Current debate over the motives, ideological justifications, and outcomes of the war with Iraq have been strident and polarizing. _A Matter of Principle _is the first volume gathering critical voices from around the world to offer an alternative perspective on the prevailing pro-war and anti-war positions. The contribu-tors—political figures, public intellectuals, scholars, church leaders, and activists—represent the most powerful views of liberal internationalism. Offering alternative positions that challenge the status quo of both the left and the right, these essays claim (...) that, in spite of the inconsistent justifications provided by the United States and its allies and the conflict-ridden process of social reconstruction, the war in Iraq has been morally justifiable on the grounds that Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant, a flagrant violator of human rights, a force of global instability and terror, and a threat to world peace. The authors discuss the limitations of the current system of global governance, which tolerates gross violations of human rights and which has failed to prevent genocide in places such as Bosnia and Rwanda. They also underscore the need for reform in international institutions and international law. At the same time, these essays do not necessarily attempt to apologize for the mistakes, errors, and deceptions in the way the Bush administration has handled the war. Disputing the idea that the only true liberal position on the war is to be against it, this volume charts an invaluable third course, a path determined by a strong liberal commitment to human rights, solidarity with the oppressed, and a firm stand against fascism, totalitarianism, and tyranny. (shrink)

In mapping out the field of human rights for those studying and researching within both humanities and social science disciplines, the Handbook of Human Rights provides not only a solid foundation for the reader who wants to learn the basic parameters of the field, but also promotes new thinking and frameworks for the study of human rights in the twenty-first century. The Handbook comprises of nearly sixty individual contributions from key figures around the world, which are grouped according to eight (...) key areas of discussion: - foundations and critiques - new frameworks for understanding human rights - world religious traditions and human rights - social, economic, group and collective rights - critical perspectives on human rights organizations, institutions, and practices - law and human rights - narrative and aesthetic dimension of rights - geographies of rights In its presentation and analysis of the traditional core history and topics, critical perspectives, human rights culture, and current practice, this Handbook proves a valuable resource for all students and researchers with an interest in human rights. (shrink)

People often engage in “offline simulation”, considering what would happen if they performed certain actions in the future, or had performed different actions in the past. Prior research shows that these simulations are biased towards actions a person considers to be good—i.e., likely to pay off. We ask whether, and why, this bias might be adaptive. Through computational experiments we compare five agents who differ only in the way they engage in offline simulation, across a variety of different environment types. (...) Broadly speaking, our experiments reveal that simulating actions one already regards as good does in fact confer an advantage in downstream decision making, although this general pattern interacts with features of the environment in important ways. We contrast this bias with alternatives such as simulating actions whose outcomes are instead uncertain. (shrink)

We present a theoretical and an empirical challenge to Cushman's claim that rationalization is adaptive because it allows humans to extract more accurate beliefs from our non-rational motivations for behavior. Rationalization sometimes generates more adaptive decisions by making our beliefs about the world less accurate. We suggest that the most important adaptive advantage of rationalization is instead that it increases our predictability as potential partners in cooperative social interactions.

Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.

The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgement have been the focus of many recent empirical studies1–11. Of central interest is whether emotions play a causal role in moral judgement, and, in parallel, how emotion-related areas of the brain contribute to moral judgement. Here we show that six patients with focal bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region necessary for the normal generation of emotions and, in particular, social emotions12–14, produce an abnor- mally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of (...) judgements on moral dilemmas that pit compelling considerations of aggregate welfare against highly emotionally aversive behaviours (for example, having to sacrifice one person’s life to save a number of other lives)7,8. In contrast, the VMPC patients’ judgements were normal in other classes of moral dilemmas. These findings indicate that, for a selective set of moral dilemmas, the VMPC is critical for normal judgements of right and wrong. The findings support a necessary role for emotion in the generation of those judgements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BRUCE MARSHALL'S READING OF AQUINAS Lours RoY, O.P. Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts IN AN ARTICLE published by The Thomist,1 Bruce D. Marshall argues that Aquinas should be viewed as a ' postliberal theologian,' that is to say, as propounding basically the same account of truth as the one put forward by George A. Lindbeck.2 In the same issue of The Thomist,3 Lindbeck not only approves Marshall's interpretation of (...) his book but goes so far as to write: "My 'cultural-linguistic' account of religious belief is in part a clumsy rendition in modern philosophical and sociological idioms of what Aquinas often said more fully and more precisely long ago " (405).4 And he adds : " Thus by showing how St. Thomas can be understood in a way consistent with Nature of Doctrine, Bruce Marshall has explained the view of truth which I had in mind better than I explained it myself " (406). In order to keep this note relatively short, I shall bypass the question of whether Marshall's presentation of Lindbeck's thought is merely a clarification or an actual revision of it. Let us simply note the fact that Lindbeck has praised Marshall's rendering without any reservation. 1" Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," The Thomist 53 (1989) : 352-402. 2 The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). a " Response to Bruce Marshall," 403-406. 4. This acknowledgment should not be taken lightly, given the remarkable acquaintance with the thought of Aquinas that Lindbeck has shown for many years. See his article, " The A Priori in St. Thomas' Theory of Knowledge " in The Heritage of Christian Thought, ed. Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grislis (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 41-63. 473 474 LOUIS ROY, O.P. The question I should like to raise bears on the accuracy of Marshall's representation of Aquinas. Marshall is undoubtedly a fine analyst of Thomas's writings. His selection of texts evinces a mastery of Thomas's corpus. He convincingly shows that there is a great similarity between Aquinas's and Lindbeck's views regarding the paramount role of faith in the access to truth. Marshall 's piece may even have suggested to some readers that, in this respect, Aquinas could be closer to a confessionalist like Lindbeck than to a revisionist like Tracy. I shall return to this hypothesis in my conclusion. Therefore, if Marshall's reading of Thomas is sound, it should be a valuable contribution to a recent debate among some confessionalists, Thomists, and revisionists.G 1. Marshall wants to test Aquinas on some distinctions drawn from Lindbeck. He begins by acknowledging that Aquinas has a correspondence theory of truth. He adds that, in matters of faith, it is impossible to verify whether one's beliefs correspond or not with what is the reality. Far from demonstrating their tenets, believers simply hold as true what has been revealed by God. So far as truths that go beyond the capacity of human reason are concerned, Thomas repeatedly asserts that no one can prove them. Given the impossibility of showing that doctrines correspond with the reality of God, the question arises: How can Christians sort out which doctrines are true? In answer to this question, Marshall introduces a distinction between the theory of truth (namely, correspondence) and the criteria by which people can justify the truth of their assertions, especially in matters which are not susceptible of proof. There are two such criteria : linguistic G These three positions are represented in the articles written by William C. Placher, Colman E. O'Neill, James J. Buckley, and David Tracy for the "Review Symposium" of Lindbeck's book, published by The Thomist 49 (1985): 392-472. Marshall's piece, which I shall discuss here, is a reply to O'Neill. In order not to make things too complicated, I will not refer to O'Neill's article, since Marshall's treatment of Aquinas is clear in itself, regardless of his disagreement with O'Neill. READING OF AQUINAS 475 coherence and practical coherence. Marshall claims that both of them are operative in the thought of Aquinas.6 Let us recall the question: How... (shrink)

Before he became infamous for character assassination disguised as literary executorship, Rufus W. Griswold established his reputation in America as a critic and early literary anthologist. In 1842, Griswold released the first edition of his massive Poets and Poetry of America with prominent Philadelphia publisher Carey and Hart. At nearly five hundred royal octavo pages—complete with elaborate frontispiece; ornamental title page with an etching by George Hewitt Cushman after Thomas Creswick; twelve-page, double-columned “historical introduction”; authorial headnotes; and selections (...) of verse from more than one hundred poets active in the roughly seventy years since American independence—Griswold’s volume was... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BRUCE MARSHALL'S READING OF AQUINAS Lours RoY, O.P. Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts IN AN ARTICLE published by The Thomist,1 Bruce D. Marshall argues that Aquinas should be viewed as a ' postliberal theologian,' that is to say, as propounding basically the same account of truth as the one put forward by George A. Lindbeck.2 In the same issue of The Thomist,3 Lindbeck not only approves Marshall's interpretation of (...) his book but goes so far as to write: "My 'cultural-linguistic' account of religious belief is in part a clumsy rendition in modern philosophical and sociological idioms of what Aquinas often said more fully and more precisely long ago " (405).4 And he adds : " Thus by showing how St. Thomas can be understood in a way consistent with Nature of Doctrine, Bruce Marshall has explained the view of truth which I had in mind better than I explained it myself " (406). In order to keep this note relatively short, I shall bypass the question of whether Marshall's presentation of Lindbeck's thought is merely a clarification or an actual revision of it. Let us simply note the fact that Lindbeck has praised Marshall's rendering without any reservation. 1" Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," The Thomist 53 (1989) : 352-402. 2 The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). a " Response to Bruce Marshall," 403-406. 4. This acknowledgment should not be taken lightly, given the remarkable acquaintance with the thought of Aquinas that Lindbeck has shown for many years. See his article, " The A Priori in St. Thomas' Theory of Knowledge " in The Heritage of Christian Thought, ed. Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grislis (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 41-63. 473 474 LOUIS ROY, O.P. The question I should like to raise bears on the accuracy of Marshall's representation of Aquinas. Marshall is undoubtedly a fine analyst of Thomas's writings. His selection of texts evinces a mastery of Thomas's corpus. He convincingly shows that there is a great similarity between Aquinas's and Lindbeck's views regarding the paramount role of faith in the access to truth. Marshall 's piece may even have suggested to some readers that, in this respect, Aquinas could be closer to a confessionalist like Lindbeck than to a revisionist like Tracy. I shall return to this hypothesis in my conclusion. Therefore, if Marshall's reading of Thomas is sound, it should be a valuable contribution to a recent debate among some confessionalists, Thomists, and revisionists.G 1. Marshall wants to test Aquinas on some distinctions drawn from Lindbeck. He begins by acknowledging that Aquinas has a correspondence theory of truth. He adds that, in matters of faith, it is impossible to verify whether one's beliefs correspond or not with what is the reality. Far from demonstrating their tenets, believers simply hold as true what has been revealed by God. So far as truths that go beyond the capacity of human reason are concerned, Thomas repeatedly asserts that no one can prove them. Given the impossibility of showing that doctrines correspond with the reality of God, the question arises: How can Christians sort out which doctrines are true? In answer to this question, Marshall introduces a distinction between the theory of truth (namely, correspondence) and the criteria by which people can justify the truth of their assertions, especially in matters which are not susceptible of proof. There are two such criteria : linguistic G These three positions are represented in the articles written by William C. Placher, Colman E. O'Neill, James J. Buckley, and David Tracy for the "Review Symposium" of Lindbeck's book, published by The Thomist 49 (1985): 392-472. Marshall's piece, which I shall discuss here, is a reply to O'Neill. In order not to make things too complicated, I will not refer to O'Neill's article, since Marshall's treatment of Aquinas is clear in itself, regardless of his disagreement with O'Neill. READING OF AQUINAS 475 coherence and practical coherence. Marshall claims that both of them are operative in the thought of Aquinas.6 Let us recall the question: How... (shrink)

Many formerly incarcerated people have civil legal needs that can imperil their successful re-entry to society and, consequently, their health. We categorize these needs and assess their association with cardiovascular disease risk factors in a sample of recently released people. We find that having legal needs related to debt, public benefits, housing, or healthcare access is associated with psychosocial stress, but not uncontrolled high blood pressure or high cholesterol, in the first three months after release.

British systematics was distinctly marked by a raft of vituperative controversies around the turn of the 1830s. After the local collapse of broad consensus in the Linnaean system by 1820, the emergence of new schemes of classification—most notably, the “quinarian” system of William Sharp Macleay—brought with it an unprecedented register of public debate among zoologists in Britain, one which a young Charles Darwin would bitterly describe to his friend John Stevens Henslow in October 1836 as possessing a “mean quarrelsome spirit,” (...) conducted in “a manner anything but like that of gentlemen.” This article aims to provide a social and conceptual account of the remarkable tenor of zoological discourse in Britain in the late 1820s and early 1830s, with joint attention to the philosophical and interpersonal commitments at play. In doing so, it analyzes the three of the period’s most striking public controversies, each of which counted key advocates of the quinarian system as central participants. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay explores key values of John Lachs's work, especially freedom, diversity, and human flourishing, when applied to the history of the philosophy of education as well as to the practical problems of policy and implementation today in American schools. I consider the importance and tensions involved in these values in the thinking of Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Dewey. Next, I examine necessary and then avoidable challenges of operationalizing freedom and diversity in schools, especially in tensions with recent policy (...) initiatives that threaten freedom and diversity for human flourishing. The aim here is to note the central importance of the values that Lachs has long championed, while attending also to the risks and dangers that misunderstanding and narrow thinking pose about them when applied to American public schools. Ultimately, I argue that while advocacy for liberty sometimes raises profound problems in the sphere of public education, democratic education is enriched immeasurably when it enables and empowers freedom to pursue diverse forms of flourishing. (shrink)

Thomas Kjeller Johansen presents a new account of Aristotle's major work on psychology, the De Anima.

Thomas Sattig develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time, and offers an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world. He brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking our ordinary conception of time with the physicist's conception, and linking metaphysical questions about time with questions in the philosophy of language.

A central tenet of contemporary moral psychology is that people typically reject active forms of utilitarian sacrifice. Yet, evidence for secularization and declining empathic concern in recent decades suggests the possibility of systematic change in this attitude. In the present study, we employ hypothetical dilemmas to investigate whether judgments of utilitarian sacrifice are becoming more permissive over time. In a cross-sectional design, age negatively predicted utilitarian moral judgment (Study 1). To examine whether this pattern reflected processes of maturation, we asked (...) a panel to re-evaluate several moral dilemmas after an eight-year interval but observed no overall change (Study 2). In contrast, a more recent age-matched sample revealed greater endorsement of utilitarian sacrifice in a time-lag design (Study 3). Taken together, these results suggest that today’s younger cohorts increasingly endorse a utilitarian resolution of sacrificial moral dilemmas. (shrink)

The thesis we develop in this essay is that all humans are endowed with a moral faculty. The moral faculty enables us to produce moral judgments on the basis of the causes and consequences of actions. As an empirical research program, we follow the framework of modern linguistics.1 The spirit of the argument dates back at least to the economist Adam Smith (1759/1976) who argued for something akin to a moral grammar, and more recently, to the political philosopher John Rawls (...) (1971). The logic of the argument, however, comes from Noam Chomsky’s thinking on language specifically and the nature of knowledge more generally (Chomsky, 1986, 1988, 2000; Saporta, 1978). If the nature of moral knowledge is comparable in some way to the nature of linguistic knowledge, as defended recently by Harman (1977), Dwyer (1999, 2004), and Mikhail (2000; in press), then what should we expect to find when we look at the anatomy of our moral faculty? Is there a grammar, and if so, how can the moral grammarian uncover its structure? Are we aware of our moral grammar, its method of operation, and its moment-to-moment functioning in our judgments? Is there a universal moral grammar that allows each child to build a particular moral grammar? Once acquired, are different moral grammars mutually incomprehensible in the same way that a native Chinese speaker finds a native Italian speaker incomprehensible? How does the child acquire a particular moral grammar, especially if her experiences are impoverished relative to the moral judgments she makes? Are there certain forms of brain damage that disrupt moral competence but leave other forms of reasoning intact? And how did this machinery evolve, and for what particular adaptive function? We will have more to say about many of these questions later on, and Hauser (2006) develops others. However, in order to flesh out the key ideas and particular empirical research paths, let us turn to some of the central questions in the study of our language faculty.. (shrink)

Thomas Sattig develops a novel philosophical picture of ordinary objects such as persons, tables, and trees. He carves a middle way between classical mereology and Aristotelian hylomorphism, and argues that objects lead double lives. They are compounds of matter and form, and each object's matter and form have different qualitative profiles.

Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...) und Gesetz nicht durch ihre Entgegensetzung bestimmen kann, sondern durcheinander erläutern muss. Wirkliche Freiheit ist nicht Freiheit von Gesetzen, sondern Freiheit in Gesetzen; verbindliche Normen sind nicht das, was Freiheit äußerlich beschränkt, sondern das, was Freiheit innerlich verwirklicht. Die Idee der Autonomie, die für die moderne praktische Philosophie seit Rousseau und Kant grundlegend ist, zielt so darauf, Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit in einem Zuge zu artikulieren: durch die Form selbstgegebener Gesetze. Mit Beiträgen von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard und Sebastian Rödl. (shrink)

Romantikken er en sammensat kulturhistorisk og andshistorisk stromning, som brod frem i slutningen af 1700-tallet og kulminerede i den forste tredjedel af 1800-tallet, men havde udlobere helt ind i det 20. arhundrede. Ud over at formulere et sAerligt verdenssyn, der abnede for en dyrkelse af folkelig fortid, for melankolsk livsforelse, dybe trAengsler, anelser, splittelse og higen efter helhed og harmoni og meget andet, var den karakteriseret ved en kritisk reaktion mod to af den tids stAerke stromninger: Den oplysningstid, som i (...) den romantiske kritik ofte blev fremstillet som en kold, reduktionistisk, materialistisk rationalisme, og den endnu koldere materialistiske og rationalistiske modernitet. En ubehagelig fremtid, som romantikerne sa trAenge sig pa med den fremvoksende industrialisering.Givet er det, at romantikkens kosmologi og filosofi blev formuleret blandt tyske intellektuelle i sidste halvdel af 1700-tallet, og at stromningen i forskellig rytme og med varierende styrke spredte sig ud over Europa. Gennemslaget inden for faglige, videnskabelige og kunstneriske omrader varierede dog meget, og pavirkningen af andslivet var hojst forskellig fra land til land. Denne bogs mere end 40 artikler - alle skrevet af forskere pa det nye, store Aarhus Universitet - spreder sig derfor over hele perioden mellem sidste kvartal af 1700-tallet og begyndelsen af 1900-tallet og omhandler alt fra forskning i Frankenstein og Aedle vilde over nationalisme og gymnastik til Florence Nightingale og onde hekse. (shrink)

Our minds have physical effects. This happens, for instance, when we move our bodies when we act. How is this possible? Thomas Kroedel defends an account of mental causation in terms of difference-making: if our minds had been different, the physical world would have been different; therefore, the mind causes events in the physical world. His account not only explains how the mind has physical effects at all, but solves the exclusion problem - the problem of how those effects (...) can have both mental and physical causes. It is also unprecedented in scope, because it is available to dualists about the mind as well as physicalists, drawing on traditional views of causation as well as on the latest developments in the field of causal modelling. It will be of interest to a range of readers in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is also available as Open Access. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an English philosopher, remembered today for his work on political philosophy. His 1651 book Leviathan established the foundation for most of Western political philosophy from the perspective of social contract theory. He also contributed to a diverse array of fields, including history, geometry, physics of gases, theology, ethics, general philosophy, and political science. He was one of the main philosophers who founded materialism. He visited Florence in 1636 and later was a regular debater in philosophic (...) groups in Paris, held together by Marin Mersenne. Hobbes's first area of study was an interest in the physical doctrine of motion and physical momentum. Despite his interest in this phenomenon, he disdained experimental work as in physics. He built a good reputation in philosophic circles and in 1645, he was chosen with Descartes, Gilles de Roberval and others, to referee the controversy between John Pell and Longomontanus over the problem of squaring the circle. His other works include: The Elements of Law Natural and Politic (1640) and De Cive (The Citizen): Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (1651). (shrink)

When do people say that they are moved, and does this experience constitute a unique emotion? We review theory and empirical research on being moved across psychology and philosophy. We examine feeling labels, elicitors, valence, bodily sensations, and motivations. We find that the English lexeme being moved typically (but not always) refers to a distinct and potent emotion that results in social bonding; often includes tears, piloerection, chills, or a warm feeling in the chest; and is often described as pleasurable, (...) though sometimes as a mixed emotion. While we conclude that it is a distinct emotion, we also recommend studying it in a more comprehensive emotion framework, instead of using the ambiguous vernacular term being moved as a scientific term. (shrink)

Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive (...) feature of conservative morality. Next, we find that the conservative and liberal structural approaches to moral judgment are associated with their corresponding patterns of reliance on distinct moral foundations. In addition, the structural approach uniquely predicts that conservatives will be more opposed to harm in circumstances like the well-known trolley problem, a result which we replicate. Finally, we show that the structural approaches of conservatives and liberals are partly linked to underlying cognitive styles. Collectively, these findings forge a link between two important yet previously independent lines of research in political psychology: cognitive style and moral foundations theory. (shrink)

Thomas Wheatland examines the influence of the Frankfurt School, or Horkheimer Circle, and how they influenced American social thought and postwar German sociology.

Thomas Alexander shows that the primary, guiding concern of Dewey's philosophy is his theory of aesthetic experience.

Objectivity can be effectively described as striving for detachment -a capacity to achieve some distance from one's own spontaneous perceptions and convictions, to experimentally adopt perspectives that do not come naturally. Novick's treatment of objectivity satisfies the requirements of objectivity, while on a rhetorical level he rejects the notion as unrealistic. Detachment enables an intellectual, specifically an historian, to operate with self-reflexivity and simultaneously socializes him or her. The ultimate power in a community of detached intellectuals striving for objectivity is (...) a powerful argument. Under Novick's notion of objectivity, the conflict for historians between scholarly integrity and political alliance is unresolvable. Removing neutrality from the definition of objectivity resolves this conflict, enabling historians to strive for detachment and fairness, not disengagement from life. Postmodern disclaimers, such as Novick's on the futility of objectivity, fail, through being overly dismissive, to help us establish criteria for evaluating individual historical accounts. Having objectivity as a goal enables us to establish those criteria. (shrink)

A nineteenth-century aristocrat, Nishi Amane (1829-1897) was one of the first Japanese to assert the supremacy of Western culture. He was sent by his government to Leiden to study the European social sciences; on his return to Japan shortly before the climactic Meiji Restoration of 1868 he introduced and adapted European utilitarianism and positivism to his country's intellectual world. To modernize, Nishi held, Japan must cast off the bonds of the Confucian world-view in order to adopt new principles of empirical (...) scholarly investigation and new standards of self-improvement. Though a Confucian by upbringing, Nishi became thoroughly committed to Western intellectual values in his programs for the new Japanese society. In his roles of teacher, writer, and government administrator, he was influential at one of the most critical times in Japan's history. Originally published in 1970. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The rhetoric of Principia Ethica, as of not a few philosophy books, is that of the clean break. Moore claims that the vast majority of previous writing on ethics has been misguided and that an entirely new start is needed. In its time, however, the book’s claims to novelty were widely disputed. Reviews in Mind, Ethics, and The Journal of Philosophy applauded the clarity of Moore’s criticisms of Mill, Spencer, and others, but said they were “not altogether original,” had for (...) the most part “already been brought out by other critics,” and were even “the standard criticisms.”1 To the Mind reviewer, “The book indicates throughout how strongly the author has been affected by Sidgwick’s views.”2 Hastings Rashdall rejected as historically inaccurate Moore’s claim that only Sidgwick before him had recognized that “good” is indefinable: “To say nothing of writers who (like Mr. Moore and myself) learned the doctrine largely from Sidgwick, I should contend that it was taught with sufficient distinctness by Plato ..., Aristotle, and a host of other writers who have studied in their school.”3 Rashdall also described Moore’s principle of organic unities as just “a new and striking way of stating a very old truth.”4 Some recent commentators have taken a similar line. Bernard Williams has said that much of Principia Ethica comes from Sidgwick,5 while Thomas Baldwin, discussing the book’s substantive values, has said the principle of organic unities “was expressly stated by Bradley,” while “McTaggart had for some years extolled the value of love, and the value of art is a central theme of romanticism.”. (shrink)

Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...) und Gesetz nicht durch ihre Entgegensetzung bestimmen kann, sondern durcheinander erläutern muss. Wirkliche Freiheit ist nicht Freiheit von Gesetzen, sondern Freiheit in Gesetzen; verbindliche Normen sind nicht das, was Freiheit äußerlich beschränkt, sondern das, was Freiheit innerlich verwirklicht. Die Idee der Autonomie, die für die moderne praktische Philosophie seit Rousseau und Kant grundlegend ist, zielt so darauf, Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit in einem Zuge zu artikulieren: durch die Form selbstgegebener Gesetze. -/- Mit Beiträgen von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard und Sebastian Rödl. (shrink)

Der Begriff der Regierung, den Foucault vor allem in den weitgehend unveroffentlichten Vorlesungen der Jahre 1978 und 1979 am College de France entwickelt hat, liefert den Schlussel zum Verstandnis seines Spatwerks. NIcht mehr Recht und Krieg, sondern Fuhrung und Hegemonie bilden die zentralen Bezugspunkte. FOucault vertritt die These, daSS die "Genealogie des modernen Staates" und die "Genealogie des modernen Subjekts" zusammengehoren. FOucaults Analyse der modernen Gouvernementmentalitat darf gerade heute Aktualitat beanspruchen. ANhand des liberalen Denkens zeigt er, wie die Selbstregulationsfahigkeit von (...) Individuen und Gruppen mit okonomischer Profitmaximierung und gesellschaftspolitischen Zielen verknupft werden. DAmit kann er die Beziehungen zwischen "Bio-Politik" und Rassismus, Freiheit und Sicherheit, dem Abbau sozialstaatlicher Leistungen und dem zunehmenden Appell an "Eigenverantwortung" und "Selbstsorge" aufzeigen. Der Neoliberalismus ist demnach eine Rationalitat, die nicht nur eine neue Form des Sozialen "erfindet", sondern auch eine neue Subjektivitat. IN ihr sind wirtschaftlicher Wohlstand und personliches Wohlsein miteinander gekoppelt, wobei nicht nur der individuelle Korper, sondern auch der Staat als politischer Korper "schlank" und "fit" sein muSS. THomas Lemkes Studie, die auf umfangreichen Recherchen und bislang unbekanntem Archivmaterial basiert, betritt Neuland in der Foucault-Rezeption. DAruber hinaus enthalt sie die umfassendste Bibliographie der politisch und sozialwissenschaftlich relevanten Arbeiten Foucaults und eine Vielzahl von deutschen Erstubersetzungen seiner Texte. SIe zeigt aber auch, wie von SchulerInnen und KollegInnen Foucaults die "Regierungs"-.PErspektive aufgenommen wurde und sich in Forschungsarbeiten konkretisieren. SIe bietet nicht nur eine Interpretation, sondern wird selbst zum Werkzeug fur eine Kritik der politischen Vernunft. (shrink)

Thomas Williams presents the most extensive collection of John Duns Scotus's work on ethics and moral psychology available in English. This accessible and philosophically informed translation includes extended discussions on divine and human freedom, the moral attributes of God, and the relationship between will and intellect.

Physical reality as an explanatory model is an abstraction of the mind. Every perceptual system is a user interface, like the dashboard of an aeroplane or the desktop of a computer. We do not see or otherwise perceive reality but only interface with reality. The user interface concept is a starting point for a critical dialogue with those epistemic theories that present themselves as veridical and take explanatory abstractions as ontological primitives. At the heart of any scientific model are assumptions (...) about which things exist, how they are related, and how we can know them. Scientific models take our knowledge beyond ordinary experience toward explanatory abstractions. The main problem with veridical models lies in why we cannot express our theories and the explanatory abstractions associated with them other than through classical perceptual interface symbols. This study analyses the limits, possibilities and constraints of explanatory abstractions. (shrink)

When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to (...) young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome‐to‐intent shift in childhood characterize the “intent‐to‐outcome” shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment. (shrink)

Before commenting on the papers from a recent interdisciplinary gathering of scholars from China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, a case is made for regional academia conversations today, because international conferences, especially in the humanities and social sciences, are still dominated by “Western” traditions, discourse, and protocols. After touching on the relative stability or variability of phenomena and procedures in the natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences, political and cultural questions are considered along with some of the ongoing consequences of the (...) East Asian adoption of the European model of the modern research university. (shrink)