggest that certain problems or conflicts arising from the Virtuoso View actually reflect inherent features of the human predicament and thus are not mere conceptual defects. Hence even if we do not find the Virtuoso View wholly convincing, we can nevertheless gain much insight from it. (shrink)

Jenefer Robinson takes the insights of modern scientific research on the emotions and uses them to illuminate questions about our emotional involvement with the arts. Laying out a theory of emotion supported by the best evidence from current empirical work, she examines some of the ways in which the emotions function in the arts. Written in a clear and engaging style, her book will make fascinating reading for anyone interested in the emotions and how they work, as well as (...) anyone engaged with the arts and aesthetics. (shrink)

This collection of new essays addresses emotion in relation to the arts. The essays consider such topics as the paradox of fiction, emotion in the pure and abstract arts, and the rationality and ethics of emotional responses to art.

Analyzes the meaning expressed in music, the social and psychological sources of meaning, and the methods of musical communication This is a book meant for ...

This paper introduces a novel form of pragmatic encroachment: one that makes a difference to the status of emotion rather than the status of belief. I begin by isolating a distinctive standard in terms of which we can evaluate emotion – one sometimes called “subjective fittingness,” “epistemic justification,” or “warrant.” I then show how this standard for emotion could face a kind of pragmatic encroachment importantly similar to the more familiar encroachment on epistemic standards for belief. Encroachment (...) on warranted emotion is a striking proposal that deserves attention. In fact, there are good reasons to think that encroachment on warranted emotion deserves to be considered the default view for those who already accept pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic status of belief. I support this parity claim by arguing for a principle that establishes a limited coordination between the conditions that warrant emotion and the conditions that justify belief. (shrink)