Emotion: Animal and Reflective

Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):561-588 (2019)
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Abstract

According to the judgment theory of emotion, emotions necessarily involve evaluative judgments. Despite a number of attractions, this theory is almost universally held to be dead, for a very simple reason: it is overly intellectualistic. On behalf of the judgment theorist, I defend a simple strategy, namely, to claim that her view is restricted to a special class of emotions, a strategy that is rooted in a plausible distinction between two broad classes of emotion. It turns out that, if the judgment theory is to be rejected, such rejection cannot be based on the charge that it overintellectualizes emotions.

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Hichem Naar
University of Duisburg-Essen

Citations of this work

Emotion: More like Action than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.
Skepticism about reasons for emotions.Hichem Naar - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):108-123.
Emotions and the Action Analogy: Prospects for an Agential Theory of Emotions.Hichem Naar - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (1):64-78.
Value Feelings: A Defense.Hichem Naar - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (4):69.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.

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