This article is in part an intervention in the ongoing debate inaugurated by Peter Harrison in 2002 when he called into question the validity of what had come by then to be called ‘the voluntarism and science thesis.’ Though it subsequently drew support from such historians of science as J.E. McGuire, Margaret Osler, Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs and, more recently, John Henry (in rebuttal of Harrison), the origins of the thesis are usually traced back to articles published in 1934–1936 and (...) 1961 respectively by the philosopher Michael Foster and the historian of ideas Francis Oakley. While classifying Foster’s work as pertaining to the ecology of ideas rather than their history, the article argues for the complementarity of the two approaches and seeks, not only to vindicate the voluntarism and science thesis itself but also to locate it within the broader constellation of ideas embracing legal and political as well as natural philosophy that the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott characterized as pertaining to a fundamental tradition of European thinking dominated by the master conceptions of Will and Artifice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Fatherhood and the Promise of EthicsKelly Oliver (bio)Both Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Levinas reject the Freudian/Lacanian association of father with law and instead associate fatherhood with promise. For Ricoeur, fatherhood promises equality through contracts, while for Levinas, fatherhood promises singularity beyond the law. The tension between equality and singularity, between law and something beyond the law, is what is at stake in Derrida’s The Gift of Death. There, Derrida (...) describes ethics as a paradox between the universal and the individual, between equality and singularity. Kierkegaard’s reading of the story of Abraham and Isaac from Genesis is the centerpiece of Derrida’s analysis. If we read The Gift of Death, with its focus on this story of father and son, in relation to Ricoeur and Levinas on the question of fatherhood, it reads as the culmination of a dialectical tension between the two. And if we read the Abraham story as a legend about father-son relations rather than just a parable of faith, The Gift of Death appears to uncover not just the paradoxical logic of ethics but also the uncompromising logic of patriarchy and paternal authority.Paternity Begets FraternityIn “Fatherhood: from Phantasm to Symbol” Ricoeur describes fatherhood as a battle of wills struggling for recognition. He brings together what he calls the different perspectives of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and religion in order to rearticulate the oedipal situation as a process of recognition (rather than a structure) which moves from the father as phantasm to the father as symbol and replaces images of real murder with symbolic sacrifice. Through his dialectical analysis, Ricoeur himself attempts to articulate a recognition of fatherhood that moves us away from the phantasm of the father as castrator to the symbol of the father as compassionate. Relying on Hegelian dialectics, Ricoeur outlines a movement from psychoanalysis’s fantastic image of an omnipotent father who must be killed so that the son might live, through Phenomenology of Spirit’s master-slave dialectic, to the Christian religious representation of the loving father sacrificing Himself through His son for the sake of all His children. In this higher stage of the dialectic of paternity, the murder of the father is replaced by his sacrifice. Oddly, however, Ricoeur’s dialectic remains at the level of the master-slave fight to the death, where—without the Hegelian resolution—the only options available to insure the recognition of the father by the son (or the son by the father) are murder or suicide. For Ricoeur, recognition requires death, symbolic if not imaginary, whereas Hegel insists that recognition comes only when the master and slave are willing to risk death but also realize the necessity of avoiding it; mutual recognition cannot be maintained if one of the parties is dead.For Ricoeur, recognition does not necessitate avoiding death but rather moving away from the realm of the family and the body to the level of the social and the law. In order for the father-son relationship to be one of mutual recognition, the father must sacrifice his absolute authority so that the son might also participate in it. The goal of recognition is equality, which can be achieved only through social contracts that abstract from the particulars of embodied familial relations. One such social operation is designation, [End Page 45] which is removed from the realm of the bodily drives that motivate the oedipal scenario. Designation requires the sublimation of bodily drives into abstract laws that can equalize bodies by turning them into symbols.The move from psychoanalysis to Christianity is a move from a domestic family to a social family: through God the Father’s sacrifice of His son, we all become members of the Christian family; we all become children of God. For Ricoeur, it is not that God is the Father because He gives the Law. Rather, the law, the covenant or contract, enables Him to be recognized as father [490]. Ricoeur implicitly rejects the Lacanian association of the Father with the Law or the Name. He claims that there is no Name of the Father. “Father” is not a name but a designation [Ricoeur 485]. And the father’s proper name is... (shrink)

The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, (...) if these boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible. (shrink)

In their classic analyses, Hobbes and Hume argue that offensively violating a covenant is irrational because the offense ruins one’s reputation. This paper explores conditions under which reputation alone can enforce covenants. The members of a community are modeled as interacting in a Covenant Game repeated over time. Folk theorems are presented that give conditions under which the Humean strategy of performing in covenants only with those who have never offensively violated or performed with an offensive violator characterizes (...) an equilibrium of the repeated Covenant Game. These folk theorems establish that for certain ideal settings Hobbes’ and Hume’s arguments against offensively violating covenants are compelling. However, these ideal settings presuppose that the community has certain mechanisms that generate common knowledge of the identities of those with whom one should perform. I analyze the results of computer simulations of the interactions in a community whose members must rely upon private communication alone. The computer simulation data show that in this community, reputation effects cannot effectively deter members from offensively violating covenants. I conclude that Hobbes’ and Hume’s warnings against offensive violation are compelling only on condition that the community is sufficiently structured to generate common knowledge among its members. I also conclude that even in such structured communities, the Humean strategy is not the uniquely “correct” policy. (shrink)

Robert Adams’s account of divine command theory argues that moral obligations are idealized versions of everyday social requirements. One type of social requirement is the ordinary demand one person makes of one another. Its idealized version is the perfect command a perfect God makes of those he loves. This paper extends Adams’s account of moral obligation by considering another kind of social requirement: promises. It argues that we can understand a divine covenant as an idealized version of a promise. (...) Promisers take on social requirements to promisees when they make promises. Analogously, God takes on obligations to humans when God makes covenants with them. Divine command theorists might fear that this makes God subject to moral rules not of his own choosing. This paper considers these fears and argues that they are unwarranted. (shrink)

In “God of the Gaps: A Neglected Reply to God’s Stone Problem”, Jc Beall and A. J. Cotnoir offer a gappy solution to the paradox of (unrestricted) omnipotence that is typified by the classic stone problem. Andrew Tedder and Guillermo Badia, however, have recently argued that this solution could not be extended to a more serious Curry-like version of the paradox. In this paper, we show that such a gappy solution does extend to it.

The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, (...) if these boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible. (shrink)

Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our beliefs and values with (...) our rational choices. The norms impose minimal constraints on deliberation and inquiry, but they also impose demands well beyond the capacities of deliberating agents. This major collection will be eagerly sought out by a wide range of philosophers in epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science, as well as economists, decision theorists, and statisticians. (shrink)

Covenant Theology brings together a number of perspectives on this important feature of Christian tradition from across the theological discipline. Based on four lectures delivered at the University of Liverpool, each address is followed by a response, allowing respected scholars of the field to engage in lively and public debate. The progression from Old Testament to New Testament, then to systematic theology and pastoral theology is intentional, as readers are encouraged to view theology as an integrative discipline rather than (...) a series of fragmented specialisms with little or no relation to one another. With contributions from Stephen Clark, James Dunn, Gary Badcock, and Robin Gill, this academic book combines fresh insights with more traditional approaches and makes for an informed and interesting read. · Lively public debate from key scholars responding to each point. · Discussions from the full length of the Bible. · Practical in its application. · Wide view of theological debate. · Links theology to other disciplines. · Encourages everyone to join the debate. (shrink)

It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’, and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. ‘Almighty’ is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; ‘omnipotent’ is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. ‘Almighty’ derives by way of Latin ‘omnipotens’ from the Greek word ‘ pantokratōr ’; and both this (...) Greek word, like the more classical ‘ pankratēs ’, and ‘almighty’ itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word ‘omnipotent’ would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word ‘omnipotens’ also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of ‘ pantocratōr ’. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word ‘almighty’ to express God's power over all things, and I shall take ‘omnipotence’ to mean ability to do everything. (shrink)

Beall and Cotnoir (2017) argue that theists may accept the claim that God's omnipotence is fully unrestricted if they also adopt a suitable nonclassical logic. Their primary focus is on the infamous Stone problem (i.e., whether God can create a stone too heavy for God to lift). We show how unrestricted omnipotence generates Curry‐like paradoxes. The upshot is that Beall and Cotnoir only provide a solution to one version of the Stone problem, but that unrestricted omnipotence generates (...) other problems which they do not adequately address. (shrink)

In today's world two narrations are vital for understanding human bonds: the account of reciprocal recognition, the Covenant, as told in the book of Genesis, ...

Let’s call “Cartesian omnipotence” the view that an omnipotent being can bring about any state of affairs at all, even logically impossible ones. The present paper explores what can be said in support of CO. It turns out that several powerful and interesting arguments can be given in its defense, although in the end, along with the vast majority of philosophers of religion, I reject it.

An omnipotent being would be a being whose power was unlimited. The power of human beings is limited in two distinct ways: we are limited with respect to our freedom of will, and we are limited in our ability to execute what we have willed. These two distinct sources of limitation suggest a simple definition of omnipotence: an omnipotent being is one that has both perfect freedom of will and perfect efficacy of will. In this paper we further explicate (...) this definition and show that it escapes the standard objections to divine omnipotence. (shrink)

One of the cornerstones of western theology is the doctrine of divine omnipotence. God is traditionally conceived of as an omnipotent or all-powerful being. However, satisfactory analyses of omnipotence are notoriously elusive. In this paper, I first consider some simple attempts to analyze omnipotence, showing how each fails. I then consider two more sophisticated accounts of omnipotence. The first of these is presented by Edward Wierenga; the second by Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso. I argue that (...) both of these accounts fail. Finally, I propose and defend a novel account of omnipotence. (shrink)

It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’, and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. ‘Almighty’ is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; ‘omnipotent’ is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. ‘Almighty’ derives by way of Latin ‘omnipotens’ from the Greek word ‘pantokratōr’; and both this Greek word, (...) like the more classical ‘pankratēs’, and ‘almighty’ itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word ‘omnipotent’ would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word ‘omnipotens’ also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of ‘pantocratōr’. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word ‘almighty’ to express God's power over all things, and I shall take ‘omnipotence’ to mean ability to do everything. (shrink)

This book presents Hartshorne's philosophical theology briefly, simply, and vividly. Throughout the centuries some of the world's most brilliant philosophers and theologians have held and perpetuated six beliefs that give the word God a meaning untrue to its import in sacred writings or in active religious devotion: God is absolutely perfect and therefore unchangeable 2.omnipotenc 3.omniscienc 4.God's unsympathetic goodness, 5.immortality as a career after death, and 6.revelationble Charles Hartshorne deals with these six theological mistakes from the standpoint of his process (...) theology. Hartshorne says, "The book is unacademic in so far as I am capable of being that." Only a master like Hartshorne could present such sophisticated ideas so simply. This book offers an option for religious belief not heretofore available to lay people. (shrink)

In cases of depression where linguistic meaning has collapsed, there is good reason to believe that a long-term strategy for recovery must include rehabilitating the depressive person's capacity for meaningful speech. This requires that the patient participate actively in interpreting her own pain. In this essay, I argue that medical diagnosis can tempt patients, particularly women, to circumvent this process of interpretation. To explain this danger, I draw on Julia Kristeva's clinical analyses of depression and recent studies on the correlation (...) between depression and self-silencing. (shrink)

If asked to define ‘omnipotence,’ the man on the street would probably say that it’s the ability to do anything. That’s about it, he’d think; nothing more needs be said. Philosophers are never so easily satisfied. They take it as matter of professional duty to find serious problems in important concepts, and to suggest that the concept be rejected or that solutions are at hand. This paper falls into the latter camp. Beginning with a relatively simple definition of ‘ (...) class='Hi'>omnipotence,’ increasingly complex definitions are proposed, problems are found with them, and newer, refined definitions are offered. In all, seven unsatisfactory definitions are examined before an adequate one is arrived at. Both traditional and new problems are addressed, and novel solutions are advanced. The definition argued to be adequate is itself novel, but also very much in keeping with our pre-reflective understanding of omnipotence. On the basis of the definition it’s concluded not only that an adequate definition of ‘omnipotence’ is possible, but that various problems alleged to attend attributing the notion to God can also be solved. (shrink)

In dialogue with Jürgen Habermas's communicative ethics, Covenant and Communication constructively explores a covenantal-communicative model of Christian ethics. Author Hak Joon Lee analyzes themes of freedom, equality, and reciprocity in Habermas's theory of communication from the perspective of the Reformed Christian doctrines of covenant and the Trinity.

Can an omnipotent being create a stone too heavy for him to lift? If not, he is not omnipotent. But if so, he is not omnipotent either, since there is something he cannot lift. Hence there can be no omnipotent being. J.L. Cowan's recent reformulation of this paradox of omnipotence has been sharpened through a number of objections and clarifications, and, in its final form, constitutes a significant problem for the analysis of the concept of an omnipotent agent. I (...) will develop fragments of two systems in which the problem can be defined more exactly, and try to indicate some formal guidelines within which constructive steps towards a solution may be possible. I will argue that the paradox shows the need for a special kind of restriction on omnipotence that can be distinguished from some related restrictions. (shrink)

Rejecting the distinction Levinas asserted between Judaism and philosophy, this book reads his philosophical works, "Totality and Infinity" and "Otherwise than ...

In Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Michael Martin argues that to posit a God that is both omnipotent and omniscient is philosophically incoherent. I challenge this argument by proposing that a God who is necessarily omniscient is more powerful than a God who is contingently omniscient. I then argue that being omnipotent entails being omniscient by showing that for an all-powerful being to be all-powerful in any meaningful way, it must possess complete knowledge about all states of affairs and thus must (...) be understood to be omniscient. (shrink)

In response to an earlier paper of mine, T. J. Mawson has argued that omnipotence is logically incompatible with wrong-doing, ‘whilst accepting that there is “a genuine, active power knowingly to choose evil” and thus leaving room for a free-will defence to the problem of evil’. Here, I attempt to show that Mawson is mistaken on both counts – that his argument for the incompatibility of omnipotence and wrong-doing is defective, and that the free-will defence cannot be sustained (...) on the ground marked out by him. Given Mawson's understanding of power and freedom, I argue that it would be possible for God to create persons who are both free and unable to make evil choices. (shrink)

The biblical metaphor of covenant sets the primary issue of pastoral care, namely, grounding in another vis-á-vis self-groundedness.

CAN A COHERENT ACCOUNT BE PROVIDED OF WHAT IT IS FOR A BEING TO BE OMNIPOTENT, WHICH BRINGS OUT WHAT THEISTS HAVE WANTED TO SAY WHEN THEY CLAIM THAT GOD IS OMNIPOTENT? IT IS ARGUED THAT IT CAN. A BEING S IS SAID TO BE OMNIPOTENT AT A TIME T IF FOR ANY LOGICALLY CONTINGENT STATE OF AFFAIRS X AFTER T, SUCH THAT THE OCCURRENCE OF X AFTER T DOES NOT ENTAIL THAT S DID NOT BRING ABOUT X AT T, (...) S IS ABLE AT T TO BRING ABOUT X. THIS ACCOUNT IS IMMUNE TO DIFFICULTIES SUCH AS THOSE OFFERED BY THE PARADOX OF THE STONE. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the supposition of divine omnipotence entails a contradiction: omnipotence both must and must not be intrinsic to God. Hence, traditional theism must be rejected. To begin, I separate out some theoretical distinctions needed to inform the discussion. I then advance two different arguments for the conclusion that omnipotence must be intrinsic to God; these utilise the notions of essence and aseity. Next, I argue that some necessary conditions on being omnipotent are (...) extrinsic, and that this means omnipotence cannot be intrinsic to God. I consider three different ways of resolving this conflict, but contend that each is unsuccessful. Before concluding, I explain why the type of strategy used to resolve the traditional paradoxes of omnipotence cannot be successfully employed against the paradox presented here. (shrink)

The classical paradox of the stone, namely, whether an omnipotent being can create a stone that the being itself cannot lift is traditionally circumvented by a response propounded by Thomas Aquinas, that even omnipotent beings cannot accomplish the logically impossible. However, in their paper “The New Paradox of the Stone,” Alfred R. Mele and M.P. Smith attempt to reinstate the paradox without falling foul of the Thomistic logical constraint. According to Mele and Smith, instead of interpreting the paradox as posing (...) a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings—represented by God at two different times—the paradox can be reformulated as posing a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to probe the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings in view of the theological arguments for the “unicity of the omnipotent.”. (shrink)

The classical paradox of the stone, namely, whether an omnipotent being can create a stone that the being itself cannot lift is traditionally circumvented by a response propounded by Thomas Aquinas, that even omnipotent beings cannot accomplish the logically impossible. However, in their paper “The New Paradox of the Stone,” Alfred R. Mele and M.P. Smith attempt to reinstate the paradox without falling foul of the Thomistic logical constraint. According to Mele and Smith, instead of interpreting the paradox as posing (...) a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings—represented by God at two different times—the paradox can be reformulated as posing a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to probe the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings in view of the theological arguments for the “unicity of the omnipotent.”. (shrink)

The doctrine that God is omnipotent takes its rise from Scriptural texts which concern two linked topics. One is how much power God has to put behind actions: enough that nothing is too hard, enough to do whatever he pleases. The other is how much God can do: ‘all things’. The link is obvious: we measure strength by what tasks it is adequate to perform, and God is so strong he can do all things. The Christian philosophical theologian who seeks (...) to explicate omnipotence seeks a convincing account of the reality beneath the ‘phenomena’ of Scripture. This article looks briefly at some historic accounts of omnipotence. It emerges that the early history of the concept emphasized strength more than range of action, with range coming to prominence in Aquinas's day. Three recent attempts to define omnipotence are then considered. All are found wanting, but the author draws morals that help him hazard his own definition. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What Omnipotence Signifies The Riddle of the Stone Further Limitations on the Power of an Omnipotent Agent Are Divine Omnipotence and Moral Perfection Compatible? Works cited.

This chapter contains section titled: Maximal Power and the Uniqueness of God What an Omnipotent Agent Can Do The Analysis of Omnipotence Divine Omnibenevolence, Omnipotence, and Freedom.

Omnipotence is the property of being all-powerful; it is one of the traditional divine attributes in Western conceptions of God. This notion of an all-powerful being is often claimed to be incoherent because a being who has the power to do anything would, for instance, have the power to draw a round square. However, it is absurd to suppose that any being, no matter how powerful, could draw a round square. A common response to this objection is to assert (...) that defenders of divine omnipotence never intended to claim that God could bring about logical absurdities. This observation about what is not meant by omnipotence does little, however, to clarify just what is meant by that term. Philosophers have therefore attempted to state necessary and sufficient conditions for omnipotence. (shrink)

Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyse omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.

Can God be both omnipotent and essentially good? Working with the Anselmian conception of God as the greatest possible being, a number of philosophers have tried to show that omnipotence should be understood in such a way that these properties are compatible. In the present paper, I argue that we can, without inconsistency or other obvious absurdity, conceive of a being more powerful than the Anselmian God. I conclude that contemporary Anselmian philosophers have conflated two logically distinct questions: (1) (...) How much power would be possessed by the best possible God? and (2) How much power is required for omnipotence? When these questions are distinguished, it can be seen that the Anselmian God does not have maximal power and is not omnipotent. (shrink)